McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROGERS, J., joined. MERRITT, J. (pp. 569-75), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.
A grand jury indicted Thomas M. Thompson and six codefendants of various federal offenses related to a drug transaction that turned into an armed robbery. Thompson pleaded guilty to three criminal counts. He received 360 months of imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He also received a mandatory consecutive sentence of ten years’ imprisonment for the discharge of a firearm in connection with a drug transaction.
On appeal, Thompson raises several claims of error. He contends that the district court erred when it enhanced his sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) for assault on an official victim and for holding a leadership role in the crime. He also argues that the district court engaged in impermissible double-[559]*559counting when it used the same criminal activity to both enhance his Guidelines range and sentence him to the ten-year mandatory sentence. Finally, he argues that he should have received only a five-year sentence for carrying and possessing a firearm during a drug transaction, rather than the ten-year sentence for discharging a firearm.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of resentencing Thompson under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
I
On April 6, 2005, the Metro Nashville Police Department arranged with a confidential informant (the “Cl”) to purchase cocaine. The Cl proceeded to purchase small amounts of cocaine from several of Thompson’s co-defendants. Several days later, the Cl told police that he learned that Thompson wanted to purchase a large volume of cocaine. The Cl met with an undercover officer who was to pose as a dealer from Chicago in order to arrange a drug transaction with Thompson.
After several rounds of negotiation, the Cl and the undercover officer met Thompson in a hotel room to finalize the sale. Police had the room under video surveillance. Thompson was shown a bag containing twenty kilograms of cocaine wrapped in smaller packages. After inspecting the cocaine, Thompson left the room, ostensibly to get more money to complete the sale. He returned with the money and was accompanied by co-defendant Kenneth Jones.
Thompson and Jones turned the drug sale into an armed robbery. Both Jones and Thompson drew semiautomatic pistols on the officer and the CL They ordered the two men to drop to the floor and not to move. Jones grabbed the bag of cocaine and money and the two fled from the hotel room.
The officers observing the drug transaction from the next room pursued Jones and Thompson down the hotel stairs, yelling, “Metro Police!” They wore jackets printed with “Police” on the sleeves and body. When one officer reached the bottom floor he noticed several kilograms of cocaine and money lying on the floor. As the officer turned the corner, Jones fired a shot in his direction. When the officer peered around the corner again, Jones fired another shot. An officer in the lobby observed Jones and Thompson running towards him. Jones fired a third shot at the officers, missing one by just a few inches. Jones and Thompson tried to hide in a vending machine area, but the police ordered them to come out and surrender, which they eventually did. The officers recovered a Ruger semi-automatic pistol and a Glock semi-automatic pistol from the top of a vending machine.
A grand jury indicted Thompson, Jones, and five other co-defendants on drug and weapons charges. Thompson was named in three of the five counts: Count One charged Thompson and five others with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; Count Two charged Thompson with possession of a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and Count Four charged Thompson with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Thompson eventually pleaded guilty to all three counts.
The probation office prepared a presen-[560]*560tence report (“PSR”).1 Beginning with a base-offense level of thirty four under the Guidelines, the office recommended a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(l) for assaulting a law-enforcement officer during the course of an offense or flight therefrom, a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a) for a leadership role in the conspiracy, and a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G § 3El.l(a) for acceptance of responsibility. With an adjusted base-offense level of 42 and a criminal-history category of V, the office recommended a sentencing range under the Guidelines of 360 months’ to life imprisonment for Counts 1 and 2. On Count 4, the office recommended that Thompson receive a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. Thompson objected to the PSR.
The district court held a sentencing hearing. After receiving testimony from several of the officers at the scene and after hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court sentenced Thompson to 360 months of imprisonment each on Counts One and Two, to be served concurrently, and 120 months on Count Four, to be served consecutively.
Thompson timely appealed his sentence.
II
A. Sentencing
A district court and an appellate court have different roles in federal sentencing. The district court must consider the relevant sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Pursuant to the so-called parsimony provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a district court must “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of § 3553(a)(2). Section 3553(a)(2) provides that the district court must consider “the need for the sentence imposed”:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.]
While the district court need not explicitly reference each of the sentencing factors of § 3553(a), “there must be sufficient evidence in the record to affirmatively demonstrate the court’s consideration of [these factors].” United States v. Jones, 445 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cm.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 251, 166 L.Ed.2d 197 (2006).
The appellate court, in contrast, reviews the defendant’s sentence for “reasonableness” under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).
