United States v. Specialty Contracting & Supply, Inc. (In Re Specialty Contracting & Supply, Inc.)

140 B.R. 922, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 917, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 830
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedMay 28, 1992
Docket15-62805
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 140 B.R. 922 (United States v. Specialty Contracting & Supply, Inc. (In Re Specialty Contracting & Supply, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Specialty Contracting & Supply, Inc. (In Re Specialty Contracting & Supply, Inc.), 140 B.R. 922, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 917, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 830 (Ga. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER

W. HOMER DRAKE, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment, filed in the above-referenced proceeding by the plaintiff, United States of America (“Plaintiff”) against the defendant, Specialty Contracting & Supply, Inc. (“Debtor”), against the defendant Richard Scott Fraley (“Fraley”), and against the Bank of Newnan (“Bank”). Bank has filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff. This is a core proceeding over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(K). The following constitutes the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

*923 FINDINGS OF FACT

In 1986, Debtor was formed as a Louisiana corporation. Debtor is in the business of selling, consulting, and mechanical services. Debtor’s corporate offices were moved to Austin, Texas on January 5,1989, and then in March, 1990, the corporate offices were moved to Sharpsburg, Coweta County, Georgia. Fraley, Bank, and Plaintiff each claim a security interest in Debt- or’s property.

Fraley, a corporate officer of Debtor, claims a security interest in Debtor’s equipment, inventory, furniture, fixtures, accounts receivable, machinery, and tools through a security agreement dated December 18, 1989. As evidenced by a promissory note attached to the security agreement, the security agreement secures a loan of $95,000.00 plus interest. On January 2, 1990, since Debtor’s corporate offices were still in Texas, Fraley filed a financial statement in Texas which noted as security Debtor’s equipment and inventory. Fraley has not filed a financial statement in Georgia with respect to his security agreement with Debtor.

Bank claims a security interest in Debt- or’s property through a security agreement dated October 22, 1990. The security agreement with Bank secures a loan of $10,100.00 to Debtor for the purpose of purchasing a 1990 Ford Ranger (“Truck”) and lists the Truck as collateral for the loan. Bank subsequently forwarded its application for the Certificate of Title in the Truck to the Georgia Department of Revenue. On November 7, 1990, the Certificate of Title was issued to Bank. Bank entered into another security agreement with Debt- or on November 30, 1990. The second security agreement secures a loan of $60,-000.00 and lists the following as collateral: office furniture, inventory, equipment, a 1983 GMC truck and a 1985 Ford truck. On December 5, 1990, Bank filed a financial statement in Georgia which noted as security office furniture and a Clark forklift.

Plaintiff claims a lien on all of Debtor’s property through a Notice of Federal Tax Lien filed in Coweta County on September 13, 1990, and a Notice of Federal Tax Lien filed in Coweta County on November 12, 1990. The first Notice of Federal Tax Lien secures tax liabilities of $23,445.79 resulting from Debtor’s third quarter 1989 Form 941. The second Notice of Federal Tax Lien secures tax liabilities of $117,788.74 resulting from Debtor’s fourth quarter 1989 Form 941 and the first, second, and third quarter 1990 Forms 941. After both notices were filed, Debtor paid the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) $6,000 on a check dated October 17, 1990, and $25,000 on a check dated December 3, 1990.

On December 28, 1990, Debtor filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. On October 11, 1991, Plaintiff filed a Complaint to Determine the Extent and Priority of Liens. In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that its federal tax liens are entitled to priority over any other lien or claim. On February 18, 1992, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that its federal tax liens are entitled to priority over Fraley’s security interest and both of Bank’s security interests. Fraley responded by arguing that his security interest in Debtor’s property has priority over Plaintiff’s federal tax liens. Fraley also asserted that Plaintiff’s first federal tax lien securing tax liabilities of $23,445.79 was satisfied by two checks dated October 17, 1990, and December 3, 1990, respectively. Bank responded by filing a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on March 13, 1992. In the Cross-Motion, Bank asserted that its security interest of $10,100.00 with the Truck as collateral is entitled to priority over Plaintiff’s federal tax liens. Bank conceded that Plaintiff’s federal tax liens are entitled to priority over Bank’s $60,000 security interest. Debtor’s case has recently been converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, which incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this Court will grant a motion for summary judgment only when there is no material issue of fact to be tried and the movant is *924 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), on remand, 826 F.2d 33 (D.C.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S.Ct. 1028, 98 L.Ed.2d 992 (1988). The movant has the burden to. establish that no such factual issue exists, Id. Id. 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, and the Court will read the opposing party’s pleadings liberally. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, to be granted when there is no room for controversy. In re Earhart, 68 B.R. 14, 15 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 1986); In re Heath, 60 B.R. 338, 339 (Bankr.D.Colo.1986).

Plaintiff argues that federal law controls the issue of priority between federal tax liens and security interests. In United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 240, 80 S.Ct. 1108, 1110, 4 L.Ed.2d 1192 (1960), the Supreme Court held that matters affecting the nature or operation of federal tax liens are federal questions. Once a federal tax lien has attached to a debtor’s interest, federal law then determines the priority of competing lien holders. See Sherwin Williams Co. v. Dave Thomas Co., Inc. (In re Dave Thomas Co., Inc.), 51 B.R. 66, 68 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1985); See also Don King Productions, Inc. v. Thomas, 945 F.2d 529, 534 (2nd Cir.1991). Since federal tax liens have attached to Debtor’s interest in the present case, federal law will control the issue of priority between Plaintiff’s federal tax liens and Fraley’s security interest and between Plaintiff’s federal tax liens and Bank’s security interest in the Truck.

Under federal law, Plaintiff’s federal tax lien is not valid against holders of security interests until notice of the lien is properly filed under the state law in which the property is situated. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6323

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Dunn
D. Kansas, 2023
Boch v. United States (In Re Boch)
154 B.R. 647 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
140 B.R. 922, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 917, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 830, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-specialty-contracting-supply-inc-in-re-specialty-ganb-1992.