LIVELY, Chief Judge.
The question in this case is whether a disclosure requirement of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1982), violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. More specifically, we must decide whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) for delivering firearms to an airline for transportation without written notice to the carrier can withstand a Fifth Amendment challenge. This is a question of first impression in this court, and it is a question on which other courts of appeals have reached opposite conclusions.
I.
The defendant Alkhafaji is a citizen of Iraq who has lived in this country as a resident alien, since 1976. In the fall of 1982, Alkhafaji decided to return to his native country for a visit. He purchased a ticket from Pan Am for an October 21, 1982 flight from Detroit, Michigan to Bag-dad, Iraq', via New York City and London, England. A few hours before boarding he checked fifteen or sixteen pieces of luggage with the airline. Acting on a tip from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, a customs inspector searched Alkhafaji’s luggage and found three shotguns and eight handguns. The luggage also contained car parts and other miscellaneous items.
A grand jury for the Eastern District of Michigan indicted Alkhafaji for attempting to export firearms illegally, a violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2278 (Count One), and for delivering firearms to a common carrier without providing the carrier written notice that the firearms were in his luggage, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (Count Two). During the trial on these charges Alkhafaji testified the shotguns and two of the handguns belonged to a friend who had been transferred unexpectedly from the Iraqi embassy in Washington to Turkey. He also testified that the remaining handguns and the car parts and other miscellaneous items in his luggage were purchased as gifts for his relatives.
A jury found Alkhafaji not guilty on Count One and guilty on Count Two. Defense counsel then filed a motion for “judgment notwithstanding the verdict,”1 contending that Alkhafaji’s prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) was barred by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. He supported this argument with a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), which held that requiring compliance with § 922(e) by a person illegally transporting firearms constitutes compulsory self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth [643]*643Amendment. At about the same time, however, the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir.1983). The district court agreed with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and granted defendant’s motion to set aside the guilty verdict. The government appeals, urging this court to follow Wilson rather than Flores. Since this appeal was filed the Ninth Circuit has vacated its panel decision in Flores and granted rehearing en banc. United States v. Flores, 732 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir.1984).
II.
A.
The Supreme Court has examined a number of statutes requiring self-reporting of information that could tend to incriminate the reporter. Both the Ninth Circuit in Flores, and the district court in this case found § 922(e) to be similar to those statutes the Court has found to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. These include statutes requiring registration by Communist Party members, registration of sawed-off shotguns and other illegal weapons, and the taxation of gambling and marahuana transactions. The government, however, argues that § 922(e) does not have the offensive characteristics the Court found in those statutes. Rather, it contends, the statute is much more like those requiring the filing of an income tax return or requiring drivers to stop and identify themselves after an automobile accident, statutes which the Court has found do not offend the Fifth Amendment. In support of this position the government also points to court of appeals decisions which have found that reports which must be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or that must be filed before taking money out of the United States, likewise do not violate the Fifth Amendment.
B.
Alkhafaji argues that correct application of Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965), requires affirmance of the district court’s judgment vacating his conviction. In Albertson the Supreme Court set aside an order issued by the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring the petitioners to register under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. The registration form required an admission that the registrant was a member of the Communist Party of the United States and this admission could be used to prosecute the registrant under various laws which made membership in that party illegal. The Supreme Court found that the registration requirement was “inconsistent” with the guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. In doing so, the Court emphasized several factors. First, the requirement was directed at “a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities,” rather than the public at large. Second, the claim of constitutional protection was “not asserted in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry”; rather, the inquiry took place in an area “permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form’s questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of the crime.” Id. at 79, 86 S.Ct. at 199. Finally, compliance with the requirement would create a substantial likelihood of prosecution.
The Albertson, criteria were applied by the Supreme Court in Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722, 19 L.Ed.2d 923 (1968), a prosecution for failing to register a sawed-off shotgun for taxation. The Court found that the statute apparently was intended to require taxation only of “gangster type” weapons. Further, the registration requirement was part of a law which made possession and transportation of certain firearms illegal under many circumstances. It existed as part of an “area permeated with criminal statutes” rather than an area concerned primarily with government regulation in a non-criminal setting.
