United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 22-1944
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO SANTONASTASO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Thompson, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
Jin-Ho King, with whom Milligan Rona Duran & King LLC was on brief, for appellant. Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
April 26, 2024 MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Antonio
Santonastaso appeals the judgment following a jury verdict finding
him guilty of making a false statement to federal investigators
and attempted witness tampering. Santonastaso contends that the
government's evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt on these
charges and that the district court erred by declining to give a
materiality instruction based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335 (2017). For the reasons
explained below, we affirm Santonastaso's convictions.
I. Background
A. The 2000 Helicopter Theft and Revocation of Santonastaso's Airman Certificate
In the summer of 2000, Santonastaso was investigated by
the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") for allegedly stealing
a helicopter and flying the helicopter without appropriate
certifications. The FAA revoked Santonastaso's airman certificate
after finding, in relevant part, that he: (1) lacked a valid
medical certificate while flying the helicopter; (2) failed to
obtain the necessary rotorcraft-helicopter rating on his airman
certificate before flying the helicopter; (3) operated the
helicopter carelessly or recklessly by carrying a passenger when
he lacked proper certifications; and (4) failed to notify the FAA
of his address change.
- 2 - As Santonastaso emphasizes on appeal, the FAA did not
list his alleged involvement in the helicopter theft as a reason
for revoking his airman certificate. But in 2002, Santonastaso
pled guilty in Massachusetts state court to stealing the
helicopter.
B. The FAA's 2018 Investigation
Nearly two decades later, in 2018, Santonastaso's
neighbor reported to local police that he saw Santonastaso flying
a helicopter from his backyard around the area. The police alerted
the FAA, and the FAA assigned Aidan Seltsam-Wilps, an aviation
safety inspector, to investigate Santonastaso. At Seltsam-Wilps's
instruction, Santonastaso's neighbor provided the FAA with written
logs of when he saw Santonastaso flying and photographs of
Santonastaso in the helicopter.
After obtaining the logs and photographs from
Santonastaso's neighbor, Seltsam-Wilps checked FAA records to
assess what certifications Santonastaso possessed and whether the
helicopter he was flying was airworthy (i.e., compliant with
federal regulations and safe to fly). Seltsam-Wilps's research
revealed that Santonastaso previously held an airman certificate,
but the FAA revoked his certificate, meaning that Santonastaso did
not have privileges to fly the helicopter. And by searching for
the helicopter's tail number to obtain its registration
- 3 - information, Seltsam-Wilps found that the helicopter appeared
airworthy.
Based on this preliminary investigation, Seltsam-Wilps
sent Santonastaso a letter requesting that he provide records to
confirm the helicopter's airworthiness. Seltsam-Wilps found
Santonastaso's responses to be inadequate and arranged to visit
Santonastaso to see the helicopter in person.
On April 18, 2018, Seltsam-Wilps -- accompanied by an
FAA maintenance inspector and a local police officer -- met
Santonastaso at his home. At first, Santonastaso denied illegally
flying the helicopter. But after Seltsam-Wilps told him that the
FAA had photographic evidence of him flying, Santonastaso changed
course to assert that he had the requisite certifications to fly.
Similarly, when Seltsam-Wilps summarized the FAA records showing
that his airman certificate had been revoked, Santonastaso "seemed
very confused," but then told Seltsam-Wilps that he had a valid
license to fly. Santonastaso presented Seltsam-Wilps with a
logbook containing an expired temporary airman certificate issued
in 1985 and expired logbook endorsements (statements issued by
certified flight instructors permitting students with specific
training to conduct certain types of flight operations) showing
that he had completed the training requirements for the Robinson
R22 helicopter he had been flying. Santonastaso also showed
- 4 - Seltsam-Wilps what he purported to be a medical certification but
was actually an inapplicable physician's checklist.
When Seltsam-Wilps inquired about Santonastaso's
awareness that his airman certificate had been revoked,
Santonastaso initially stated that he never received notice from
the FAA about the revocation. But he later told Seltsam-Wilps
that the notice must have been sent to him "when [he] was out of
the country working for the State Department." Seltsam-Wilps asked
Santonastaso about this supposed State Department work, to which
Santonastaso responded that he had been "part of a team of
operatives, and it's black ops sort of stuff," involving members
of the CIA and DEA. Santonastaso further explained that the "whole
story about the stolen helicopter and [his] jail time . . . was
all a cover-up; and once he spoke with the remaining members of
his team of operatives, he would be able to clear [the] matter
up," as it was "all a big misunderstanding."