B. The Advisory Guidelines
1. In General
One of the sentencing factors that the district court must consider is the applicable Guidelines range. United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir.2006), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 3065, 168 L.Ed.2d 758 (2007). Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) requires that the district court consider “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—(A) the applicable category [561]*561of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines — (i) issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Supreme Court explained in Gall that the Guidelines are the “starting point and the initial benchmark” for federal sentencing. 128 S.Ct. at 596.
When considering the Guidelines, the district court must calculate the correct sentencing range. Id.; Gale, 468 F.3d at 934. In practice, this means that the court must begin at the proper base-offense level, apply any applicable enhancements or reductions to arrive at the adjusted-offense level, and use the resulting offense level with the appropriate criminal-history category to arrive at a sentencing range. This is what the district court did in the recent Supreme Court case of Kimbrough v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007). The district court began with a base-offense level of 32 and a criminal history of II for Kimbrough. Id. at 565. The district court then found that Kimbrough had testified falsely at his codefendant’s trial and added 2 levels, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 34. Id. The Supreme Court favorably noted that the district court “began by properly calculating and considering the advisory Guidelines range.” Id. at 575. Using the Guidelines range (as adjusted with any judge-found facts) as the applicable Guidelines range for purposes of § 3553(a)(4) has been the consistent practice of this court. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 503 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir.2007) (applying a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence where the Guidelines calculation was enhanced based on judge-found facts and the resulting sentence would have been outside a non-enhanced Guidelines range); United States v. Cook, 453 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that “Booker ... has no bearing on advisory guideline calculations”); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court’s fact-finding with respect to an obstruction of justice enhancement did not violate the Sixth Amendment and stating that “Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 129, 166 L.Ed.2d 35 (2006); cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 257-58, 125 S.Ct. 738 (expressly rejecting the dissent’s approach that would have left a sentencing judge free “to consider facts or circumstances not found by a jury or admitted in a plea agreement for the purpose of adjusting a base-offense level down, but not up, within the applicable guidelines range”). When engaging in this fact-finding, district courts employ the “same preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that governed prior to Booker.” United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir.2006).
Once the district court has calculated the appropriate Guidelines range, it then considers that range in light of the other relevant § 3553(a) factors in fashioning the sentence. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir.2006). We accord a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence that lies within the advisory Guidelines range. Gale, 468 F.3d at 937; see Rita v. United States, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (permitting circuit courts to apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence).
2. Guidelines Enhancement for Assault on an Official Victim
Thompson first contends that the district court erred by enhancing his offense level under U.S. S.G. § 3A1.2 for assaulting an officer. He argues that he did not know that the purported “drug dealer” in the hotel room was actually an undercover officer. He also argues that the [562]*562district court found that only Jones fired on the officers who were in pursuit of the two as they fled the hotel room.
We find no error by the district court. Section 3A1.2 provides in relevant part:
(c) If, in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, the defendant or a person for whose conduct the defendant is otherwise accountable—
(1) knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that a person was a law enforcement officer, assaulted such officer during the course of the offense or immediate flight therefrom;
increase [the offense level] by 6 levels. The district court made clear that the enhancement went to Thompson’s conduct after the robbery, not his conduct in the hotel room. Both Thompson and Jones brandished their firearms as they fled the room. The evidence presented during the sentencing hearing also confirmed that the two defendants were on sufficient notice that the pursuing officers were, in fact, police officers.
Even assuming arguendo that there was insufficient evidence that Thompson himself shot at the officers, there was sufficient evidence that “a person for whose conduct” Thompson was “otherwise accountable” created “a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” There is little dispute that Jones fired at the officers during the flight. In discussing Thompson’s leadership role in the conspiracy, the district court found that Thompson “was the man in charge” because: (a) “he was the man with whom the Cl negotiated to try to arrange to buy 20 kilograms of cocaine,” JA 133; (b) the “negotiations continued with Thompson,” id.; (c) “he was the man that was doing all the talking and wanted to see the cocaine,” id.; (d) “[h]e’s the one that went out and brought in Jones to try to complete the deal with his additional money,” JA 134; and (e) “[h]e was also giving directions to Jones, who attempted to turn left down the hall. And he directed him, no, to go right down the hall and down the stairs at the end of the hall,” id. Finding Thompson to be “the man in charge,” it was not unreasonable for the district court also to conclude that he should be held “accountable ... for the shots being fired by Jones.” JA 131. Under U.S. S.G. § 3A1.2(c), this was sufficient to apply the six-level enhancement.