The Supreme Court decided two other cases on the same day as the Haynes deci[644]*644sion. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct.
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LIVELY, Chief Judge.
The question in this case is whether a disclosure requirement of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1982), violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. More specifically, we must decide whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) for delivering firearms to an airline for transportation without written notice to the carrier can withstand a Fifth Amendment challenge. This is a question of first impression in this court, and it is a question on which other courts of appeals have reached opposite conclusions.
I.
The defendant Alkhafaji is a citizen of Iraq who has lived in this country as a resident alien, since 1976. In the fall of 1982, Alkhafaji decided to return to his native country for a visit. He purchased a ticket from Pan Am for an October 21, 1982 flight from Detroit, Michigan to Bag-dad, Iraq', via New York City and London, England. A few hours before boarding he checked fifteen or sixteen pieces of luggage with the airline. Acting on a tip from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, a customs inspector searched Alkhafaji’s luggage and found three shotguns and eight handguns. The luggage also contained car parts and other miscellaneous items.
A grand jury for the Eastern District of Michigan indicted Alkhafaji for attempting to export firearms illegally, a violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2278 (Count One), and for delivering firearms to a common carrier without providing the carrier written notice that the firearms were in his luggage, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (Count Two). During the trial on these charges Alkhafaji testified the shotguns and two of the handguns belonged to a friend who had been transferred unexpectedly from the Iraqi embassy in Washington to Turkey. He also testified that the remaining handguns and the car parts and other miscellaneous items in his luggage were purchased as gifts for his relatives.
A jury found Alkhafaji not guilty on Count One and guilty on Count Two. Defense counsel then filed a motion for “judgment notwithstanding the verdict,”1 contending that Alkhafaji’s prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) was barred by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. He supported this argument with a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), which held that requiring compliance with § 922(e) by a person illegally transporting firearms constitutes compulsory self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth [643]*643Amendment. At about the same time, however, the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir.1983). The district court agreed with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and granted defendant’s motion to set aside the guilty verdict. The government appeals, urging this court to follow Wilson rather than Flores. Since this appeal was filed the Ninth Circuit has vacated its panel decision in Flores and granted rehearing en banc. United States v. Flores, 732 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir.1984).
II.
A.
The Supreme Court has examined a number of statutes requiring self-reporting of information that could tend to incriminate the reporter. Both the Ninth Circuit in Flores, and the district court in this case found § 922(e) to be similar to those statutes the Court has found to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. These include statutes requiring registration by Communist Party members, registration of sawed-off shotguns and other illegal weapons, and the taxation of gambling and marahuana transactions. The government, however, argues that § 922(e) does not have the offensive characteristics the Court found in those statutes. Rather, it contends, the statute is much more like those requiring the filing of an income tax return or requiring drivers to stop and identify themselves after an automobile accident, statutes which the Court has found do not offend the Fifth Amendment. In support of this position the government also points to court of appeals decisions which have found that reports which must be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or that must be filed before taking money out of the United States, likewise do not violate the Fifth Amendment.
B.
Alkhafaji argues that correct application of Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965), requires affirmance of the district court’s judgment vacating his conviction. In Albertson the Supreme Court set aside an order issued by the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring the petitioners to register under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. The registration form required an admission that the registrant was a member of the Communist Party of the United States and this admission could be used to prosecute the registrant under various laws which made membership in that party illegal. The Supreme Court found that the registration requirement was “inconsistent” with the guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. In doing so, the Court emphasized several factors. First, the requirement was directed at “a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities,” rather than the public at large. Second, the claim of constitutional protection was “not asserted in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry”; rather, the inquiry took place in an area “permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form’s questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of the crime.” Id. at 79, 86 S.Ct. at 199. Finally, compliance with the requirement would create a substantial likelihood of prosecution.
The Albertson, criteria were applied by the Supreme Court in Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722, 19 L.Ed.2d 923 (1968), a prosecution for failing to register a sawed-off shotgun for taxation. The Court found that the statute apparently was intended to require taxation only of “gangster type” weapons. Further, the registration requirement was part of a law which made possession and transportation of certain firearms illegal under many circumstances. It existed as part of an “area permeated with criminal statutes” rather than an area concerned primarily with government regulation in a non-criminal setting.
