United States v. Shannon Cotton

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: July 26, 2024
• Docket: 23-1591
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-1591 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

SHANNON L. COTTON, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 2:07-cr-20019-MMM-EIL-1 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 12, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2024 ____________________

Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Shannon Cotton violated his su- pervised release by using cocaine and losing all contact with his probation officer. After the district court revoked the re- lease, a dispute arose over the maximum period of imprison- ment Cotton could face for the violations. The district court determined that the answer was two years, disagreeing with the government’s contention that Cotton faced a maximum revocation sentence of five years. The question is difficult but, 2 No. 23-1591

in the end, we conclude the answer is five years based on the language Congress used in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). That leads us to vacate Cotton’s revocation sentence and to remand for resentencing. I Even though the question presented is primarily one of statutory construction, the issue presented arises from a com- plex procedural history. What’s important is keeping track of Cotton’s original conviction and sentence, the discretionary sentence reduction he later received, and intervening changes in law. Everything began in 2007, when Cotton pleaded guilty in federal court to two counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) for distributing and possessing with intent to distrib- ute at least five grams of cocaine. Each count brought with it a mandatory minimum term of five years’ imprisonment and a maximum term of forty years. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2007). But Cotton’s sentencing exposure in- creased to a mandatory minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life because the government, as was its right, invoked 21 U.S.C. § 851 and filed prior felony information based on Cot- ton’s two prior Illinois felony convictions for possessing and delivering cocaine in violation of 720 ILCS 570-401(c)(2), (d)(i). At sentencing the district court applied the Sentencing Guidelines, determined that Cotton qualified as a career of- fender, and imposed a sentence of 262 months (almost 22 years) and eight years of supervised release. In 2010, and while Cotton was serving his sentence, Con- gress passed the Fair Sentencing Act. See Pub. L. 111-220, 124 No. 23-1591 3

Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3, 2010). The statute altered the threshold of crack cocaine required to trigger certain statutory minimum and maximum sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841—the statute under which Cotton had been convicted. Specifically, Con- gress increased the quantity of cocaine necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum five-year term of imprisonment from 5 grams to 28 grams. By its terms, however, the Fair Sentencing Act applied only prospectively, not retroactively. The law later changed again, this time in a way favorable to Cotton. In 2018 Congress enacted the First Step Act, giving district courts the discretion to resentence an applicant “as if” the new penalties of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. See Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018). Cotton noticed the change in law and moved for a reduction in his sentence. The district court granted his motion and, in its discretion, reduced Cotton’s sentence from 262 months to 188 months. The district court’s order also expressly stated that “[e]xcept as provided above, all provisions of the [original] judgment dated 11/20/2007 shall remain in effect.” Cotton finished serving his sentence in the fall of 2020 and began his term of supervised release. As too often happens, though, Cotton’s struggle with substance abuse and drug dealing got the better of him, leading in time to his probation officer petitioning the district court to revoke supervised re- lease based on positive tests for using cocaine and marijuana and being arrested for possessing a sizeable quantity of mari- juana. A dispute then arose about the maximum revocation sen- tence Cotton faced for his violations of supervised release. Consistent with the view of the Probation Office, the 4 No. 23-1591

government took the position that the answer was five years. But Cotton believed any revocation sentence could not exceed two years. The different perspectives rooted themselves pri- marily in competing interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)— the statutory provision addressing maximum penalties at- taching to revocations of supervised release. The district court grappled with the statutory questions and in the end sided with Cotton and imposed a revocation sentence of two years with a new three-year term of super- vised release to follow. The government now appeals, renewing the legal conten- tions it pressed in the district court. II A The proper starting point is § 3583(e)(3), which tell us that a court, upon finding a violation of supervised release, may revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of su- pervised release ... except that a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any such revo- cation more than 5 years in prison if the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony, more than 3 years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony, or more than one year in any other case. No. 23-1591 5

Id. § 3583(e)(3). Notice at a basic level how Congress structured this pro- vision: by hinging the maximum revocation sentence upon the class of felony—A, B, C, or D—of the offense of conviction. What the parties dispute is the measurement point—whether the § 841 conviction is a class A, B, C, or D felony as a function of Cotton’s 2007 judgment (the government’s view) or, in- stead whether the class of felony turns on what the conviction and sentence would be under current law (Cotton’s view). An altogether different statute—18 U.S.C. § 3559—pro- vides an essential link in the chain of reasoning necessary to answer who has the better interpretation of § 3583(e)(3). Class A felonies are those with a maximum prison sentence of life. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1). Class B felonies are those with a maxi- mum term of 25 years or more (but less than life). Id. § 3559(a)(2). Class C felonies are those with a maximum term of 10 to 25 years in prison. Id. § 3559(a)(3). And, finally, class D felonies are those whose maximum is less than ten but five or more years. Id. § 3559(a)(4). Returning to § 3583(e)(3), both sides insist that the statute’s plain language supports their respective positions, with the government urging us to focus on Congress’s use of the past tense when stating that the class-of-felony determination de- pends on “the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release.” For the government, then, Cotton faced a maximum revocation sentence of five years because his original convic- tion in 2007 under § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B) exposed him to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment—a class A felony. The government gets there by reminding us that its filing of the § 851 prior felony information in Cotton’s original case 6 No. 23-1591

had the effect of increasing the statutory maximum sentence from 40 years to life. Cotton advances a different interpretation of § 3583(e)(3), directing our attention to Congress’s use of the present tense for determining what the class of Cotton’s original offense of conviction would be today—not, as the government would have it, what it was in 2007. To put the point in statutory terms, Cotton implores us to ask more generally whether an equivalent § 841 offense “is” (if it resulted in conviction today) a class A, B, C, or D felony. Asking the question in the present tense yields clear bene- fits for Cotton. He recognizes that, if convicted today of the same § 841 offense to which he pleaded in 2007, he would face a maximum sentence of 20 years. He gets there in two steps. First, he points to the Fair Sentencing Act’s modified drug quantity thresholds for cocaine charges under § 841 and cor- rectly observes that his five-gram offense today would result in the new (and not enhanced) twenty-year maximum term of imprisonment. Second—to explain why his sentence would not be enhanced today upon the government’s filing of a § 851 prior felony information—Cotton points to our 2020 decision in United States v. Ruth, where we concluded that prior Illinois cocaine convictions like Cotton’s do not trigger an enhance- ment under 21 U.S.C. § 841. See 966 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2020). Cotton presses both points, for their combined effect re- veals that if charged today with the same charges he faced in 2007, he would face a maximum sentence of 20 years—a class C felony—and thus, under the terms of § 3583(e)(3), a 2-year maximum revocation sentence. This is the reasoning the dis- trict court agreed with and adopted. No. 23-1591 7

