United States v. Terxidor

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 1, 2024
• Docket: 23-652
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 1 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-652 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:22-cr-00081-VC-1 v. MEMORANDUM* DAMADRE TERXIDOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 14, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: LEE and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM, Senior District Judge.***

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States Senior District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. Damadre Terxidor appeals the denial of his motion to suppress a loaded

firearm discovered after a traffic stop. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

At around 10:00 p.m. on September 23, 2021, two officers patrolling the

Tenderloin neighborhood of San Francisco spotted a Hyundai with an “unusual”

paper license plate. The license plate, which appeared to be affixed to another plate,

was smaller than typical. Additionally, the officers could not see a state of issuance

anywhere on the plate due to the small font size.

The officers entered the plate number into the California Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System (“CLETS”). When doing so, however, the officers

failed to notice that the full plate number contained eight digits, not the seven digits

used for California plates. They also failed to notice that CLETS, as a result,

dropped the last digit from their query.

Because CLETS dropped the last digit from the officers’ query, the system

erroneously informed the officers that the number they entered was associated with

a California plate registered to a Mercedes. This led the officers to believe that the

Hyundai’s paper plate was fake or stolen. In reality, the plate was a valid temporary

Georgia plate.

After the officers stopped the Hyundai, Terxidor volunteered that he was on

parole. The officers searched the car pursuant to the conditions of Terxidor’s parole

2 23-652 and uncovered a loaded firearm. Terxidor filed a motion to suppress the loaded

firearm, which the district court denied, and Terxidor entered a conditional guilty

plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

On appeal, Terxidor concedes that the officers could lawfully search the

Hyundai once they learned he was on parole, but he argues that the officers lacked

reasonable suspicion to stop him in the first instance because the stop was based

largely on an unreasonable mistake of fact. Specifically, Terxidor argues that

because the plate on the Hyundai was smaller than a California plate, did not say

“California,” had different font, and had a different alphanumeric sequence, it was

objectively unreasonable for the officers to suspect it was a stolen California plate

or an attempt at forging one. He further argues that, because of these characteristics,

it was unreasonable for the officers to enter the plate number into a California-only

database, rather than an all-state database. Finally, he argues it was unreasonable

for the officers to fail to notice that the database returned results for a number that

was one digit shorter than that which they entered.

“We review reasonable suspicion determinations de novo, reviewing findings

of historical fact for clear error and giving due weight to inferences drawn from those

facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” United States v.

Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal citation and

3 23-652 quotation marks omitted). In determining whether an officer had reasonable

suspicion to stop a vehicle, courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances of

each case” to see whether the detaining officer had a “particularized and objective

basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). But “[t]o be reasonable is not to

be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of

government officials . . . .” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014).

“An officer might, for example, stop a motorist for traveling alone in a high-

occupancy vehicle lane, only to discover upon approaching the car that two children

are slumped over asleep in the back seat. The driver has not violated the law, but

neither has the officer violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 57. “[O]bjectively

reasonable” mistakes of fact will not invalidate an otherwise lawful stop. Id. at 66

(emphasis omitted).

Here, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Terxidor given: (1) the officers

encountered the Hyundai at night in an especially crime-heavy portion of the

Tenderloin, (2) the appearance of the temporary plate affixed to the Hyundai

appeared unusual to the officers, (3) the officers were unable to see a state of

issuance on the plate, and (4) the officers’ CLETS query—albeit mistaken—

4 23-652 indicated that the plate number affixed to the Hyundai was associated with a different

vehicle.1

Moreover, the officers’ conduct was not the type of “deliberate, reckless, or

grossly negligent conduct” that the exclusionary rule is designed to deter. See

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). “To trigger the exclusionary

rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully

deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the

justice system.” Id. Here, one of the officers testified that it was “uncommon” to

see temporary out-of-state plates and recalled seeing only two or three over his two

years on patrol. And both officers “credibly testified” that they did not learn of the

all-state database until the morning of the evidentiary hearing—months after the

traffic stop. For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Terxidor’s

motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

1 Terxidor argues that it was clear error for the district court to find that the Hyundai was driving faster than surrounding traffic and that its occupants turned down the car’s music upon spotting the officers. We need not decide this issue, however, because even if such findings were clear error, the officers still had reasonable suspicion to stop the Hyundai under the totality of circumstances.

5 23-652