The Supreme Court decided two other cases on the same day as the Haynes deci[644]*644sion. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court struck down a statute making it a crime to willfully fail to pay an occupational tax on wagering and to register as one conducting wagering. There were numerous laws making wagering a crime, and the Court found that the information obtained from the registration and issuance of a wager license would be readily available to prosecutors enforcing such laws. This information, divulged on pain of prosecution, “would surely prove a significant ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish his guilt.” Id. at 48, 88 S.Ct. at 703 (citations omitted). The Court also applied the Albertson criteria to reverse a conviction in Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968). This to, was a case involving the tax on wagering. The opinion highlighted the additional duty of one engaged in the wagering business to file monthly returns with the Internal Revenue Service on a form which revealed the details of the wagering business actually being carried on. As in Marchetti, the Court found that the combination of state and federal anti-gambling laws placed Grosso “entirely within ‘an area permeated with criminal statutes,’ where he is ‘inherently suspect of criminal activities.’ ” Id. at 64, 88 S.Ct. at 712.
In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under the Marihuana Tax Act. Central to its determination of a Fifth Amendment violation was the finding that the purpose of the Act was to bring to light violations of the marihuana laws. Since possession of marihuana is illegal in every state, compliance with requirements of the Act would create a “real and appreciable” risk of incrimination. Id. at 18, 89 S.Ct. at 1539. By complying, a person identified himself as a member of a “selective” and “suspect” group, since persons legally in possession of marihuana were “virtually certain” either to be registered or to be exempt from obtaining an order form required by regulations. Id.
C.
The government relies upon a group of cases in which the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit found no Fifth Amendment problem with disclosure requirements which could potentially provide some basis for a criminal prosecution.
In United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of one engaged in illegal liquor traffic for willfully refusing to file an income tax return. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes found that “the protection of the Fifth Amendment was pressed too far” in the decision of the court of appeals reversing the conviction. Id. at 263, 47 S.Ct. at 607. The defendant could have objected to answering specific questions on grounds of Fifth Amendment privilege, but could not refuse to file the return. “It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime.” Id. at 263-64, 47 S.Ct. at 607-08. In Albertson and the other cases previously discussed the Court distinguished Sullivan on the ground that all persons with taxable income are required to file returns, and thus, the filing requirement is not directed at a “highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities” and the claim of privilege in Sullivan was not “against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes.” Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79, 86 S.Ct. at 199.
In California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971), the Court found Sullivan rather than Albertson controlling. At' issue was the question whether a state “hit and run” statute which required a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident to stop at the scene and give his name and address infringed the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. In a plurality opinion, Chief Burger wrote:
Tension between the State’s demand for disclosures and the protection of the [645]*645right against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other; neither interest can be treated lightly.
402 U.S. at 427, 91 S.Ct. at 1537. In conducting its close scrutiny of the California statute, the Court found the Albertson elements missing. All drivers of motor vehicles have the same responsibility under the law; the requirement of identifying one’s self after an accident was not directed to a “selective” or “suspect” group. Moreover, involvement in an automobile accident does not ordinarily implicate any criminal activity. In addition, the purposes of the statute are non-criminal — to facilitate proper allocation of civil liabilities and to regulate the use of motor vehicles. The fact that the essentially neutral act of making the required disclosure might possibly have the collateral consequence of ultimately leading to prosecution is not sufficient:
In order to involve the privilege it is necessary to show that the compelled disclosures will themselves confront the claimant with “substantial hazards of self-incrimination.”
402 U.S. at 429, 91 S.Ct. at 1538. Justice Harlan, the author of Albertson, Haynes, Marchetti, Grosso and Leary, concurred in the judgment in Byers. He concluded that when a statute “operate[s] in the context of the ... collection of data for purposes essentially unrelated to criminal prosecution,” id. at 436, 91 S.Ct. at 1542, “the presence of a ‘real’ and not ‘imaginary’ risk of self-incrimination is not a sufficient predicate for extending the privilege against self-incrimination” to such a regulatory scheme. Id. at 439, 91 S.Ct. at 1543.
