United States v. Russell

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-3747 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:24-cr-00135-SPW-1 v. MEMORANDUM* CAMERON LEE RUSSELL, Jr.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 8, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: CHRISTEN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Cameron Lee Russell, Jr. challenges a district court order denying his

motion to dismiss his indictment for one count of receiving a firearm while under

felony indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). Because the parties are

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo the district court’s denial of the

motion to dismiss. United States v. Bartley, 9 F.4th 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2021).

We affirm.

1. Russell argues that constitutional applications of § 922(n) require an

individualized assessment of dangerousness. But we have recognized that the

nation’s “historical tradition reveals that legislatures were permitted to

categorically disarm those they deemed dangerous without having to perform ‘an

individualized determination of dangerousness as to each person in a class of

prohibited persons.’” United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743, 760 (9th Cir. 2025)

(en banc) (citation modified). Indeed, in rejecting a facial challenge to § 922(n),

we confirmed that the nation’s history and tradition established “that legislatures

could disarm ‘groups’ of people without any individualized determination.”

United States v. Stennerson, 150 F.4th 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation

modified). Thus, a constitutional application of § 922(n) need not be premised on

an individualized assessment of dangerousness.

2. Russell contends that because obstruction of justice under Montana law,

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-303, does not require violent conduct, it does not justify

disarmament under the historical tradition of temporarily disarming defendants

facing serious criminal charges. Regardless, Russell’s disarmament is supported

2 25-3747 by the “historical tradition of disarming ‘categories of persons thought by a

legislature to present a special danger of misuse.’” Duarte, 137 F.4th at 759

(quoting United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 698 (2024)); Stennerson, 150 F.4th

at 1288-89.1

The prohibition in § 922(n) reflects Congress’s judgment that those facing

felony indictment are “presumed to pose a special risk of misusing firearms.”

Duarte, 137 F.4th at 761 (citation modified). “Congress today, like the founding

era legislatures . . . , retains the power to disarm narrow segments of the population

whom it deems a threat to public safety.” United States v. Perez-Garcia, 96 F.4th

1166, 1189 (9th Cir. 2024). Moreover, § 922(n) only “temporarily infringed”

Russell’s Second Amendment rights, and such “[t]emporary disarmaments are

well-precedented.” Id. at 1190.

3. Russell argues that § 922(n) is unconstitutional as applied to him because

the obstruction of justice charge against him was flawed and was later dismissed.

We reject this argument. “The federal guns laws . . . focus not on reliability, but

on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in order to keep firearms away

from potentially dangerous persons.” Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67

1 United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. June 18, 2026) does not affect this analysis. Slip op. at 15 n.6 (“[O]ur conclusion today should not be taken to suggest ‘that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.’” (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698)).

3 25-3747 (1980). Russell was free to challenge his indictment “before obtaining a firearm,”

but he cannot collaterally attack the indictment as a defense to his violation of §

922. Id.

Russell contends that Lewis has been effectively overruled by the Supreme

Court’s recent Second Amendment caselaw, but he fails to identify any aspect of

that caselaw that undermines the proposition that a defendant must “clear his status

before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress’ purpose broadly to keep

firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and

dangerous.” Id. at 64-65 (citation modified). Nor does Russell suggest that the

nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation demand an inquiry into the

validity of a predicate indictment prior to disarmament.2

AFFIRMED.

2 We GRANT Russell’s motion to take judicial notice of the release order from his state criminal case (Dkt. 16). See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).

4 25-3747