United States v. Sanchez-Cortez

530 F.3d 357, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12212, 2008 WL 2315659
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 6, 2008
Docket05-41130
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 530 F.3d 357 (United States v. Sanchez-Cortez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Sanchez-Cortez, 530 F.3d 357, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12212, 2008 WL 2315659 (5th Cir. 2008).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Marcelino Sanchez-Cortez (“Sanchez”) appeals the sentence imposed for his conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Sanchez asserts that the district court miscalculated his criminal history score by adding two points for a prior military court martial conviction of being absent without leave (“AWOL”). Finding no error, we AFFIRM.

I.

Sanchez pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a quantity in excess of five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). At the sentencing hearing, the district court ruled that Sanchez did not qualify for the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) because he did not fall within criminal history category I, as required by the statute.

In calculating Sanchez’s criminal history score, the district court assigned two criminal history points to Sanchez’s prior conviction by an Article 86 United States Air Force Court Martial for being AWOL. Sanchez concedes that his AWOL conviction was imposed by a general or special court martial. He also concedes that he was sentenced to 114 days of confinement *359 and ordered to forfeit $670 in pay per month for six months as a result of the offense.

The district court concluded that the prior AWOL conviction should be counted in calculating his criminal history score under § 4A1.2(g) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides that “[sentences resulting from military offenses are counted if imposed by a general or special court martial.” The district court rejected Sanchez’s arguments that the AWOL conviction should be excluded from the calculation because it fell within the exceptions listed in § 4A1.2(c). The district court did, however, grant Sanchez a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Based on this analysis, the district court sentenced Sanchez to 121 months of imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release.

II.

On appeal, Sanchez urges this court to vacate his sentence and remand because his prior AWOL conviction qualifies as one of the offenses excluded from criminal history calculations under § 4A1.2(c).

Although the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, the sentencing court must still “begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (citing Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). This court reviews the district court’s interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. See United States v. Lee, 310 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir.2002).

Generally, sentences for misdemeanor offenses are counted in the calculation of a defendant’s criminal history score. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). However, certain listed offenses and offenses “similar to” them are excluded under the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1) and (2). 1 The military offense of being AWOL is not specifically listed in § 4A1.2(c)(l) or (2). 2

Sanchez urges this court to remand so that the district court might examine the facts underlying his AWOL conviction to determine whether it is “similar to” the offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c)(l) or (2). Based on the current record, however, it is apparent that Sanchez’s prior conviction does not qualify for either of the § 4A1.2(c) exclusions.

The exclusion provided in § 4A1.2(c)(l) is inapplicable here because convictions for offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c)(l), and similar offenses, do count in calculating the criminal history score “if the sentence was ... a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days.” Id. Sanchez was sentenced to 114 days of imprisonment for his AWOL conviction. Thus, the AWOL conviction would *360 not qualify for the § 4A1.2(c)(1) exception even if it were similar to a listed offense.

Sanchez also asserts that his military conviction falls within the exclusion of § 4A1.2(c)(2) because being AWOL is similar to truancy — an offense specifically listed in the subsection. Sanchez cites no authority for this proposition. To determine whether an offense is similar to one of the offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c), this court has used a “common sense approach which relies on all possible factors of similarity.” United States v. Hardeman, 933 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1991). We consider factors such as “a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses, the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment, the elements of the offense, the level of culpability involved, and the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct.” Id. No factor is accorded dis-positive weight. United States v. Lamm, 392 F.3d 130, 132 (5th Cir.2004).

Under this common sense approach, Sanchez’s AWOL offense is not similar to truancy. In Texas, truancy is a Class C misdemeanor, punishable by a fíne not to exceed $500. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 25.094(e); Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 12.23. In contrast, Sanchez’s AWOL conviction resulted in a sentence of 114 days’ confinement and the forfeiture of $670 in pay per month for six months. The differences between the elements of truancy and the AWOL offense are also readily apparent. 3 In short, truancy laws apply to juveniles who fail to attend school, not adult members of the military who fail to report for duty. The “level of culpability” factor also indicates that an AWOL offense is not similar to truancy. The implications of violating truancy laws are largely personal to the student who misses educational opportunities. In contrast, an AWOL offense may hinder orderly military operations. Finally, an adult member of the military who fails to report timely to duty as required by law demonstrates a greater likelihood of recurring criminal conduct than does a truant juvenile. For these reasons, we conclude that Sanchez’s military conviction for being AWOL is not similar to the offense of truancy. 4

III.

On the record, it is apparent that Sanchez’s AWOL offense does not fall within the exceptions listed in § 4A1.2(c). The sentence imposed by the district court is AFFIRMED.

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Bluebook (online)
530 F.3d 357, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12212, 2008 WL 2315659, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-sanchez-cortez-ca5-2008.