F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS July 11, 2006 FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-2124 (D.C. No. CR-05-595-JC) D A V ID SILV A , (D . N.M .)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BR ISC OE, O’BRIEN, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant David Silva pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to three
counts of possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The
district court sentenced him to concurrent 140-month terms of imprisonment for
each of the three counts. Although his sentence was within the statutory range
* This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. and the plea agreement waived any right to appeal a sentence w ithin the statutory
range, M r. Silva filed this appeal. Thereafter, the government moved to enforce
the plea agreement under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (per curiam). M r. Silva has responded that the motion should be denied
for the reasons that (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to waive an
appeal of the district court’s denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing on
alleged outrageous government conduct and (2) enforcing the plea agreement
would result in a miscarriage of justice seriously undermining the fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. As discussed below, w e
grant the government’s motion and dismiss the appeal.
In Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325, this court held that “in review ing appeals
brought after a defendant has entered into an appeal waiver” this court will
determine “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of
appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice.” A miscarriage of justice will result if (1) “the district
court relied on an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance
of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
invalid”; (3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is
otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quotation omitted). For an “otherwise
unlaw ful” w aiver, the error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
-2- reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
The government’s motion to enforce addresses each of the three Hahn
prongs. M r. Silva, however, opposes the motion only based on the second and
third. Thus, we need not address the first prong. 1 See United States v. Porter,
405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.) (recognizing each Hahn factor need not be
addressed if defendant does not make argument w ith respect to that factor), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 550 (2005).
KN OW ING AN D V OLU NTA RY W AIVER
M r. Silva argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the
waiver, because he did not know that the district court would, at the time of
sentencing, declare that it would not accept any evidence he intended to present
concerning wrongdoing by government agents and he did not know that the
district court would sentence him based on both his and the government agents’
wrongful conduct. In determining whether M r. Silva’s w aiver of his right to
appeal was made knowingly and voluntarily, we consider “whether the language
of the plea agreement states that [he] entered the agreement knowingly and
voluntarily” and whether there is “an adequate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. M r. Silva bears the “burden to present
1 In any event, it is clear that this appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights.
-3- evidence from the record establishing that he did not understand the waiver.” Id.
at 1329 (quotation omitted).
M r. Silva fails to meet his burden. The plea agreement fully set forth the
factual basis for the plea. It stated that he understood that the maximum term of
imprisonment was from five to forty years and that there could be no prediction
what sentence the district court would impose. R., Vol. 1, Doc. 66 at 2-3. The
plea agreement further stated that he “knowingly waives the right to appeal any
sentence within the statutory range applicable to the statute(s) of conviction.” Id.
at 7. It also provided that he
agrees and represents that this plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from those set forth in this plea agreement. There have been no representations or promises from anyone as to what sentence the Court will impose.
Id. Also, the signature section of the plea agreement provided that M r. Silva
“understand[s] the agreement and voluntarily sign[s] it.” Id. at 9.
Likewise, at the plea colloquy, M r. Silva indicated that he understood the
rights he was waiving and the terms of the plea agreement and that he was
pleading guilty voluntarily. Id., Vol. III at 5-7. He stated that he had reviewed
the plea agreement with his attorney and was satisfied with its terms. Id. at 5-6.
He further indicated that he understood that his sentence would be from five to
forty years’ imprisonment for each count. Id. at 6-7. In addition, he stated that
the facts set forth in the plea agreement were correct. Id. at 8.
-4- Nothing in the record suggests that M r. Silva did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter into the plea agreement. He presents no record evidence
showing that he did not understand the waiver. See United States v. Edgar,
348 F.3d 867, 872-73 (10th Cir. 2003). Although, after he pled guilty, he filed in
district court a motion to strike the waiver of an appeal, he did not argue in that
motion that his waiver was unknowing and involuntary. 2 The plea agreement
squarely addresses the amount and type of cocaine M r. Silva sold to the
government agents. He conceded those facts and indicated an awareness of the
possible punishment.
