COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Steven Hudson pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court
increased Hudson’s base offense level under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) after finding that Hudson had sustained a prior conviction for a “crime of violence.” The court cited Hudson’s conviction for unlawful use of a firearm under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) and this court’s holding in
United States v. Pulliam,
566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009), that a violation of the same Missouri statute is a “violent felony” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Hudson appeals, arguing that
Pulliam
is no longer good law in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions. We conclude that
Pulliam
controls and therefore affirm.
The sentencing guidelines provide that when a person is sentenced for unlawful possession of a firearm, the base offense level is 20 if “the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Without a qualifying pri- or conviction, the base offense level is lower. The guidelines define “crime of violence” to include an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a)(l). This text is described as the “force” clause of the definition.
Hudson was convicted in 2010 for unlawful use of a weapon under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4). A person violates that subdivision if he knowingly “[e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.”
In
Pulliam,
we held that § 571.030.1(4) is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Like the term “crime of violence” under the guidelines, the definition of “violent felony” under the statute includes an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
Pulliam
addressed a prior conviction under § 571.030.1(4) and said that “[i]t goes without saying that displaying an operational weapon before another in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened use of physical force against another person.” 566 F.3d at 788. Accordingly, the conviction qualified as a violent felony.
Hudson does not contend, in evaluating his prior conviction, that there is any material difference between the “force” clauses in the respective definitions of “violent felony” under § 924(e) and “crime of violence” under the guidelines. He argues,
however, that
Pulliam
has been superseded by recent Supreme Court decisions. He cites three principal authorities:
Samuel Johnson v. United States,
— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015),
Curtis Johnson v. United States,
559 U.S. 133, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010), and
Descamps v. United States,
— U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013).
In
Samuel Johnson,
the Court held that a portion of the definition of “violent felony” in the ACCA known as the “residual clause,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. 135 S.Ct. at 2563. That decision has no application here. Although the definition of “crime of violence” under the guidelines until recently included an identically-worded residual clause, the guidelines are not subject to constitutional vagueness challenges.
Beckles v. United States,
No. 15-8544, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 896-97, 197 L.Ed.2d 145, 2017 WL 855781, at *11 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017). More to the point,
Pulliam
did not rely on the residual clause.
Pulliam
held that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) is a violent felony under the “force” clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Therefore, nothing in
Samuel Johnson
calls into question the reasoning of
Pulliam.
Curtis Johnson
did address the “force” clause of § 924(e), but it does not undermine
Pulliam. Curtis Johnson
held that slight unwanted touching of another person does not constitute “physical force” under the statute, because the statute requires the use, attempted.use, or threatened use of
“violent
force — that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265 (emphasis in original). The Missouri statute under which Hudson was convicted requires exhibiting a weapon that is “readily capable of
lethal use
in an angry or threatening manner.” “Lethal” means “[cjapable of causing death,”
Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014), so threatening use of such a weapon necessarily involves a threatened use of -violent force, not merely an unwanted physical touching.
Pulliam,
therefore, is consistent with
Curtis Johnson.
Hudson’s third offering,
Descamps v. United States,
— U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), addressed when a sentencing court may apply the so-called “modified categorical approach” to determine whether a prior offense is a violent felony under the ACCA. This approach allows courts, when confronted with state statutes that define multiple alternative offenses, to consult a limited class of judicial records to 'determine under which alternative the defendant was convicted.
Id.
at 2281.
Mathis v. United States,
— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct; 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), clarified that the modified categorical approach applies only when a statute sets forth alternative elements that define multiple offenses, not when a statute articulates multiple means of committing a single offense.
Id.
at 2252-53.
Neither
Descamps
nor
Mathis
affects the vitality of
Pulliam.
Section 571.030.1 of the Missouri statutes enumerates multiple offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of a weapon.
Yates v. State,
158 S.W.3d 798, 801-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). Hudson was convicted under subdivision (4). That subdivision is phrased in the alternative, applying to exhibition of a weapon in an “angry
or
threatening manner.”
Pulliam,
however, reasoned that a violation of subdivision (4)
categorically
is a violent felony: “displaying an operational weapon before another in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened, use of physical force against another person.” 566 F.3d at 788. Thus, assuming for the sake of analysis that subdivision (4) defines a single
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Steven Hudson pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court
increased Hudson’s base offense level under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) after finding that Hudson had sustained a prior conviction for a “crime of violence.” The court cited Hudson’s conviction for unlawful use of a firearm under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) and this court’s holding in
United States v. Pulliam,
566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009), that a violation of the same Missouri statute is a “violent felony” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Hudson appeals, arguing that
Pulliam
is no longer good law in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions. We conclude that
Pulliam
controls and therefore affirm.
The sentencing guidelines provide that when a person is sentenced for unlawful possession of a firearm, the base offense level is 20 if “the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Without a qualifying pri- or conviction, the base offense level is lower. The guidelines define “crime of violence” to include an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a)(l). This text is described as the “force” clause of the definition.
Hudson was convicted in 2010 for unlawful use of a weapon under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4). A person violates that subdivision if he knowingly “[e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.”