At the end of this meeting, Seltsam-Wilps instructed
Santonastaso to stop flying the helicopter, citing the serious
consequences that could result if the FAA found that he had
violated federal regulations. Later that day, Santonastaso called
Seltsam-Wilps to reiterate that he had an airman certificate and
medical certification, and "indicated that he had no intention of
[refraining from] flying the helicopter."
- 5 - True to his word, Santonastaso continued flying, and the
FAA received documentation from his neighbor of approximately 85
flights that he piloted in the helicopter between April and
November 2018. But in November 2018, the Town of East Brookfield
sued Santonastaso in Massachusetts state court and eventually
obtained a permanent injunction barring him from flying the
C. The U.S. Department of Transportation's 2019 Investigation
While the FAA's investigation of Santonastaso was
administrative in nature, the Office of the Inspector General of
the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT-OIG") later opened a
criminal investigation into Santonastaso's conduct. In the spring
of 2019, the DOT-OIG received a complaint from the U.S. Attorney's
Office regarding Santonastaso's alleged operation of a helicopter
without an airman certificate. DOT-OIG Special Agent Marybeth
Roberts obtained a copy of the FAA's investigation file and started
the DOT-OIG's criminal investigation into Santonastaso's conduct.
On April 17, 2019, Roberts and another DOT-OIG special
agent met with Santonastaso at his home. As part of her
introduction, Roberts identified herself as a federal law
enforcement officer, informed Santonastaso of his right to not
speak with her, and explained that lying to a federal law
enforcement officer is a criminal offense. Roberts also gave
- 6 - Santonastaso her business card, which listed her position as a
DOT-OIG special agent.
Like Seltsam-Wilps, Roberts questioned Santonastaso
about the revocation of his airman certificate. Santonastaso told
Roberts that he found out about the revocation during his 2018
meeting with Seltsam-Wilps and that the revocation was related to
a stolen helicopter. Roberts then showed Santonastaso a copy of
the revocation notice that was sent to him in 2000, and
Santonastaso confirmed that the mailing address was where he lived
at the time. Unlike in his interview with Seltsam-Wilps,
Santonastaso did not mention working for the State Department,
CIA, DEA, or any undercover operation. Santonastaso also clarified
to Roberts that he was not currently flying because his helicopter
needed maintenance. And when Roberts asked for his flight logbook,
he told Roberts that he kept the logbook in Woodstock, Connecticut.
On May 6, 2019, Roberts and DOT-OIG Special Agent Dwight
Schwader went to Woodstock to meet Roland Toutant, the manager of
Toutant Airport, and learned that Toutant was friends with
Santonastaso. Based on information from Toutant, Roberts and
Schwader proceeded to interview Ronald Plouffe, the manager of a
nearby airport in Southbridge, Massachusetts. While being
interviewed by Roberts and Schwader, Plouffe received a call from
Santonastaso. Plouffe clandestinely signaled to the agents that
Santonastaso was on the line, and Schwader leaned in closely to
- 7 - the phone receiver to take notes on the call. Santonastaso told
Plouffe that a woman was "asking questions" about him at "other
airports" because "his neighbor was mad" about him flying his
helicopter. Of particular relevance here, Schwader's notes from
the call indicated that Santonastaso referred to the woman as "a
girl from MA DOT," presumably shorthand for the Massachusetts
Department of Transportation. During the call, Santonastaso
instructed Plouffe to say that he did not know Santonastaso or
anything else in response to the woman's questions. Santonastaso
also referenced the permanent injunction that prohibited him from
flying and the potential consequences of doing so.
D. The Federal Criminal Proceedings Against Santonastaso
On May 30, 2019, a federal grand jury indicted
Santonastaso on four counts:
• Count 1: Serving as an airman without an airman certificate when flying the helicopter in 2018 in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46306(b)(7); • Count 2: Making false statements to federal investigators by denying culpability in the 2000 helicopter theft during the FAA's 2018 investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); • Count 3: Making false statements denying his illegal operation of a helicopter in 2018 and purporting to have medical certification during the DOT-OIG's 2019 investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); and • Count 4: Attempted witness tampering involving his call to Plouffe during the DOT-OIG's 2019 investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).
- 8 - Before Santonastaso's trial began, and as will be
explained in further detail, Santonastaso's counsel requested a
jury instruction that incorporated the materiality standard
adopted by the Supreme Court in Maslenjak. See 582 U.S. at 338,
350. The district court declined to give Santonastaso's proposed
instruction.
