PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4304
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAHID HASSAN MUSLIM, a/k/a Sharp, a/k/a Sean Williams,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:13-cr-00307-RJC-DCK-1)
Argued: September 20, 2019 Decided: November 25, 2019
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Richardson joined.
ARGUED: Kimberly Harvey Albro, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: R. Andrew Murray, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. WYNN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Shahid Hassan Muslim appeals decisions of the U.S. District Court of
Western North Carolina related to his trial, conviction, and sentence. Defendant raises eight
grounds on appeal: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to continue trial; (2)
the court erred in conducting a morning session of trial in Defendant’s absence; (3) the
court erred in admitting expert testimony without undertaking analysis under Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); (4) the court erred in denying
Defendant’s right to testify at his trial; (5) the court erred in instructing the jury on a count;
(6) the court erred in denying a post-trial motion to withdraw as counsel; (7) the court erred
in applying four sentencing enhancements; and (8) there was a complete miscarriage of
justice.
We affirm the district court on all issues.
I
Defendant operated a prostitution ring between at least 2010 and continuing through
November 2013, when he was arrested. He was indicted on ten counts. The charges
included kidnapping, sex trafficking, and sexual exploitation of a child. After a week-long
trial, a jury found him guilty on all ten counts. The court sentenced Defendant to three
terms of life imprisonment, as well as seven shorter terms, all to be served concurrently.
This appeal followed, raising numerous challenges.
II
A
2 Defendant first argues that the district court wrongly denied a motion to continue
his trial. “We review the denial of a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 531 (4th Cir. 2013). A district court abuses its
discretion “when its denial of a motion for continuance is ‘an unreasoning and arbitrary
insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.’” Id. (quoting
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)). “[E]ven if such an abuse [of discretion] is
found, the defendant must show that the error specifically prejudiced h[is] case in order to
prevail.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Williams, 455 F.3d 724, 739
(4th Cir. 2006)).
Here, Defendant’s motion to continue—the fourth such motion—came two days
before the start of trial, which was scheduled for August 5, 2014. The district court denied
the motion, stating, “This case was peremptorily set. It has been on the docket for a long
time. I’m not inclined to continue this case.” J.A. 105. Indeed, the previous motion to
continue, which the parties had filed jointly over two months prior, had specified a trial
date of August 5, 2014. Dist. Ct. ECF No. 33. Laying out the reasons to continue, that joint
motion had stated, among other things, that the case was complex, that there was a great
deal of discovery, that the parties expected the trial to last over a week, and that the
Government would be bringing witnesses from Washington, D.C., Florida, Texas, and
California. At that time, defense counsel had needed more time to locate experts, research
legal issues, and conduct plea negotiations.
Defendant’s motion on appeal repeated arguments from the previous motion. The
case was complex and had voluminous discovery. Counsel again needed more time to
3 locate experts, research legal issues, and conduct plea negotiations. Compare Dist. Ct. ECF
No. 33 ¶ 14 with Dist. Ct. ECF No. 56 ¶ 15. Counsel also cited “unexpected time drains”
with other clients over the preceding two weeks. J.A. 89. However, counsel did not explain
why the “unexpected time drains” and the additional discovery interfered with the
preceding months of preparations. Nor did he identify any expert witness he proposed to
locate, much less show he could obtain their attendance if the continuance were granted.
See United States v. Clinger, 681 F.2d 221, 223 (4th Cir. 1982) (listing elements a party
usually must prove when seeking a continuance to secure the attendance of a witness). Nor
did he address why he failed to file the motion at an earlier date. See United States v.
LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815, 824 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The later that a motion for a continuance
is made, the more likely it is made for dilatory tactics; hence, it is less likely that the district
court arbitrarily denied the continuance.”).
We hold that the trial court was within its discretion to deny the motion to continue.
And because there was not an abuse of discretion, we will not discuss the question of
prejudice.
B
Defendant’s next challenge concerns his absence at a single morning session of his
week-long trial. We review a district court’s decision to “proceed with a trial when the
defendant is absent” for abuse of discretion, and the “district court’s factual findings will
not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Camacho, 955 F.2d 950, 953
(4th Cir. 1992). Violations stemming from a defendant’s absence from the courtroom are
4 subject to a harmless error analysis. United States v. Harris, 814 F.2d 155, 157 (4th Cir.
