United States v. Stanelle

184 F. Supp. 2d 854, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1743, 2002 WL 104809
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 24, 2002
Docket00CR007
StatusPublished

This text of 184 F. Supp. 2d 854 (United States v. Stanelle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Stanelle, 184 F. Supp. 2d 854, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1743, 2002 WL 104809 (E.D. Wis. 2002).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

ADELMAN, District Judge.

Defendant Deborah Stanelle pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud conspiracy for her role in a property-flipping scheme that involved some sixty-three properties, thirty-seven of which were charged in the indictment. I here address the government’s motion for a restitution order.

I. BACKGROUND

Stanelle purchased inner-city Milwaukee properties at foreclosure, tax, and other distressed property sales, and then swiftly resold them at much higher prices. The purchase moneys were financed by mortgages on the properties, and the artificially high sales prices were based upon misrepresentations about such matters as the value of the properties, the amount of down payments, and whether Stanelle held second mortgages. In addition, for some properties, Stanelle and her colleagues recorded sham intermediate sales to one another at high prices, although the represented amount of money did not change hands. Finally, the mortgage brokers who arranged the mortgages accepted bribes for such favors in approving mortgages as overlooking ultimate buyers’ poor credit records.

The conspiracy’s profits were thus funded by fraudulently obtained mortgages. Several mortgages have already been defaulted upon, leading to foreclosures and distressed property sales. It is therefore probable that mortgage originators and/or holders lost money due to the conspiracy.

I sentenced Stanelle February 9, 2001 and, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), granted victims 90 days in which to establish the amount of their losses so that I could enter an appropriate restitution order.

II. STANDARD OF DECISION

I first assess whether this case is covered by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, or the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663. The MVRA extends to all Title 18 offenses against property, including offenses committed by fraud or deceit, that cause pecuniary loss to an identifiable victim or victims. § 3663A(c)(1). The court in United States v. Cummings, No. 01-CR-153 (DLC), 2002 WL 27752, at *5, 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 249, at *17-*18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.10, 2002), recently found that “the term ‘offense against property’ used in § 3663A(c)(l) to describe the Title 18 offenses for which restitution is mandatory should also mean an offense against ‘tangible property.’ ” The court therefore concluded that a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to commit theft of money through fraud, including loan fraud, was covered *857 under the MVRA rather than the VWPA. Id., 2002 WL 27752, at *5-*6, 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 249, at *19. I follow Cummings and find that the present case is governed by the MVRA because it involves a conspiracy under § 371 to commit bank fraud.

The MVRA directs that restitution is to be ordered to any victims who are “directly and proximately harmed” as a result of the offense of conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). The court must determine the full amount of each victim’s losses and order restitution to each victim in that amount. § 3664(f)(1)(A). The government must establish each victim’s amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence, § 3664(e), and must prove that the defendant (or a co-conspirator) caused the loss, United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 968 (7th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1263, 120 S.Ct. 2721, 147 L.Ed.2d 986 (2000). The government must provide evidence “regarding the victims’ actual losses which directly resulted from the offenses of conviction.” United States v. Menza, 137 F.3d 533, 538 (7th Cir.1998). If a victim’s loss did not result solely from the offense of conviction, restitution is to be ordered in “the amount (if any) of the loss that is reasonably attributable to the illegal scheme.” Martin, 195 F.3d at 969.

The MVRA defines “loss” as the greater of the value of the property on the date of loss, or on the date of sentencing, less the value of any part of the property that is returned. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(l)(B). Where the property is a fraudulently-obtained loan backed by collateral, each victim’s MVRA loss is the amount the victim realized, less the basis, subject to appropriate adjustments for that victim. Each victim’s amount realized is the amount it received from selling or reselling the loan or disposing of the collateral; if it still owns the loan and has not disposed of the collateral when restitution is ordered, the fair market value of the loan may be used instead if it can be ascertained or estimated with sufficient accuracy. The loan originator’s basis is the amount it lent; each successive holder’s basis is its cost to purchase the loan. Adjustments for each victim require subtracting any repayments of principal to that victim and, under United States v. Shepard, 269 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir.2001), adding appropriate prejudgment interest.

Restitution loss amounts may be established through inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, so long as the evidence has “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 542 (7th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). Nonetheless, the preponderance of the evidence standard is the same that is needed to establish damage amounts in civil litigation; the government’s burden requires it to do more than merely submit a victim’s invoice asserting some dollar figure as its loss amount. Menza, 137 F.3d at 538.

III. ANALYSIS

AMRESCO Residential Mortgage Corporation (“AMRESCO Residential Mortgage Corp.”) purchased many of the mortgages involved in this case, and is the only victim to request restitution. Three of its mortgages—for $33,000, $33,600, and $24,747, respectively, for a total amount lent of $91,347—had gone through foreclosure by the time of sentencing, and AM-RESCO Residential Mortgage Corp. limited its MVRA restitution request to its losses on those three mortgages. In its initial request, which the government endorsed, AMRESCO Residential Mortgage Corp. asserted that its loss on the first two loans was the entire loan amount, and that its loss on the third loan was $10,351.76, for a total loss amount of $76,951.76. In a *858

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Related

United States v. Philip J. Menza
137 F.3d 533 (Seventh Circuit, 1998)
United States v. Willie A. Newman
144 F.3d 531 (Seventh Circuit, 1998)
United States v. Everett v. Shepard
269 F.3d 884 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Laurence Seward
272 F.3d 831 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
184 F. Supp. 2d 854, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1743, 2002 WL 104809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-stanelle-wied-2002.