United States v. Santiago-Becerril
This text of United States v. Santiago-Becerril (United States v. Santiago-Becerril) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
United States v. Santiago-Becerril, (1st Cir. 1997).
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION] [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 96-1912
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
PEDRO ANTONIO RAMOS-ROSA,
Defendant, Appellant.
_________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
_________________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Lagueux,* District Judge. ______________
_________________________
Ernesto Hernandez Milan on brief for appellant. _______________________
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jos A. Quiles- _____________ _______________
Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, W. Stephen Muldrow and ________ __________________
Nelson P rez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorneys, on brief _________________
for appellee.
_________________________
June 9, 1997
_________________________
_________________
*Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Pedro Antonio Ramos- Per Curiam. __________
Rosa (Ramos) challenges the sentence imposed following his guilty
plea to carjacking (count 1) and an associated firearms charge
(count 2). See 18 U.S.C. 2, 924(c)(1) & (3), 2119(3) (1994). ___
Having reviewed the record carefully, we detect no error.
In this instance, the sentencing court figured the
applicable guideline sentencing range (GSR) to be 324 to 405
months on count 1. The government moved for a substantial
assistance departure, USSG 5K1.1, and the appellant chimed in,
seeking even greater clemency. The court chose a sentence of 225
months on count 1, followed by a mandatory minimum five-year
consecutive sentence on count 2.
The appellant does not contest the correctness of the
GSR. Nevertheless, he asserts that the court blundered in
denying him an appropriate downward departure by (a) erroneously
considering his past criminal history (including a juvenile
offense for which no conviction ensued), and (b) ignoring the
purpose of USSG 5K1.1 and the policy of the Sentencing
Commission in respect to offenders who assist the government.
Additionally, he contends that the district court erred by
considering elements of the offense which already were considered
by the Sentencing Commission when it assigned a base offense
level to the crime of conviction. These claims are meritless.
"It is by now apodictic that a criminal defendant
cannot ground an appeal on the sentencing court's discretionary
decision not to depart below the GSR." United States v. Gifford, _____________ _______
2
17 F.3d 462, 473 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Koon v. United States, ___ ____ ____ _____________
116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046-47 (1996); Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R.
Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under ________________________________________________________
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 13-14 _________________________________
(1991). This rule applies full bore to substantial assistance
departures. See United States v. Vaknin, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st ___ _____________ ______
Cir. 1997) [No. 96-1394, slip op. at 10-11]; United States v. _____________
Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155-57 (1st Cir. 1993). In both _______
situations, the departure decision is unappealable as long as it
rests on differential factfinding or on the weighing of competing
equities; jurisdiction only attaches "when it appears that the
failure to depart stemmed from the sentencing court's mistaken
impression that it lacked the legal authority to depart or,
relatedly, from the court's misapprehension of the rules
governing departure." Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1153. No such _______
oversight occurred here.
The appellant labors to find a cognizable error, but he
is unsuccessful. The district court in fact departed downward.
The appellant's real dissatisfaction is that, as he sees it, the
extent of the departure was not sufficiently generous. In
general, such complaints are not cognizable on appeal. See ___
United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 1990). _____________ ________
Moreover, looking to the whole of the record, see United States ___ _____________
v. Rostoff, 53 F.3d 398, 407 (1st Cir. 1995), it is perfectly _______
clear that the trial judge knew he could depart once the
government invoked USSG 5K1.1. He in fact did so, choosing, as
3
was his right, to impose a sentence greater than the prosecution
had recommended or the appellant had hoped but still below the
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Related
Koon v. United States
518 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 1996)
United States v. Gifford
17 F.3d 462 (First Circuit, 1994)
United States v. Rostoff
53 F.3d 398 (First Circuit, 1995)
United States v. Ilario M.A. Zannino
895 F.2d 1 (First Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Dana Pighetti
898 F.2d 3 (First Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Abel A. Mariano, Jr., United States of America v. Barry Butterworth
983 F.2d 1150 (First Circuit, 1993)
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