In late March 2022, the government proceeded to try its
case against Santonastaso on the same four counts from the grand
jury indictment. At the close of the government's case-in-chief,
Santonastaso made a motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and renewed the motion at the close
of evidence. The court denied the motion. Santonastaso's counsel
noted his objection to the court's denial. After a five-day trial,
the court charged the jury, and Santonastaso's counsel objected to
the court's rejection of his preferred materiality instruction.
The jury found Santonastaso guilty on Counts 1, 2, and
4, and not guilty on Count 3. Santonastaso filed a post-judgment
motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts 2 and 4. On May 25,
2022, the district court entered a one-line text-only order denying
the motion.
On November 30, 2022, after the sentencing hearing, the
district court entered judgment against Santonastaso.
Santonastaso then filed this timely appeal challenging his
conviction on Counts 2 and 4 only.
- 9 - II. Discussion
The parties agree that Santonastaso has preserved his
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts 2 and 4
and to the alleged instructional error.
This court reviews a preserved challenge to the
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a criminal conviction under a
de novo standard. See United States v. Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d
1, 11 (1st Cir. 2020). Our de novo review requires us to "examine
the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and decide whether that evidence,
including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would allow a
rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the charged count or crime." United
States v. Cruz-Díaz, 550 F.3d 169, 172 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008). This
approach does not allow us to "view each piece of evidence
separately, re-weigh the evidence, or second-guess the jury's
credibility calls." United States v. Acevedo-Hernández, 898 F.3d
150, 161 (1st Cir. 2018). We will "revers[e] only if the defendant
shows that no rational factfinder could have found him guilty."
United States v. Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2019).
As for preserved claims of instructional error, we
deploy "a bifurcated framework." United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d
25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012). "We review de novo questions about whether
the instructions conveyed the essence of the applicable law and
- 10 - review for abuse of discretion questions about whether the court's
choice of language was unfairly prejudicial." Id. We will not
reverse the district court's decision to reject the defendant's
preferred instruction "unless the proposed instruction is itself
substantively correct, was not covered (at least in substance) in
the charge as given, and touched upon a salient point (such that
the refusal so to instruct seriously undercut the proponent's
ability to mount a particular claim or defense and caused
substantial prejudice)." United States v. Simon, 12 F.4th 1, 50
(1st Cir. 2021).
We begin with Santonastaso's arguments relative to Count
2 before turning our attention to his protestations about Count 4
and note that "if [Santonastaso] prevails on the insufficiency
argument, then we need not explore any of the other trial errors
raised" because the Double Jeopardy Clause would attach and
preclude a second trial. United States v. Pérez-Greaux, 83 F.4th
1, 12 (1st Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Orlandella, 96
F.4th 71, 83 n.19 (1st Cir. 2024).
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count 2 (False Statements Regarding the 2000 Helicopter Theft)
To prove Santonastaso's guilt on Count 2, the government
presented evidence that, during the FAA's 2018 investigation,
Santonastaso told Seltsam-Wilps that he was part of an undercover
team who used the 2000 helicopter theft as a "cover-up" and thus
- 11 - falsely denied culpability for stealing the helicopter. To
establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), "the government must
prove that the defendant (1) made a material, false statement
(2) in a matter within the jurisdiction of the government
(3) knowing that the statement was false." United States v.
Vázquez-Soto, 939 F.3d 365, 371 (1st Cir. 2019).
Santonastaso's appeal focuses on challenging the
government's proof on the materiality element. First, and related
to his jury instruction challenge, Santonastaso argues that the
Supreme Court's decision in Maslenjak required the government to
prove a more concrete causal connection between his false statement
denying culpability for the 2000 helicopter theft and the FAA's
2018 investigation. Second, even if this court declines to adopt
Maslenjak in the § 1001(a) context, Santonastaso insists that the
government's materiality evidence was still insufficient under
this Circuit's existing standards because his false statement
"ha[d] no bearing whatsoever" on the FAA's 2018 helicopter
operation investigation.
We take these two sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments
in turn, beginning with a discussion of Maslenjak. Because we
ultimately conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support
Santonastaso's conviction on Count 2, we then proceed to address
Santonastaso's instructional error claim, which also centers
around Maslenjak and the § 1001(a) materiality standard.
- 12 - 1. Whether Maslenjak Applies to § 1001(a) Prosecutions
Santonastaso urges us to read Maslenjak's materiality
standard into § 1001(a), enhancing the government's burden to
establish a causal relationship between his false statement
regarding the helicopter theft and the course of the FAA's
investigation. But as will become clear, the law-of-the-circuit
doctrine forecloses such a move.