B The government has the better position. We arrive at that conclusion by taking a step back and returning, as we must, to the language Congress employed in § 3583(e)(3). Recall that the maximum revocation sentence depends on whether “the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony,” or a class B felony, and so on. The present-tense verb—“is”—cannot be divorced from what it modifies: “the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release.” Everyone agrees that Cotton’s 2007 conviction under § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) resulted in his term of supervised re- lease. See United States v. Ford, 798 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the “offense that resulted in the term of su- pervised release” is “the offense for which the defendant was initially placed on supervised release”). We can put the point another way. Section 3583(e)(3) does not ask whether someone else’s conviction for the same conduct “is” or would be a class A, B, C, or D felony under current law. The statute asks whether Shannon Cotton’s conviction un- der the 2007 version of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) “is” a class A, B, C or D felony. The answer is yes: Cotton’s 2007 conviction was for a class A felony and that remains true to- day. This construction of § 3583(e)(3)’s language aligns with the Supreme Court’s observation in Johnson v. United States that post-revocation penalties arise from and are “treat[ed] ... as part of the penalty for the initial offense.” 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000); see also United States v. Snyder, 635 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that § 3583(e)(3) refers to the felony 8 No. 23-1591

classification of the defendant’s offense as of the time of sen- tencing). In the final analysis, then, we conclude that Cotton’s 2007 federal cocaine conviction remains and therefore “is” a class A felony. And that remains so notwithstanding the passage of the First Step Act or our decision in Ruth. Indeed, nothing about a favorable exercise of the discretion conferred by the First Step Act to reduce a sentence—a benefit Cotton re- ceived—alters an original judgment of conviction. As the dis- trict court stated in reducing Cotton’s term of imprisonment under the First Step Act, “all other provisions of the [original] judgment … shall remain in effect.” Cotton’s sentence was re- duced, but his original conviction is intact. Nor did our decision in Ruth alter Cotton’s felony classifi- cation. In Ruth we held that an Illinois conviction for cocaine distribution does not qualify as a predicate for enhanced pen- alties under § 841 and § 851 because the state’s definition of cocaine is categorically broader than the parallel definition in the Federal Criminal Code. See 966 F.3d at 646–50. Cotton is right that if he were sentenced today, he would not be subject to the same penalties under § 841, nor would he receive a stat- utory sentencing enhancement based on his Illinois cocaine convictions. Again, though, Cotton is not being sentenced to- day: he remains convicted of the same offense and pursuant to the same judgment entered in 2007. Nothing we decided in Ruth modified Cotton’s 2007 judgment of conviction. See United States v. Jones, 833 F.3d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that intervening Supreme Court case law does not change the felony classification of the base offense under § 3583(e)(3)). A broader point also deserves emphasis. This entire ap- peal is about the maximum revocation sentence Cotton faced No. 23-1591 9

upon the district court’s determination that he violated the conditions of supervised release. A revocation sentencing proceeding is not an opportunity to challenge an underlying conviction, and, even more specifically, § 3583(e)(3) does not sit alongside § 2255 and present an alternative means availa- ble to federal prisoners to challenge some aspect of their con- viction or sentence. This point is clear in our case law. See United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that challenges to an original sentence cannot be raised during probation revocation proceedings); accord United States v. Brock, 39 F.4th 462, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2022) (em- ploying similar reasoning with respect to the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). C No doubt today’s decision will disappoint Shannon Cot- ton. He is represented by a very able counsel who devised the best available arguments for preserving the district court’s de- termination that the maximum revocation sentence cannot ex- ceed two years. While we have concluded that the maximum is five years, it warrants underscoring that the district court on remand has discretion in applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to select a reasonable revocation sentence below that upper limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (authorizing the consider- ation of specified § 3553(a) sentencing factors). In doing so, moreover, the district court may consider intervening changes in law since the time of Cotton’s original sentencing in 2007 and the reduction he received under the First Step Act. Cf. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 502 (2022) (hold- ing that a district court may consider nonretroactive legal changes when resentencing under the First Step Act). 10 No. 23-1591

With this closing observation, we VACATE Cotton’s rev- ocation sentence and REMAND to the district court for resen- tencing. No. 23-1591 11

PRYOR, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. ‘Ž—ȱ‘Š——˜—ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ Šœȱoriginally sentenced in 2007, ‘ŽȱŠŒŽȱŠȱ–Š¡’–ž–ȱ˜ȱ•’Žȱ’—ȱ™›’œ˜—ǰȱ–ŽŠ—’—ȱ‘’œȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ Šœȱ ŠȱŒ•ŠœœȱȱŽ•˜—¢ǯȱ˜›Žȱ‘Š—ȱŠȱŽŒŠŽȱ•ŠŽ›ǰȱ‘˜ ŽŸŽ›ǰȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ Šœȱ›ŽœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱunder the First Step Actǯȱ—ȱ ‘Ž—ȱ‘Žȱ’œȬ ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱ›ŽœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ˜Ĵ˜—ǰȱ’ȱ Šœȱ›Žšž’›Ž to recalculate ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ—Ž ȱœŠž˜›¢ȱœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱ›Š—Žǯȱ‘’œȱ›Š—Žǰȱ’—ȱž›—ǰȱ became zero to 30 years in prison—reclassifying ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ˜Ȭ fense as ŠȱŒ•ŠœœȱȱŽ•˜—¢ǯȱ —ȱ˜‘Ž›ȱ ˜›œǰȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱžœŽȱ its discretion—as ’ȱ ŠœȱŽ–™˜ Ž›Žȱ˜ȱ˜ȱ‹¢ȱ˜—›Žœœ—and ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽ•¢ȱapplied the Fair Sentencing Act through the First Step Act ˜ȱ›ŽœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ˜Ĵ˜—.

he majority opinionǰȱ‘˜ ŽŸŽ›ǰȱž›—œȱ‹ŠŒ”ȱ‘ŽȱŒ•˜Œ”ȱŠ—ȱ Ž›ŠœŽœȱ ‘Žȱ ’–™ŠŒȱ ˜ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ›ŽœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ǯ I cannot agree ’‘ȱthis conclusion, Šœȱ’ȱž—Ž›–’—Žœȱ‘ŽȱŸŽ›¢ȱ™ž›™˜œŽȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱŽěŽŒȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱFirst Step Act. I therefore respectfully dissent in part.

