HALL, District Judge.
The facts1 and applicable laws being still fresh in everyone’s mind from the argument makes it superfluous to review them in these comments. Nor will the [853]*853brevity of these comments permit any extended analysis of the law or various regulations. I will very briefly and informally state the grounds of my decision.
I think a writ should be granted. I do not believe that any Of the points which the government has raised are sufficient to show that this man did have due process. I believe he was denied due process. I think the action of the local board was arbitrary and capricious when it reversed its three previous determinations that he was not a resident of the United States. I do not think there was any evidence to support it.
I do not think the rules and regulations provide any norm or standard by which the local board can determine whether or not a person is in one of the “other categories” mentioned in Section 5 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 305;2 nor do they provide a norm or standard by which if certain facts are present it can determine whether or not a person is or is not “re[854]*854siding in the United States,” as that term is used in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act, SO U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 302, 303.
In connection with this matter the determination by the Bureau of Naturalization and Immigration that this man retained his student status and is thus not a resident, must be given weight. He is not, under the Immigration and Naturalization Laws, entitled either to citizenship, or to be a permanent resident of the United States, or a resident at all. At the most, he can only be a visitor, and that only so long 'as he remains a student. He is unlawfully in the United States, unless he is here only temporarily, as a visitor. And that Bureau held he is here temporarily as a visitor-student. He came in as a student, he is still a student and they renewed his visa as such.
While it may be argued that such determination is not binding upon the Director of Selective Service nor upon the local board, still the local board did not make any inquiry in that respect, or in that case, when they made their decision on March 10th.
And after all, it is one government, and I do not think it is within the contemplation of our system that a man should be fish before one department and fowl before another. If he can be a student-visitor — and not a resident — so far as the government of the United States is concerned when it is interpreted by the Department of Immigration and Naturalization, and be a resident so as to subject him to military service on behalf of the United States insofar as some other government department is concerned, it would require I think what John Marshall called refined and metaphysical reasoning. One thereby might sustain such a contrary conclusion by two departments of one government.
But, after all, in connection with this matter and in connection with all matters that pend before the courts and acts of the government, the government of the United States is trying to set an example of doing justice. It has been the established policy of the United States for many years to invite aliens to come to the United States in order to participate in our educational system. And pursuant to that policy, they amended the immigration laws to permit [855]*855them to come here. We have excused them from many obligations that are imposed upon citizens in order that we might extend to them what we hope and believe is the system of American culture as taught in our schools.
It does not seem to me to comport with justice that we should continue to do that and because a man is here and when he finishes the particular course he had in mind when he arrived, but continues as a student pursuing the same subjects, the country which invited him then impress him into their armed services.
I seriously doubt the validity of the sections of the regulations we were talking about this afternoon, whereby the Director of Selective Service takes away from persons who are seeking a certificate of non-residence the right to appeal to civilian appeal boards or to the President. I believe that under the law the exclusive methods of appeal described are appeals to the appeal boards and appeals to the President.3 I do not think that it was contemplated by Congress when it authorized the President to delegate whatever powers he had that that would authorize a delegation to the Director of Selective Service to deprive people of a right which Congress was very careful to guard, in setting up what they described as a civilian system of local boards and appeal boards where civilians could determine best who could serve in the armed forces and who best could [856]*856serve at home in the war effort.4 The law specifically gives these boards the power not only of determining exemptions and deferments, but also all questions or claims of individuals with respect to who is or who is not included by the Act. Congress was very careful to keep that out of the hands of the military. The denial of that right of appeal is a denial of due process. I am inclined to think, in view of the prohibitions of the Act against army officers serving on local or appeal boards, although I do not think it is necessary to pass on the question, and I do not pass on it in this case, that the fact that the Director of Selective Service is a brigadier general would deprive him of the power of acting on the appeal here.5
It seems to me due process has also been denied the petitioner, because there is no rule promulgated in the regulations whereby any standards are established for any person who is subject to the Act to determine whether or not he is or is not entitled to a certificate of non-residence.
