United States v. Roth

669 F. Supp. 1383, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7521
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedAugust 13, 1987
Docket85 CR 763
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 669 F. Supp. 1383 (United States v. Roth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Roth, 669 F. Supp. 1383, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7521 (N.D. Ill. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GETZENDANNER, District Judge:

This court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of June 5, 1987, left open two questions presented by the defendant’s Motion to Suppress Title III Surveillance. Raised by Roth’s adoption of pleadings filed by James Costello and Judge Wayne Olson before Judge Roszkowski in United States v. Costello, those issues involved the scope and conduct of the government’s eavesdropping on Judge Olson’s chambers at Branch 57 of the Circuit Court of Cook County. In an opinion issued June 10, 1985, Judge Roszkowski denied Costello’s and Olson’s challenge to the surveillance. See 610 F.Supp. 1450, 1472-1478 (N.D.Ill.1985). I have reviewed the entire file and find Judge Roszkowski’s decision to be well considered. 1 Accordingly, I adopt Judge Roszkowski’s reasoning and conclusions here. Roth’s remaining challenge to the wiretap is therefore denied.

Roth argues, first, that the conduct of the bugging “so unreasonably exceeded” the scope of Chief Judge Parsons’ authorization order as to render it void under Fourth Amendment principles. Accordingly, Roth asks that all evidence flowing from the surveillance be suppressed. See United States v. Suquet, 547 F.Supp. 1034, 1039-43 (N.D.Ill.1982) (“flagrant disregard” of surveillance order’s limiting provisions justifies complete suppression). The second argument, which expresses similar concerns, is based on Title Ill’s “minimization” requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).

That provision mandates that electronic surveillance “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception” under Title III. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). The clear purpose of the section is to prevent the indiscriminate seizure of conversations made “without regard to their connection to the crime under investigation,” — a practice the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). Although it is the responsibility of the government to demonstrate, as a prima facie matter, that reasonable efforts were made to minimize non-pertinent conversations, the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue rests with the defense. Suquet, 547 F.Supp. at 1042, n. 19, quoting United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 875 (7th Cir.1975).

The Supreme Court has cautioned that any inquiry into the government’s behavior under § 2518(5) necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). Given the realities of electronic eavesdropping, courts have afforded the government wide latitude in intercepting conversations. See United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.Supp. 345, 389 et seq. (N.D.Ill.1982), aff 'd United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S.Ct. 1354, 84 L.Ed.2d 377 (1985); Suquet, 547 F.Supp. at 1036, et seq. The essential question, nevertheless, remains whether the government did “all that it could to avoid unnecessary intrusion” by the surveillance team. Suquet, 547 F.Supp. at 1046, quoting Quintana, 508 F.2d at 874. See also Lafave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 4.5 at 237 (1985) (“it must be emphasized that the statute does not absolutely forbid ... interception [of non-pertinent conversations], but merely requires that measures be adopted to reduce the extent of such interception to a practical minimum”).

*1385 Considering the evidence presented before Judge Roszkowski, I find that the monitoring agents made reasonable efforts to minimize their interception of non-pertinent conversations 2 and that they did not “flagrantly disregard” the terms of the court order. The record shows that the three agents, two of whom were attorneys, were specifically apprised of the importance of mimimization in a Title III investigation. Those concerns were accentuated in this investigation due to the ethical and legal problems posed by the bugging of a judge’s chambers. To this end, the monitoring agents reviewed several minimization procedures memoranda and conferred with the assistant United States attorneys supervising the case. These memoranda discussed, inter alia, the importance of immediately terminating the interception of legally privileged conversations. The agents also studied voice familiarization tapes prior to the monitoring in order to aid them in identifying the targets of the investigation. 3 Although no specific time limit was set, the agents all understood that they were to discontinue monitoring a conversation after “a few minutes” unless the communications overheard were pertinent to the investigation. See Gov.App. D at 136, 281 (testimony of FBI Agent William C. Megary); 306-307 (testimony of FBI Agent James A. Hersley); 327, 333 (testimony of FBI Agent Larry M. Dickerson). 4

Special minimization procedures, in addition, were ordered for the initial phase of the surveillance by top Justice Department officials including then-FBI Director William Webster. These included a prohibition on monitoring conversations determined not to include one of the named targets of the investigation. The November 29, 1980 minimization memorandum states: “Only if the monitoring agent determines that a conversation is criminal in nature before he is able to determine that the participant with Judge Olson is not one of the five named individuals may the conversation of an unnamed individual be monitored.” Conversations involving more than two participants were also to be minimized. Supplemental Minimization Memo of November 13, 1980. To facilitate implementation of these special procedures, a radio signaling system was devised by which FBI mole Terry Hake could alert the monitoring agents to the presence of targets in the judge’s chambers. 5

These self-imposed special procedures, which were implemented out of concern for the sensitivity of the surveillance, were to be suspended upon interception of conversations evidencing clearly criminal behavior on the part of Judge Olson. After notice to the authorizing judge, “normal” minimization requirements were to be followed. The evidence of criminality came on December 3, 1980 — three days into the bugging. On that date, FBI Agent William Megary intercepted a conversation between Judge Olson and defendant Roth which the government characterized as clearly criminal. See Def.Mem.

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Related

United States v. Cleveland
964 F. Supp. 1073 (E.D. Louisiana, 1997)
United States v. Roth
669 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Illinois, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
669 F. Supp. 1383, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7521, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-roth-ilnd-1987.