I. BACKGROUND A. ˜Ĵ˜—ȂœȱŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱŠ—ȱ —Ž›ŸŽ—’—ȱŸŽ—œ In 2007, ‘Š——˜—ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ ŠœȱŒ‘Š›Žȱ ’‘ǰȱŠ—ȱ™•ŽŠŽȱ guilty to, ’œ›’‹ž’—ȱŠ—ȱ™˜œœŽœœ’—ȱ ’‘ȱ’—Ž—ȱ˜ȱ’œ›’‹žŽȱ Šȱ•ŽŠœȱ꟎ȱ›Š–œȱ˜ȱŒ˜ŒŠ’—Žǯ 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) ǻŘŖŖŝǼǯȱŽŒŠžœŽȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ‘Šȱ ˜ȱprior state felony drug con- Ÿ’Œ’˜—œǰȱ‘Žȱ Šœȱ›Žšž’›Žȱ˜ȱœ™Ž—ȱ‹Ž ŽŽ—ȱ10 years and life in prison. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), 851 ǻŘŖŖŝǼǯȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱ Šœȱ Š•œ˜ȱ˜‹•’ŠŽȱ˜ȱ’–™˜œŽȱŠȱ•ŽŠœȱŽ’‘ȱ¢ŽŠ›œȱ˜ȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›ŽȬ lease. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Later, the district court sentenceȱ ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ ˜ almost 22 years (262 months) in prison. And it ordered eight years of œž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽȱ˜ȱ˜••˜ . 12 No. 23-1591

‘’•Žȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ ŠœȱœŽ›Ÿ’—ȱ‘’œȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽǰȱCongress passed the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. ŘřŝŘȱǻŘŖŗŖǼǯȱ‘’œȱŒ— ‘’Œ‘ȱŠ™™•’Žȱ˜—•¢ȱ™›˜œ™ŽŒ’ŸŽ•¢—in- Œ›ŽŠœŽȱ‘ŽȱŠ–˜ž—ȱ˜ȱŒ›ŠŒ”ȱŒ˜ŒŠ’—Žȱ—ŽŽŽȱ˜ȱ›’Ž›ȱŒŽ›Š’—ȱ mandatory minimum sentences under § 841. Id. § 2. In 2018, Congress –ŠŽȱ‘ŽȱŠ’›ȱŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱŒȂœȱ‹Ž—Žęœȱ ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱ˜›ȱŒŽ›Š’—ȱŽŽ—Š—œǰȱ’—Œ•ž’—ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ǰ through the First Step Act. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). ‘’œȱŒȱŠ••˜ Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›œȱ˜ȱ›ŽœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱŠȱŽŽ—Š—ȱȃŠœȱ ’Ȅȱ‘ŽȱŠ’›ȱŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱŒȂœȱ™Ž—Š•’Žœȱ Ž›Žȱ’—ȱŽěŽŒȱ ‘Ž—ȱ‘Žȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ŠœȱŒ˜––’ĴŽǯȱId. § ŚŖŚǻ‹Ǽǯȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ–˜Ÿed for a sen- tence reduction under the First Step Act. ‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž›ȱ ›Š—Žȱ ‘Žȱ ›ŽšžŽœ in 2020, reducing ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ œŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ ˜ȱ slightly more than 15 years (188 months). It also shortened ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽȱŽ›–ȱ˜ȱœ’¡ȱ¢ŽŠ›œǯ SŽŸŽ›Š•ȱ –˜—‘œȱ ŠŽ›ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ›ŽœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ǰȱ Žȱ ŽŒ’Žȱ United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020). In that case, Žȱ ŽŽ›–’—Žȱ ‘Šȱ ™›’˜›ȱ ••’—˜’œȱ Œ˜ŒŠ’—Žȱ Œ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—œ—•’”Žȱ the ones used to increase ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ –Š¡’–ž–ȱ œŽ—Ž—ŒŽ—do not trigger the § 841 sentencing enhancement. Id. at 644. B. ž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱŽ•ŽŠœŽȱŽŸ˜ŒŠ’˜— Ž›ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱcompleted the reduced sentence and Šœȱ›ŽȬ •ŽŠœŽȱ›˜–ȱ™›’œ˜—ǰȱ‘ŽȱŸ’˜•ŠŽȱ‘ŽȱŽ›–œȱ˜ȱ‘’œȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›ŽȬ lease. Because of this misstep, ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱ ŠœȱŽ—’•Žȱ ˜ȱȃ›ŽŸ˜”Žȱǽ˜Ĵ˜—ȂœǾȱŽ›–ȱ˜ȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽȄȱŠ—ȱ›Žšž’›Žȱ ‘’–ȱ˜ȱœŽ›ŸŽȱŠȱŽ›–ȱ˜ȱ’–™›’œ˜—–Ž—ǯȱŗŞȱǯǯǯȱȗȱřŞśřǻŽǼǻřǼǯȱ Here, the ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž— ’œȱŠœ”’—ȱžœȱ˜ȱdecide the maximum sentence of imprisonment that the district court could ‘ŠŸŽȱ imposed on ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ˜••˜ ’—ȱthe ›ŽŸ˜ŒŠ’˜—ǯȱ˜ȱŠ—œ Ž›ȱ‘’œȱ šžŽœ’˜—ǰȱ Žȱ –žœȱ •˜˜”ȱ to § řśŞřǻŽǼǻřǼǰȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ œŽœȱ ‘Žȱ No. 23-1591 13