I believe that the power existed under Section 5 of the Act for the President to establish “categories of people” who would be non-residents. But the President delegated his power to the Director of Selective Service in that connection. The Diréctor of Selective Service did not either in his own name or in the name of the President specify or establish any categories other than those that, in the Act, are designated with particularity.
[857]*857I think he has simply, under the regulations as they now stand, reserved to himself the power personally to determine — by what rules, no one would know — this petitioner or any other person who sought a certificate of exemption — whether he was or was not entitled to it.
That, in my judgment, is what is described in the decisions as arbitrary and capricious, and I would say lack of due process and a lack of rule of reason.
I might mention another thing that influences me in connection with the decision of the local board on March 10 to revoke the certificate of non-residence is the fact that on the identical evidence, they granted three previous certificates.
The only additional thing before the board on March 10th, was a letter from the State Director of March 1, 1944, the effect of which was to peremptorily suggest to the board that they recall and cancel petitioner’s certificate of non-residence. The letter refers to a “mimeographed statement” of October 23,1943. This statement was in evidence.
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HALL, District Judge.
The facts1 and applicable laws being still fresh in everyone’s mind from the argument makes it superfluous to review them in these comments. Nor will the [853]*853brevity of these comments permit any extended analysis of the law or various regulations. I will very briefly and informally state the grounds of my decision.
I think a writ should be granted. I do not believe that any Of the points which the government has raised are sufficient to show that this man did have due process. I believe he was denied due process. I think the action of the local board was arbitrary and capricious when it reversed its three previous determinations that he was not a resident of the United States. I do not think there was any evidence to support it.
I do not think the rules and regulations provide any norm or standard by which the local board can determine whether or not a person is in one of the “other categories” mentioned in Section 5 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 305;2 nor do they provide a norm or standard by which if certain facts are present it can determine whether or not a person is or is not “re[854]*854siding in the United States,” as that term is used in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act, SO U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 302, 303.
In connection with this matter the determination by the Bureau of Naturalization and Immigration that this man retained his student status and is thus not a resident, must be given weight. He is not, under the Immigration and Naturalization Laws, entitled either to citizenship, or to be a permanent resident of the United States, or a resident at all. At the most, he can only be a visitor, and that only so long 'as he remains a student. He is unlawfully in the United States, unless he is here only temporarily, as a visitor. And that Bureau held he is here temporarily as a visitor-student. He came in as a student, he is still a student and they renewed his visa as such.
While it may be argued that such determination is not binding upon the Director of Selective Service nor upon the local board, still the local board did not make any inquiry in that respect, or in that case, when they made their decision on March 10th.
And after all, it is one government, and I do not think it is within the contemplation of our system that a man should be fish before one department and fowl before another. If he can be a student-visitor — and not a resident — so far as the government of the United States is concerned when it is interpreted by the Department of Immigration and Naturalization, and be a resident so as to subject him to military service on behalf of the United States insofar as some other government department is concerned, it would require I think what John Marshall called refined and metaphysical reasoning. One thereby might sustain such a contrary conclusion by two departments of one government.
But, after all, in connection with this matter and in connection with all matters that pend before the courts and acts of the government, the government of the United States is trying to set an example of doing justice. It has been the established policy of the United States for many years to invite aliens to come to the United States in order to participate in our educational system. And pursuant to that policy, they amended the immigration laws to permit [855]*855them to come here. We have excused them from many obligations that are imposed upon citizens in order that we might extend to them what we hope and believe is the system of American culture as taught in our schools.
It does not seem to me to comport with justice that we should continue to do that and because a man is here and when he finishes the particular course he had in mind when he arrived, but continues as a student pursuing the same subjects, the country which invited him then impress him into their armed services.