1987).
The Fifth Amendment “guarantees a defendant the right to be present at all stages
of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings, while Rule 43
[of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] enshrines an even broader right to be present.”
United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 517 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). However, a defendant may waive his right to be present if he is voluntarily
absent “without compelling justification” after the trial begins. United States v. Rogers,
853 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988). The right “cannot cursorily, and without inquiry, be
deemed by the trial court to have been waived simply because the accused is not present
when he should have been.” Id. (quoting United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 287,
291 (5th Cir. 1983)). And, the court should make efforts to ascertain the defendant’s
location and reason for absence, as well as the “likelihood the trial could soon proceed with
the defendant, the difficulty of rescheduling and the burden on the government.” Id.
Trial began as scheduled on August 5 and Defendant was present for the entirety of
the first two days. On the third day of trial, however, at the start of the morning session,
Defendant was absent. The district court was advised that, early that morning, Defendant
reported experiencing “some type of seizure activity.” J.A. 660. Medical staff at the jail
examined him, noted he had no seizure history and appeared to have no seizure activity,
and suggested he was malingering. After the medical staff evaluated Defendant, he was
taken to the courthouse, where, according to the marshal, he lay on the floor passively
refusing to come to court. Defendant’s counsel went to him to explain the court intended
5 to rule he was waiving his right to be present. Upon returning, counsel indicated that
Defendant seemed to have made a slight head movement in response to counsel’s attempt
to communicate. The court then made a finding that Defendant was voluntarily absenting
himself from the proceedings. Even after that announcement, the district court judge used
an audio-video connection set up in Defendant’s cell to make a personal attempt to
communicate with Defendant. After having spent an hour addressing Defendant’s absence,
the court finally ended the inquiry and resumed the trial without him physically present.
The trial remained available to Defendant in the holding cell via the audio-video
connection. In the afternoon, Defendant rejoined the proceedings in the courtroom.
Unlike in cases in which this Court concluded that the district court summarily
assumed that the defendant waived his right to be present, the district court here made
repeated efforts to ascertain Defendant’s status and ensure Defendant’s presence. See
Camacho, 955 F.2d at 954–55 (concluding that the district court abused its discretion in
determining that the defendant had voluntarily absented himself from trial where a serious
snowstorm made it likely that the defendant was delayed in traffic); Rogers, 853 F.2d at
252 (concluding that the district court abused its discretion where it merely “inquired of
defense counsel regarding [the defendant’s] whereabouts, but did nothing else”). We
therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with the trial
in Defendant’s absence.
C
Defendant also appeals the district court’s denial of a motion to exclude the expert
testimony of software quality assurance engineer Daniel Magdael. We review a district
6 court’s decision to admit expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), for abuse of discretion. Belville v. Ford Motor Co., 919 F.3d
224, 232 (4th Cir. 2019). “A district court abuses its discretion if it makes an error of law
or clearly erroneous factual finding.” Id. Such rulings are “entitled to great deference.”
NCO Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Montgomery Park, LLC, 918 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir.), as amended
(Mar. 15, 2019). Where the alleged error was harmless, we may affirm without determining
if the district court improperly admitted the testimony. United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d
73, 81 (4th Cir. 2005).
The Supreme Court in Daubert required that the trial judge assess two factors to
determine whether to admit expert testimony: “(1) whether the testimony is based on
‘scientific knowledge’ (i.e. knowledge grounded ‘in the methods and procedures of
science’), and (2) whether the testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact.” Md. Cas. Co.
v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 137 F.3d 780, 784 (4th Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Here, the Government charged Defendant with producing child pornography using
materials shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. To support the charge, the
Government offered video evidence from a computer seized from Defendant’s bedroom.
The video showed Defendant having sex with a minor; it was therefore child pornography.