In
Pulliam,
we held that § 571.030.1(4) is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Like the term “crime of violence” under the guidelines, the definition of “violent felony” under the statute includes an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
Pulliam
addressed a prior conviction under § 571.030.1(4) and said that “[i]t goes without saying that displaying an operational weapon before another in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened use of physical force against another person.” 566 F.3d at 788. Accordingly, the conviction qualified as a violent felony.
Hudson does not contend, in evaluating his prior conviction, that there is any material difference between the “force” clauses in the respective definitions of “violent felony” under § 924(e) and “crime of violence” under the guidelines. He argues,
however, that
Pulliam
has been superseded by recent Supreme Court decisions. He cites three principal authorities:
Samuel Johnson v. United States,
— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015),
Curtis Johnson v. United States,
559 U.S. 133, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010), and
Descamps v. United States,
— U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013).
In
Samuel Johnson,
the Court held that a portion of the definition of “violent felony” in the ACCA known as the “residual clause,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. 135 S.Ct. at 2563. That decision has no application here. Although the definition of “crime of violence” under the guidelines until recently included an identically-worded residual clause, the guidelines are not subject to constitutional vagueness challenges.
Beckles v. United States,
No. 15-8544, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 896-97, 197 L.Ed.2d 145, 2017 WL 855781, at *11 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017). More to the point,
Pulliam
did not rely on the residual clause.
Pulliam
held that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) is a violent felony under the “force” clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Therefore, nothing in
Samuel Johnson
calls into question the reasoning of
Pulliam.
Curtis Johnson
did address the “force” clause of § 924(e), but it does not undermine
Pulliam. Curtis Johnson
held that slight unwanted touching of another person does not constitute “physical force” under the statute, because the statute requires the use, attempted.use, or threatened use of
“violent
force — that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265 (emphasis in original). The Missouri statute under which Hudson was convicted requires exhibiting a weapon that is “readily capable of
lethal use
in an angry or threatening manner.” “Lethal” means “[cjapable of causing death,”
Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014), so threatening use of such a weapon necessarily involves a threatened use of -violent force, not merely an unwanted physical touching.
Pulliam,
therefore, is consistent with
Curtis Johnson.
Hudson’s third offering,
Descamps v. United States,
— U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), addressed when a sentencing court may apply the so-called “modified categorical approach” to determine whether a prior offense is a violent felony under the ACCA. This approach allows courts, when confronted with state statutes that define multiple alternative offenses, to consult a limited class of judicial records to 'determine under which alternative the defendant was convicted.
Id.
at 2281.
Mathis v. United States,
— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct; 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), clarified that the modified categorical approach applies only when a statute sets forth alternative elements that define multiple offenses, not when a statute articulates multiple means of committing a single offense.
Id.
at 2252-53.
Neither
Descamps
nor
Mathis
affects the vitality of
Pulliam.
Section 571.030.1 of the Missouri statutes enumerates multiple offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of a weapon.
Yates v. State,
158 S.W.3d 798, 801-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). Hudson was convicted under subdivision (4). That subdivision is phrased in the alternative, applying to exhibition of a weapon in an “angry
or
threatening manner.”
Pulliam,
however, reasoned that a violation of subdivision (4)
categorically
is a violent felony: “displaying an operational weapon before another in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened, use of physical force against another person.” 566 F.3d at 788. Thus, assuming for the sake of analysis that subdivision (4) defines a single
offense,
Pulliam
already concluded that both means of committing the offense (an angry display or a threatening display) involve the requisite threatened use of force. The Supreme Court’s refinement of the categorical analysis under § 924(e) therefore does not affect our circuit precedent in
Pulliam.
Hudson also seems to suggest that
Pulliam
conflicts with
United States v. Fields,
167 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 1999), and
United States v. Jackson,
462 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2006), because thpse earlier decisions held that § 571.030.1(4) constitutes a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of the guidelines.
Jackson,
462 F.3d at 901;
Fields,
167 F.3d at 1191. The residual clause followed a list of several enumerated offenses and encompassed any offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2015).
Fields
and
Jackson
do not conflict with
Pulliam-,
they simply address a different issue. Under circuit precedent, Hudson’s prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence under
both
the force clause of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1)
(Pulliam) and
the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2)
(.Fields
and
Jackson).
The district court here relied on the force clause, and that decision was correct in light of
Pulliam.
Hudson has not identified any developments in Missouri law after 2009 that undermine the court’s conclusion in
Pulliam.
Although this court in
United States v. Dixon,
822 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2016), construed Missouri law to mean that the State need not prove that a weapon is “functional” to satisfy the elements of § 571.030.1(4), the weapon that is exhibited in an angry or threatening manner must be “readily capable of lethal use.”
Id.
at 466;
cf. id.
at 467 (Kelly, J., concurring). Thus, even if “functional” is deemed synonymous with “operational,” such that
Pul-liam’s
assumption about an offender displaying an “operational weapon” could be questioned in light of
Dixon, see
566 F.3d at 788, the
Pulliam
court’s ultimate conclusion remains sound in light of the statutory elements: Displaying a weapon that is “readily capable of lethal use” before another in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened use of physical force against another person.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.