United States v. Sauzameda

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit·Decided December 14, 2021·No. 20-2151·Unpublished

Opinion

FILED

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 14, 2021

TENTH CIRCUIT

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 20-2151 (D.C. No. 1:17-CR-02583-JCH-1)

SERGIO DANIEL SAUZAMEDA, (D. N.M.) also known as David Luna-Gomez,

Defendant - Appellant.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore, submitted without oral argument.

*

This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

I. INTRODUCTION

A grand jury indicted Sergio Sauzameda on charges he, inter alia, conspired to distribute methamphetamine and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. In response to the indictment, Sauzameda filed a motion to suppress, asserting the affidavit in support of a wiretap order for a relevant cellular phone (“Romero Phone 4”) did not establish probable cause to intercept voice communications. The district court denied the suppression motion and Sauzameda entered into a conditional plea agreement. He agreed to plead guilty to a two-count information charging both conspiracy to distribute and actual distribution of methamphetamine, but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

Sauzameda asserts the district court erred in concluding the wiretap order for voice communications over Romero Phone 4 was supported by probable cause. This argument is unconvincing. The affidavit in support of the wiretap order, particularly the history of drug-distribution related communications over Romero Phones 1 through 3, established a fair probability that voice communications over Romero Phone 4 would relate to past, current, or impending drug offenses. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied Sauzameda’s motion to suppress. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the order of the district court.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Background Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the “Act”), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2522, governs the issuance of orders authorizing the interception of, inter alia, wire and electronic communications. Interception and disclosure of such communications is generally prohibited. Id. § 2511. Upon a proper application, however, a federal judge may authorize such interception to help prevent, detect, or prosecute serious federal crimes. Id. § 2516. Before authorizing a wiretap, Title III of the Act requires a judge to find probable cause supporting issuance of the order. Id. § 2518(3)(a). In furtherance of that requirement, Title III sets forth detailed requirements governing both the application for a wiretap and any judicial order ultimately authorizing a wiretap. See id. § 2518; see also Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491, 1495 (2018). A wiretap application must be in writing, upon oath or affirmation, to a federal “judge of competent jurisdiction.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). It must include “a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted,” id. § 2518(1)(b)(iii), and “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [an enumerated] offense will be obtained through such interception,” id. § 2518(3)(b). It is this second requirement—that a wiretap application establish probable cause to believe each type of communication sought to be

Appellate Case: 20-2151 Document: 010110618767 Date Filed: 12/14/2021 Page: 4

intercepted will concern an enumerated crime—that is the narrow issue before the court in this appeal. 1 The facts and circumstances set out in a wiretap application must establish “probable cause to believe a particular offense has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and that conversations related to the offense will be overheard” on the subject telephone. United States v. Armendariz, 922 F.2d 602, 607 (10th Cir. 1990); see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)–(b). Probable cause has the same meaning in the wiretap context as it does in any other. Armendariz, 922 F.2d at 608. Thus, a wiretap application must convince a judge “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge,” as stated therein, are “based on reasonably trustworthy information” and “sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has or is being committed.” Id. Whether probable cause exists is evaluated by examining the “totality-of-the-circumstances” and involves “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable cause may be established through factual information about previously monitored conversations over the subject telephone, telephone data linking the

1 See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2 (“Mr. Sauzameda’s argument is that one of [the] two particular forms of communication [intercepted over Romero Phone 4]—phone calls—is unsupported by probable cause.”).

subject telephone to drug-trafficking activity, statements from confidential sources, physical surveillance, or other relevant evidence. See United States v. Apodaca, 820 F.2d 348, 350 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987). Evidence used to establish probable cause for one device can be used to show a new device is being used for a similar purpose. See United States v. Scurry, 821 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also id. (recognizing “drug traffickers frequently switch phones to avoid police detection”). Ultimately, probable cause is a flexible standard and there is no bright-line rule as to the type of evidence upon which a court may rely when evaluating a wiretap application. B. Factual Background Drug Enforcement Agency Task Force Officer Adam Gaitan sought interception of text and voice communications over Romero Phone 4. Gaitan’s affidavit identified Orlando Romero as a convicted drug trafficker, the “highest leader/organizer” in his trafficking organization, and a source of supply to other dealers. R. Vol. I at 80. Gaitan also identified Romero’s mother and girlfriend as fellow drug traffickers. Gaitan described the criminal investigation in detail, beginning with information from a confidential source that Romero distributed drugs in Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the “Los Padillas” gang and that he had several different sources of supply.

Gaitan confirmed Romero was selling controlled substances by purchasing heroin and/or methamphetamine from Romero on four separate occasions over a six-month period. During that period, Gaitan communicated with Romero, by both text messages and voice calls, on four cellular phones to arrange the drug transactions. In October 2015, Romero arranged a drug transaction using text messages via a cellular phone (“Romero Phone 1”). In November 2015, Romero arranged another drug transaction using text messages via a second cellular phone (“Romero Phone 2”). In January 2016, Romero arranged a third drug transaction using both text messages and a voice call via a third cellular phone (“Romero Phone 3”). In February 2016, Romero discussed a future drug transaction using text messages via Romero Phone 3. In March and April 2016, Romero arranged a fourth drug transaction using text messages and voice calls via Romero Phone 3, and a voice call via Romero Phone 2. Romero initiated every voice call to Gaitan.

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