Looking for evidence of interstate commerce, FBI Digital Forensics Examiner Lee
Weingarten analyzed the video, as well as other videos from the computer. Weingarten
determined based on reflections in the other videos that they appeared to have been made
with a Flip Video camera. He then determined that the metadata identifying the recording
7 device for those videos matched the corresponding metadata of the child pornography
video. Having independently identified the recording device as a Flip Video camera,
Weingarten reached out to Flip Video’s parent company to locate an expert who could
confirm his conclusion. That expert would be Daniel Magdael, a software quality assurance
engineer with experience working with Flip Video cameras. Like Weingarten before him,
Magdael determined a Flip Video camera recorded the video at issue. The Government
went to these lengths because Flip Video cameras were made in China, and thus could only
have arrived in North Carolina via foreign commerce.
The district court’s ruling admitting Magdael’s testimony was quite brief. However,
without passing on whether the ruling fell short of Daubert, we may consider whether the
proposed error was harmless. Weingarten testified to his independent extraction and
comparison of the video metadata, and he testified to the critical link between the child
pornography video and the Flip Video camera. Our review of the record shows that
Defendant’s conviction did not rest on Magdael’s expert testimony alone; the jury would
have connected the video to the Flip Video camera based on Weingarten’s unchallenged
testimony in this case. Thus, the alleged error, even if present, was harmless.
D
Defendant also contends he was denied his right to testify. “A defendant’s right to
testify in his own defense is rooted in the Constitution’s Due Process Clause, Compulsory
Process Clause, and Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.” United States v.
Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2013). Given the constitutional nature of this right,
courts generally review de novo whether a defendant’s right to testify on his own behalf
8 was violated at trial. E.g., United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 2000).
However, because Defendant failed to raise this issue below, we review this issue for plain
error. United States v. Johnson, 464 F. App’x 112, 114 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (per
curiam) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)) (analyzing under the
plain error standard the defendant’s argument “that the district court failed to sua sponte
inquire into whether Johnson’s failure to testify on his own behalf was a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to do so”). To show plain error, Defendant
must show “(1) that the court erred, (2) that the error is clear and obvious, and (3) that the
error affected his substantial rights, meaning that it ‘affected the outcome of the district
court proceedings.’” United States v. Catone, 769 F.3d 866, 871 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). Even if Defendant shows plain error, we “retain discretion
whether to recognize the error and will deny relief unless the district court’s error ‘seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting
Olano, 507 U.S. at 736).
Courts, including this one, have held that “the trial court does not have a sua sponte
duty to conduct a colloquy with the defendant at trial to determine whether the defendant
has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to testify.” Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d
874, 881 (4th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). However, a number of courts have also
recognized “exceptional, narrowly defined circumstances,” United States v. Rodriguez-
Aparicio, 888 F.3d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d
9, 12 (3d Cir. 1995)), virtually all of which “involve conflicts between the defendant and
counsel,” where a court does have such a duty, id. (collecting cases). An example of such
9 a situation is where there is “some indication that either the defendant actually wants to
testify and is being prevented from doing so or that there is a conflict between the defendant
and his lawyer on the matter.” United States v. Manjarrez, 258 F.3d 618, 624 (7th Cir.
2001). Courts have made clear, though, that such a situation is “the exception, not the rule.”
Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 13. “Where the trial court has no reason to believe that the
defendant’s own attorney is frustrating his or her desire to testify, a trial court has no
affirmative duty to advise the defendant of the right to testify or to obtain an on-the-record
waiver of such right.” Id.
At the close of the Government’s evidence, the district court advised Defendant that
he had the right to testify. Defendant responded that he understood. The district court asked
Defendant whether he wanted to testify, and Defendant said that he wanted to, but that he
was not prepared to testify at that moment. The district court informed Defendant that his
testimony properly came next in the trial. The district court permitted Defendant to speak
with counsel, after which Defendant’s counsel stated that he did not intend to put on any
evidence at that time. At a subsequent sidebar conference, Defendant’s counsel informed
the district court that:
I want to make sure we’re clear. The decision to take the stand or not take the stand is totally the defendant’s. He would not answer the question one way or the other . . . . He did not ever say no. Then he just said in my ear, “Okay, I want to take the stand.”
J.A. 1101-02.
The district court judge adjourned trial for the evening but stated he would consider
again if Defendant wished to take the stand the next morning. The next morning, the court
10 asked Defendant’s counsel whether he would move to reopen so that Defendant could
testify. Defendant’s counsel indicated that he would file a motion to reopen. The record
shows that the court directed that Defendant take the stand, but then there was a recess,
after which Defendant’s counsel stated that “the defendant would like to withdraw its [sic]
motion to reopen the case and move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of all the
evidence.” J.A. 1113.