3. Guidelines Enhancement for Leadership Role
Thompson also challenges the four-level increase he received for his leadership role in the conspiracy. The Guidelines call for a four-level enhancement if a defendant is an “organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a). Thompson argues that the evidence points to Jones, not Thompson, as the leader. The district court recognized that Jones also played a significant role in the conspiracy and robbery. More than one person can, however, hold a leadership role in the conspiracy for purposes of the Guidelines enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4 (“There can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.”). Given that Thompson negotiated the details of the drug sale, had the money, and checked the cocaine for quality, the district court properly concluded that he had a leadership role.
4. Double Counting
Thompson next alleges that the district court enhanced his Guidelines offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c) for the same activity it sentenced him under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). He ar[563]*563gues that by doing so, the district court punished him twice for the same criminal activity. “[T]he ‘established rule’ in this circuit is that ‘impermissible “double counting” occurs when precisely the same aspect of a defendant’s conduct factors into his sentence in two separate ways.’ ” United States v. Sabino, 307 F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 193 (6th Cir.1999)). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b) provides that if a defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the term of imprisonment is that required by the statute. Thus, the question is whether the same aspect of Thompson’s conduct factors into 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(iii) and U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 in two separate ways.
The district court did not engage in impermissible double counting. A key aspect of Thompson’s conduct that enhanced his Guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 — the fact that the people Jones was shooting at were police officers and not simply private citizens — is not a factor of the crime set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, this is not a case where “precisely the same aspect” of a defendant’s conduct impacted his sentence in two separate ways. United States v. Sloley, 19 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir.1994) (“By their terms, there is no inherent or necessary overlap between § 924(c)(1) and § 3A1.2(b) — indeed most § 924(c) violations do not involve an ‘official victim.’ The mere fact that the drug trafficker in this particular case used a law enforcement officer’s gun against the officer should not preclude a court from applying both the firearm statute and the ‘official victim’ adjustment.”); cf. United States v. Cousins, 469 F.3d 572, 575 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding the district court’s enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 even though the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 871(a) and 879(a)(2) for threatening the President of the United States and his family). Accordingly, we reject Thompson’s claim that the district court erred by applying the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2.
C. Mandatory Sentence Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)
In his final argument, Thompson asserts that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment because the discharge-of-a-firearm enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(iii) was not pled in the indictment or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Had the district court sentenced him under subparagraph (i) for use and carry of a firearm, rather than (iii) for the discharge of one, he would have been subject only to a five-year, rather than ten-year, mandatory minimum sentence.
Although we reject Thompson’s Appren-di-based argument, we do conclude that the district court committed reversible error by applying subparagraph (iii) to Thompson under the specific language of the indictment.
1. Harris v. United States
Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which [564]*564the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
Thompson’s Apprendi argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002). In Harris, the Court held that subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) were sentencing factors that may be found by a preponderance of the evidence by a judge, rather than elements of the crime that must be found by a jury under the higher standard. Id. at 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406. The petitioner in Harris had argued that the Court’s decision in Apprendi conflicted with its earlier decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). In Apprendi, the Court explained, “[O]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. However, fourteen years earlier, the Court in McMillan “had declined to adopt a more restrictive constitutional rule. McMillan sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, when the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had possessed a firearm.” Harris, 536 U.S. at 550, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (discussing McMillan). The two earlier decisions could be reconciled, according to the Court:
... McMillan and Apprendi are consistent because there is a fundamental distinction between the factual findings that were at issue in those two cases. Apprendi said that any fact extending the defendant’s sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict would have been considered an element of an aggravated crime—and thus the domain of the jury—by those who framed the Bill of Rights. The same cannot be said of a fact increasing the mandatory minimum (but not extending the sentence beyond the statutory maximum), for the jury’s verdict has authorized the judge to impose the minimum with or without the finding. As McMillan recognized, a statute may reserve this type of factual finding for the judge without violating the Constitution.
Id. at 557, 122 S.Ct. 2406.
Blakely, in turn, applied the holding of Apprendi in reviewing a state judge’s enhancement of a defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum. 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Supreme Court distinguished McMillan, explaining that the decision was not on-point because it “involved a sentencing scheme that imposed a statutory minimum if a judge found a particular fact.” Id. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citing Harris in support). Pointedly, Blakely did not reverse either McMillan or Harris. Likewise, when presented with a similar question in Booker, the Court did not overturn or otherwise comment negatively about the continuing vitality of McMillan or Harris.
