United States v. Stewart
This text of United States v. Stewart (United States v. Stewart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________ ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) v. ) Criminal No. 07-0084 (PLF) ) JUAN STEWART, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 11, 2008, defendant Juan Stewart was sentenced to a five-year term of
imprisonment after he pled guilty to a charge of Unlawful Possession with the Intent to Distribute
Crack Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). As part of his plea
agreement, Mr. Stewart agreed that he would be held accountable for 29.6 grams of cocaine base.
Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), a five-year term of imprisonment was the minimum
sentence that could be imposed on a defendant in Mr. Stewart’s position. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2008). In other words, it was a mandatory sentence below which the Court
had no discretion to go.
On June 9, 2009, the Court announced in a criminal case unrelated to this one that
it would from that point forward sentence defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses using
the Sentencing Guidelines formulated for powder cocaine offenses. See United States v. Lewis,
623 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2009). This change in sentencing practice meant that some crack
cocaine offenders would receive substantially lower sentences than would otherwise be the case.
See, e.g., id. at 43, 48 (noting that, under the Guidelines for crack offenses, Mr. Lewis would have a Guidelines sentencing range of 151 to 188 months, whereas under the Guidelines for
powder cocaine offenses, his recommended sentence would be 46 to 57 months).
On July 15, 2009, shortly after the Court’s announcement in Lewis, Mr. Stewart
filed a motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, asking that the Court resentence
him using the Guidelines for powder cocaine. Before the Court could rule on that motion, Mr.
Stewart submitted another filing, this time asking that his motion for a reduced sentence be
stayed while Congress considered passing legislation that would reduce sentences for crack
offenses to make them more comparable to sentences imposed for powder cocaine offenses. The
Court accordingly stayed Mr. Stewart’s motion. On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed
into law the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which reduced, but did not eliminate, the disparities
between sentences imposed for crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses. See Pub. L. No.
111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. Since the FSA marked the culmination of the attempts by Congress to
address those sentencing disparities, the Court now will lift the stay on Mr. Stewart’s motion and
address its merits.
Mr. Stewart’s sentence cannot be reduced. First, the Court is not authorized by
18 U.S.C. § 3742 or by any other statute to resentence a defendant to give him the benefit of a
change in the Court’s sentencing practices that occurred after the defendant’s conviction and
original sentence became final. See Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2687 (2010) (“A
federal court generally ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.’”
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c))); United States v. Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220, 224 & n.20
(D. Me. 2010) (the FSA does not affect criminal sentences that became final before the FSA’s
effective date). Second, the term of imprisonment to which Mr. Stewart was sentenced was then
-2- and remains now, even after the passage of the FSA, the mandatory minimum sentence permitted
by statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2011) (requiring defendants convicted of an
offense involving more than 28 grams of crack cocaine to serve at least five years in prison).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the stay imposed on these proceedings is LIFTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that [22] Mr. Stewart’s Motion to Reduce Sentence
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/___________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge DATE: June 28, 2011
-3-
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