Knowledge of the specific claims of error in sentencing is not a prerequisite
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS July 11, 2006 FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-2124 (D.C. No. CR-05-595-JC) D A V ID SILV A , (D . N.M .)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BR ISC OE, O’BRIEN, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant David Silva pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to three
counts of possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The
district court sentenced him to concurrent 140-month terms of imprisonment for
each of the three counts. Although his sentence was within the statutory range
* This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. and the plea agreement waived any right to appeal a sentence w ithin the statutory
range, M r. Silva filed this appeal. Thereafter, the government moved to enforce
the plea agreement under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (per curiam). M r. Silva has responded that the motion should be denied
for the reasons that (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to waive an
appeal of the district court’s denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing on
alleged outrageous government conduct and (2) enforcing the plea agreement
would result in a miscarriage of justice seriously undermining the fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. As discussed below, w e
grant the government’s motion and dismiss the appeal.
In Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325, this court held that “in review ing appeals
brought after a defendant has entered into an appeal waiver” this court will
determine “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of
appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice.” A miscarriage of justice will result if (1) “the district
court relied on an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance
of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
invalid”; (3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is
otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quotation omitted). For an “otherwise
unlaw ful” w aiver, the error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
-2- reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
The government’s motion to enforce addresses each of the three Hahn
prongs. M r. Silva, however, opposes the motion only based on the second and
third. Thus, we need not address the first prong. 1 See United States v. Porter,
405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.) (recognizing each Hahn factor need not be
addressed if defendant does not make argument w ith respect to that factor), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 550 (2005).
KN OW ING AN D V OLU NTA RY W AIVER
M r. Silva argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the
waiver, because he did not know that the district court would, at the time of
sentencing, declare that it would not accept any evidence he intended to present
concerning wrongdoing by government agents and he did not know that the
district court would sentence him based on both his and the government agents’
wrongful conduct. In determining whether M r. Silva’s w aiver of his right to
appeal was made knowingly and voluntarily, we consider “whether the language
of the plea agreement states that [he] entered the agreement knowingly and
voluntarily” and whether there is “an adequate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. M r. Silva bears the “burden to present
1 In any event, it is clear that this appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights.
-3- evidence from the record establishing that he did not understand the waiver.” Id.
at 1329 (quotation omitted).
M r. Silva fails to meet his burden. The plea agreement fully set forth the
factual basis for the plea. It stated that he understood that the maximum term of
imprisonment was from five to forty years and that there could be no prediction
what sentence the district court would impose. R., Vol. 1, Doc. 66 at 2-3. The
plea agreement further stated that he “knowingly waives the right to appeal any
sentence within the statutory range applicable to the statute(s) of conviction.” Id.
at 7. It also provided that he
agrees and represents that this plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from those set forth in this plea agreement. There have been no representations or promises from anyone as to what sentence the Court will impose.
Id. Also, the signature section of the plea agreement provided that M r. Silva
“understand[s] the agreement and voluntarily sign[s] it.” Id. at 9.
Likewise, at the plea colloquy, M r. Silva indicated that he understood the
rights he was waiving and the terms of the plea agreement and that he was
pleading guilty voluntarily. Id., Vol. III at 5-7. He stated that he had reviewed
the plea agreement with his attorney and was satisfied with its terms. Id. at 5-6.
He further indicated that he understood that his sentence would be from five to
forty years’ imprisonment for each count. Id. at 6-7. In addition, he stated that
the facts set forth in the plea agreement were correct. Id. at 8.
-4- Nothing in the record suggests that M r. Silva did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter into the plea agreement. He presents no record evidence
showing that he did not understand the waiver. See United States v. Edgar,
348 F.3d 867, 872-73 (10th Cir. 2003). Although, after he pled guilty, he filed in
district court a motion to strike the waiver of an appeal, he did not argue in that
motion that his waiver was unknowing and involuntary. 2 The plea agreement
squarely addresses the amount and type of cocaine M r. Silva sold to the
government agents. He conceded those facts and indicated an awareness of the
possible punishment.