In Maslenjak, the Supreme Court addressed the standard
for obtaining a conviction premised on false statements to
immigration officials under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), the statute
prohibiting the commission of an "illegal act in connection with
naturalization." 582 U.S. at 341. Maslenjak became a naturalized
citizen several years after obtaining refugee status and
immigrating to the United States. Id. at 339. But immigration
officials later discovered that Maslenjak made false statements
when she applied for refugee status. Id.
Maslenjak was then charged with, and convicted of,
violating § 1425(a) based on the government's proof that she lied
on her naturalization questionnaire in attesting that she never
gave false information "to a government official while applying
for an immigration benefit" or to gain entry to the United States.
Id. In vacating Maslenjak's conviction, the Court summarized that
"the District Court told the jury that it could convict based on
any false statement in the naturalization process . . . , no matter
- 13 - how inconsequential to the ultimate decision." Id. at 352. The
Court held that such an instruction was in error because § 1425(a)
requires proving that the false statement had a "causal influence"
on the naturalization decision. Id. at 346–47.
The Maslenjak Court then outlined a "two-part showing"
for materiality under § 1425(a). Id. at 349. The government must
first "prove that the misrepresented fact was sufficiently
relevant to . . . [a] naturalization criterion that it would have
prompted reasonable officials . . . to undertake further
investigation"; and second, the government must demonstrate that
further "investigation 'would predictably have disclosed' some
legal disqualification." Id. at 349–50 (emphases added)
(citations omitted).
As Santonastaso notes, this Circuit has not addressed
whether Maslenjak's materiality holding applies to prosecutions
under § 1001(a). The government points us to the
law-of-the-circuit doctrine because, in two § 1001(a) cases
post-dating Maslenjak (United States v. Rivera-Ortiz, 14 F.4th 91
(1st Cir. 2021), and United States v. Chen, 998 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2021)), we adhered to our prior approach to assessing materiality
under § 1001(a) without adopting Maslenjak's more stringent
materiality standard. Santonastaso responds that Rivera-Ortiz and
Chen do not trigger the law-of-the-circuit doctrine at all.
Indeed, the question of whether Maslenjak's materiality holding
- 14 - applies to § 1001(a) was not squarely before the court in either
case nor did we address the issue sua sponte.
But because the law-of-the-circuit doctrine "is rooted
in the need for consistency[,] . . . its force does not depend on
a prior panel's use of talismanic phrases." United States v.
Lewis, 517 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2008). In other words, "[s]o
long as a prior panel, in a holding directly or closely on point,
makes clear its choice of a rule of law, that choice is binding on
newly constituted panels within the circuit, subject only to the
isthmian exceptions noted in our earlier decisions." Id.
Here, Santonastaso correctly points out that no
post-Maslenjak cases in this Circuit have directly confronted
Maslenjak's applicability to § 1001(a) prosecutions. Nonetheless,
the panel decisions in Rivera-Ortiz and Chen implicitly made this
court's "choice of a rule of law" clear. By continuing to rely on
the pre-Maslenjak materiality standard in § 1001(a) cases without
any consideration of Maslenjak as new binding authority, we are
bound by our prior panels' interpretations of the § 1001(a)
materiality element.1 See Rivera-Ortiz, 14 F.4th at 100; Chen,
998 F.3d at 10.
1 Aside from stating the obvious that § 1425 is a different statute than § 1001, we note that the two vary significantly in terms of text and structure. In addition, none of our sister circuits have addressed Maslenjak's applicability to the § 1001(a) materiality element. Accordingly, we cannot fault our prior panels
- 15 - Santonastaso makes no attempt to argue that either of
the two exceptions to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine apply, see
United States v. Barbosa, 896 F.3d 60, 74 (1st Cir. 2018)
(describing exceptions), so we will not address them. We are
therefore bound by the law-of-the-circuit doctrine, and we rely on
the materiality standard for § 1001(a) as articulated in our
pre- and post-Maslenjak cases to assess Santonastaso's sufficiency
challenge on Count 2.
2. Whether the Government Presented Sufficient Evidence of Materiality
Under this court's materiality standard for § 1001(a)
prosecutions, a false statement is material where it is "of a type
which would have a 'natural tendency' to influence an investigation
in the 'abstract.'" Chen, 998 F.3d at 10 (quoting United States
v. Phillipos, 849 F.3d 464, 473 (1st Cir. 2017)). Importantly,
"the statement need not actually have influenced the governmental
function." United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir.
2013). Instead, "[i]t is enough that the 'statement could have
provoked governmental action.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Accordingly, a statement "is material regardless of whether the
agency actually relied upon it," Sebaggala, 256 F.3d at 65, and
for not identifying and relying upon Maslenjak as on-point binding precedent in this context.
- 16 - "the knowledge of the interrogator is irrelevant to the materiality
of the defendant's false statements," Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 54.
Similarly, "where a defendant's statements are intended to
misdirect government investigators, they may satisfy the
materiality requirement of section 1001 even if they stand no
chance of accomplishing their objective." Id. at 55.
Santonastaso argues that his statements denying
culpability for the helicopter theft in 2000 were immaterial for
two main reasons. First, he maintains that the FAA's 2018
investigation was solely intended to discern whether he had proper
qualifications to fly the helicopter and whether the helicopter
was airworthy, such that the helicopter theft in 2000 had nothing
to do with either investigatory purpose. Second, he relies on the
fact that in revoking his airman certificate in 2000, the FAA did
not identify helicopter theft as a reason for the revocation. So,
in Santonastaso's view, even to the extent that the 2018
investigation tangentially encompassed his airman certificate
revocation in 2000, any statements he made about the helicopter
theft could not possibly have been material.
The government responds that Santonastaso's statements
were material to the FAA's 2018 investigation because "one of the
purposes of the inspectors' visit with Santonastaso was to
determine if the information in the FAA database might be
erroneous." Furthermore, the government emphasizes that "FAA
- 17 - safety inspectors do not have access to lists of persons who work
for the CIA or other agencies in an undercover capacity," meaning
Seltsam-Wilps had no way to corroborate Santonastaso's story
without deeper investigation.
Although Santonastaso raises valid points about the
facial irrelevance of his involvement in the helicopter theft with
respect to the 2018 investigation, he falls short of the high bar
to show that no reasonable jury could have convicted him under
§ 1001(a). A reasonable jury could have found that Santonastaso's
false statement was material -- even if it was largely unrelated
to the investigation at hand and his story was genuinely
incredible -- by concluding that he intended to misdirect
investigators. See Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 55.
And in Rivera-Ortiz, this court held that a plausible
explanation for how a federal investigation "would be impacted by
the false statements" was "sufficient" to show materiality. 14
F.4th at 100. Here, the government presented testimony from
Seltsam-Wilps that his investigation involved confirming the
accuracy of the FAA's database on revocations and he could not
have readily verified Santonastaso's alleged undercover work. In
the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could
find that, by falsely denying involvement in the 2000 helicopter
theft, Santonastaso could have provoked the FAA to further
investigate his purported undercover work or the accuracy of its
- 18 - database. While the government's evidence for materiality was not
particularly plentiful, it was sufficient for a reasonable jury to
have found Santonastaso's statements to be material. We thus
affirm the jury's guilty verdict on Count 2.
B. Instructional Error on the Materiality Standard
Having found the evidence sufficient to sustain
Santonastaso's conviction on Count 2, we turn to his instructional
error claim. In line with his arguments for applying Maslenjak's
materiality holding to § 1001(a) prosecutions, Santonastaso
requested a jury instruction that incorporated Maslenjak's
formulation of the materiality standard. Santonastaso's proposed
instruction provided, in relevant part: "A statement is not
material if it could have influenced the decisionmaker. The
government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
statement would have influenced the decisionmaker."
The court rejected Santonastaso's proposed instruction.
At the close of evidence, the court gave the following instruction
modeled after First Circuit Pattern Instruction 4.18.1001: "A
statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence or
be capable of influencing the decision of the decisionmaker to
which it was addressed, regardless of whether the agency actually
relied upon it. A statement is also material if it provokes
government action."
- 19 - The district court did not err in declining to give
Santonastaso's proposed instruction because, as explained, this
Circuit has not adopted Maslenjak's materiality holding for
§ 1001(a) prosecutions. And as given, the court's instruction
correctly stated the controlling law on materiality. In fact,
aside from urging us to determinatively hold that Maslenjak applies
to § 1001(a) prosecutions, Santonastaso does not point to any other
substantive legal error or prejudice caused by the district court's
chosen instruction. Therefore, his instructional error claim
fails.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count 4 (Attempted Witness Tampering Involving Plouffe)
The government charged Santonastaso with attempted
witness tampering based on his call to Plouffe instructing him not
to speak with a woman who was investigating him, all while DOT-OIG
special agents were incidentally present to interview Plouffe
regarding Santonastaso. A person who "knowingly uses
intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or
attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to . . . hinder, delay, or prevent the
communication to a law enforcement officer . . . of information
relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal
offense," is guilty of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(3).
