United States v. Terrance Cole

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: January 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-2576
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

CLD-056 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2576 ___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TERRANCE LARNELL COLE, a/k/a TC, a/k/a THE BOSS, a/k/a BIG HEAD, a/k/a T, Appellant ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:04-cr-00109-001) District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab ____________________________________

Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 26, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 23, 2025) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Terrance Cole appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release. The

Government moves for summary affirmance. We conclude that the appeal presents no

substantial question, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6, so we grant the

Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

I.

In 2006, Cole was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania on one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more

of cocaine and one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments.1 United States

v. Cole, 246 F. App’x 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2007). Cole was sentenced to life in prison for

the conspiracy to distribute charges, along with a concurrent 20-year sentence for money

laundering, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Id. Since

that time, Cole has filed a series of motions to reduce his sentence under the First Step

Act. His most recent petition asserted that errors in his initial sentencing, his

progressively worsening hypertension, and his demonstrated history of rehabilitation

combined to constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for his release.

The District Court disagreed, holding that his proffered reasons were not

extraordinary and compelling under the First Step Act. United States v. Cole, 2024 WL

3758827, at *6-9. The District Court further held that even if they constituted an

extraordinary and compelling reason for his release, relief would not be granted based on

1 At trial, the government presented extensive testimony from members of the criminal organization Cole controlled, which evidenced that Cole was responsible for distributing approximately 3,000kg of cocaine across his career, and had a reputation for violence. 2 consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at *10-11.

Jones then appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s

denial of compassionate release for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb the

decision unless “there is a definite and firm conviction that [the District Court]

committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the

relevant factors.” See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020).

III.

A district court has discretion to “reduce [a federal inmate’s] term of

imprisonment” if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a

reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting compassionate release, a

district court must also consider the sentencing factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

“to the extent that they are applicable.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include,

among other things, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1); the need for the sentence “to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment

for the offense”; “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to protect the

public from further crimes of the defendant.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Cole had not

shown extraordinary and compelling reasons as required by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Cole,

2024 WL 3758827, at *9-10. The District Court reasonably determined that Cole’s

3 petition did not present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for his release, noting

that Cole’s hypertension was both mild and treatable, his sentencing contentions were

without merit, and Cole’s record of admittedly exemplary behavior while incarcerated did

not make him eligible for release. Id. at 7-9.

Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in determining that, even if Cole had

presented sufficiently compelling reasons for his release, the seriousness of his offenses

warranted his continued incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In considering the

“nature and circumstances” of the crime, the District Court aptly emphasized that Cole’s

sentence must “‘reflect the seriousness of the offense,’” and noted that Cole ran a violent,

large-scale cocaine trafficking organization that operated throughout western

Pennsylvania for over a decade, and that his “reprehensible criminal conduct [had] left

the streets of Western Pennsylvania awash in drugs.” Cole, 2024 WL 3758827, at *10

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)).

We therefore will affirm the District Court’s judgment.