Knowledge of the specific claims of error in sentencing is not a prerequisite
for a knowing waiver of the right to appeal the sentence. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326.
In deciding whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, the focus in on the “right
relinquished” rather than on the “prospective result of the sentencing proceeding.”
Id. Therefore, M r. Silva’s inability to know what the district court would do at
sentencing has no bearing on whether he knowingly and voluntarily entered into
the waiver. Accordingly, based on the language of the plea agreement and his
reaffirm ation of the plea agreement’s provisions during the Rule 11 colloquy, w e
2 After entering into the plea agreement, M r. Silva filed a motion to modify the plea agreement, requesting that the district court strike the portion of the waiver stating that he knowingly waived his right to appeal any sentence within the applicable statutory range. He argued that the appeal waiver violated public policy and fairness concerns by precluding him from challenging on appeal the disparity in sentencing between cocaine powder and cocaine base. The district court denied the motion.
-5- conclude M r. Silva knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his
sentence.
M ISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
Next, M r. Silva argues that enforcing the waiver will result in a miscarriage
of justice because the waiver is “otherwise unlawful.” He maintains that the
majority of his sentencing time is based on outrageous government conduct and
sentencing entrapment or manipulation by government agents, who made several
cocaine purchases, switched their purchases from powder cocaine to crack
cocaine, and greatly increased the amounts they purchased, all solely to increase
his punishment. He contends that although he was predisposed to selling small
amounts of powder cocaine, the government agents entrapped him into selling
larger amounts of crack cocaine, thereby subjecting him to greater punishment.
W ithout a meaningful opportunity to challenge the government’s alleged wrongful
conduct, he argues that the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings will be undermined.
-6- In addition, he argues that the district court wrongly prejudged the issue
concerning the agents’ conduct. 3 This too, he argues, undermined the fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.
In deciding whether a waiver is “otherwise unlawful,” we consider, among
other things, whether the plea agreement correctly stated the statutory maximum,
and review whether the sentence conforms with plea agreement’s terms and
M r. Silva’s understanding of the plea. See United States v. M aldonado, 410 F.3d
1231, 1234 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 577 (2005). W e
conclude that M r. Silva has not met his burden to persuade us that the waiver is
“otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1233.
At the plea hearing, the district court informed M r. Silva that he would
have the right at sentencing to make a statement on his own behalf and to have his
3 In response to M r. Silva’s request for an evidentiary hearing, the district court, in part stated
W ell you can put on testimony if you want to, but I’m not going to buy it. I mean, they’re just doing their job. And if your guy wants to sell crack, that’s his problem. Just because they asked for it, he said, “I can get you crack,” or “I can get you meth.” W hatever. And they said, “W e’ll take either.” It’s kind of the end of the discussion for me.
....
He’s a drug dealer, a level V. He says he can supply anything, that he’s the big guy in Bernalillo. So if he’s the big guy in Bernalillo, he better be ready to take the consequences.
R., Vol. IV at 8-9.
-7- attorney make a statement. R., Vol. III at 9. Defense counsel did make a
statement at the sentencing hearing. At that time, the district court noted and
defense counsel agreed that there was no ambiguity about what M r. Silva sold to
the undercover agents. Nor is there any question that M r. Silva received a
sentence less than the statutory maximum, both in accordance with the plea
agreement’s terms and M r. Silva’s stated understanding of the possible sentence.
Accordingly, we conclude the plea was not “otherwise unlawful.” Indeed,
concerns of fairness, integrity, and public reputation favor enforcing the appellate
waiver.
W e GRANT the government’s motion to enforce the plea agreement and
DISM ISS the appeal. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT PER CURIAM
-8-