United States v. Tristan Grant
This text of United States v. Tristan Grant (United States v. Tristan Grant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-30071 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:19-cr-03-RRB-MMS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* TRISTAN JAMAL GRANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 20, 2024 Anchorage, Alaska Submission Withdrawn July 23, 2024 Resubmitted April 23, 2026
Before: BYBEE, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Tristan Grant appeals his convictions for sex trafficking and sexual
exploitation of minors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (2); 2251(a), (e); 1594(c), and for
being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1. Grant first challenges his convictions on due process grounds, arguing that
he was denied the right to trial by an impartial tribunal because the district court
prejudged his guilt. As evidence, he points to the judge’s statements that he had
begun work on his findings before the trial’s conclusion and to the minimal time it
took for the judge to produce those findings after trial ended. Because he did not
raise this objection before the district court, we review for plain error. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 52(b).
We conclude that there was no due process violation. Due process “entitles a
person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal.” Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 32 F.3d
1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242
(1980)). “As long as a judge is capable of refining his views” such that his mind is
not “‘irrevocably closed’ on the issues as they arise in the context of the specific
case,” the judge is impartial enough to satisfy the demands of due process. United
States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1476–77 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting S. Pac. Commc’ns
Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
Grant has not shown that the judge’s mind was irrevocably closed to his
arguments. Even if the judge began to draw conclusions during the trial—as drafting
findings of fact before the end of trial would suggest—nothing in the record indicates
that he would not have revised those conclusions had Grant presented credible
evidence to call the government’s case into question. A judge may form preliminary
2 yet revisable judgments prior to trial’s completion. See Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (stating that a judge’s “knowledge and the opinion it produced”
do not improperly bias a judge when they are “properly and necessarily acquired in
the course of the proceedings”). And nothing about the judge’s efficiency
undermined the integrity of the court so as to violate due process by the appearance
of partiality. Cf. Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he
adjudicator’s pecuniary or personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings may
create an appearance of partiality that violates due process . . . .” (first emphasis
added) (citation omitted)).
2. Next, Grant argues that the district court denied him the right to a jury trial
by accepting an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent waiver of that right. See
United States v. Ceja, 23 F.4th 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2022). Because Grant submitted
a written waiver to the court, we presume that his waiver was knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. United States v. Shorty, 741 F.3d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 2013). Grant
has not overcome that presumption. He repeatedly affirmed not only his
understanding of the nature of the right he was waiving but also his willingness to
do so in light of his circumstances. Those circumstances included the massive
disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic, which necessitated the general continuance
of criminal jury trials. When the district court advised Grant that jury trials had been
3 postponed and would likely continue to be postponed for the indefinite duration of
the public health crisis, Grant chose to proceed to a bench trial.
Grant emphasizes that when he made this choice, he was ignorant of a limited
exception allowing some jury trials to proceed under the district court’s general
orders. Without the opportunity to consider and request such an exception, Grant
argues that his waiver could not be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. But on the
record before us, there is every indication that Grant would still have opted for a
bench trial if it meant a swifter resolution of his case. In November 2020, Grant
stated his preference for a jury trial but also expressed willingness to accept a bench
trial out of a desire to “get this over with.” The district court explained the advantage
of a jury trial, and Grant expressed that he would prefer an earlier bench trial to a
later jury trial. As time wore on, Grant became increasingly impatient. When he
last inquired about the availability of jury trial, he told the district court that
“regardless . . . I want to do a bench trial.”
We conclude that Grant’s ignorance of the exception did not affect the
voluntariness of his waiver. He willingly chose the speedier bench trial and is now
bound by its results.
3. Grant’s contention that the district court violated his right to a speedy trial
also fails. He challenges the court’s decision to exclude the time between February
26 and July 22 of 2019 from the 70-day clock created by the Speedy Trial Act, 18
4 U.S.C. § 3161. But that exclusion was permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A),
whereby a judge may grant “such continuance on the basis of his findings that the
ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial.” The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of
factors the court “shall consider” in granting an ends-of-justice exclusion, including
whether the case’s complexity would preclude “adequate preparation . . . within the
time limits established.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(B). The district court cited the complexity
of Grant’s case and defense counsel’s need for additional preparation time as reasons
for excluding the relevant time period. Reviewing the court’s ends-of-justice
determination for clear error, we find no fault. See United States v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
United States v. Tristan Grant, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-tristan-grant-ca9-2026.