United States v. Seminerio

680 F. Supp. 2d 523, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2802, 2010 WL 148618
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 14, 2010
DocketS1 08 Cr. 1238(NRB)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 680 F. Supp. 2d 523 (United States v. Seminerio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Seminerio, 680 F. Supp. 2d 523, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2802, 2010 WL 148618 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD, District Judge.

“What the [expletive deleted] does it mean [to be an] elected official[ ]?” Former New York State Assemblyman Anthony Seminerio’s pre-sentence hearing, held pursuant to United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.1978), (the “Hearing”), provided in-depth insight into Seminerio’s answer to his own question: “It doesn’t *526 mean shit.” 1 Gov. Ex. 3. The Hearing also provided insight into how incomplete Seminerio’s answer was, for it exposed how Seminerio used his office to earn over a million dollars in “consulting fees.”

On June 24, 2009, Seminerio pleaded guilty to one count of a Scheme to Defraud the Public of Honest Services under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346. The government contends, as described in the Superseding Indictment, that Seminerio accepted bribes and engaged in extortion as part of a decade-long scheme to use his office — both literally and figuratively — for personal gain and at the expense of the public trust. Defendant maintains in his pre-sentence submissions that he is only accountable for a “single, isolated, criminal act” — an “extremely aberrant and atypical episode” in which defendant failed to disclose a conflict of interest. Defs Mem. 146. The dichotomy between these two portraits necessitated the Fatico hearing.

Anthony Seminerio became a member of the New York State Assembly in 1978. During his career in the Assembly, he lobbied on behalf of entities that served his district in Queens, particularly for certain hospitals whose agenda he helped advance in Albany. In 1996, Seminerio began working as a consultant with Neighborhood Marketing Services (“Neighborhood Marketing”), 2 a company run by a local community leader named Arlene Pedone, whom Seminerio had known for many years. The business relationship between Pedone and Seminerio broke down in 1998, and Seminerio sought to continue earning money as a consultant on his own. He formed a sole proprietorship called Marc Consultants and, over the next eight years, received over a million dollars of “consulting fees” through that entity. 3

In a conversation with a former colleague in the Assembly, Brian McLaughlin, Seminerio explained that after many years of watching hospital executives get rich in part as a result of his efforts in Albany, he decided: “Screw you, from now on ... I’m a consultant.” 4 Gov. Ex. 1. Seminerio then described how he structured certain consulting arrangements in conjunction with a business partner, General Bernard Gordon Ehrlich (also a convicted felon): “We charge a consulting fee, he charges the consulting fee to the hospital, and I work for his consulting firm ... It’s perfect, it works out nice ... And we don’t have to do nothing ... I mean I don’t have to do nothing.” Gov. Ex. 2. Seminerio further predicted: “[T]he day I leave the Assembly ... I’ll lose maybe 60 percent of my business.” Gov. Ex. 1.

Seminerio asserts that he provided bona fide consulting services to his clients. Although Seminerio’s clients defined his value to them in terms of “opening doors” or “making introductions,” Gov. Exs. 52, 56, several clients admit that Seminerio provided substantially the same services for them before he became a paid consultant. Indeed, the record is devoid of any bona fide consulting services that fall outside *527 the scope of activities an elected official could readily be expected to perform on behalf of his or her constituents. The entities that paid fees to Seminerio include a hospital, a college and a business lobbying organization, all of which serve the constituents of Seminerio’s Assembly District. Not only were certain of defendant’s services or introductions something that any diligent assemblyman might do as part of his role as a public servant, but in Seminerio’s case, many of his so-called introductions were made between parties who already knew one another or to entities that were also paying for the privilege of Seminerio’s influence and contacts.

Based upon defendant’s plea and the conduct established by a preponderance of the evidence at the Hearing, 5 we conclude, for the reasons discussed below, that Section 201.1(b)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines applies in this case. We further conclude, applying Section 2Bl.l(b)(l) of the guidelines and based on our findings below, that the conduct established at the hearing supports a loss calculation of at least $1,000,000. Accordingly, the applicable advisory guidelines range, before any potential departures, is 135 to 168 months.

DISCUSSION

To put our factual findings in context, we turn first to the scope of criminal liability for honest services fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 and address defendant’s argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. In Part II, we turn to the evidence presented at the Hearing and summarize our factual findings with respect to defendant’s corrupt relationships relevant to the “loss amount” to be factored into his guidelines sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(l). In Part III, we address Seminerio’s two remaining legal arguments, namely (a) that his sentencing guidelines range should not be determined under Section 2C1.1, but rather under the “Conflict of Interest” Section, 2C1.3, which would result in a lower guidelines range, and (b) that he was entitled to rely on an Advisory Opinion he obtained from the New York Legislative Ethics Committee and which permitted Seminerio to provide consulting services in certain circumstances.

I. Scope of Criminal Liability for Honest Services Fraud

Section 1346 of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime to devise a “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” The “important factor” that must be proved is that a defendant “engaged in conduct ‘for the purpose of executing a scheme to deprive another of the right of honest services.’ ” United States v. Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d 918, 921 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1162, 119 S.Ct. 1076, 143 L.Ed.2d 79 (1999)). In the Second Circuit, the scheme to deprive another of honest services need not implicate the defendant’s official duties. Id.

The violation of a state statute or a duty imposed by state law can be used to establish federal criminal liability for hon *528

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680 F. Supp. 2d 523, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2802, 2010 WL 148618, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-seminerio-nysd-2010.