United States v. Swift & Co.

282 U.S. 468, 51 S. Ct. 202, 75 L. Ed. 464, 1931 U.S. LEXIS 18, 1 C.B. 283, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 970, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 659
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 2, 1931
Docket56
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 282 U.S. 468 (United States v. Swift & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Swift & Co., 282 U.S. 468, 51 S. Ct. 202, 75 L. Ed. 464, 1931 U.S. LEXIS 18, 1 C.B. 283, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 970, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 659 (1931).

Opinion

*469 Me. Justice Roberts

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an action by respondent for the recovery of the amount of an admitted overpayment of income and war-profits taxes for the taxable year 1917; with interest.

In its return for 1917 respondent included the value of stock dividends received. February 28, 1923, it filed a claim for refund, alleging that the dividends in question should have been allocated to other years than 1917. The claim was rejected. Subsequently this court decided that stock dividends did not constitute income, as defined by the Sixteenth Amendment (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S.. 189). September 3, 1927, respondent, filed a second claim for refund which it designated as an amended claim, and therein for the first time asserted that the dividends did not constitute taxable income. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the latter claim was barred by the statute of limitations and rejected it.

The respondent’s position is that the-second claim-should be construed as an amendment of the first; but, if not, then, treating the second as an original claim, it was filed within the time required by law and should have been allowed. The Court of Claims overruled respondent’s first contention, but held with it upon its second, and entered. judgment in its favor. Upon the petition of the United States this court granted a writ of certiorari.

If the Court of Claims was right in its disposition of respondent’s second contention we need not trouble ourselves with respect to the first. It is admitted that if the later claim for refund was filed in time the respondent should recover. The sums of which a refund is sought were not paid in cash, but consisted of a credit of an amount overpaid for other taxable years. Whether the claim was" filed in due time depends, therefore, upon a determination of the date when the credit was allowed *470 within the meaning of the statutes. Section 252 of the Revenue Act of1921 (42 Stat.- 268) contains the following provision:

“ That if, upon examination of any return of income made pursuant to . . . the Revenue Act of 1917, ... it appears that an amount of income, war-profits or excess-profits tax has been paid in excess of that properly due, then, notwithstanding the provisions of section 3228 of the Revised Statutes, the amount of the excess shall be credited against any income, war-profits or excess-profits taxes, or installment thereof, then due from the taxpayer under any other return, and any balance of such excess shall be immediately refunded to the taxpayer: Provided, That no such credit or refund shall be allowed or made after five years from the date when the return was due, unless before the expiration of such five years a claim therefor is filed by the taxpayer: ...”

The applicable portion of Section 284 (b) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 66) follows:

“No such credit or refund shall be-allowed ;or made after . . . four years from the time the tax was paid in' the case of a tax imposed .by any prior Act, unless before the expiration of such period a claim ■ therefor is filed by the taxpayer; ...”

■ Under the quoted statutes the respondent was required, to file its claim within four years from the date of the allowance of the credit. The petitioner asserts that the credit was allowed on February 9, 1923, when the Commissioner certified the overassessment to the Collector. The respondent insists that it was when the Commissioner signed the schedule of refunds and credits as reported by the Collector on September 6, 1923. The earlier date is more than four years from the filing of the claim, and the later one is within said period.

*471 The issue thus raised wiE be resolved by determining what act constituted the allowance of the credit. Proper decision requires an understanding of the procedure followed in such cases.

. The record discloses that the practice of the Bureau' /was in .the first instance to examine the taxpayer’s return and if it disclosed an overassessment to prepare for the Commissioner a so-called certificate of o.verassessment, which when certified by the Deputy Commissioner went to the Commissioner. When the' Commissioner had accumulated a number of such certificates with respect to taxpayers in a single coHection district, a form caUéd á schedule of overassessments was prepared, one line on such schedule dealing with each taxpayer’s account for the taxable year in question. On this schedule was noted, the overassessment of the taxpayer.und blanks were left for further entries by the Colector ,of the district. To if was attached a subsidiary schedule, called a schedule of refunds and credits, on which the CoEector should make report of his actions pursuant to the schedule of over-assessments, and these two schedules, together with the individual certificates of over assessment, were forwarded to the .Collector. • On the schedule of overassessments were certain printed intructions as follows:

“ The several amounts herein noted as reduction of tax HabEity are hereby approved and aHowed.
You wiE immediately check the items herein against the accounts of the several taxpayers and determine whether the several amounts in which the tax HabEity has^ been reduced should be abated in whole or in part and make such abatement, as may be warranted by the condition of the taxpayer’s account for the year involved.
“ If any part of the tax is found to be an overpayment, you will examine áH accounts of the taxpayer for sub *472 sequent periods and apply such overpayment as a credit against the tax owing (if any) on the taxpayer’s account for subsequent periods. (This applies to income, war-profits and excess-profits taxes only.)
The balance (if any) of the overpayment shall be entered in column 12 and placed upon a schedule of refunds (Form 7777A) and an appropriate memorandum made upon the taxpayer’s account.
“You will thereupon complete and certify this schedule and Schedule 7777A and return three copies of each to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue at Washington, making the appropriate entries in your accounts.” *

The Commissioner, when he forwarded these papers to the Collector, had no way of knowing whether the overassessnient would bring about an abatement of taxes theretofore assessed and unpaid, or' would result in an overpayment by the taxpayer. This could only be ascertained by the Collector from the books and records kept by him. Moreover, after the Collector ascertained whether an-overpayment resulted, he would have to determine from his books and records the further question whether such overpayment should be applied as a credit on taxes due or, in the absence of any taxes dub, ought to be refunded.

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282 U.S. 468, 51 S. Ct. 202, 75 L. Ed. 464, 1931 U.S. LEXIS 18, 1 C.B. 283, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 970, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 659, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-swift-co-scotus-1931.