I seriously doubt the validity of the sections of the regulations we were talking about this afternoon, whereby the Director of Selective Service takes away from persons who are seeking a certificate of non-residence the right to appeal to civilian appeal boards or to the President. I believe that under the law the exclusive methods of appeal described are appeals to the appeal boards and appeals to the President.3 I do not think that it was contemplated by Congress when it authorized the President to delegate whatever powers he had that that would authorize a delegation to the Director of Selective Service to deprive people of a right which Congress was very careful to guard, in setting up what they described as a civilian system of local boards and appeal boards where civilians could determine best who could serve in the armed forces and who best could [856]*856serve at home in the war effort.4 The law specifically gives these boards the power not only of determining exemptions and deferments, but also all questions or claims of individuals with respect to who is or who is not included by the Act. Congress was very careful to keep that out of the hands of the military. The denial of that right of appeal is a denial of due process. I am inclined to think, in view of the prohibitions of the Act against army officers serving on local or appeal boards, although I do not think it is necessary to pass on the question, and I do not pass on it in this case, that the fact that the Director of Selective Service is a brigadier general would deprive him of the power of acting on the appeal here.5
It seems to me due process has also been denied the petitioner, because there is no rule promulgated in the regulations whereby any standards are established for any person who is subject to the Act to determine whether or not he is or is not entitled to a certificate of non-residence.
I believe that the power existed under Section 5 of the Act for the President to establish “categories of people” who would be non-residents. But the President delegated his power to the Director of Selective Service in that connection. The Diréctor of Selective Service did not either in his own name or in the name of the President specify or establish any categories other than those that, in the Act, are designated with particularity.
[857]*857I think he has simply, under the regulations as they now stand, reserved to himself the power personally to determine — by what rules, no one would know — this petitioner or any other person who sought a certificate of exemption — whether he was or was not entitled to it.
That, in my judgment, is what is described in the decisions as arbitrary and capricious, and I would say lack of due process and a lack of rule of reason.
I might mention another thing that influences me in connection with the decision of the local board on March 10 to revoke the certificate of non-residence is the fact that on the identical evidence, they granted three previous certificates.
The only additional thing before the board on March 10th, was a letter from the State Director of March 1, 1944, the effect of which was to peremptorily suggest to the board that they recall and cancel petitioner’s certificate of non-residence. The letter refers to a “mimeographed statement” of October 23,1943. This statement was in evidence. It is unsigned and bears no caption or designation either as a “directive,” “order,” “memorandum to the local board,” or any of the various other appellations given to the almost innumerable types of communications to local boards from state or national headquarters. It certainly was not a rule or regulation promulgated by the President or his delegee, the National Director of Selective Service. And the State Director is not empowered under the Act to promulgate rules or regulations nor to substitute his judgment for that of the local or appeal boards.
It must be kept in mind also that when each previous certificate was granted under the rules and regulations, the local board notified the Selective Service System of such action, and no objection was made. It must also be kept in mind that once before the State Director called for the file. It had the same evidence in it then as was in it on March 10th and as was in it on March 1st, when he wrote the letter. He called for it for review, and yet he sent it back, without objection to the board’s action and with apparent approval.
My view is that it points up to no other conclusion than that the local board acted on March 10th without any supporting evidence and, I might say, in an arbitrary and capricious manner. And that tends to support the conclusion which I arrive at that the determination of the Director of Selective Service, if he had the power to make it on appeal, was arbitrary and capricious. He had the record of the granting of these certificates as they were granted. It was required that they be sent in, and they were sent in on each of the three previous occasions, and yet nothing was done about it, and he had no new or different evidence before him either.
I think that probably concludes any remarks I want to make in connection with the matter.
The stipulation shows that the answer in response to the government on the order to show cause would be deemed to be a return in response to a writ, and the Army has produced the body of the petitioner, so that I think probably we can dispense with the formalities that are ordinarily gone through in a preliminary way, and if counsel will prepare the writ, I will now order it to issue, directing the respondents in this case to discharge the petitioner from the Army of the United States.