maximum prison term for sentences ˜••˜ ’—ȱ Šȱ ›ŽŸ˜ŒŠ’˜—ȱ based on the Œ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜— of the underlying ˜ěŽ—œŽǯȱȃǽ Ǿȱ‘Žȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ‘Šȱ ›Žœž•Žȱ ’—ȱ ‘Žȱ Ž›–ȱ ˜ȱ œž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ ›Ž•ŽŠœŽȱ ’œȱ Šȱ class A felony,” then the reimprisonment term is limited to ꟎ȱ¢ŽŠ›œǯȱȗ 3853(e)(3). 1 A class B felony has a three-year max- ’–ž–ǰȱŠȱŒ•Šœœȱȱ˜›ȱȱŽ•˜—¢ȱ‘Šœȱ Šȱ ˜-year maximum, and any other felony type has a one-year maximum. Id. ‘ŽœŽȱŒ•ŠœȬ œ’ęŒŠ’˜—œȱŠ›ŽȱŽ—Ž›Š••¢ȱ‹ŠœŽȱ˜—ȱ‘Žȱ–Š¡’–ž–ȱŽ›–ȱ˜ȱ’–Ȭ ™›’œ˜—–Ž—ȱŠž‘˜›’£Žȱ‹¢ȱ‘ŽȱœŠžŽȱ˜ȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ǯȱȗȱřśśşǻŠǼǯ ŽŒŠ••ȱ‘Šǰȱ ‘Ž—ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ Šœȱ˜›’’—Š••¢ȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ’—ȱŘŖŖŝǰȱ ‘Žȱ Œ˜ž•ȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ ‹ŽŽ—ȱ œŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ ˜ȱ •’Žȱ ’–™›’œ˜—–Ž—ǯȱ ‘Šȱ –ŽŠ—œȱ ‘’œȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ŠœȱŠȱŒ•ŠœœȱȱŽ•˜—¢ǯȱȗȱřśśşǻŠǼǻŗǼǯȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ ™˜’—œȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ’—Ž›ŸŽ—’—ȱŽŸŽ—œȱ‘Šǰȱ‘Žȱ‹Ž•’ŽŸŽœǰȱ‘ŠŸŽȱœŽ— his Ž•˜—¢ȱŒ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱŒŠœŒŠ’—ȱ˜ —ǯȱ’›œǰȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱŠ›žŽœȱ‘Šȱ ‘’œȱ ›ŽŒŽ’™ȱ ˜ȱ ’›œȱ Ž™ȱŒȱ ›Ž•’Žȱ ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽ•¢ȱ ›ŽžŒŽȱ ‘Žȱ –Š¡’–ž–ȱ œŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ ‘Žȱ Œ˜ž•ȱ ›ŽŒŽ’ŸŽǰȱ ‘Ž›Ž‹¢ȱ Œ‘Š—’—ȱ ‘’œȱ class A felony into a class B felony. Second, he argues that our decision in Ruth, 966 F.3d at 644, made clear that his prior ›žȱŽ•˜—’Žœȱ Ž›Žȱ’–™›˜™Ž›•¢ȱžœŽȱ˜ȱ‘’”Žȱž™ȱ‘’œȱ–Š¡’–ž–ȱ sentence. Applying Ruthǰȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜—Ž—œǰȱ–ŽŠ—œȱ‘Šȱ‘’œȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ Œ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱœ‘˜ž•ȱ›˜™ȱŠŠ’——this time to a class C felony. ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱŠ›ŽŽȱ ’‘ȱŠ••ȱ˜ȱ‘’œȱŠ—ȱ˜ž—ȱ‘Š Cot- ˜—Ȃœȱž—Ž›•¢’—ȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ŠœȱŠȱŒ•ŠœœȱȱŽ•˜—¢ because he no •˜—Ž›ȱ ‘Šȱ Š—¢ȱ ™›’˜›ȱ ›žȱ Œ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—œȱ ˜›ȱ Šȱ œŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱ

1 ‘Žȱ–Š“˜›’¢ȱžœŽœȱ’—Ž›Œ‘Š—ŽŠ‹•¢ȱ‘ŽȱŽ›–œȱȃ˜Ž—œŽȄȱŠ—ȱȃŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ǯȄȱ

See AnteǰȱŠȱśǰȱŝǯȱŽŒ’˜—ȱřśŞřǰȱ‘˜ ŽŸŽ›ǰȱœ™ŽŠ”œȱ˜—•¢ȱ˜ȱ˜Ž—œŽœ—and not ˜ȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—œǯȱ —ȱŽ—Ž›Š•ǰȱŠ—ȱȃ˜Ž—œŽȄȱ’œȱŠȱŒ›’–’—Š•ȱŠŒǰȱ ‘Ž›ŽŠœȱŠȱȃŒ˜—Ȭ Ÿ’Œ’˜—Ȅȱ’œȱŽšž’ŸŠ•Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠȱȃ“ž–Ž—ǯȄ Offense, BLACKȂS LAW D  ȱ (12th ed. 2024); Conviction, BLACKȂS LAW D  ȱ (12th ed. 2024). Be- ŒŠžœŽȱ˜˜—ȱ˜Žœȱ—˜ȱ‹ŠœŽȱ‘’œȱŠ›ž–Ž—ȱ˜—ȱ‘Žȱ–ŽŠ—’—ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ ˜›ȱȃ˜Ȭ Ž—œŽǰȄȱ ȱ›Ž›Š’—ȱ›˜–ȱŒ˜—œ’Ž›’—ȱ ‘Ž‘Ž›ȱ‘Žȱ–Š“˜›’¢ȂœȱžœŽȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ ˜›ȱ ȃŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—Ȅȱ’—œŽŠȱ˜ȱȃ˜Ž—œŽȄȱž—Ž›–’—Žœȱ‘ŽȱœŠž˜›¢ȱŽ¡ȱ’—ȱȗȱřśŞřǯ 14 No. 23-1591