The Second Circuit has found Byers controlling in upholding convictions under two quite different statutes which require potentially incriminating disclosures. In United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 93, 58 L.Ed.2d 116 (1978), the court affirmed a conviction for securities fraud. The defendants maintained that if they had disclosed the true facts surrounding certain transactions to the SEC and the public they would have been admitting sufficient facts to form a basis for criminal prosecution under federal labor laws. The court rejected this argument and conducted the “close scrutiny” dictated by Byers, using the balancing approach described in that decision. The court concluded that this balancing requires a finding that an “essentially regulatory statute” does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination where four conditions are found to exist: (1) self-reporting is essential to fulfillment of the regulatory objective, (2) the burden of disclosure is placed on the general public rather than a selective, suspect group, (3) the general activity is lawful and (4) the possibility of incrimination is not substantial. The court also pointed out that Byers held that the possibility that disclosed information might be “a link in the chain” of evidence leading to prosecution and conviction is not a sufficient basis for finding an infringement. 571 F.2d at 728.
The offense in United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 1314, 63 L.Ed.2d 760 (1980), was failure to report to United States Customs the transportation out of the United States of “monetary instruments” having a value in excess of $5,000 as required by the Bank Secrecy Act. The court analyzed the reporting requirement under both the Albertson line of cases and under Byers and concluded that it was not inconsistent with the guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. Important considerations were the fact that the transportation of money out of the United States is not itself illegal and that the majority of persons required to make the report would have no involvement in criminal activity. Thus the reporting requirement is not aimed at an “inherently suspect group” and it does not involve an area “permeated with criminal statutes.” The court distinguished Haynes because the statute involved there required reports only with respect to weapons principally used in unlaw[646]*646ful activities. The court found the legitímate regulatory, noncriminal interest of the government to be substantial and that the reporting requirements do not involve a “direct link to any related criminal activity.” Id. at 640.
III.
The statute under which Alkhafaji was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered to any common or contract carrier for transportation or shipment in interstate or foreign commerce, to persons other than licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, or licensed collectors, any package or other container in which there is any firearm or ammunition without written notice to the carrier that such firearm or ammunition is being transported or shipped; except that any passenger who owns or legally possesses a firearm or ammunition being transported aboard any common or contract carrier for movement with the passenger in interstate or foreign commerce may deliver said firearm or ammunition into the custody of the pilot, captain, conductor or operator of such common or contract carrier for the duration of the trip without violating any of the provisions of this chapter.
On appeal the government argues that the district court properly identified the controlling criteria from Albertson but misapplied the law in this case. This case is governed by Byers, the government contends, because the notice requirement of § 922(e) is directed to all persons who transport firearms, not to a “selective” or “inherently suspect” group. The mistake of the district court, and of the panel in Flores, according to the government, was that they concentrated on the criminal activity of the defendant. The analysis in Byers centered on the class to whom the reporting requirement applies, not on the individual challenging the statute. Since many people are permitted to own and legally transport firearms, compliance by most people with the notice requirement would reveal no criminal activity. Under this approach it is immaterial that Alkhafaji was not typical of the broad class at whom the statute is directed.
The government buttresses its argument by reference to Stirling and Dichne. In both cases the defendants who failed to make the required disclosures were engaged in criminal activities. Nevertheless, the court focused on the nature of the entire group subject to the disclosure requirement and found in each case that this group encompassed a large number of people who were engaged in no unlawful activity. Thus, most of the required reports would have provided no evidence of criminal activity, though truthful disclosures would have provided facts tending to incriminate the defendants who challenged the statutes.
The government urges us to adopt the rational of Wilson. In Wilson the court acknowledged that the requirement of notice by one transporting firearms falls within an “area permeated with criminal statutes.” Nevertheless, the requirement is directed to all passengers on common carriers, not just to those engaged in illegal transportation of weapons. Thus it is not aimed at an inherently suspect group. The Wilson court examined the legislative history of § 922(e) and concluded that “its primary purpose was not the apprehension of illegal arms dealers; rather, it was designed to enable common carriers to fulfill more effectively their own statutory responsibilities under § 922(f) [to not transport firearms or ammunition if there is reasonable cause to believe such transportation would violate provisions of the Act].” Wilson, 721 F.2d at 974. This view of the Act is buttressed by the fact that the report is required to be made to the common carrier, not to the government. “The mere possibility that a common carrier might provide incriminating information to the government, we find, does not render convictions for failure to give notice under [647]*647§ 922(e) unconstitutional.” Id. (footnote omitted).
