United States v. Stewart

29 F. Supp. 59, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2249
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedAugust 24, 1939
DocketNo. 2685-S
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 29 F. Supp. 59 (United States v. Stewart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Stewart, 29 F. Supp. 59, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2249 (N.D. Cal. 1939).

Opinion

ST. SURE, District Judge.

This is a suit brought by the Government to cancel three patents issued to the State of California, and to quiet title to 7,413.48 acres of land claimed to be a part of Mare Island in San Francisco Bay.

“The lands in question are in the area acquired as a result of the Mexican War by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, July 4, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, which guaranteed the property rights of Mexicans in the annexed territory. The United States claims under deed to it in 1853 by Bissell and Aspinwall and another, who derived their title under grant of May 20, 1841, by Alvarado, Mexican Governor of California, to Castro, a Mexican citizen, of the island La Yegua (Mare Island) ‘in all its extent.’” Defendants claim under three patents issued by California in 1874, in 1896, and in 1910 respectively, “purporting to convey the land in question as a part of the swamp or overflowed lands granted to the state by the Swamp Lands Act of Congress, Sept. 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 982-984,” hereinafter called the Swamp Lands Act. The quoted language is from United States v. O’Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 504, 58 S.Ct. 708, 712, 82 L.Ed. 980, showing a common source of title beginning with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to lands involved in the O’Donnell case and those in suit here, but there is no other pertinent similarity between the cases.

[60]*60The lands in the O’Donnell case were within swamp and overflowed land survey No. 34 containing 164.55 acres, which this court found the United States was the owner of and ever since 1853 had occupied for military purposes in connection with a naval station and Navy Yard; that the possession of the United States had at all times been actual, open, adverse, and exclusive; that the value of the buildings, structures, and utilities placed upon the land by the Government exceeded $1,250,-000.

In the O’Donnell case the defendants “specifically challenged the existence and validity of the Castro grant, the validity of the decrees of confirmation of the title of Bissell and Aspinwall, and any prescriptive title of the United States. * * * The trial court made findings of fact and reached conclusions of law in favor of the United States on all these issues. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and decreed ‘that the United States has no title to the patented lands [in suit], and that the title is in and quieted in’ respondents. 91 F.2d 14, 45.” United States v. O’Donnell, supra. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals, thereby finally settling the question as to the validity of the Castro grant and establishing the title of the United States to the lands in survey 34.

The lands in the present case are within swamp land survey No. 569 containing, as we have seen, upwards of seven thousand acres northwest of the Island.-

In its complaint the Government alleges that the United States “is the owner of and has since the year 1853, occupied as part of the Mare Island Navy Yard Reservation for public, to-wit: military and naval purposes, and has been in possession” of the lands in controversy. Having in the O’Donnell case quieted title to the lands within survey 34, the Government now claims that the adjoining lands in survey 569 are a physical part of the “Mare Island granted by the Mexican Government to Castro, purchased by the United States from Bissell and Aspinwall, assignees of Castro and set apart for a naval reservation by Executive Order of the President of the United States.”1

To sustain its case, the Government relies upon the Castro grant, the decree of the Board of Land Commissioners in Bissell and Aspinwall v. United States, 30 Fed.Cas. page 1232, the deed from Bis-sell and Aspinwall to the United States, the Freeman survey made in conformity with the Act of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631, and said Executive Order. The Government contends that the Freeman survey “is conclusive in determining the delineation of Mare Island in the instant case.” In addition to this survey, many maps, plats, drawings, and documents were introduced in evidence in support of the Government’s theory that the lands in survey 569 are part and parcel of the lands comprising survey 34 and the upland of what is commonly known as Mare Island upon which the buildings of the Navy Yard are located. The evidence is interesting but without convincing force in the face of the facts opposed to it. In other words, the Government has failed to sustain the burden of proof resting upon it.

It appearing that the lands in suit were not originally a part of Mare Island and were not embraced in the Castro grant, the reservation for naval purposes does not apply to them, and the attack upon the patents fails.

Defendants have set up in their answers affirmative defenses of (1) the statute of limitations, (2) establishment and recognition of a boundary line between surveys 34 and 569, and (3) equitable estoppel.

Defendants Mary’W. Stewart et al. plead that as to two of the patents, swamp land patent No. 72 and swamp land patent No. 152, the suit is barred by Sec. 8 of the Act of March 3, 1891, which provides that “Suits' by the United States to vacate and annul any patent shall only be brought within six years after the date of the issuance of such patents.”2 Patent No. 72 was issued on June 5, 1896, and patent No. 152 on February 7, 1910. The suit was commenced April 22, 1930. One patent was issued thirty-four years before suit, and the other twenty years before. Clearly, as to the lands covered by the two patents, the suit is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The case of Unit[61]*61ed States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 209 U.S. 447, 28 S.Ct. 579, 52 L.Ed. 881, is directly in point, and is conclusive.

In the light of the following facts, which I think present an insuperable obstacle to the Government’s case, it is unnecessary to discuss the legal phases of the second and third defenses:

1. The lands in suit prior to reclamation by the defendants and their predecessors in interest were swamp and overflowed lands within the provisions of the Swamp Lands Act through which title passed to the State of California.

2. The lands were surveyed in' the year 1869 under the authority of the State, and are identified by said survey as survey No. 569 and as containing 7,413.48 acres; thereafter, on April 7, 1874, the State issued its patent conveying all of the lands to John W. Pearson.

3. Patents No. 72 and No. 152 were issued to the State of California' by the United States under the provisions of Swamp Lands Act on June 5, 1896, and February 7, 1910, respectively; also on April 26, 1924, a patent, No. 937055, was issued to the State by the Government under the provision of the Swamp Lands Act. A portion of the lands in suit are included in these patents.

4. For more than fifty years last past the lands in suit have been in the actual, open, and exclusive possession of the defendants and their respective predecessors in interest.

5.’ In 1883 a suit was brought in the Superior Court of Solano County, State of California, afterwards removed into the United States Circuit Court, to recover possession of the very lands in suit.

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Related

Stewart v. United States
316 U.S. 354 (Supreme Court, 1942)

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Bluebook (online)
29 F. Supp. 59, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2249, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-stewart-cand-1939.