United States v. Sanchez-Urias

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: June 24, 2025
• Docket: 24-1506
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-1506 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 24, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-1506 (D.C. No. 1:24-CR-00042-RMR-1) MAGDIEL SANCHEZ-URIAS, (D. Colo.) a/k/a Chinola,

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Magdiel Sanchez-Urias pleaded guilty to a federal drug charge and the district

court sentenced him to a 121-month prison term. He has appealed from that sentence

but his plea agreement contains an appeal waiver. The government now moves to

enforce that waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir.

2004) (en banc). Sanchez-Urias, through counsel, opposes the government’s motion

and urges the court to instead go directly to the merits and dismiss the appeal

because, counsel says, there is no nonfrivolous basis for his client to overturn his

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-1506 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2025 Page: 2

conviction or sentence. For the reasons explained below, we grant the government’s

motion and dismiss this appeal.

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. District Court Proceedings

A federal grand jury indicted Sanchez-Urias with one count of conspiracy to

distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine and one count of illegal reentry.

He agreed to plead guilty to a single charge of possessing 50 grams of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Sanchez-Urias’s written plea agreement

included an appeal waiver with narrow exceptions. The only exception currently at

issue would allow Sanchez-Urias to appeal if “the sentence exceeds the top end of the

advisory guideline range from the Sentencing Guidelines that applies for the

defendant’s criminal history (as determined by the district court) at a total offense

level of 29.” R. vol. I at 42.

The district court held a change-of-plea hearing. At that hearing, the court

summarized the exception to the appeal waiver as follows: “[I]f I accept your plea

agreement, you can only appeal the sentence . . . if it exceeds the top end of the

advisory guideline range that applies for your criminal history as determined by the

Court at a total offense level of 29 in your particular case.” R. vol. III at 13.

Sanchez-Urias confirmed he understood.

Later during the change-of-plea hearing, the court asked counsel for

Sanchez-Urias to explain the parties’ respective positions about Sanchez-Urias’s

likely offense level and criminal history category. Counsel responded that both sides

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believed the criminal history category would be IV but they disagreed on the offense

level. The government believed the offense level would be 29 (and therefore a range

of 121 to 151 months), whereas the defense believed it would be 27 (leading to a

range of 78 to 97 months). The district court then emphasized to Sanchez-Urias, in

various ways, that counsels’ estimates were only estimates and he could end up

receiving a sentence either above or below those estimates. Sanchez-Urias confirmed

multiple times that he understood.

At sentencing, the district court concluded that Sanchez-Urias’s criminal

history category was IV, as the parties predicted. The court further concluded,

however, that the total offense level was 31. This yielded a recommended guidelines

calculation of 151 to 188 months. Even so, the government recommended a

121-month sentence, matching the bottom of the Guidelines range if calculated with a

total offense level of 29. The court accepted that recommendation and sentenced

Sanchez-Urias to 121 months.

According to his current attorney (who was appointed on appeal),

Sanchez-Urias believed the district court’s calculation of the total offense level at

31 (i.e., higher than 29) brought his case outside of the appeal waiver. For this

reason, his attorney says, he instructed his trial attorney to file a notice of appeal,

which she did.

B. Appellate Proceedings

Before the government moved to enforce the appeal waiver, Sanchez-Urias’s

new attorney on appeal filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

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and moved to withdraw. In the Anders brief, the attorney stated that Sanchez-Urias is

“entitled to appeal . . . if the Sentencing Guidelines total offense level exceed[s] 29.”

Aplt. Anders Br. at 9, ECF No. 26-1. Nonetheless, counsel had concluded there was

no nonfrivolous argument that the district court erred at sentencing given district

courts’ broad discretion and the fact that a 121-month sentence was already lower

than 151 months (the low end of the Guidelines range if calculated with a total

offense level of 31).

Soon after, the government filed its motion to enforce the appeal waiver, i.e.,

the motion currently at issue. Sanchez-Urias, through counsel, responded that the

appeal-waiver exception is confusing, especially for an uneducated man such as

Sanchez-Urias. Counsel stated that the confusion was compounded by the district

court’s explanation of the waiver exception during the change-of-plea hearing,

particularly in light of the hearing’s later discussion about the parties’ competing

estimates regarding Sanchez-Urias’s offense level. All of this, counsel claimed, led

Sanchez-Urias to believe he could appeal if the district court calculated his offense

level higher than 29. Counsel suggested these circumstances mean his client did not

knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement. But rather than

straightforwardly making that argument, counsel concluded that challenging the

voluntariness of the appeal waiver might prompt this court to void the plea agreement

altogether (potentially leading to a much harsher sentence), so the best course in

these circumstances would be to go straight to the merits and file an Anders brief (as

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counsel had already done). He therefore encouraged the court to deny the

government’s motion to enforce and instead proceed on the Anders brief.

This court entered an order for further briefing from Sanchez-Urias’s counsel.

The court noted that counsel had not actually taken a position on the three factors the

court must consider when deciding whether to enforce an appeal waiver, namely,

“(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate

rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate

rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice,”

Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. The court therefore required clarification of counsel’s

views.