The government asserts that only one of the three Albertson criteria is met in § 922(e) — it exists in an area “permeated with criminal statutes.” However, it is primarily a regulatory, not a criminal provision. Significantly, upon receiving the required report a common carrier need not notify the government; it can fulfill its legal obligation by refusing the shipment. Thus, there is no substantial likelihood that the report will lead to a criminal prosecution. Finally, the government argues, § 922(e) is not directed at a “highly selective and inherently suspect” group, the “most important factor” under the Byers analysis.
Alkhafaji relies principally upon Flores and argues that the panel decision in that case correctly applied the tests of Albert-son and its progeny. He reminds the court that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is fundamental to our system of justice and should be given “a liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.” Turning to the conflicting court of appeals decisions, Alkhafaji submits that only Flores is sound and that Wilson errors in not distinguishing Byers as concerning a noncriminal act — involvement in an automobile accident. Alkhafaji concludes that the California reporting requirement in Byers involves none of the Albertson factors while § 922(e) implicates all of them.
VI.
It seems clear to us that § 922(e) falls somewhere between the statutes considered in the Albertson line and the one at issue in Byers. Though it is primarily a regulatory statute, it does reflect congressional concern with weapons and ammunition, an area permeated with criminal statutes. However, all persons who ship firearms or ammunition to someone other than a licensed importer, dealer, manufacturer or collector are required to give written notice to the carrier, with passengers being permitted to deliver legally possessed weapons and ammunition to a representative of the carrier in lieu of the written notice. Many people who would fall into this group would not be acting unlawfully. It cannot be said that this requirement is directed at a “highly selective and inherently suspect” group of people. This general requirement cannot be held to violate an individual passenger or shipper’s constitutional right solely because compliance might supply evidence of other criminal activity.
The disclosure statutes in Albertson, Marchetti, Haynes, Grosso and Leary, had as their primary purpose facilitation of the enforcement of particular criminal laws. This is not the case with § 922(e). It is primarily a regulatory statute, enacted to assist common carriers in their duty not to transport weapons and ammunition under conditions which violate other laws. This purpose is expressed in the legislative history. See H.Rep. No. 1557, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4410, 4420 (refers to § 922(e) as Section 922(d)). At least one other court of appeals has found the same legislative purpose as the Wilson court. See United States v. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.1980):
Section 922(e) was enacted in order to inform the carrier of the character of the items it was shipping thus placing on it the duty to inquire into the legality of the shipment.
We think it is significant that all of the statutes considered in Albertson and like cases required a report to a government agency. In contrast, § 922(e) requires a report only to the carrier. Though carriers may pass such reports along to governmental agencies concerned with enforcement of other laws relating to firearms, they are not required to do so. The carriers fulfill their responsibility by refusing to accept the firearms or ammunition for transportation if inquiry reveals that such transportation would be unlawful. Under these circumstances, the likelihood that required [648]*648disclosures will be incriminating is much less substantial. In Byers the Court, after referring to many instances in which an organized society imposes the burden of providing information with respect to matters of public concern, wrote:
In each of these situations there is some possibility of prosecution — often a very real one — for criminal offenses disclosed by or deriving from the information that the law compels a person to supply. Information revealed by these reports could well be “a link in the chain” of evidence leading to prosecution and conviction. But under our holdings the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged here.
402 U.S. at 428, 91 S.Ct. at 1538.
Giving due regard to all the considerations discussed in the Supreme Court decisions we conclude that the district court erroneously set aside the jury’s verdict. Section 922(e) is not inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.2
Having determined that the Fifth Amendment argument was not well taken we need not consider the government’s contention that Alkhafaji waived this defense by not presenting it in a timely manner.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.