United States v. the Tug Rebel

893 F. Supp. 940, 1995 WL 432300
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedMay 11, 1995
DocketCiv. 93-586-FR
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 893 F. Supp. 940 (United States v. the Tug Rebel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. the Tug Rebel, 893 F. Supp. 940, 1995 WL 432300 (D. Or. 1995).

Opinion

AMENDED OPINION

FRYE, District Judge:

The matter before the court is the motion of the plaintiff for partial summary judgment (#23).

FACTS

On the afternoon of July 15, 1990—a clear and sunny day—-a flotilla of barges propelled by the tug REBEL entered the navigational lock at the John Day Dam. At the front of the flotilla were two empty grain barges tied next to each other. Behind the starboard forward barge was a loaded petroleum barge; behind the petroleum barge was a derrick barge. In this configuration, the flotilla, not including the tug, was 636 feet from bow to stern. The tug REBEL was 87 feet in length.

The maximum length for a flotilla using the navigational lock at the John Day Dam is 650 feet. The upstream and downstream limits of the lock space are marked by yellow vertical lines painted on construction joints at either end of the lock. The distance between the yellow lines is 650 feet. The length of the navigational lock is 675.45 feet.

Because the flotilla was 723 feet long, Darrel McBride, the phot who was operating the flotilla, knew that he would have to “knock *941 out,” i.e., once the barges were tied off in the lock, he would have to move the tug from its position astern the derrick barge to a position adjacent to that barge.

Pursuant to the standard procedures on the Columbia River, McBride “radioed” the John Day locks about half an hour prior to his anticipated arrival. During the conversation, McBride advised that he would be needing an up-river lockage, that he was “long” and would need to “knock-out.”

When the flotilla reached the lock, the light was green, signifying that the flotilla could enter the lock. The deckhand, Danny Lee Burum, went to the bow of the starboard grain barge at the front of the flotilla to advise the pilot, who was in the wheelhouse, of his distance from the wingwall. This is standard procedure upon entry into the lock. There were two other crew members on board. However, since flotillas operate around the clock during the river transits, the crew members work shifts of six hours on duty and six hours off duty. Thus, the other two crew members were in their living quarters, apparently asleep, and had no involvement in the lockage or the incidents resulting in this litigation.

Again following standard procedure, once the flotilla had passed a corner on the wing-wall of the lock chamber and thus had begun to enter the lock chamber, Burum walked aft to tie off the flotilla. He tied off the flotilla at floating bollard number 2 at the lock to the derrick barge. He then went back on board the tug in preparation for moving the tug adjacent to the derrick barge. He did not return to the forward barges to check their location relative to the yellow line marking the end of the 650-foot length of the lock space.

From his position in the wheelhouse of the tug, the pilot was unable to evaluate the position of the flotilla relative to the forward yellow stripe; thus, he had to adjudge his location by looking back to the rear yellow stripe. He did this prior to “knock-out” estimating that the stripe was about 30 feet back from the bow of the tug in its position astern of the derrick barge.

The pilot moved the tug adjacent to the derrick barge. At that point, he advised the lockmaster, John Brostowitz, that the flotilla was secure. The lockmaster received the communication. Burum then went below to do maintenance on the engine. McBride stayed in the wheelhouse.

On the day of the incident, Brostowitz, the lockmaster, was to follow a standard procedure for upstream lockage as follows: He was to wait at the downstream lockstand until he received a message from the tug pilot that the flotilla was secure. He was then to check the line from the flotilla to the cleat on the lock to see that it was taut. He was then to check the flotilla to see if it was forward of the downstream stripe. After doing that, he was to proceed to the upstream lockstand.

At the upstream lockstand, Brostowitz was to check to see that a second line was tied from the flotilla to a cleat and that the line was taut. He was also to check to see that the forward end of the flotilla was inside the upstream stripe. After having satisfied himself that the flotilla was positioned correctly, he was then to proceed with the lockage.

On this occasion, Brostowitz did not check to make sure that the forward end of the flotilla was inside the upstream stripe, and Brostowitz did not monitor the location of the flotilla during the lockage until it was too late to prevent the accident.

After Brostowitz commenced the fill, he remained in the upstream lockstand completing the log that shows the day’s commercial lockages. This activity diverted his attention from the lockage until he looked up and noticed that the bows of the forward barges were coming up under the upstream gate.

In a panic, Brostowitz made a telephone call to the tug master telling him to back up. Within thirty seconds of the call, there were cracking noises, and parts of the upstream gate started to fly off. The push knees of the forward barge had come up under the upstream gate, jamming the gate and causing such damage to the upstream gate that it had to be replaced.

After the allision, Brostowitz volunteered for a drug and alcohol test. The results of *942 the drug and alcohol test were negative. The crewmembers involved also were tested for drugs and alcohol and no one tested positive for drugs and alcohol.

On May 17, 1993, the United States filed this action against the defendants, the Tug REBEL, the Barges, and Tidewater Barge Lines, Inc., seeking to recover for the damages to the upstream lock gate pursuant to the provisions of 33 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 409. The United States contends that under 33 U.S.C. § 411, the defendants are strictly liable to the United States for the damages to the upstream lock gate caused by the negligence of the defendants.

The defendants deny that they were negligent, arguing that the damage to the upstream lock gate was caused solely by the negligence of the lockmaster. In the alternative, the defendants argue that if they are found to be at fault in some respect, the fault for which they are liable in damages must be determined in accordance with the principles of comparative negligence.

The United States moves the court for an order of partial summary judgment on the grounds that the governing principles of Title 33 of the United States Code impose strict liability on the defendants and preclude the application of the principles of comparative negligence used in general maritime law.

The defendants contend that the damages to the lock gate were caused solely by the lockmaster. The defendants further contend that even if they are found to be strictly liable under Title 33, they are not absolutely liable, and the liability of the parties should be based upon comparative fault.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
893 F. Supp. 940, 1995 WL 432300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-the-tug-rebel-ord-1995.