United States v. Stapp

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-6157 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 24, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-6157 (D.C. No. 5:24-CR-00303-HE-1) KENT MATTHEW STAPP, (W.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, BACHARACH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Kent Matthew Stapp is a prisoner who pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited

object. See 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2). He was sentenced to 24 months in prison. 1

Mr. Stapp seeks to appeal his sentence, but the government has moved to enforce the

appeal waiver contained in his plea agreement. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d

1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

Mr. Stapp was already incarcerated when the underlying conduct for the instant 1

offense occurred. The 24-month sentence was imposed to run consecutively to his previous sentence. Appellate Case: 25-6157 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 2

Mr. Stapp’s attorney responded, saying it would be frivolous to oppose the

government’s motion, and he requests to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738, 744 (1967). Mr. Stapp filed a pro se response in opposition to his attorney’s Anders

motion. He appears to argue that his appeal falls outside of the scope of his appeal

waiver and that he did not enter into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. 2 He

specifically argues that his sentence was too high, because, while he possessed a

prohibited object, he did not possess a weapon, and his plea agreement led him to believe

that he would be sentenced for possessing a prohibited object, not a weapon. He also

appears to assert that the attorneys involved in his proceedings below tricked him into

entering a guilty plea.

We will enforce an appeal waiver if (1) the appeal falls within the waiver’s scope,

(2) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal, and (3) enforcing

the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.

Scope of the Waiver

Mr. Stapp waived the right to appeal his conviction as part of his plea agreement.

And he waived the right to appeal his sentence unless it exceeded the applicable

Sentencing Guidelines range, which was 27 to 33 months in prison. We reject his

argument that his sentence was too high. Mr. Stapp’s 24-month sentence does not meet

this exception, so his appeal waiver covers this appeal.

2 We construe Mr. Stapp’s pleadings liberally but do not serve as his advocate. Luo v. Wang, 71 F.4th 1289, 1291 n.1 (10th Cir. 2023).

2 Appellate Case: 25-6157 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 3

Knowing and Voluntary Waiver

Both the plea agreement and the plea colloquy make clear that the plea waiver was

knowing and voluntary. Mr. Stapp underwent a competency evaluation before entering

his plea and was found competent to proceed. The plea agreement, which Mr. Stapp

signed, states that the appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary. The district court, in

accepting Mr. Stapp’s guilty plea, complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b) and conducted an

adequate plea colloquy.

Turning to Mr. Stapp’s arguments on this factor, we conclude that he entered into

his plea knowingly and voluntarily. First, he represented to the district court in the text of

his plea agreement and during the plea colloquy that he possessed an object that could be

used as a weapon. Second, our review of the record does not reflect any collusion or

trickery from any party as relates to Mr. Stapp’s guilty plea.

Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Stapp’s plea was entered unknowingly or

involuntarily.

Miscarriage of Justice

Enforcing an appeal waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice if (1) the district

court relied on an impermissible sentencing factor; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel in

negotiating the waiver makes it invalid; (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum;

or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful in a way that seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. We see

nothing suggesting that enforcing the waiver here will result in a miscarriage of justice.

3 Appellate Case: 25-6157 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 4

We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. We grant the government’s motion to

enforce the appeal waiver. We dismiss this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam