United States v. Tajhan Knox

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: December 6, 2022
• Docket: 18-1540
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 18-1540 ________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TAJHAN OMAR KNOX, a/k/a TI-G, Appellant _____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 5-17-cr-00252-001) District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith ________________

Argued: February 11, 2022

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and COWEN ∗, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: December 6, 2022)

Keith M. Donoghue [ARGUED] Robert Epstein Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 601 Walnut Street The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West Philadelphia, PA 19106 Counsel for Appellant

∗ The Honorable Robert E. Cowen assumed inactive status on April 1, 2022 after the argument and conference in this case, but before the filing of the opinion. This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12. Kelly A. Lewis Fallenstein Office of United States Attorney 504 West Hamilton Street Suite 3701 Allentown, PA 18101

Robert A. Zauzmer [ARGUED] Office of United States Attorney 615 Chestnut Street Suite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Counsel for Appellee

OPINION ** ________________

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

Tajhan Knox appeals a 2017 sentence for drug trafficking and firearm possession

on the ground that he was improperly sentenced as a “career offender” under the federal

sentencing guidelines. Knox contends a prior conviction for conspiracy to commit

robbery was incorrectly held to be a qualifying offense supporting a career offender

designation because conspiracies to commit a crime of violence are not included in the

sentencing guidelines’ definition of “crime of violence.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES

MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’M 2016) (“U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)”). After we

heard argument in this case, another panel of this Court held the sentencing guidelines’

** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

2 definition of “crime of violence” does not include conspiracies to commit a crime of

violence. United States v. Abreu, 32 F.4th 271, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2022). Accordingly, we

will vacate Knox’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

I.

In 2017, Knox pleaded guilty to nine counts related to drug trafficking and firearm

possession. The sentencing judge held Knox qualified as a “career offender” due to two

prior offenses: a Pennsylvania conspiracy to commit robbery conviction and a

Pennsylvania drug conviction. Knox did not object to his career offender designation.

The career offender designation increased Knox’s sentencing guideline range from 70–76

months to 262–327 months’ imprisonment, and he was ultimately sentenced to 264

months’ imprisonment. Knox appealed his sentence, raising for the first time on appeal

that his conspiracy to commit robbery conviction should not have been considered a

“crime of violence” under the sentencing guidelines.

II.1

Because Knox did not object to his career designation status or to whether his

prior conspiracy to commit robbery conviction qualified as a crime of violence, we

review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190,

194 (3d Cir. 2021). Under plain error review, we must decide whether (1) the District

Court’s conclusion that Knox’s conspiracy to commit robbery conviction qualified as a

“crime of violence” was error, and, if so, whether the error (2) is “plain,” (3) “affect[s]

1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

3 substantial rights,” and (4) “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (alterations in

original) (citations omitted). The Government concedes that, following our decision in

Abreu, the first three prongs of the plain error test are satisfied. Accordingly, the only

remaining question is whether the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

III.

The Supreme Court has held that, generally, “the failure to correct a plain

Guidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights will seriously affect the

fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v.

United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1911 (2018); see also United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d

345, 359 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We generally exercise our discretion to recognize a plain error

in the misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines.” (citation omitted)). Indeed, we have

observed “few things . . . affect . . . the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of

the judicial process more than a reasonable probability an individual will linger longer in

prison than the law demands only because of an obvious judicial mistake.” Dahl, 833

F.3d at 359 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d

1328, 1335 (10th Cir. 2014)).

The Government contends we should deviate from this usual course because the

Presentence Report suggests Knox committed the armed robbery that was the object of

the conspiracy charge to which he pleaded guilty. But we have declined to consider the

facts of prior convictions when exercising plain error review of an erroneous application

4 of the sentencing guidelines because “sentencing courts should not look to the underlying

facts of the prior offense, but to its elements.” Dahl, 833 F.3d at 359 (citation omitted).

What is relevant here is the crime for which Knox was actually convicted, not another

crime for which the Government now claims Knox could have also been convicted.

IV.

For these reasons, we will vacate Knox’s sentence and remand for resentencing.