Defendant argues that because Defendant repeatedly indicated that he wanted to
testify, the district court erred in failing to inquire into Defendant’s desire to testify.
Defendant further argues that the district court should have been on notice regarding “on-
the-record conflicts” between Defendant and his trial counsel, and therefore should have
inquired further with Defendant. Appellant’s Br. at 17.
However, the district court did ask Defendant whether he wished to testify.
Moreover, although Defendant disagreed with his attorney throughout the trial, there is no
evidence in the record that Defendant’s attorney prevented Defendant from testifying.
Indeed, Defendant’s counsel indicated that the decision to testify was solely the
Defendant’s. Throughout, the district court offered Defendant time to consider his
decision—including overnight—as well as opportunities to consult with counsel. Each
time Defendant expressed a desire to testify, the court offered him the opportunity, but
Defendant declined. There is no indication that the final withdrawal of the motion to reopen
occurred without the direction of Defendant. Given the foregoing, we hold that the district
court did not clearly err.
E
11 Defendant’s next ground of appeal concerns the jury instructions for Count Seven
at the close of his trial. Count Seven was for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(B) in
conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2), one element of which requires a predicate “crime
of violence.” Defendant contends that the district court improperly instructed the jury on
the predicate offense, which the indictment charged as “physical assault,” because the
district court did not give the elements of the predicate offense and because the district
court instructed that “physical assault” is a “crime of violence.”
Generally, we review de novo “whether a district court has properly instructed a
jury on the statutory elements of an offense,” United States v. Rahman, 83 F.3d 89, 92 (4th
Cir. 1996), as well as “[w]hether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence,” United
States v. Henriquez, 757 F.3d 144, 147 (4th Cir. 2014). However, where, as here, a
defendant does not object below to the district court’s jury instructions regarding a specific
count, we review for plain error. United States v. Cowden, 882 F.3d 464, 475 (4th Cir.
2018). Under this standard, we have discretion to correct a plain error which affects
substantial rights, and we exercise that discretion where such an error “seriously affect[s]
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” or where failure to
correct would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (first quoting
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (alteration in original); and then
quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
It is clear here that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury when,
although it correctly identified the charged predicate offense, it did not give the elements
of that offense. Cf. United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 209-10 (4th Cir. 1999). The
12 district court also erred when it instructed the jury that “physical assault” is a “crime of
violence.” Although the district court did not identify a statute or jurisdiction for the
predicate offense, the record shows that “physical assault” here could only have been one
of two offenses: (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(2), assault of a female by a male at least 18
years of age, or (2) or North Carolina assault at common law. We have previously held that
neither of these is a “crime of violence.” See United States v. Vinson, 805 F.3d 120, 124-
26 (4th Cir. 2015).
These are errors. But, “even assuming that [they] . . . ‘affec[ted] substantial rights,’
[they] do[] not meet the final requirement of Olano.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.
461, 469 (1997) (second alteration in original) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736).
In this case, the indictment charged that Defendant beat one of the women he was
prostituting. In more detail, he punched her in the stomach so hard she tilted over, grabbed
her by her hair, took her into a bathroom and turned on the water while she was screaming,
and kept beating her. She could barely walk afterwards. Defendant’s victim testified about
the assault at trial, as did a witness. The jury heard, and we have reviewed, a week of
testimony similar in nature to what we have just described.
Moreover, in light of Defendant’s three life sentences on other convictions, vacating
the Travel Act conviction—for which Defendant was sentenced to a 240-month term of
imprisonment—would have no practical consequence. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say that declining to correct the errors would seriously affect the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings, nor would it result in a miscarriage of justice.
See United States v. Cedelle, 89 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 1996).
13 We therefore will not vacate this conviction.
F
Defendant next appeals the denial of a post-trial motion to withdraw as counsel.
“We review the denial of a motion to withdraw for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Blackledge, 751 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 2014). If the district court abused its discretion,
“the ruling is subject to harmless error review.” Id. at 194. We consider three factors in
deciding whether a district court abused its discretion in denying such a motion: “(1)
timeliness of the motion; (2) adequacy of the court’s inquiry; and (3) ‘whether the
attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in total lack of communication
preventing an adequate defense.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 108
(4th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir.
