United States v. Shiheem Brown

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4186 Doc: 35 Filed: 06/29/2026 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4186

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHIHEEM OCTAVIOUS BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (5:23-cr-00251-M-RN-1)

Submitted: June 25, 2026 Decided: June 29, 2026

Before BENJAMIN and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Christopher S. Edwards, WARD AND SMITH, P.A., Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, Katherine Simpson Englander, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4186 Doc: 35 Filed: 06/29/2026 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Shiheem Octavious Brown pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

armed bank robbery and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a), (d), (e), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of

violence and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).

The district court sentenced Brown to 216 months’ imprisonment and five years of

supervised release.

On appeal, Brown’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning

whether the district court erred under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020),

by failing to unambiguously incorporate the district’s standing order specifying the

discretionary conditions of Brown’s supervised release. Although informed of his right to

do so, Brown has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government has moved to

dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in Brown’s plea agreement. We dismiss in

part and affirm in part.

“We review an appellate waiver de novo to determine its enforceability” and “will

enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls within its scope.”

United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[A]n appellate waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed

to it.” Id. at 224. To determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, “we look to

the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s experience, conduct,

educational background and knowledge of his plea agreement and its terms.” Id. “When

2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4186 Doc: 35 Filed: 06/29/2026 Pg: 3 of 4

a district court questions a defendant during a [Federal] Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 11

hearing regarding an appeal waiver and the record shows that the defendant understood the

import of his concessions, we generally will hold that the waiver is valid.” United States

v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021).

Our review of the record confirms that Brown knowingly and intelligently waived

his right to appeal his convictions and sentence on any ground except for ineffective

assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. We therefore conclude that the appellate

waiver is valid and enforceable and that any challenge to the reasonableness or calculation

of Brown’s sentence falls squarely within the waiver’s broad scope.

Turning to the issue raised by Anders counsel, Brown’s appeal waiver does not bar

this court from reviewing whether the district court committed reversible Rogers error. See

United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2021). In Rogers, we held that

a district court is required to orally pronounce at sentencing all discretionary conditions of

supervised release. 961 F.3d at 296. “[A] district court may satisfy its obligation to orally

pronounce discretionary conditions through incorporation—by incorporating, for instance,

all [Sentencing] Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release

sentence, and then detailing those conditions in the written judgment.” Id. at 299. A court

also “may comply with the pronouncement requirement by expressly incorporating a

written list of proposed conditions,” such as recommendations in a presentence report or

“a court-wide standing order that lists certain conditions of supervised release.” Id. In

addition to failing to announce or incorporate discretionary conditions of supervised

release, we have held that an unexplained inconsistency between the orally pronounced

3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4186 Doc: 35 Filed: 06/29/2026 Pg: 4 of 4

and written versions of a discretionary supervised release condition is also a Rogers error.

See United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 193-94 (4th Cir. 2022). We review de novo “the

consistency of the defendant’s oral sentence and the written judgment.” Id. at 193 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Here, at the sentencing hearing, the district court expressly incorporated the

mandatory and standard conditions of supervision adopted in the Eastern District of North

Carolina’s standing order. It then explicitly announced each of the special conditions of

supervised release not contained within the standing order. We have reviewed the record

and conclude that the court’s oral pronouncement matches those listed in the judgment.

In accordance with our obligations under Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record for any potentially meritorious issues that do not fall within the scope of the appeal

waiver and have found none. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss and

dismiss the appeal as to all issues falling within the scope of the broad appeal waiver in

Brown’s plea agreement. We also affirm the remainder of the criminal judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Brown, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Brown requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Brown. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART 4