United States v. Suirui Group Co., Ltd.

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided June 3, 2026·No. Civil Action No. 2026-0369·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 26-00369 (AHA) v.

SUIRUI GROUP CO., LTD., et al.,

Defendants.

Order

On May 26, 2026, this court granted the government’s request for a preliminary injunction

pending resolution of its claim to enforce the President’s order that Suirui Group and its subsidiary

divest from Jupiter Systems because their ownership of the company “threatens to impair the

national security of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1); ECF No. 47; see Regarding the

Acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC by Suirui International Co., Limited, 90 Fed. Reg. 31125 (July

11, 2025). The court concluded the government was likely to succeed in enforcing the President’s

divestment order, and that, at least based on the current record, the defendants’ argument that the

order failed to comply with due process is unpersuasive. ECF No. 47 at 9–18. And, in addition to

giving deference to the President’s finding of a national security risk pursuant to Congress’s

express authorization, the court credited witness testimony that Suirui had not made meaningful

efforts to divest despite asking for multiple extensions and that Suirui’s continued control of

Jupiter Systems pending litigation posed a national security threat that would irreparably harm the

United States. Id. at 10, 18–22. Finding that the equities and public interest arising from the

national security risk also strongly favored preliminary relief, the court found that appointing a receiver to manage Jupiter Systems pending litigation was the appropriate relief, tailored to the

particular claim likely to succeed and the government’s particular showing of harm, equities, and

public interest. Id. at 23–30; see ECF No. 48. The defendants now move for a stay pending appeal.

ECF No. 52. The court concludes the defendants have not satisfied the showing required for a stay

pending appeal and therefore denies the motion.

The D.C. Circuit has advised that a “stay pending appeal is an ‘extraordinary’ remedy.”

KalshiEX LLC v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 119 F.4th 58, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 904 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir.

2018) (per curiam)). To obtain a stay pending appeal, the defendants must show that (1) they will

likely succeed on the merits of their appeal; (2) they will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay; (3)

a stay will not substantially injure other parties; and (4) a stay is in the public interest. Id. The first

two factors are “the most critical,” and here no factor favors a stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,

434 (2009).

The defendants’ argument that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal is

unpersuasive. As described in the court’s opinion, it is undisputed the President has the authority

to order divestment, that he made the required findings to support his divestment order, and that

Suirui has failed to comply with the order despite asking for and receiving multiple extensions.

ECF No. 47 at 9–10. The court further found that, although Suirui claims it is committed to

divestment, it has instead delayed, and taken no meaningful effort toward, compliance. Id. at 10.

Although the defendants now say the President’s order failed to provide due process, the court

explained the government is likely to succeed in showing the Committee on Foreign Investment

in the United States (“CFIUS”) gave the defendants notice of its concerns and its plan to refer the

transaction to the President, access to the unclassified evidence it relied on, and an opportunity to

2 rebut the concerns and evidence, consistent with Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment

in the United States, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). ECF No. 47 at 11–18. The defendants’ stay

motion retreads their arguments at the preliminary injunction stage. They continue to posit that

CFIUS’s letters did not give them “access to” the unclassified evidence CFIUS relied on and that

CFIUS must have given an incomplete account. ECF No. 52-1 at 4–6. But the court found that, at

least on the record at this stage, the letters gave the defendants “access to” the unclassified

information CFIUS relied on, as Ralls requires. 758 F.3d at 319; ECF No. 47 at 12–16. The court

credited testimony that the letters included all unclassified and uncontrolled information that was

in the risk-based analysis relied on to refer the transaction to the President. ECF No. 47 at 13–16;

see ECF No. 44 at 33–34. And the defendants have not made any colorable argument that they are

entitled to anything that was not provided to them, beyond mere speculation that something was

improperly withheld. See ECF No. 47 at 15–16. 1

The defendants’ remaining arguments for a stay are premised on challenging the court’s

finding of irreparable harm, which was based on the President’s finding of a national security risk

and substantial testimony demonstrating that the risk would remain present absent preliminary

relief, as well as arguing that it is the defendants that would be irreparably harmed by the

appointment of a receiver due to the consequences it may have for their businesses. See ECF No.

52-1 at 7–11. Nothing in the defendants’ stay motion gives reason to question the court’s finding

1 The defendants’ stay motion is also premised on misconstruing the court’s opinion, suggesting that the court understood Congress’s amendments to the Defense Production Act to modify what is required by Ralls and due process. See ECF No. 52-1 at 6 (arguing that the court “read[s] nonexistent language into that statute” to alter the requirements of due process set forth in Ralls). That isn’t accurate. The court concluded that CFIUS’s risk-based analysis is, consistent with the statute and the credible testimony in this case, what CFIUS relied on. ECF No. 47 at 15. Providing the unclassified information in the risk-based analysis therefore satisfies Ralls. See 758 F.3d at 319 (explaining that an affected party has the right to “be given access to the unclassified evidence on which the official actor relied” (emphasis added)).

3 of irreparable harm to the United States posed by the national security risk that was found by the

executive branch, as authorized by Congress. See ECF No. 47 at 18–21; TikTok Inc. v. Garland,

604 U.S. 56, 75 (2025); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–34 (2010). And the

stay motion also gives no reason to reconsider the testimony, credited by the court, that Jupiter

Systems’ products used by the federal government, the military, and entities that operate critical

infrastructure could be accessed and exploited by the introduction of hardware and software

vulnerabilities; that this risk is continuing and will remain so during this litigation as long as Suirui

maintains control of Jupiter Systems, given Suirui’s relationship with and subordination to the

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United States v. Suirui Group Co., Ltd., (D.D.C. 2026).

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Related

Nken v. Holder
556 U.S. 418 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
177 L. Ed. 2d 355 (Supreme Court, 2010)
TikTok Inc. v. Garland
604 U.S. 56 (Supreme Court, 2025)