1995), as recognized in United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 652 (4th Cir. 2015)).
During the nearly three years between arrest and sentencing, Defendant had four
different attorneys. The first, a federal public defender, withdrew early due to a conflict.
The second represented Defendant through the end of trial. At the start of trial, immediately
before jury selection, Defendant tendered to the court a handwritten letter complaining
about counsel. This triggered a conversation between Defendant and the court wherein
Defendant alleged that his counsel was unprepared and inadequate. The court noted that
counsel was competent and prepared for trial, but informed Defendant that he had the
option of proceeding to trial representing himself. Defendant declined and trial proceeded.
Two months after trial, Defendant’s counsel filed a motion for inquiry into counsel and to
substitute counsel; the motion explained that Defendant alleged there was a conflict of
14 interest, that Defendant was verbally abusing counsel and alleging counsel was
“incompetent, ineffective, and [was] conspiring against him,” and that Defendant refused
to work with counsel and demanded new counsel. J.A. 1229. The court granted the motion
and appointed a third attorney for Defendant. Some five months later, this counsel also
moved to withdraw. Defendant, believing his attorney was a part of a vast conspiracy
against him, refused to cooperate with counsel and had filed a complaint against him with
the State Bar. The court described the situation as “extremely frustrating,” but granted the
motion to withdraw and appointed Defendant’s fourth attorney, Counsel Richard Beam.
J.A. 1330.
Counsel Beam did not fare better than Defendant’s previous attorneys. The same
problems arose. Counsel Beam moved to withdraw, the Government filed a response
opposing the motion, and the court held a hearing. At the hearing, Counsel Beam explained
that Defendant refused to address the draft PSR and would only speak with Counsel Beam
about pursuing allegations against other lawyers, including one of Counsel Beam’s friends
and also other professional colleagues, who had been involved with the case. Counsel
Beam had spoken to the North Carolina State Bar, and the Bar had advised that he move
to withdraw. The Government took the position that Defendant was the cause of the series
of breakdowns in communication with his counsel and that “Defendant’s demand for a fifth
court-appointed attorney is nothing more than an effort to avoid sentencing.” J.A. 1457.
Procedurally, the case was waiting on Defendant to file objections to the draft PSR.
Although Counsel Beam had objections to file, he could not file them where there was a
conflict with the party he represented. The probation officer characterized the situation as
15 a “rarity” in her fifteen-year career. J.A. 1494. The court ultimately issued an eleven-page
order denying the motion to withdraw. Counsel moved for reconsideration, and the court
again denied the motion.
With the foregoing in mind, we begin our analysis of the three relevant factors. The
first factor—timeliness—applies both to the temporal proximity of the motion to trial or
another proceeding but also the resulting delay on the overall proceedings. United States
v. Corporan-Cuevas, 35 F.3d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The court must weigh the
defendant’s right to choose counsel against the countervailing state interest in proceeding
with prosecutions on an orderly and expeditious basis.”). As recounted above, Counsel
Beam was Defendant’s fourth lawyer. Furthermore, twenty months had passed since trial,
and Defendant’s refusal to cooperate was preventing the case from moving to sentencing.
See United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 895 (4th Cir. 1994) (“In our review of a district
court’s denial of such a request [to withdraw], we must therefore be mindful of the court’s
interest in moving its docket.”). We conclude that the timeliness factor weighs in favor of
affirming the district court’s order.
Regarding the second factor—adequacy of the court’s inquiry—the district court
held an extensive hearing on the motion to withdraw. We describe the hearing above and
will not recount it here. We conclude this factor also weighs in favor of affirming the
district court’s order.
Finally, we turn to the third factor—whether the attorney/client conflict resulted in
a total lack of communication. It is clear there was a conflict between Counsel Beam and
Defendant. However, Defendant’s conduct was a major causative factor. See United States
16 v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 918 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The district court is not compelled to
substitute counsel when the defendant’s own behavior creates a conflict.”). Counsel Beam
stated that Defendant would not “talk to [him] about anything in the PSR,” and this was
evidenced by the months-long delay in filing Defendant’s objections to the PSR. J.A. 1488.