Ž—‘Š—ŒŽ–Ž—ȱ Š—ȱ ‘’œȱ –Š¡’–ž–ȱ Ž›–ȱ ˜ȱ ’–™›’œ˜—–Ž—ȱ Šœȱ —˜ ȱŘŖȱ¢ŽŠ›œ. II. ANALYSIS ‘Žȱ šžŽœ’˜—ȱ ™›ŽœŽ—Žȱ ’—ȱ ‘’œȱ Š™™ŽŠ•ȱ ’œȱ ‘Ž‘Ž› these ‘›ŽŽȱ’—Ž›ŸŽ—’—ȱŽŸŽ—œ—the Fair Sentencing Act, First Step Act relief, and Ruth—Œ‘Š—Žȱ ‘Žȱ Œ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱ ˜ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ȃ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ‘Šȱ›Žœž•Žȱ’—ȱ‘ŽȱŽ›–ȱ˜ȱǽ‘’œǾȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽ.” § 3583(e)(3). —Ž›ŸŽ—’—ȱŽŸŽ—œȱthat ˜ȱ—˜ȱ‘ŠŸŽȱ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱŽěŽŒȱŒŠ—Ȭ —˜ȱŠ•Ž›ȱ‘ŽȱŒ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱŠ—ȱž—Ž›•¢’—ȱŽ•˜—¢ because the underlying ˜ěŽ—œŽ has not been alteredǯȱ žȱ ’—Ž›ŸŽ—’—ȱ ŽŸŽ—œȱ ‘Šȱ are ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱ ’—ȱ —Šž›Ž—•’”Žȱ ’›œȱ Ž™ȱŒȱ ›ŽȬ lief—could Œ‘Š—Žȱ‘˜ ȱŠȱŽ•˜—¢ȱ’œȱŒ•Šœœ’ꮍǯ ȱŠ›ŽŽȱ ’‘ȱ‘Žȱ –Š“˜›’¢ȱ‘Šȱ‘’œȱšžŽœ’˜—ȱ’œȱŠȱ’ĜŒž•ȱ˜—Žǯȱžȱ ȱœŽŽȱŠȱ’Ÿ’Ȭ ’—ȱ•’—Žȱ‘Šȱ’œȱ Ž••-supported by existing precedent. A. ˜—-Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱ ‘Š—Žœ—Š’›ȱ Ž—Ž—Œ’—ȱŒȱ Š—ȱ Ruth Non-›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱŒ‘Š—Žœȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱ•Š ȱ ˜ž• not change the Œ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱ ˜ȱ Š—ȱ ȃ˜ěŽ—œŽȄȱ ž—Ž›ȱ ȗ 3583(e)(3). ‘ŠȂœȱ ‹ŽȬ cause the ȃ˜ěŽ—œŽ” ’œȱ—˜ȱŠěŽŒŽȱ‹¢ȱthe —Ž ȱ•ŽŠ•ȱ›ž•Ž ’‘ȱ ˜—•¢ȱ™›˜œ™ŽŒ’ŸŽȱŽěŽŒǯ Ž ȱœŠžŽœȱ˜›ȱ“ž’Œ’Š•ȱŽŒ’œ’˜—œȱ‘Šȱ arise after sentencing generally do not bear on the statutory penalties for § 3583(e)(3) ›ŽŸ˜ŒŠ’˜—ȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽœǯȱUnited States v. Ortiz, 779 F.3d 176, 180–82 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (inter- ŸŽ—’—ȱŽŒ’œ’˜—ȱ˜—ȱȱŽ•’’‹’•’¢ǼDzȱUnited States v. Johnson, 786 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2015) (Fair Sentencing Act); United States v. Turlington, 696 F.3d 425, 427–28 (3d Cir. 2012) (Fair Ž—Ž—Œ’—ȱŒǼǯȱ‘’œȱ›ž•ŽȱŠ•’—œȱ Ž••ȱ ’‘ȱ˜ž›ȱ™›ŽŒŽŽ—ȱ‘Šȱ ™›˜‘’‹’œȱŽŽ—Š—œȱ›˜–ȱŒ˜••ŠŽ›Š••¢ȱŠĴŠŒ”’—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱž—Ž›Ȭ •¢’—ȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱ›ŽŸ˜ŒŠ’˜—ȱŒ˜—Ž¡ǯȱE.g., United States No. 23-1591 15

v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1980). Although the majority does not say so explicitly, I understand it to be adopt- ’—ȱ‘’œȱ›ž•Žǯȱ ȱ ˜ž•ȱŠœȱ Ž••ǯ ‘’œȱ›ž•ŽȱŽ•’–’—ŠŽœȱŠ—¢ȱŠ›ž–Ž—ȱ‘Šȱ‘Žȱ™ŠœœŠŽȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 Œ‘Š—Žȱ ‘˜ ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ œ‘˜ž•ȱ‹ŽȱŒ•Šœœ’ꮍǯȱ‘ŽȱŒȱ Šœȱ—˜ȱ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽǰȱUnited States v. Clay, 50 F.4th 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2022), and therefore fails to apply to ŽŽ—Š—œȱ •’”Žȱ ˜Ĵ˜—. Turlington, 696 F.3d at 428 (noting that the Fair Sentencing Act does not apply to defend- Š—œȱ ‘˜ȱ Ž›Žȱ‹˜‘ȱŒ˜—Ÿ’ŒŽȱŠ—ȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ™›’˜›ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽȬ ŽŒ’ŸŽȱŠŽȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŒǼ. Similarly, our 2020 decision in Ruth, 966 F.3d at 644, ‘’Œ‘ȱ ŒŠ–Žȱ –˜—‘œȱ ŠŽ›ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ›ŽœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ǰȱ ˜Žœ not alter the Œ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱ ˜ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽǯȱ Žȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ noted that Ruth generally ˜Žœȱ—˜ȱ‘ŠŸŽȱ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱŽěŽŒ. See United States v. Vaughn, 62 F.4th 1071, 1072 (7th Cir. 2023). ‘Ž›Ž˜›Žǰȱ Ruth ȃŒŠ——˜ȱ‹ŽȱŠ™™•’ŽȄȱ˜ȱ›ŽŒ•Šœœ’¢ȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ˜ěŽ—œŽ because he Šœȱ œŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ Š—ȱ ›ŽœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ ‹Ž˜›Žȱ Ruth Šœȱ ‘Š—Žȱ ˜ —. Ortiz, 779 F.3d at 180–81. Indeed, the Second Circuit ŒŠ–Žȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱœŠ–ŽȱŒ˜—Œ•žœ’˜—ȱ ‘en a defendant argued that Š—ȱ’—Ž›ŸŽ—’—ȱŒŠœŽȱ‘Šȱ Šœȱ–žŒ‘ȱ•’”ŽȱRuth undermined his ™›ŽŸ’˜žœȱ›žȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—œȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž›Ž˜›ŽȱŒ‘Š—Žȱ‘ŽȱŒ•Šœœ’ęȬ ŒŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘’œȱ˜›’’—Š•ȱ˜ěŽ—œŽǯȱId. So, to the extent the majority concludes that non-retroac- ’ŸŽȱŒ‘Š—Žœȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱ•Š ȱŒŠ——˜ȱŠ•Ž›ȱ‘ŽȱŒ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ˜Ȭ ˜—Ȃœȱ˜ěŽ—œŽǰȱ ȱŒ˜—Œž›ǯ 2

2 Of course, nothing stops a district judge from considering non-retroac-

’ŸŽȱ Œ‘Š—Žœȱ ’—ȱ ‘Žȱ •Š ȱ ’—ȱ ˜›–ž•Š’—ȱ ‘Žȱ Š™™›˜™›’ŠŽȱ ›ŽŸ˜ŒŠ’˜—ȱ œŽ—Ȭ tence. See Ante, at 9; see also ŗŞȱǯǯǯȱȗȗȱřśśřǻŠǼǻŜǼǰȱřśŞřǻŽǼȱǻ›Žšž’›’—ȱ‘Žȱ 16 No. 23-1591

B. Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱ‘Š—Žœ—’›œȱŽ™ȱŒȱŽ•’Ž ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ Š›ž–Ž—ȱ Š‹˜žȱ ’›œȱ Ž™ȱ Œȱ ›Ž•’Žǰȱ ‘˜ ŽŸŽ›ǰȱ has merit. I respectfully ™Š›ȱ Š¢œ ’‘ȱ–¢ȱŒ˜••ŽŠžŽœȱ˜—ȱ‘Žȱ impact of ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›Ȃœȱ’œŒ›Ž’˜—Š›¢ȱŠ™™•’ŒŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ Š’›ȱŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱŒȱ˜ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ’—ȱŘŖŘŖ. ȃǽǾ‘Žȱ’›œȱŽ™ȱŒȂœȱŒŽ—›Š•ȱ˜Š•Ȅȱ Šœȱȃ˜ȱ–Š”Žȱ›Ž›˜ŠŒȬ ’ŸŽȱ ‘Žȱ Œ‘Š—Žœȱ ’—ȱ ‘Žȱ Š’›ȱ Ž—Ž—Œ’—ȱ Œ.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 497 (2022). —ȱ ‘Ž—ȱthe district Œ˜ž›ȱŽ¡Ž›Œ’œŽȱ’œȱ’œŒ›Ž’˜—ȱŠ—ȱŠŸŽȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ‘’œȱ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱ relief, ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ˜ȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜— Šœȱ›ŽŒ•Šœœ’ꮍ because ‘Žȱ–Š¡’–ž–ȱŽ›–ȱ˜ȱ’–™›’œ˜—–Ž—ȱ ŠœȱŽŒ›ŽŠœŽǯȱ‘Žȱ–ŠȬ jority ’—œŽŠȱŒ˜—Œ•žŽœȱ‘Šȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ Šœȱ—˜ȱ›ŽŒ•ŠœȬ œ’ꮍǯȱ ‘’œȱ ŽŽ›–’—Š’˜—— ‘’Œ‘ȱ ’œȱ unsupported by cited authority—undermines the ŸŽ›¢ȱ™ž›™˜œŽȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱFirst Step Act. œȱ Žȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ ’—œ›žŒŽǰȱ hen a district court ꗍœ a de- fendant eligible for relief under the First Step Act, the court –žœȱ ȃ›ŽŒŠ•Œž•ŠǽŽǾȱ ‘Žȱ œŠž˜›¢ȱ –’—’–ž–ȱ Š—ȱ –Š¡’–ž–ȱ ‘Šȱ ˜ž•ȱ‘ŠŸŽȱŠ™™•’Žȱ‘Šȱdzȱ‘ŽȱŠ’›ȱŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱŒȱ‹ŽŽ—ȱ ’—ȱŽěŽŒȱŠȱ‘Žȱ’–Žȱ‘ŽȱǽŽŽ—Š—Ǿȱ Šœȱ˜›’’—Š••¢ȱŒ˜—Ÿ’ŒŽǯȄȱ United States v. FowoweǰȱŗȱǯŚ‘ȱ śŘŘǰȱ śŘşȱǻŝ‘ȱ ’›ǯȱŘŖŘŗǼǯȱ‘Žȱ court may ‘Ž—ȱ›ŽžŒŽȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—ȂœȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ ’‘’—ȱ‘˜œŽȱ bounds. See id. at 529, 532. he courtǰȱ‘˜ ŽŸŽ›ǰ ’œȱ—˜ȱ›Žšž’›Žȱ to do so; it has broad discretion to refuse to resentence an oth- Ž› ’œŽ-šžŠ•’ꮍȱŽŽ—Š—ǯȱId. at 527. Here, the district court chose to use its discretion to resen- Ž—ŒŽȱ˜Ĵ˜—ǯȱ ȱ’ȱ—˜ȱ‘˜•ȱŠȱ‘ŽŠ›’—ȱ˜—ȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ–˜’˜—ȱŠ—ȱ ’œȱ ˜›Ž›ȱ Šœȱ ‹›’Žǯȱ žȱ ‘Ž›ŽȂœȱ —˜ȱ ›ŽŠœ˜—ȱ ˜ȱ ˜ž‹ȱ ‘Šȱ ‘Žȱ

Œ˜—œ’Ž›Š’˜—ȱ˜ȱž— Š››Š—ŽȱœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱ’œ™Š›’’Žœȱ‹Ž˜›ŽȱœŽ—’—ȱŠȱŽȬ Ž—Š—ȱ‹ŠŒ”ȱ˜ȱ™›’œ˜—Ǽǯ No. 23-1591 17

Œ˜ž›ȱ ˜••˜ Žȱ ˜ž›ȱ ’—œ›žŒ’˜—œȱ ’—ȱ Fowowe, and recalculated ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ—Ž ȱstatutory minimum and maximum œŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱȃŠœȱ if” the Fair Sentencing Act Šœ ’—ȱŽěŽŒ ‘Ž—ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ ŠœȱŒ˜—Ȭ Ÿ’ŒŽǯȱSee 1 F.4th at 532. ŽŒŠ••ȱ‘Šȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ ŠœȱŒ‘Š›Žȱ ’‘ǰȱŠ—ȱ™•ŽŠŽȱž’•¢ȱ to, ’œ›’‹ž’—ȱ Š—ȱ ™˜œœŽœœ’—ȱ ’‘ȱ ’—Ž—ȱ ˜ȱ ’œ›’‹žŽȱ Šȱ •ŽŠœȱ꟎ȱ›Š–œȱ˜ȱŒ˜ŒŠ’—Žǯ A ꟎-›Š–ȱŒ›ŠŒ”-Œ˜ŒŠ’—Žȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ’‘ȱŠȱ™›’˜›ȱŽ•˜—¢ȱ›žȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ȱ¢’Ž•ŽȱŠȱ–Š¡’–ž–ȱ˜ȱ•’Žȱ in prison in 2007 Š—ȱŠȱ•ŽŠœȱŽ’‘ȱ¢ŽŠ›œȱ˜ȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽ. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii), 851 (2007). ‘ŽȱŠ’›ȱŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱŒǰȱ‘˜ ŽŸŽ›ǰȱ’—Œ›ŽŠœŽȱ‘Žȱ‘›Žœ‘˜•ȱ ˜ȱŒ›ŠŒ”ȱŒ˜ŒŠ’—Žȱ—ŽŒŽœœŠ›¢ȱ˜ȱ›’Ž›ȱŒŽ›Š’—ȱ–Š—Š˜›¢ȱ–’—’Ȭ mums. Fowowe, 1 F.4th at 525. And if this Act had been in place ‹Ž˜›Žȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ Œ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ǰȱ ‘’œȱ ꟎-›Š–ȱ Œ›ŠŒ”-cocaine of- fense— ’‘ȱ Šȱ ™›’˜›ȱ Ž•˜—¢ȱ ›žȱ Œ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—— ˜ž•ȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ yielded, at most, a 30-year prison sentence and a statutory –’—’–ž–ȱ˜ȱœ’¡ȱ¢ŽŠ›œȱ˜ȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽ. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 851. ‘’œȱ recalculated statutory sentencing range—zero to 30 years in prison—’œȱ ‘Šȱ ‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž›ȱ Šœȱ ›Žšž’›Žȱ ˜ȱ Œ˜—œž•ȱ ‹Ž˜›Žȱ ›ŽœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱ ˜Ĵ˜— in 2020. —ȱ ˜‘Ž›ȱ ˜›œǰȱ ‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž›ȱ ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽ•¢ȱ ›ŽžŒŽȱ ‘Žȱ –Š¡’–ž–ȱ œŽ—Ȭ Ž—ŒŽȱ‘Šȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱŒ˜ž•ȱŠŒŽȱ˜›ȱ‘’œȱ˜ěŽ—œŽ. ‘ŽœŽȱŒ‘Š—Žœȱ’—ȱ the statutory maximums ›˜ž‘ȱ ‹¢ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ›ŽœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱ caused ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱto become a class B felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1)–ǻŘǼȱǻ™›˜Ÿ’’—ȱ‘Šȱ˜ěŽ—œŽœȱ ’‘ȱ–Š¡’–ž–ȱœŽ—Ȭ tences of 25 years or more, but less than life, are class B felo- nies). —Žȱ ˜‘Ž›ȱ Šœ™ŽŒȱ ˜ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ›ŽœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱ Œ˜—ę›–œȱ this. ‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž›ǰȱ ’—ȱ Š’’˜—ȱ ˜ȱ ’Ÿ’—ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ Šȱ œ‘˜›Ž›ȱ 18 No. 23-1591