- 20 - Santonastaso argues that the government failed to prove
the specific intent element of witness tampering because
Santonastaso "acted with state-law matters in mind and without any
intent in connection with any potential federal offense." In
particular, Santonastaso describes that approximately two weeks
after DOT-OIG agents met with him in April 2019, he received notice
of the permanent injunction barring him from flying that was issued
by the Worcester County Superior Court. And just four days after
the permanent injunction was issued, Santonastaso called Plouffe
while DOT-OIG agents were present. Contending that he had
"state-law matters in mind," Santonastaso characterizes his
conversation with Plouffe as centering around the recent state
court proceedings with no mention of the federal investigation.
Additionally, he points out that DOT-OIG Special Agent Schwader's
notes reflect that Santonastaso told Plouffe that "a woman from
the '[MA] DOT'" was investigating him, while DOT-OIG Special Agent
Roberts explicitly introduced herself as a federal agent and gave
Santonastaso a business card identifying her as a federal agent.
In United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 (1st Cir.
2000), we "dispel[led] any notion that the defendant's intent to
hinder communication must include an awareness of the possible
involvement of federal officials." Id. at 680. There, we
explained that "Section 1512 explicitly does not require proof of
the defendant's state of mind with respect to whether the officials
- 21 - involved were federal officers." Id. As such, "the evidence may
be sufficient to support a conviction under § 1512(b)(3) even if
the defendant had no knowledge that the witness threatened had
even contemplated communicating with a federal official." Id. at
680–81.
Presumably to evade the clear rule we set in Baldyga,
Santonastaso appears to argue that he lacked specific intent to
interfere with an investigation into a "potential federal
offense," rather than knowledge that federal agents were involved
in the investigation. But in Baldyga, we emphasized that "[a]ll
that § 1512(b)(3) requires is that the government establish that
the defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that
happened to be federal." 233 F.3d at 681 (quoting United States
v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 687 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also
Applewhaite, 195 F.3d at 687 (summarizing that in a § 1512(b)(3)
prosecution, "[t]he government did not have to establish that the
defendants specifically intended to interfere with a federal
investigation"). Likewise, we held in United States v. Byrne, 435
F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006), that "a defendant may be held strictly
liable under [§ 1512(b)(3)] for the happenstance that a federal
law enforcement agent rather than, say, a local police officer or
internal affairs specialist investigated his conduct." Id. at 25.
Consequently, for specific intent purposes under § 1512(b)(3),
there is no meaningful distinction between intent related to the
- 22 - federal status of the investigating agents and the federal nature
of the crime being investigated.
Under the standards we have adopted in Baldyga and Byrne,
we must uphold the jury's guilty verdict on this record. In
addition, we note that the government presented detailed evidence
related to Santonastaso's knowledge of the involvement of federal
officials in a federal investigation. For example, as the
government highlights, Santonastaso did not limit his discussion
with Plouffe to complaining about the state court proceedings.
Instead, Santonastaso told Plouffe that a woman investigating his
helicopter flying was asking questions about him at airports. And
in fact, after interviewing Santonastaso and informing him of her
status as a federal agent, Roberts visited Toutant, Santonastaso's
friend, at an airport just before meeting Plouffe at the
Southbridge Airport. Moreover, Santonastaso instructed Plouffe to
avoid revealing any information if asked by the female
investigator.
Although Santonastaso did not refer to Roberts by name
and Schwader's notes implied that Santonastaso said that the woman
worked for the Massachusetts DOT, a rational jury could have
inferred that Santonastaso had Roberts in mind. And, again,
because Santonastaso had recently been interviewed by Roberts, who
was indeed investigating a federal crime and clearly explained to
Santonastaso that she was a federal agent, the jury could sensibly
- 23 - deduce that he was specifically thinking of the federal
investigation when he called Plouffe. Therefore, the jury
reasonably concluded that Santonastaso knowingly attempted to
influence Plouffe during a federal investigation conducted by
federal law enforcement agents, and we affirm its guilty verdict
on Count 4.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the evidence
was sufficient for the jury to find Santonastaso guilty of making
a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness
tampering, and the district court did not commit instructional
error in rejecting Santonastaso's proposed materiality
instruction. We therefore affirm the underlying convictions for
those charges against Santonastaso.
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