Prior panels of this court have recognized that Harris is still controlling, even post-Blakely and Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 630, 643 (6th [565]*565Cir.2007) (“The application of this mandatory minimum [of five years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) ] creates no Appren-di problem, moreover, because five years does not exceed the statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment that can be imposed ... under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).” (citing United States v. Wade, 318 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that Harris confined the constitutional requirements of Apprendi to factors that increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum))); United States v. Bowen, 194 Fed.Appx. 393, 404 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that the court could “see no reason to hold Harris has been implicitly overruled by Booker and Blakely”). Other courts have similarly recognized the vitality of Harris. United States v. Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 449 (3d Cir.2006) (“Harris remains binding law in the wake of the Booker decision.”); United States v. Estrada, 428 F.3d 387, 391 (2d Cir.2005) (“[W]e are bound by the Supreme Court’s rulings in Almendarez-Torres and Harris.”); United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.2005) (“We cannot question Harris’ authority as binding precedent.”); United States v. Jones, 418 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir.2005) (“Under Harris, which the Supreme Court did not disturb in Booker, imposition of the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for violation of 924(c) (1) (A) (iii) did not violate the Sixth Amendment.”). While Thompson asks us, in effect, to find that Harris has been implicitly overruled by Blakely and Booker, we do not have the authority to do that. Williams, 464 F.3d at 449 (citing cases); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (reaffirming the rule that “[i]f a precedent of [the] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”). Accordingly, we deny Thompson’s Apprendi challenge.
2. Exceeding the Scope of the Indictment
Yet, while we find no error under Apprendi, we do conclude that the district court erred in applying subparagraph (iii) under the particular language of the indictment. Courts have long understood that a criminal indictment holds a central place under the U.S. Constitution. It
protects three constitutional due process rights, namely: the Sixth Amendment’s right to fair notice of the criminal charges against which one will need to defend; and the Fifth Amendment’s dual protections against twice placing a defendant in jeopardy for the same offense, and holding the defendant to answer for crimes not presented to or indicted by a grand jury. United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 935 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.1975)). The grand jury is vested with the exclusive authority of setting the criminal charges in an indictment.
The grand jury charged both Thompson and Jones with violating § 924(c)(1)(A). Specifically, the indictment reads in relevant part:
COUNT THREE
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES:
On or about April 26, 2005, in the Middle District of Tennessee, KENNETH L. JONES, knowingly used, carried, and discharged a firearm, to-wit: a Glock, Model 21, .45 caliber, semi-automatic pistol, during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime for which he may [566]*566be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to-wit: a violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 841(a)(1).
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.
COUNT FOUR
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES:
On or about April 26, 2005, in the Middle District of Tennessee, THOMAS M. THOMPSON, knowingly used and carried a firearm, to-wit: a Ruger, Model P94, .40 caliber, semi-automatic pistol, during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to-wit: a violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 841(a)(1).
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.
By the terms of Count 4, the grand jury charged Thompson with using and carrying the Ruger during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and aiding and abetting the same under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Though evidence during the sentencing hearing did not establish that the Ruger was discharged during the course of the drug trafficking crime, the district court sentenced Thompson to the 10-year mandatory minimum under § 924(c)(l)(A)(iii) based on evidence that Jones had discharged the Glock.
We recognize that, as a general matter, Thompson may indeed be held liable for Jones’ conduct. As the Government points out, aiding and abetting liability is available under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and Pinkerton liability is available for co-conspirators. Nevertheless, the question here is not whether Thompson may be held liable for Jones’ actions generally, but rather whether, under the specific language of § 924(c) and the indictment, the district court appropriately sentenced Thompson to the 10-year mandatory minimum.
There are two fundamental problems with the district court’s sentence. First, by the terms of the indictment, the grand jury charged Thompson with using and carrying “a Ruger” in connection with drug trafficking, and aiding and abetting the same under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Under a plain reading of the indictment, the Ruger, being “a firearm” for purposes of § 924(c)(1)(A), would be “the firearm” for purposes of Thompson’s sentence. Second, the indictment charged Thompson not only with respect to a particular make and model of firearm, it also charged him with respect to specific criminal activity— “us[ing] and carr[ying]” a firearm. In contrast, it charged his co-defendant with “us[ing], carrfying], and dischargpng]” a firearm. Thus, the indictment not only failed to provide Thompson notice that the Glock could serve as “the firearm” for purposes of the § 924(c)(1)(A) enhancements, it also failed to put him on notice that he could be held responsible for the discharge of a firearm.2
[567]*567Had the grand jury expressly incorporated Count 3 into Count 4, then Thompson would have had clear notice that by pleading guilty to Count 4, including the reference to the aiding and abetting statute, he was also potentially liable for the actions of his co-defendant spelled out in Count 3. Alternatively, the grand jury could have dispensed with listing any of the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) in either Count 3 or 4 — i.e., it could have omitted any references to the particular make and model of firearm or the term “discharge” in Count 3, and simply referred to § 924(c)(1)(A) in both counts. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (“An indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges. But it need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime.”); United States v. Perez-Olalde, 328 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir.2003) (explaining that sentencing factors need not be included in the grand-jury indictment); Buckley v. Butler, 825 F.2d 895, 903 (5th Cir.1987) (“[Tjhere is no Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment on the sentencing facts.”).