prison sentence, also •˜ Ž›Žȱ‘’œȱŽ›–ȱ˜ȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽȱ from eight years to six years. ‘’œȱ’œȱ—˜Š‹•Žǯȱȱœ’¡-year super- Ÿ’œŽȱ ›Ž•ŽŠœŽȱ Ž›–ȱ ’œȱ •ŽŠ••¢ȱ ™Ž›–’œœ’‹•Žȱ ˜—•¢ȱ ’ȱ the district Œ˜ž›ȱ‹Ž•’ŽŸŽȱ‘Šȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ—˜ ȱ Šœȱ˜—ŽȱŠ›’œ’—ȱž—Ȭ Ž›ȱȗȱŞŚŗǻ‹ǼǻŗǼǻǼǰȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱœž™™•’ŽœȱŠȱ–’—’–ž–ȱ˜ȱœ’¡ȱ¢ŽŠ›œȱ˜ȱ œž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ ›Ž•ŽŠœŽǰȱ Š—ȱ —˜ȱ ž—Ž›ȱ ȗ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)ǰȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ ™›˜Ÿ’Žœȱ˜›ȱŠȱ•ŽŠœȱŽ’‘ȱ¢ŽŠ›œȱ˜ȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽǯȱ—ȱ’ȱ ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱž—Ž›œ˜˜ȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ˜ȱ‹Žȱœž‹“ŽŒȱ˜ ȗȱŞŚŗǻ‹ǼǻŗǼǻǼȂœȱ™Ž—Š•’Žœǰȱ‘Ž—ȱ’ȱŠ•œ˜ȱž—Ž›œ˜˜ȱ‘Šȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ could be sentenced to no more than 30 years in prisonǰȱ’ŸŽ—ȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ™›’˜›ȱŽ•˜—¢ȱ›žȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—œ. Again, that means that ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ‹ŽŒŠ–Ž a class B felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(2). ‘Žȱ–Š“˜›’¢ȱ˜™’—’˜—ȱ›Žœ’œœȱ‘’œȱŒ˜—Œ•žœ’˜—ȱ‹¢ȱ‘’‘•’‘Ȭ ing that the district court stated in its First Step Act relief order ‘Šǰȱ Ž¡ŒŽ™ȱ Šœȱ ˜‘Ž› ’œŽȱ ™›˜Ÿ’Žǰȱ ȃŠ••ȱ ™›˜Ÿ’œ’˜—œȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ǽ˜›’’—Š•Ǿȱ “ž–Ž—ȱ dzȱ œ‘Š••ȱ ›Ž–Š’—ȱ ’—ȱ ŽěŽŒǯȄȱ In the major- ’¢ȂœȱŸ’Ž ǰȱ‘’œȱ–ŽŠ—œȱ‘Šȱ‘ŽȱŒ•Šœœȱȱ—Šž›Žȱ˜ȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ˜Ȭ Ž—œŽȱ ŠœȱŽ¡™•’Œ’•¢ȱ•Žȱž—˜žŒ‘Žȱ‹¢ȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ǯȱžȱ ‘Šȱ˜ŸŽ›•˜˜”œȱ‘ŽȱŠŒȱ‘Šȱthe district court exercised its dis- Œ›Ž’˜—ȱŠ—ȱ›ŽŒ•Šœœ’ꮍȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ‘›˜ž‘ȱ‘Žȱ›Ž›˜ŠŒȬ ’ŸŽȱŠ™™•’ŒŠ’˜—ȱof the Fair Sentencing Act. ‘’œȱ›ŽŒ•Šœœ’ęŒŠȬ ’˜—ȱŠŠ’—ȱ’œȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ‹¢ȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱ’Ÿ’—ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱœ’¡ȱ ¢ŽŠ›œȱ ˜ȱ œž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ ›Ž•ŽŠœŽȱ Šȱ ›ŽœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ǯȱ ‘’œȱ ˜ž•ȱ —˜ȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ‹ŽŽ—ȱœŠž˜›’•¢ȱ™Ž›–’œœ’‹•Žȱ’f the court desired ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ remain a class A felony under § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), ‘’Œ‘ȱŒŠ››’Žœȱ ’‘ȱ’ȱ‹˜‘ȱŠȱ–Š¡’–ž–ȱ˜ȱ•’Žȱ’—ȱ™›’œ˜—ȱŠ—ȱŠȱ –’—’–ž–ȱ˜ȱŽ’‘ȱ¢ŽŠ›œȱ˜ȱœž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽǰȱ’ŸŽ—ȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ ™›’˜›ȱŽ•˜—¢ȱ›žȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—œ. ž›ȱŒ’›Œž’ȱ‘Šœȱ—ŽŸŽ›ȱŽ¡™•’Œ’•¢ȱ‘Ž•ȱ‘Šȱ’›œȱŽ™ȱŒȱ›ŽȬ •’Žȱ›ŽŒ•Šœœ’ęŽœȱ˜ěŽ—œŽœȱ’—ȱ‘’œȱ Š¢ǯȱžȱ Žȱ‘ŠŸŽȱassumed in No. 23-1591 19

