United States v. Thind

261 U.S. 204, 43 S. Ct. 338, 67 L. Ed. 616, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2544
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 19, 1923
Docket202
StatusPublished
Cited by57 cases

This text of 261 U.S. 204 (United States v. Thind) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 43 S. Ct. 338, 67 L. Ed. 616, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2544 (1923).

Opinion

*206 MR. Justice Sutherland

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause is here upon a certificate from the Circuit Court qf Appeals, requesting the instruction of this Court in respect of the following questions:

“1. Is a'high caste Hindu of full Indian blood, born at Amrit Sar, Punjab, India, a white person within the meaning of section 2169, Revised Statutes?
*207 2. Does the act of February 5, 1917, (39 Stat. L. 875, section 3) disqualify from naturalization as citizens those Hindus, now barred by that act, who had lawfully entered the United States prior to the passage of said act? ”

The appellee was granted a certificate of citizenship by the District Court of the United States for the District of Oregon, over the objection of the naturalization examiner for the United States. A bill in equity was then filed by the United States, seeking a cancellation of the certificate on the ground that the appellee was not a white person and therefore not lawfully entitled to naturalization. The District Court, on motion, dismissed the bill (268 Fed. 683) and an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals. No question is made in respect of the individual qualifications of the appellee. The sole question is whether he falls within the class designated by Congress as eligible.

Section 2169, Revised Statutes, provides that the provisions of the Naturalization Act “ shall apply to aliens, being free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”

If the applicant is a white person within the meaning of this section he is entitled to naturalization; otherwise not. In Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, we had occasion to consider the application of these words to the case of a cultivated Japanese and were constrained to hold that he was not within' their meaning. As there pointed out, the provision is not that any particular class of persons shall be excluded, but it is, in effect, that only white persons shall be included within the privilege of the statute. “ The intention was to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it to all who could not be so classified. It is not enough to say that the framers did not have in mind the brown or yellow races of Asia. It is necessary to go farther and be able to say that had these particular *208 races been suggested the language of the act would have been so varied as to include them within its privileges,” (p. 195) citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 644. Following a long line of decisions of the lower federal courts, we held that the words imported a racial and not an individual test and were meant to indicate only-persons. of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race. But, as there pointed out, the conclusion that the phrase “ white persons ” and the word “ Caucasian ” are synonymous does not end the matter. It enabled us to dispose of the problem as it was there presented, since the applicant for citizenship clearly fell outside the zone of debatable ground on the negative side; but the decision still left the question to be dealt with, in doubtful and different cases; by the “ process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.” Mere ability on the part of an applicant for naturalization to establish a line of descent from a Caucasian ancestor will not ipso facto and necessarily conclude the inquiry. • Caucasian ” is a conventional word of much flexibility, as a study of the literature dealing with racial questions will disclose, and while it and the words “ white persons ” are treated as synonymous for the purposes of that case, they are not of identical meaning— idem per idem.

In the endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the statute we must not fail to keep in mind that it does not employ the word “ Caucasian ” but the words “ white persons,” and these are words of common speech and not of scientific origin. The word Caucasian ” not only was not employed in the law but was probably wholly unfamiliar to the original framers of the statute in 1790. When we employ it we do so as an aid to the ascertainment of the legislative intent and not as an invariable substitute for the statutory words. Indeed, as used in the science of ethnology, the connotation of the word is by no means clear and the use of it in its scientific sense as an equiva *209 lent for the words of the statute, other considerations aside, would simply mean the substitution of one perplexity for another. But in this country, during the last half century especially, the word by common usage has acquired a popular meaning, not clearly defined to be sure, but sufficiently so to enable us to say that its popular as distinguished from its scientific application is of appreciably narrower scope. It is in the popular sense of die word, therefore, that we employ it as an aid to the construction of the statute, for it would be obviously illogical to ■ convert words of common speech used in a statute into words of scientific terminology when neither the latter nor the science for whose purposes they were coined was within the, contemplation of the framers of the statute or of' the people for whom it was framed. The words of the statute are to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man from whose vocabulary they were taken. See Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251, 261.

They imply, as we have said, a racial test; but the term “ race is one which, for the practical purposes of the statute, must be applied to a group of living persons now possessing in common the requisite characteristics, not to groups of persons who are supposed to be or really are descended from some remote, common ancestor, but who, whether they both resemble him to a greater or less extent, have, at any rate, ceased altogether to resemble one another. It may be tr-ue' that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable and profound differences between them today; and it is not impossible, if that common ancestor could be materialized in the flesh, we should discover that he was himself sufficiently differentiated from both of his descendants to preclude his racial classification with either. The question for deter *210 mination is not, therefore, whether by the speculative processes of ethnological reasoning we may present a probability to the scientific mind that they have the same origin, but whether we can satisfy the common understanding that they are now the same or sufficiently the same to justify the interpreters of a statute — written in the words of common speech, for common understanding, by unscientific men — in classifying them together in the /statutory category as white persons.

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Bluebook (online)
261 U.S. 204, 43 S. Ct. 338, 67 L. Ed. 616, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-thind-scotus-1923.