United States v. Stebbins

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 28, 2025
• Docket: 24-2958
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 28 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-2958 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:20-cr-00049-BMM-1 v. MEMORANDUM* CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL STEBBINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Brian M. Morris, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 26, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Christopher Michael Stebbins appeals from the district court’s denial of his

motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 821

to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo both the district court’s “interpretation and application

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of the Sentencing Guidelines” and “determination that it does not have the

authority to reduce a sentence.” United States v. D.M., 869 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th

Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not

recount them here. We affirm.

Stebbins’s original sentence is below the low end of his amended guideline

range, and he did not provide substantial assistance. Accordingly, he is not eligible

for a reduction in sentence under United States Sentencing Guidelines

Section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), which provides, “the court shall not reduce the

defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy

statement to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range”

unless the exception for substantial assistance applies. U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 921 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2019) (noting a defendant’s eligibility for a sentence reduction is decided by

determining “whether a reduction is consistent with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 1B1.10, the policy statement that implements § 3582(c)(2)”).

Stebbins’s challenges to Section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) also are unpersuasive. As

an initial matter, in United States v. Tercero, 734 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2013), we

held that the amendment of Section 1B1.10 “does not affect” the two-step process

mandated by Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010). Stebbins’s argument

that Dillon is not binding is therefore foreclosed.

2 24-2958 There is no conflict between Section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) and Section 5K1.2

because the provisions relate to different proceedings—Section 5K1.2 concerns

sentencing, while Section 1B.10(b) concerns sentence modifications. See U.S.S.G.

§ 5K1.2 (“A defendant’s refusal to assist authorities in the investigation of other

persons may not be considered as an aggravating sentencing factor.” (emphasis

added)). The sentencing court already sentenced Stebbins and did not consider his

refusal to assist authorities as an aggravating sentencing factor. Because a

sentence modification proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) is an act of congressional

lenity, it is “not constrained by the general policies underlying initial sentencing or

even plenary resentencing proceedings.” United States v. Padilla-Diaz, 862 F.3d

856, 861 (9th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Navarro, 800 F.3d 1104, 1112

(9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he restrictions and rules associated with sentencing do not

carry over to sentence reduction proceedings, which are instead governed by their

own set of rules.”). Thus, Section 5K1.2 plays no role in proceedings under

§ 3482(c)(2).

Moreover, the fact that Stebbins cannot benefit from a congressional act of

lenity because he is already serving a below-the-guideline range sentence does not

mean he is being “punished.” As the district court noted, not receiving a benefit

“does not amount to a punishment.”

3 24-2958 Section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)’s limitation on when a sentence may be reduced

does not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See Dillon, 560 U.S.

at 828 (“[T]he sentence-modification proceedings authorized by § 3582(c)(2) are

not constitutionally compelled” and “do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right

to have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). Accordingly,

it does not violate the right to trial. Moreover, Stebbins has already exercised his

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—there has been no constitutional deprivation

of that right.

We have already rejected an equal protection challenge to

Section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A). See Padilla-Diaz, 862 F.3d at 862. In Padilla-Diaz, we

concluded that “[w]hile § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) will sometimes produce unequal and

arguably unfair results, Defendants have not shown that it fails rational basis

review.” Id. Similarly, here, Stebbins does not show why Section 1B1.10(b)(2)’s

differential treatment between those who have provided substantial assistance with

those who have not fails rational basis review.

Finally, there is no conflict between Section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), which are factors a court must consider in imposing a sentence. As

noted, “rules associated with sentencing” are generally not applicable in sentence

modification proceedings. Navarro, 800 F.3d at 1112. Moreover, Stebbins does

not contend the sentencing court did not consider the § 3553(a) factors during his

4 24-2958 original sentencing. See Tercero, 734 F.3d at 983 (rejecting the argument that

Section 1B1.10 conflicts with the Guidelines’ purpose and noting the sentencing

court “did consider the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a)” when it

“originally sentenced” the defendant (emphasis in original)). And for a motion for

a reduction in sentence, a court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors

is triggered only after the court finds that a defendant is eligible for a reduction in

sentence. See id.

In sum, the district court properly denied Stebbins’s motion to reduce his

sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 821 to the Guidelines.

AFFIRMED.

5 24-2958