Moreover, in its denial of the motion to withdraw, the district court observed that this was
the third time Defendant had followed the same general pattern with his court-appointed
attorney, i.e., filing allegations against them, refusing to cooperate with them, and filing
State Bar complaints. Nevertheless, despite Defendant’s behavior, Counsel Beam had
visited the jail, filed motions, and even investigated Defendant’s allegations of Government
misconduct. Reviewing the record, we thus conclude this factor too weighs in favor of the
affirming the district court’s decision.
Accordingly, the district court was within its discretion to deny Defendant’s motion
to withdraw as counsel.
G
Defendant next argues that the district court made four sentencing errors. Generally,
when considering “whether a sentencing court properly calculated the Guidelines range,”
we review a court’s “factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”
United States v. Shephard, 892 F.3d 666, 670 (4th Cir. 2018). However, because Defendant
did not make any objections to his PSR, we review for plain error. United States v. Strieper,
666 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012).
Defendant appeals the district court’s application of sentencing enhancements
pursuant to sections 3B1.1(a), 3A1.1(b)(1), 3C1.1, and 2G1.3(b)(1)(B) of the 2015 U.S.
17 Sentencing Guidelines Manual. These enhancements apply where the court finds the
defendant to have been an organizer or leader, harmed a vulnerable victim, committed
obstruction of justice, and exerted supervisory control, respectively.
1. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)—Organizer/Leader Enhancement
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) provides for a four-level enhancement if the defendant was an
“organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive.” A person who is “not criminally responsible for the commission of
the offense” is not a participant, and the defendant must have been the “organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants.” Id. cmt. nn.1-2.
Defendant argues that his prostitution enterprise lacked the requisite number of
participants to apply the enhancement, as the unindicted victims were not participants for
purposes of this Guidelines provision. Defendant cites United States v. Jarrett, 956 F.2d
864 (8th Cir. 1992), in which the court concluded that certain people in that case who were
transported to work as prostitutes were not participants. Id. at 868. Jarrett is inapposite.
There, the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 and 2423 of transporting both
adults and minors to work as prostitutes. Id. at 865. Accordingly, that court determined that
these people were not participants merely because they were themselves transported; to be
participants they must have “assisted in the unlawful transportation of others.” Id. at 868.
Here, the counts at issue pertained to Defendant’s operation of an interstate
prostitution enterprise. Although the victims were not indicted or convicted, they were part
of the enterprise. Where interstate prostitution is the relevant conviction, the prostitutes
involved may be counted as participants. See United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 101
18 (1st Cir. 1991) (counting five prostitutes among participants of “a pervasive interstate
prostitution ring”). Moreover, trial testimony indicates that Defendant oversaw other non-
prostitute participants, including his driver and his girlfriend, who also facilitated
prostitution.
The district court did not plainly err in applying § 3B1.1(a).
2. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1)—Vulnerable Victim Enhancement
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) provides for a two-level enhancement if the defendant
“knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.” A
“vulnerable victim” is an individual who is “unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or
mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” Id.
cmt. n.2. The section does not apply “if the factor that makes the person a vulnerable victim
is incorporated in the offense guideline”; for example, if the guideline provides an
enhancement for the age of the victim, the vulnerable victim enhancement would not apply
unless the victim was “unusually vulnerable for reasons unrelated to age.” Id.
The counts on which Defendant received this enhancement all involved minor
victims. Defendant argues that where an offense already accounts for the victim’s age, the
victim must be vulnerable due to “physical or mental condition,” or “otherwise particularly
susceptible to the criminal conduct.” Id. Defendant claims that victim prostitutes are
typically vulnerable in several ways, including being unemployed, having small children,
and having troubled home lives; he argues that the Government must distinguish
Defendant’s prostitute victims as more vulnerable than a typical prostitute victim.
Defendant further argues that, regarding one of his victims, he targeted her “not because of
19 a particular vulnerability, but based on her history with [Defendant].” Appellant’s Br. at
54.