Instead, by charging Jones specifically with using, carrying and discharging a Glock and charging Thompson only with using and carrying a Huger, the grand jury narrowed the indictment vis-a-vis Thompson in a material way. Cf. United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 379-81 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that the Government’s decision to limit indictment to a particular weapon constituted a material narrowing of indictment); see also United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 901-04 (10th Cir.2006) (same). Because the indictment did not give Thompson fair notice that he could be held responsible for discharge of the Glock, the district court impermissibly exceeded the scope of the indictment at the sentencing stage. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate Thompson’s ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(iii).
We note for clarification that our holding today does not limit the district court on remand to consider only whether Thompson should receive a mandatory minimum of five years under § 924(c) (1) (A) (i). Subparagraph (ii) of that section provides a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for “brandishing” a firearm. Neither Count 3 nor Count 4 specifically reference brandishing or sub-paragraph (ii). As the grand jury did not narrow the indictment with respect to brandishing as it did with respect to discharging, the district court is free to consider whether Thompson should receive a sentence for brandishing the Ruger.
Ill
Finally, we briefly respond to a few of the dissent’s comments. The dissent proposes a “Golden Mean” to guide sentencing courts based in part on the principle that all judicial factfinding must be eschewed unless either the factfinding results in a sentence somewhere within the initial base-offense level under the Guidelines or the district court explicitly explains why the concepts of general and individual deterrence outweigh the mitigating circumstances and the likelihood of successful rehabilitation. Dis. op. at 571. In order to adopt this Golden Mean, however, courts would first have to don the [568]*568crowns of philosopher-kings — for that is the only way that any court in this circuit could avoid the clear import, reasoning and holding of binding precedent.
As explained above, both the Supreme Court and this court have consistently treated adjusted Guidelines ranges as the applicable ranges for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). See supra § II.B.l. Adjustments to the base-offense level routinely depend upon facts found by sentencing judges by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court has sanctioned judicial factfinding, even factfinding that enhances rather than reduces a defendant’s sentence, so long as the factfinding does not result in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. See supra § II.B.1. Had the Supreme Court meant, instead, that the applicable Guidelines range really should be the base-offense level, unadjusted by any judicial factfinding, one would have expected that it would have clarified and expounded upon such a seismic shift in how the Guidelines are calculated.3 In fact, if the dissent’s position were sound, one wonders why the Supreme Court did not excise much of the Guidelines when it excised portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and § 3742 in Booker.
The dissent’s position also conflicts with the underlying theory of the Supreme Court’s recent Rita decision. The theory of Rita is that the Guidelines do take the sentencing factors of § 3553 into account, and when the district court independently takes those factors into account, and reaches a consistent result, a court of appeals may presume that the district court has properly weighed the sentencing factors. See Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2463. The theory only makes sense if the Guidelines are applied as they were contemplated to apply — by taking into account enhancements provided for by the Guidelines. There is simply no basis to contend that the Sentencing Commission ever contemplated sentencing without taking into account enhancements provided for by the Guidelines.
As to the couple of points that the dissent makes about this particular case, the dissent’s analysis rings hollow. Leaving aside whether engaging in a conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine is a “victimless” crime, Dis. op. at 569, part of Thompson’s sentence was based on his being a felon in possession of a firearm and using and carrying the firearm during the drug transaction. As the district court found based on police testimony and video surveillance, Thompson’s “use” of the firearm included pointing it at the Cl and the undercover police officer. Thompson’s illegal activities were hardly “victimless.”
Finally, the district court did not engage in a “rote sentencing” of Thompson, the dissent’s characterization to the contrary notwithstanding. Dis. op. at 574-75. The district court held a sentencing hear[569]*569ing for Thompson and one of his co-defendants. The court heard testimony from three eye witnesses. The transcript of the hearing runs over 100 pages. A review of the transcript confirms that the district court addressed each of Thompson’s objections. It also confirms that the court considered the relevant sentencing factors and provided a reasoned explanation for the sentence. Accordingly, apart from the district court’s error in exceeding the indictment on the § 924(c)(1)(A) charge, we find no other abuse of discretion in its sentencing of Thompson.
IV
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART Thompson’s sentence. We REMAND the case to the district court for the limited purpose of resentenc-ing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) consistent with this opinion.