United States v. Thomas Ralph Farese

612 F.2d 1376
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·Decided April 17, 1980·No. 79-2113·Published·Cited by 22 cases

Opinion

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:

The sole issue on this appeal is whether there was probable cause for a state judge to issue a warrant authorizing the police to place a concealed transmitter in the offices of the defendant, Thomas Farese. The district judge accepted the recommendation of the magistrate, made after an evidentiary hearing, and granted Farese’s motion to suppress the evidence gained from the listening device. The district judge found, based on the magistrate’s recommendation, that certain statements in the policeman’s affidavit submitted to the state judge were made with reckless disregard for their truth. He held that there was not probable cause to grant the warrant absent those portions of the affidavit. We act on the premise that his factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and we have, therefore, in accordance with the teachings of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 158, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2678, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), considered the affidavit after excising those portions that he found to have been included with reckless disregard for their truth. We conclude that the affidavit as thus purged is sufficient to support the state judge’s finding of probable cause, see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1512, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 726 (1964), and we, therefore, reverse the judgment suppressing the evidence obtained.

If the issuance of a warrant is based solely upon information gained from an informant, the affidavit must contain (a) “some of the underlying circumstances” from which the informant drew the conclusions he presented to the police officer and (b) “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable’. Otherwise, ‘the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint’ will be drawn not ‘by a neutral and detached magistrate,’ as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime’ . . Id. at 114 15, 84 S.Ct. at 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d at 729 (footnote omitted).

The affidavit, the full text of which, as expurgated, is attached, was executed by Detective Olivieri of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department. Much of it was based upon information provided by a confidential informant, known by the pseudonym “Jason.” It manifestly disclosed enough of the underlying circumstances from which Jason concluded that Farese was operating a drug-smuggling operation from his office to allow the state judge to infer that Jason’s conclusion was correct. Jason provided a wealth of detail concerning Farese’s smuggling operation, including where the drugs were entering the United States (Port Everglades), the names of the freighters used to bring them to this country (the Carib Express and the Halcyon Star), and how they were distributed locally (in white trucks belonging to Al’s Delivery Service). He also related activity that, while not criminal in itself, would be unusual in an office handling Farese’s nominal business (contract shipping) and could be considered part of a pattern of behavior commonly associated with drug smuggling: the maintenance of elaborate secrecy concerning the contents of and transactions in Farese’s office; the movement into and out of the office of large sums of cash; the presence of a telex teletype and a ship-to-shore radio in an office whose nominal business would not require them; and the frequenting of the office by persons whose appearance and behavior was unlike that of people with whom Farese could be expected to have dealings in the normal course of his nominal business. These people generally refused to give their true names, instead representing themselves as “The Sheik” or “The *1378 Prince.” 1 “A magistrate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way.” Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 644 (1969) (footnote omitted).

Furthermore, the state judge in this case did not have to rely solely on the amount of factual detail to support the inference that Jason came by his information in a reliable way; Jason directly stated how he obtained some of it. Specifically, Jason’s claim that the marijuana was being distributed locally in white trucks belonging to Al’s Delivery Service was based on his personal observation 2 of marijuana residue in the back of one of those trucks, which was loaned to him by Farese. Many of Jason’s other allegations were based on what his girlfriend, who was Farese’s secretary, told him. She of course would have ample opportunity to observe the suspicious activity around Farese’s office.

This case is, therefore, very different from Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), where the Court held that there was a lack of probable cause in part because “if the informant came by the information indirectly, he did not explain why his sources were reliable,” id. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589, 21 L.Ed.2d at 643-644. It is clear enough why Jason’s information from his girlfriend could be considered reliable. The mass of detail Jason furnished, together with his indications of how he learned those details, provided an ample basis from which the state judge could conclude that Jason was “relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual’s general reputation,” id.

The second of the Aguilar requirements, that the affidavit disclose some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or his information reliable, is likewise satisfied. There is sufficient evidence in Jason’s own story on the basis of which the state judge could credit Olivieri’s conclusion that Jason was a reliable iñformant. 3 In telling Olivieri that he was a former narcotics salesman who had sold a great deal of marijuana, Jason made an admission against interest. As the Supreme Court has said, “[ajdmissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility — sufficiently at least to support a finding of probable cause to search.” United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 734 (1971).

*1379 We do not, however, need to rest our holding solely upon what Olivieri in the affidavit related he had learned from Jason. He recited other facts in the affidavit that corroborated Jason’s story. Farese’s secretary talked to Olivieri, corroborated what Jason had said about the suspicious activity in Farese’s office, and provided further details about that activity; 4

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

United States v. Thomas Ralph Farese, 612 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1980).

612 F.2d 1376 (United States v. Thomas Ralph Farese) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Brown v. Benefield
757 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (M.D. Alabama, 2010)
Daniels v. CITY OF HARTFORD, ALA.
645 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (M.D. Alabama, 2009)
United States v. Johnson
558 F. Supp. 2d 807 (E.D. Tennessee, 2008)
United States v. Spells
215 F. App'x 378 (Fifth Circuit, 2007)
United States v. Willie James Robinson, Jr.
202 F. App'x 434 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Dixon, L. C.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006
Dixon v. State
206 S.W.3d 613 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006)
United States v. Leon Morgan Roland
133 F. App'x 660 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
United States v. Brundidge
170 F.3d 1350 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Bradford Satterwhite, III
980 F.2d 317 (Fifth Circuit, 1992)
U.S. v. Satterwhite
Fifth Circuit, 1992
United States v. Burke
490 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. Florida, 1980)
United States v. Farese
616 F.2d 568 (Fifth Circuit, 1980)
United States v. John Martin
615 F.2d 318 (Fifth Circuit, 1980)