United States v. Steven Fishoff

949 F.3d 157
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJanuary 30, 2020
Docket18-3549
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 949 F.3d 157 (United States v. Steven Fishoff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Steven Fishoff, 949 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2020).

Opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 18-3549 ____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

STEVEN FISHOFF, Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D. C. Criminal No. 3-15-cr-00586-001) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on July 8, 2019

Before: MCKEE, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 30, 2020)

Daniel T. Brown Murphy & McGonigle 1001 G Street, NW Seventh Floor Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for Appellant

Mark E. Coyne John F. Romano Office of United States Attorney 970 Broad Street Room 700 Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel for Appellee

O P I N I ON

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

Under Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act, a defendant who violates a Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule or regulation but proves that he “had no knowledge of such rule or regulation” is not subject to imprisonment. 1 The rule is intended to protect laypersons

1 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).

2 who commit technical violations. 2 This case requires us to determine the precise burden on a defendant who wishes to use the so-called “non-imprisonment defense.” We hold that a defendant can establish lack of knowledge and avoid imprisonment if he demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not know the substance of the rule or regulation that he violated. Because appellant Steven Fishoff did not establish a lack of knowledge of the rule that he pled guilty to violating and because his other procedural arguments fail, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I

Fishoff began trading securities in the early 1990s. He was a skilled trader and eventually quit his job in the clothing manufacturing sector to trade full-time. He initially traded in partnership with a “backer,” i.e., an investor who provided the capital for his trading activity. By 2009, he had earned enough money to set up his own firm, Featherwood Capital, Inc. At Featherwood, he had one full-time employee and also worked with several independent contractors. He controlled accounts that yielded profits between $2 and $5 million per year. Despite his successes, Fishoff neither had any formal training in nor took any courses on the securities markets, regulations, or compliance. Nor did he ever hold a securities or other professional license. He operated Featherwood without any expert legal or regulatory advice.

2 See United States v. Lilley, 291 F. Supp. 989, 992 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (citing Report of the Joint Conference Committee, 78 Cong. Rec. 10263 (1934)); see also 78 Cong. Rec. 8295-96 (1934) (statement of Sen. Steiwer).

3 One of Fishoff’s practices was short-selling a company’s stock in anticipation of the company making a secondary offering. Short-selling is the sale of a security that the seller has borrowed with the belief that the price of the security will drop. This enables the seller to make a profit by buying back the stock at a lower price before returning it. Secondary offerings, i.e., when a public company issues and sells new shares to raise money, can cause the company’s share price to decrease because the new shares dilute the value of existing shares. Not surprisingly, many traders and market researchers try to predict when a company will make a secondary offering by, for example, forecasting when a company will need an influx of cash. In order to make such a forecast, a trader will use public financial disclosures or watch for updated shelf registration statements. 3

Although secondary offerings are confidential, a company, through its underwriter, may contact potential buyers to assess interest in the offering. Different investment banks, acting as underwriters, take different approaches in authorizing their salespeople to describe the subject company and its market capitalization. However, when a salesperson provides confidential information, such as the name of the

3 Short-selling can artificially depress a stock’s price. To ensure that secondary offerings reflect market forces, the SEC issued Rule 105 of Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.105, which generally prohibits the purchase of securities in secondary offerings if the purchaser engaged in short-selling of that stock within a five-day period before the offering. Although Rule 105 is not at issue here, it is the subject of certain claims in a related SEC case. SEC v. Fishoff, No. 13-cv-3725-MAS- DEA (D.N.J.) (filed June 3, 2015).

4 issuing company and the pricing and timing of the offering, the recipient of this information is considered to be “over the wall” or “OTW” and is barred by relevant law, including the SEC’s Rule 10b-5-2, from trading the issuer’s securities or disclosing the information to anyone else before the offering is publicly announced. Otherwise, the recipient will have an unfair advantage and be able to profit from the inside information, for example by short-selling the stock and repurchasing it after the announcement of the secondary offering, assuming the price has indeed dropped.

The criminal insider trading activity at issue in this case relates to Featherwood’s practice of receiving confidential information about impending secondary offerings, i.e. being brought over the wall, and short-selling based on that inside information. Two of Fishoff’s associates, Ronald Chernin and Steven Constantin, opened accounts at investment banking firms and cultivated relationships with investment bankers in order to receive solicitations to invest in secondary offerings. Chernin and Constantin learned about specific secondary offerings from the investment banks and agreed to keep the information confidential. They then telephoned Fishoff and told him they were “OTW” and had learned when a certain company was planning a secondary offering. Fishoff would short-sell the company’s shares, later profiting by purchasing the shares after the announcement of the secondary offering, when the price had fallen. Fishoff also shared the inside information with Paul Petrello, a long- time business associate, personal friend, and former colleague at Worldwide Capital, one of Fishoff’s early backers. Petrello similarly used the inside information to short-sell, and he and Fishoff split the trading profits. Petrello testified at his own plea hearing that Fishoff would send the first two letters of

5 the company’s stock trading symbol by text message and then tell him the last two letters by phone. 4

In November 2015, Fishoff was charged in a five- count Indictment including one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and four separate counts of securities fraud. He eventually pled guilty to Count 4, securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. His plea related to the trading of stock in Synergy Pharmaceuticals, Inc. As described in the plea agreement, in the government’s sentencing memorandum, and at the plea hearing, Chernin was solicited by phone to participate in Synergy’s confidentially marketed secondary offering and brought over the wall on April 30, 2012. He called Fishoff a few minutes later.

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Bluebook (online)
949 F.3d 157, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-steven-fishoff-ca3-2020.