non-precedential Anders orders that this is the case. In United States v. Perkins, for example, ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—ȱ›ŽŒŽ’ŸŽȱ’›œȱŽ™ȱ Œȱ ›Ž•’Žȱ Š—ǰȱ Šȱ ‘’œȱ Ž—œž’—ȱ ›ŽŸ˜ŒŠ’˜—ȱ ‘ŽŠ›’—ǰȱ Žȱ —˜Žȱ ‘Šȱ‘’œȱŘŖŖŝȱŒ›ŠŒ”-Œ˜ŒŠ’—Žȱ˜ěŽ—œŽǰȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ Šœȱ˜—ŒŽȱŠȱŒ•Šœœȱȱ Ž•˜—¢ǰȱȃ‹ŽŒŠ–ŽȱŠȱǽŒǾ•ŠœœȱȱŽ•˜—¢ȄȱȃǽǾ‘›˜ž‘ȱ‘Žȱ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱ application of the Fair Sentencing Act.” No. 21-1421, 2021 WL śŗśŞŖŖŖǰȱŠȱȘŘȱǻŝ‘ȱ’›ǯȱ˜ŸǯȱśǰȱŘŖŘŗǼDzȱsee United States v. Baker, No. 21-2182, 2022 WL 523084, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2022) (same). ȱŠ™™ŽŠ›œȱ‘ŠȱŸŽ›¢ȱŽ courts —Š’˜— ’Ž ‘ŠŸŽȱŠ›ŽœœŽȱ ‘’œȱœ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱ’œœžŽǯȱžȱ‘Žȱ˜—•¢ȱŽŽ›Š•ȱŠ™™Ž••ŠŽȱŒ˜ž›ȱ˜ȱŠ—ŠȬ lyze the problem generally came to the same conclusion, al- beit also in non-precedential fashion. United States v. Jones, No. 22-30480, 2023 WL 6458641, at *4 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2023). In Jonesǰȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—ȱ–˜ŸŽȱ˜›ȱ’›œȱŽ™ȱŒȱ›Ž•’ŽȱŠȱ‘’œȱœžȬ ™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›Ž•ŽŠœŽȱ›ŽŸ˜ŒŠ’˜—ȱ‘ŽŠ›’—ǯȱId. at *1. He argued that the Œȱ›ŽŒ•Šœœ’ꮍȱ‘’œȱ˜›’’—Š•ȱŒ›ŠŒ”-cocaine ˜ěŽ—œŽ from a class A felony to a class B felony. Id. ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ǰȱ‘˜ Ȭ ŽŸŽ›ǰȱŽŽ›–’—Žȱ’ȱ Šœȱ›Žšž’›Žȱ˜ȱŠ™™•¢ȱ‘Žȱ˜›’’—Š•ȱŒ•Šœœȱȱ Œ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ǯȱId. ŠȱȘŘǯȱ‘Žȱ’‘ȱ’›Œž’ȱ’œŠ›ŽŽǯȱId. at *5. It ˜ž—ȱ‘Šȱ ‘Žȱ’›œȱ Ž™ȱŒȱ ›ŽŸŽŠ•Žȱ Šȱ ȃŒ•ŽŠ›ȱ ’—Ž—’˜—Ȅȱ ˜ȱ Œ‘Š—Žȱ œŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱ •Š œȱ ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽ•¢ǰȱ ˜™Ž—’—ȱ ‘Žȱ ˜˜›ȱ ˜›ȱ ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—ȂœȱŽ•˜—¢ȱŒ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‹Žȱ›Ž-ŽŸŠ•žŠŽǯȱId. at *4. ȱŠ–ȱŠ Š›Žȱ˜ȱ—˜ȱŒŠœŽȱ‘Šȱ‘ŠœȱŒ˜–Žȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ˜™™˜œ’ŽȱŒ˜—Ȭ clusion. —ȱœž–ǰȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱ›ŽœŽ—Ž—Œ’—ȱž—Ž›ȱ‘Žȱ’›œȱŽ™ȱŒȱin 2020 ›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽ•¢ȱŒ‘Š—Žȱ‘ŽȱŒ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜— of his underlying ˜ěŽ—œŽ—that is, from a class A to a class B felony. ˜ȱ hold ˜‘Ž› ’œŽȱ ˜ž•ȱ‹Žȱ˜ȱŽ—¢ȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ‘Žȱ‹Ž—Žęȱ˜ȱ ‘Šȱ–’‘ȱ ‹Žȱ ȃ‘Žȱ –˜œȱ œ’—’ęŒŠ—ȱ Œ›’–’—Š•ȱ “žœ’ŒŽȱ ›Ž˜›–ȱ ‹’••ȱ ’—ȱ Šȱ 20 No. 23-1591

generation.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 155 (2024) ǻ ˜›œžŒ‘ǰȱ ǯǰȱ’œœŽ—’—ǼȱǻŒ’Š’˜—ȱ˜–’ĴŽǼǯȱ

* * * For these reasons, ȱŒ˜—Œž›ȱ ’‘ȱ‘Žȱ–Š“˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽ¡Ž—ȱ that non-›Ž›˜ŠŒ’ŸŽȱ Œ‘Š—Žœȱ ’—ȱ ‘Žȱ •Š —including the pas- sage of the Fair Sentencing Act and our decision in Ruth—do —˜ȱŒ‘Š—Žȱ‘ŽȱŒ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱž—Ž›•¢’—ȱ˜ěŽ—œŽ. žȱ ȱ ›Žœ™ŽŒž••¢ȱ ’œœŽ—ȱ ›˜–ȱ ‘Žȱ –Š“˜›’¢Ȃœȱ ‘˜•’—ȱ ‘Šȱ ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱresentencing under the First Step Act did ȃ—˜‘’—Ȅȱ ˜ȱ Š•Ž›ȱ ‘’œȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ Œ•Šœœ’ęŒŠ’˜—ǯȱ ˜›ȱ ‘ŽœŽȱ ›ŽŠœ˜—œǰȱ ȱ ˜ž•ȱ ‘˜•ȱ‘Šȱ˜Ĵ˜—Ȃœȱž—Ž›•¢’—ȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ’œȱŠȱŒ•ŠœœȱȱŽ•˜—¢ and the district court on remand could œŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ˜Ĵ˜—ȱ˜ȱ—˜ȱmore than three years in prison.