Counsel’s supplemental response offers arguments against the first and second

Hahn considerations. We will address those arguments as they become relevant to

our analysis below. Counsel nonetheless urges the court to “dismiss the appeal under

Anders, not under Hahn.” Aplt. Resp. to Court’s May 13, 2025 Order at 7, ECF

No. 42.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Scope of the Waiver

As noted, our first inquiry when faced with a motion to enforce an appeal

waiver is to decide “whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver

of appellate rights.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. According to Sanchez-Urias’s counsel,

Sanchez-Urias believes the answer is no because the district court calculated his

offense level as 31, not 29. Counsel himself vacillates between outright endorsing

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this understanding of the waiver exception and saying that it is at least a reasonable

understanding of the waiver exception in light of the confusion allegedly surrounding

it and Sanchez-Urias’s lack of education.

We will address the alleged confusion below, in the context of whether

Sanchez-Urias knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights. Our current

inquiry is simply to ascertain the waiver’s scope according to its plain language.

See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (performing a

Hahn scope-of-the-waiver analysis and focusing on “the plain language of the plea

agreement”).

Again, Sanchez-Urias may appeal if “the sentence exceeds the top end of the

advisory guideline range from the Sentencing Guidelines that applies for the

defendant’s criminal history (as determined by the district court) at a total offense

level of 29.” R. vol. I at 42 (emphasis added). The focus here is unambiguously the

length of the sentence. All that matters is whether his ultimate sentence exceeded the

Guidelines range specified for a total offense level of 29 and a yet-to-be-calculated

criminal history score. The criminal history score turned out to be IV, and

therefore, correlated with an offense level of 29, the relevant Guidelines range for

appeal-waiver purposes was 121 to 151 months. Sanchez-Urias received 121 months.

This appeal falls within the scope of the appeal waiver.

B. Knowing and Voluntary

We next ask “whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

appellate rights.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. Counsel for Sanchez-Urias says the

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appeal-waiver exception is confusing and his client therefore did not know what he

was agreeing to. We note this is only argument of counsel—we have found nothing

in the record supporting the notion that Sanchez-Urias was indeed confused. In any

event, we are not required to consider alleged confusion created by an unreasonable

reading of the language. See United States v. Scott, 469 F.3d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir.

2006) (“It is well settled that we must interpret the agreement according to the

defendant’s reasonable understanding of its terms.” (emphasis added)). As noted

immediately above, the waiver exception asks whether “the sentence exceeds” the

yet-to-be-determined Guidelines range, R. vol. I at 42 (emphasis added), not whether

the total offense level exceeds 29.

Counsel also claims that the district court’s oral explanation of the waiver

exception was confusing. The district court said, “[I]f I accept your plea agreement,

you can only appeal the sentence . . . if it [i.e., the sentence] exceeds the top end of

the advisory guideline range [i.e., a range of months] that applies for your criminal

history as determined by the Court at a total offense level of 29 in your particular

case.” R. vol. III at 13. This is a fair summary of the waiver exception. And again,

nothing in the record establishes that this explanation confused Sanchez-Urias. 1

1 Counsel says, “All that would have been required [to prevent the alleged confusion] was a[n] explanation that any sentence within the sentencing range of 121–151 months created by a defendant, like Appellant, with a criminal history category of IV would prevent Appellant from appealing.” Resp. at 7, ECF No. 35. This ignores the appeal waiver’s plain language. The waiver did not say that Sanchez-Urias would fall into criminal history category IV. It explicitly left that open, which is why neither the appeal waiver nor the district court itself could give Sanchez-Urias a fixed sentencing range. 7 Appellate Case: 24-1506 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2025 Page: 8

We also disagree that the district court created confusion through its later

discussion of the parties’ dispute over the total offense level. At that point in the

hearing, the district court was no longer discussing the appeal waiver or its

exceptions.

Finally, assuming for argument’s sake there was confusion about any of these

matters, Sanchez-Urias’s failure to object on these grounds in the district court means

he would need to show plain error to avoid his appeal waiver on this account.

See United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 870–71 (10th Cir. 2003) (analyzing the

knowing-and-voluntary requirement and holding that a district court’s failure to

explain the appellate waiver provision is reviewed for plain error if there was no

objection on that account in the district court). Plain error requires, among other

things, an error that “affected [the defendant’s] substantial rights,” meaning “it

affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. at 872 (internal quotation

marks omitted). “In the context of a plea agreement, an error is prejudicial if the

defendant [shows] he would not have pleaded guilty if the district court had [properly

explained the appeal waiver].” Id. Sanchez-Urias makes no such showing. He

offers nothing to suggest his choice to plead guilty turned on his alleged belief that he

could avoid the appeal waiver if the district court calculated his total offense level at

higher than 29.

For all these reasons, we reject Sanchez-Urias’s challenge to the knowing-and-

voluntary element of the Hahn test.

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C. Miscarriage of Justice

Finally, we ask “whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of

justice.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. Counsel for Sanchez-Urias affirmatively disclaims

this possibility: “Because Appellant has no viable appeal [as explained in counsel’s

Anders brief], a miscarriage of justice would not occur if his appeal were dismissed,

even under a finding that the Court was enforcing a plea waiver.” Aplt. Resp. to

Court’s May 13, 2025 Order at 2. Whether the defendant has a viable merits

argument is not part of the Hahn miscarriage-of-justice analysis. 2 Even so, we need

not analyze a Hahn factor the defendant does not contest. See Porter, 405 F.3d

at 1143. We therefore find no miscarriage of justice would occur if we enforce the

appeal waiver.

III. CONCLUSION

We grant Sanchez-Urias’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. We further grant the

government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver, and we dismiss this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam

2 In the Hahn context, a miscarriage of justice occurs “[1] where the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3] where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” 359 F.3d at 1327 (bracketed numerals in original; internal quotation marks omitted). 9