Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 27, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 24-6018 v. (D.C. No. 5:18-CR-00152-PRW-1) (W.D. Okla.) LAWRENCE SAMUELS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before HARTZ, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.** _________________________________
Defendant-Appellant, Lawrence Samuels, Jr., appeals from the district court’s
revocation of his supervised release based on his violation of a condition which
prohibited him from possessing a firearm. I R. 69. Mr. Samuels argues that this
condition is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and thus could not serve as a
basis for the district court’s revocation of his supervised release. Aplt. Br. at 7. He also
argues that the district court erred in re-imposing this allegedly unconstitutional condition
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. ** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 2
for his additional term of supervised release. Id. at 7–8. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Background
In 2004, Mr. Samuels pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iii). II R. 4; Aplt. Br. at 1.
The district court sentenced him to 210 months’ incarceration and five years’ supervised
release. II R. 4. After his sentence was commuted by President Obama, Mr. Samuels
began his term of supervised release in May 2018. I R. 53. His term was set to expire in
May 2023. Id. Critical to this appeal, one of the conditions of Mr. Samuels’s supervised
release was that he must not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon. Id. at 69.
In September 2022, while on supervised release, Mr. Samuels was pulled over for
speeding while driving a rental car in Texas. Id. at 54. Mr. Samuels consented to the
officer’s search of the car, and the officer found a handgun hidden in a sock in the engine
bay. Id. Mr. Samuels was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id.
Shortly thereafter, his probation officer filed a Petition for Warrant or Summons for
Offender Under Supervision, alleging that Mr. Samuels violated both (1) the mandatory
condition of his release to not commit another federal, state, or local crime; and (2) the
standard condition to not possess a firearm.1 Id.
1 The petition also alleged that Mr. Samuels left the judicial district without permission of the district court or his probation officer. I R. 54. Mr. Samuels admitted this violation at the revocation hearing, and it is not at issue in this appeal. See id.; Aplt. Br. at 4. 2 Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 3
At the revocation hearing, Mr. Samuels disputed the violations arising from his
possession of a firearm. Id. at 55. In deciding whether Mr. Samuels had constructive
possession of the firearm in the engine bay, the district court applied a “sole-occupancy”
standard and found Mr. Samuels guilty of the alleged violations. Id. The district court
revoked Mr. Samuels’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment
and 36 months’ supervised release. Id. at 13–17. The district court imposed the same
condition prohibiting Mr. Samuels from possessing a firearm. Id. at 17.
Mr. Samuels appealed, and this court reversed and remanded on the basis that the
district court applied the wrong standard for determining constructive possession of the
firearm. Id. at 52–66; United States v. Samuels, No. 23-6000, 2023 WL 8596457, at *1
(10th Cir. Dec. 12, 2023). Specifically, this court held that the district court should have
applied a “joint-occupancy” standard because the vehicle was a rental car, Mr. Samuels
had possession of the car for only three days, and the firearm was located in the engine
bay rather than the passenger compartment. Samuels, 2023 WL 8596457, at *4–5. On
remand, the district court heard argument on Mr. Samuels’s constructive possession of the
firearm under the correct joint-occupancy standard. III R. 4–40. Applying that standard,
the district court again determined that Mr. Samuels had constructive possession of the
firearm and therefore violated the conditions of his supervised release.2 Id. at 27–30.
The district court imposed a sentence of time served followed by two years’ supervised
2 Mr. Samuels does not challenge the district court’s constructive possession analysis in this appeal. See generally Aplt. Br.
3 Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 4
release. Id. at 38. The term of supervised release included the same conditions that were
previously imposed, including the condition prohibiting Mr. Samuels from possessing a
firearm, which is at issue in this appeal. Id. at 38–39.
Discussion
Because Mr. Samuels did not object to the imposition of this condition of
supervised release below, our review is for plain error. United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d
686, 691 (10th Cir. 2011). “To establish plain error, the defendant must show: (1) error,
(2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 691–92 (quotations
omitted). “Legal questions relating to the revocation of supervised release are reviewed
de novo.” United States v. Williams, 106 F.4th 1040, 1044 (10th Cir. 2024) (quotations
omitted).
Mr. Samuels asks this court to immediately terminate his supervised release
because the condition of supervised release prohibiting him from possessing a firearm is
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Aplt. Br. at 8. More specifically, he
argues that the district court (1) erred in revoking his supervised release based on this
condition, and (2) could not re-impose this condition as a condition of additional
supervised release. Id. at 7–9. Both arguments turn on whether restrictions on felons
possessing firearms violate the Second Amendment. See id.; Aplee. Br. at 5. Indeed, the
condition of supervised release prohibiting Mr. Samuels from possessing a firearm must
comport with the Second Amendment. See Mike, 632 F.3d at 692.
Mr. Samuels’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent. In Vincent v.
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Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 27, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 24-6018 v. (D.C. No. 5:18-CR-00152-PRW-1) (W.D. Okla.) LAWRENCE SAMUELS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before HARTZ, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.** _________________________________
Defendant-Appellant, Lawrence Samuels, Jr., appeals from the district court’s
revocation of his supervised release based on his violation of a condition which
prohibited him from possessing a firearm. I R. 69. Mr. Samuels argues that this
condition is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and thus could not serve as a
basis for the district court’s revocation of his supervised release. Aplt. Br. at 7. He also
argues that the district court erred in re-imposing this allegedly unconstitutional condition
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. ** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 2
for his additional term of supervised release. Id. at 7–8. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Background
In 2004, Mr. Samuels pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iii). II R. 4; Aplt. Br. at 1.
The district court sentenced him to 210 months’ incarceration and five years’ supervised
release. II R. 4. After his sentence was commuted by President Obama, Mr. Samuels
began his term of supervised release in May 2018. I R. 53. His term was set to expire in
May 2023. Id. Critical to this appeal, one of the conditions of Mr. Samuels’s supervised
release was that he must not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon. Id. at 69.
In September 2022, while on supervised release, Mr. Samuels was pulled over for
speeding while driving a rental car in Texas. Id. at 54. Mr. Samuels consented to the
officer’s search of the car, and the officer found a handgun hidden in a sock in the engine
bay. Id. Mr. Samuels was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id.
Shortly thereafter, his probation officer filed a Petition for Warrant or Summons for
Offender Under Supervision, alleging that Mr. Samuels violated both (1) the mandatory
condition of his release to not commit another federal, state, or local crime; and (2) the
standard condition to not possess a firearm.1 Id.
1 The petition also alleged that Mr. Samuels left the judicial district without permission of the district court or his probation officer. I R. 54. Mr. Samuels admitted this violation at the revocation hearing, and it is not at issue in this appeal. See id.; Aplt. Br. at 4. 2 Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 3
At the revocation hearing, Mr. Samuels disputed the violations arising from his
possession of a firearm. Id. at 55. In deciding whether Mr. Samuels had constructive
possession of the firearm in the engine bay, the district court applied a “sole-occupancy”
standard and found Mr. Samuels guilty of the alleged violations. Id. The district court
revoked Mr. Samuels’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment
and 36 months’ supervised release. Id. at 13–17. The district court imposed the same
condition prohibiting Mr. Samuels from possessing a firearm. Id. at 17.
Mr. Samuels appealed, and this court reversed and remanded on the basis that the
district court applied the wrong standard for determining constructive possession of the
firearm. Id. at 52–66; United States v. Samuels, No. 23-6000, 2023 WL 8596457, at *1
(10th Cir. Dec. 12, 2023). Specifically, this court held that the district court should have
applied a “joint-occupancy” standard because the vehicle was a rental car, Mr. Samuels
had possession of the car for only three days, and the firearm was located in the engine
bay rather than the passenger compartment. Samuels, 2023 WL 8596457, at *4–5. On
remand, the district court heard argument on Mr. Samuels’s constructive possession of the
firearm under the correct joint-occupancy standard. III R. 4–40. Applying that standard,
the district court again determined that Mr. Samuels had constructive possession of the
firearm and therefore violated the conditions of his supervised release.2 Id. at 27–30.
The district court imposed a sentence of time served followed by two years’ supervised
2 Mr. Samuels does not challenge the district court’s constructive possession analysis in this appeal. See generally Aplt. Br.
3 Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 4
release. Id. at 38. The term of supervised release included the same conditions that were
previously imposed, including the condition prohibiting Mr. Samuels from possessing a
firearm, which is at issue in this appeal. Id. at 38–39.
Discussion
Because Mr. Samuels did not object to the imposition of this condition of
supervised release below, our review is for plain error. United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d
686, 691 (10th Cir. 2011). “To establish plain error, the defendant must show: (1) error,
(2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 691–92 (quotations
omitted). “Legal questions relating to the revocation of supervised release are reviewed
de novo.” United States v. Williams, 106 F.4th 1040, 1044 (10th Cir. 2024) (quotations
omitted).
Mr. Samuels asks this court to immediately terminate his supervised release
because the condition of supervised release prohibiting him from possessing a firearm is
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Aplt. Br. at 8. More specifically, he
argues that the district court (1) erred in revoking his supervised release based on this
condition, and (2) could not re-impose this condition as a condition of additional
supervised release. Id. at 7–9. Both arguments turn on whether restrictions on felons
possessing firearms violate the Second Amendment. See id.; Aplee. Br. at 5. Indeed, the
condition of supervised release prohibiting Mr. Samuels from possessing a firearm must
comport with the Second Amendment. See Mike, 632 F.3d at 692.
Mr. Samuels’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent. In Vincent v.
4 Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 5
Garland, this court held that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), did not invalidate our precedent regarding
the constitutionality of longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
convicted felons. 80 F.4th 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2024); see also United States v.
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009). Our judgment in Vincent was vacated
and the Supreme Court remanded for further consideration in light of United States v.
Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Vincent v. Garland, 144 S. Ct. 2708 (2024). The briefs in
this case were filed while Vincent was still on remand from the Supreme Court. See Aplt.
Br. at 13 n.4. Subsequently, this court readopted its earlier opinion, concluding that
nothing in Rahimi undermined its earlier reasoning. Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263,
1264–66 (10th Cir. 2025).3
We are bound to follow Vincent and affirm the constitutionality of prohibitions on
felons possessing firearms. See id.; United States v. Swan, 91 F.4th 1052, 1059 n.7
(10th Cir. 2024). Mr. Samuels acknowledges as much in his briefing, where he states
that, if the panel in Vincent on remand were to readopt its initial opinion, then he makes
his arguments only to preserve his appellate rights for en banc review or review by the
Supreme Court. See Aplt. Br. at 17; Aplt. Reply Br. at 2 n.1. Thus, pursuant to this
court’s precedent, prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons — such as the
condition of Mr. Samuels’s supervised release — are constitutional under the Second
Amendment. Vincent, 127 F.4th at 1264. Because we find no error, let alone plain error,
3 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Pamela J. Bondi was substituted for Merrick B. Garland as the Appellee. 5 Appellate Case: 24-6018 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2025 Page: 6
the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge