United States v. Toyota Motor Corp.

569 F. Supp. 1158, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5752, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16085
District Court, C.D. California·Decided June 21, 1983·No. CV 83-0687-CHH·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION TO ENFORCE IRS SUMMONS

CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a petition to enforce summonses issued by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to the Toyota Motor Corporation, a Japanese corporation (“Toyota Japan”), and its American sales subsidiary, Toyota Motor Sales, Inc. U.S.A. (“Toyota U.S.A.”). See 26 U.S.C. § 7604. The summonses contain 15 separate requests (see Appendix) for documents and records relating to the sale of Toyota vehicles in the United States and Japan for fiscal years 1975 through 1978, and were issued during the course of an IRS audit of Toyota U.S.A.’s tax liability for those years. The Court has previously determined that it has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the respondents, that venue is proper, and that service of the enforcement petition was properly effected on all parties. United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F.Supp. 354 (C.D.Cal.1983).

I. SERVICE OF SUMMONS

As a threshold matter, respondent Toyota Japan contends that it was never properly served with an IRS summons. Two IRS summonses are in issue here: the first is addressed to “TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A., INC., Mr. Isao Makino, President of Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. and department of Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., and Toyota Motor Sales Co., Ltd.”; and the second to “TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION and Mr. Isao Makino, Director of Toyota Motor Corporation.” Both summonses were personally delivered to Mr. Makino at his office in Torrance, California, where he serves as President of Toyota U.S.A. Mr. Makino also holds the position of Senior Managing Director of Toyota Japan.

Section 7603 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7603, provides that an IRS summons “shall be served ... by an attested copy delivered in hand to the person to whom it is directed ...” It is undisputed that the summons was served, in hand, to Mr. Makino. The Court is of the opinion that such delivery was sufficient to effect service upon Toyota Japan. As previously noted in this iitigation, Toyota U.S.A. may be considered a “managing agent” of Toyota Japan, as that term is used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(3). Service of the summons “in hand” upon an officer of the managing agent is therefore sufficient to effect service upon the foreign corporation. Moreover, because *1161 Mr. Makino serves as a “representative director” of Toyota Japan, he is empowered, under Japanese law, to perform “all judicial and extra-judicial acts relating to the business of the company.” Japanese Commercial Code, art. 78(1), quoted in Kitagawa, Doing Business in Japan, App. 5A (1982). Given this authority, service of the summons upon Mr. Makino was sufficient to effect service upon Toyota Japan.

II. COMPLIANCE TO DATE

Respondents contend that they have already provided the IRS with records responsive to a number of the items requested. Specifically, respondents have complied with the requests contained in items 1, 2, 6, 12B, 13, and 14. In addition, respondents assert that they have provided the IRS with all available information in response to Item 7. Petitioner does not contest any of these assertions; accordingly, the Court concludes that respondents have fully complied with these requests.

III. NON-EXISTENCE OF DOCUMENTS

Respondents also contend that the summonses call for, in part, the production of records that do not exist. With respect to items 3, 4, 8, 9, and 12A, respondent Toyota Japan asserts that it no longer maintains cost records on a model-by-model basis. According to the affidavits of respondent’s officers, the only cost records for fiscal years 1975 through 1978 still in existence are general ledger and subledger accounts. Because the detailed backup data and supporting records used to create these accounts were discarded in the normal course of business prior to issuance of the IRS summonses, Toyota Japan is unable to provide responsive documents. In addition, respondents state that they cannot comply with specifications 10 and 11, which seek documents describing the factors entering into the determination of transfer prices charged to Toyota U.S.A. by Toyota Japan. Although respondents admit that they possess materials relating to current transfer pricing policy, the documents relevant to fiscal years 1975 through 1978 were also discarded prior to the issuance of IRS summonses in 1982.

Respondents have properly raised this defense at this stage of the enforcement proceedings. United States v. Rylander, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983). This Court cannot compel the production of nonexistent documents. United States v. Asay, 614 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.1980). Because the petitioners have not provided any evidence to rebut the respondents’ assertions of impossibility, enforcement of the summonses is denied as to items 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12A.

IV. ITEM 15

Item 15 of the summonses requires the respondents to:

Provide all orders, directives, instructions, commands, and regulations issued to Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. by Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., and Toyota Motor Sales Co., Ltd. for each of the fiscal years 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978.

Section 7603 mandates that an IRS summons describe the documents to be produced “with reasonable certainty.” A request for all orders, directives, instructions, commands and regulations issued to the subsidiary by its parent corporations does not satisfy this statutory requirement. Item 15 does not describe the records requested with sufficient particularity to enable the respondents to identify which documents are sought. Furthermore, many of the documents encompassed within the scope of this request are irrelevant to the purpose of the IRS audit. Accordingly, this request may not be enforced as presently formulated. See, eg., United States v. Ladd, 471 F.Supp. 1150, 1157-58 (N.D.Texas 1979).

Although counsel for the petitioners acknowledged these deficiencies at oral argument, they have failed to suggest any suitable remedies. In their post-trial memorandum of May 5, 1983, petitioners proposed that Item 15 be narrowed to include only the production of orders and directives (1) dictating pricing policies and (2) relating to matters that “affect” pricing. In re *1162 sponse to this proposal, respondents contend that no orders or directives were ever received that fall within the first category. As for the second category, respondents argue that a subjective judgment would be required as to which documents in their possession might relate to a matter “affecting” the price at which Toyota U.S.A. purchased automobiles during the years in question. These arguments are well taken.

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United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5752, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16085 (C.D. Cal. 1983).

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