Defendant glosses over the Government’s grounds for vulnerability, presented at
the sentencing hearing: “They were young, they were down on their luck. They didn’t have
a stable home. And that gave him an area to exploit.” J.A. 1600. As one minor victim
testified, she left the Virgin Islands, alone, at a young age and began living with her aunt,
who mistreated and neglected her; she began sneaking out of her house at age 16 to meet
Defendant; and she moved into Defendant’s house at age 16 shortly after getting pregnant
and being kicked out of her aunt’s house. Accordingly, she was “particularly susceptible
to the criminal conduct,” given her lack of a stable home and parental figures. Similarly,
the victim whom Defendant allegedly targeted based on her history with Defendant was 16
when she met Defendant and was “staying in hotels because [she] didn’t have a house to
go to” when she moved in with him. J.A. 766. She too was a vulnerable victim.
Our review is for plain error and the Government presented a series of grounds
specific to these victims that could support applying § 3A1.1(b)(1); accordingly, we will
not disturb the determination of the district court.
3. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1—Obstruction of Justice Enhancement
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides for a two-level enhancement if the defendant “willfully
obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice”
regarding the “investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction” and the obstructive conduct related to either the “defendant’s offense of
conviction” or “a closely related offense.” Obstructive conduct occurring before the
20 investigation of the instant offense “may be covered . . . if the conduct was purposefully
calculated, and likely, to thwart the investigation” of the offense of conviction. Id. cmt. n.1.
Defendant argues it was error to apply this enhancement to his federal kidnapping
charge based on obstruction of a previous state kidnapping charge. Both the state and
federal charges related to the same kidnapping. The previous state charge had been
dismissed when Defendant had the victim submit a false affidavit that she was not
kidnapped. According to Defendant, because the victim testified in the federal trial that the
affidavit from the state proceeding was false, Defendant’s actions did not have any bearing
on the federal proceeding; the obstruction did not pertain to the “instant offense,” i.e., the
federal kidnapping charge only.
As the Guidelines commentary indicates, obstructive conduct before the
investigation of the instant offense may be covered if the conduct was “purposefully
calculated, and likely, to thwart the investigation” of the offense of conviction. Id. Just so
here. This Court has held, albeit in an unpublished opinion, that where a defendant
obstructed justice in state proceedings on a charge, and the federal investigation had not
yet begun, but a federal charge was subsequently brought on a related charge, § 3C1.1 may
apply. See United States v. Hall, 68 F. App’x 446, 447 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (per
curiam) (“[Section] 3C1.1 makes no distinction between a federal and a state investigation
of the instant offense.”). The same reasoning applies here.
The district court did not plainly err in applying § 3C1.1.
4. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B)—Supervisory Control Enhancement
21 U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B) provides for a two-level enhancement if the minor victim
was “otherwise in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant.” This
subsection is “intended to have broad application and includes offenses involving a victim
less than 18 years of age entrusted to the defendant, whether temporarily or permanently,”
including “temporary caretakers.” Id. cmt. n.2(A). The sentencing court should “look to
the actual relationship that existed between the defendant and the minor,” and not simply
the legal status of their relationship. Id.
Defendant claims he received the enhancement on Count Four (recruiting a minor
to engage in a commercial sex act) because the minor victim was living with him.
Defendant argues that the enhancement should not apply because the minor victim’s
relationship to Defendant was “almost exclusively related to his role as a pimp and the
underlying crimes.” Appellant’s Br. at 57. But the record shows that was not the case.
Defendant acted as a “temporary caretaker” for her, thereby qualifying him for the
enhancement. The victim moved in with Defendant when she was under 18, after being
kicked out of her aunt’s house. The victim testified she relied on Defendant to drive her to
high school. The record is replete with additional examples of Defendant providing for the
victims, including this minor victim, in his prostitution ring—they all lived together in the
same house and moved as a unit to various cities, where Defendant rented the hotel rooms
in which they stayed. See J.A. 491 (testimony that the enterprise operated “kind of like a
family”).
We hold that the district court did not plainly err in applying § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B).
H
22 Having addressed Defendant’s other grounds of appeal, we turn to his allegation
that there was a complete miscarriage of justice. We have reviewed the record and find that
Defendant’s miscarriage of justice claim is meritless.
III
In conclusion, we affirm the district court as to all issues.
AFFIRMED