United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 21-1507
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ELIEZER ROSARIO-RAMOS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Kayatta and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
José R. Olmo-Rodríguez for appellant. Gregory B. Conner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, U.S. Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
May 28, 2025 KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. After assaulting and robbing an
elderly woman, Eliezer Rosario-Ramos and his brother were indicted
for carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and bank larceny.
Rosario-Ramos pled guilty to the carjacking offense and proposed
an upwardly variant sentence of fifteen years. Citing, among other
considerations, the brutal nature of the attack and the death of
the victim Zulma Lebrón-Serrano soon after, the district court
sentenced Rosario-Ramos to twenty-three years. Rosario-Ramos now
appeals, asserting a host of procedural and substantive defects
with his sentence. We affirm.
I.
In August 2018, Rosario-Ramos and his grandfather were
at the home of seventy-seven-year-old Lebrón-Serrano to perform
some paid work. During the job, Lebrón-Serrano gave Rosario-Ramos
her debit card and personal identification number (PIN) to buy
himself and his grandfather breakfast. When purchasing the food,
Rosario-Ramos ran Lebrón-Serrano's account balance, saw that it
totaled over $18,000, and decided to rob her.
Rosario-Ramos recruited his brother Orlando Martínez-
Ramos to participate in the robbery. On the evening of August 15,
2018, the two brothers broke into Lebrón-Serrano's home,
blindfolded and gagged her, beat her with a frying pan, and stole
her money, some of her valuables, and her car. They then went on
an extended shopping spree before being arrested by the police for
- 2 - driving a stolen vehicle. Nine days after the attack, Lebrón-
Serrano died. According to the medical autopsy report, the causes
of her death were acute pulmonary edema, atherosclerotic and
hypertensive cardiac disease, uncontrolled arterial hypertension,
and uncontrolled diabetes mellitus. The autopsy report also lists
facial and bodily trauma as "contributory" factors.
The following month, a federal grand jury returned a
two-count indictment charging carjacking resulting in serious
bodily injury and bank larceny. Rosario-Ramos pled guilty to the
carjacking offense. The parties stipulated that the appropriate
offense level for Rosario-Ramos translated to a sentencing range
under the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines of 11.25 to 14 years.
But as part of his plea deal, Rosario-Ramos agreed that an upward
variance was appropriate "[a]fter due consideration of the
relevant factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the victim's
death within nine days of the carjacking and attack." Rosario-
Ramos proposed a sentence of fifteen years, and the government
proposed a sentence of sixteen years.
The U.S. Probation Office issued a presentence
investigation report (PSR), in which it concluded that the
§ 2B3.1(c)(1) murder cross-reference should apply, thereby
increasing the Guidelines-recommended sentence to life
imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(c)(1), 2A1.1. But
recognizing that the maximum term of imprisonment for carjacking
- 3 - resulting in serious bodily injury is twenty-five years, see 18
U.S.C. § 2119(2), the Probation Office recommended a sentence of
twenty-five years. In his written response, Rosario-Ramos
contested, among other things, the Probation Office's conclusion
that the murder cross-reference should apply.
At sentencing, the district court declined to apply the
murder cross-reference, citing the government's stance that it
would be "difficult to establish a . . . direct causal
relationship between the beating and [Lebrón-Serrano's death]."
The district court noted, however, that the autopsy report made it
"clear that the assault, and robbery, and the beating of the victim
had direct consequences and exacerbated what already was a chronic
condition." The district court found that the attack carried out
by Rosario-Ramos and his brother contributed to Lebrón-Serrano's
death. Thus, the court sentenced Rosario-Ramos to twenty-three
years of imprisonment.
Rosario-Ramos now appeals. He argues that the district
court impermissibly relied during sentencing on the assumption
that Rosario-Ramos's attack on Lebrón-Serrano contributed to her
death; that the district court impermissibly imposed an upward
variance based on aggravating factors already contemplated by the
Guidelines; and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
because it is substantially higher than his brother's and exceeds
- 4 - both the Guidelines sentencing range and the already upwardly
variant sentences put forth by both parties.1
We address these arguments seriatim and conclude that
Rosario-Ramos's sentence is procedurally and substantively sound.
As such, we affirm the district court's judgment.
II.
Appellate review of sentencing challenges "involves a
two-step pavane." United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 15
(1st Cir. 2020). First, we evaluate the procedural soundness of
the sentence; if we find no procedural error, we go on to weigh
the sentence's substantive reasonableness. Id. "A sentence is
procedurally sound so long as the district court did not commit a
procedural error in arriving at the sentence." United States v.
Rivera-Moreno, 613 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (listing examples of
procedural errors). And a sentence is substantively reasonable so
long as it reflects "a plausible sentencing rationale and a
defensible result." United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st
Cir. 2008).
1 Rosario-Ramos also contends that his sentence is so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. But this challenge consists of a single conclusory sentence. As such, we deem it waived for underdevelopment and do not consider it further. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
- 5 - A.
We first address Rosario-Ramos's contention that his
sentence is procedurally unfair because the district court
improperly determined that the attack causally contributed to
Lebrón-Serrano's death. We review the district court's rejection
of this preserved objection for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Vargas-Martinez, 15 F.4th 91, 98 (1st Cir. 2021). Within
the abuse-of-discretion framework, "we review a district court's
factual findings for clear error." United States v. Vélez-Soto,
804 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2015).
In formulating Rosario-Ramos's sentence, the district
court found that the robbery and beating contributed to Lebrón-
Serrano's death nine days after the assault. In so finding, the
district court relied, in part, on the autopsy report's listing of
facial and bodily trauma as "contributory" factors to the death.
Rosario-Ramos claims this reliance was error. He points
to a document published on the website of the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) addressing the use and
completion of death reporting. See Nat'l Ctr. for Health Stat.,
U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Medical Examiners'
and Coroners' Handbook on Death Registration and Fetal Death
Reporting (2003), https://perma.cc/3G4Z-ETP4. Unhelpfully to
Rosario-Ramos, the CDC report at one point advises medical
examiners to list on death certificates any "significant
- 6 - conditions that contributed to the death." Id. at 13. Rosario-
Ramos cites to another section of the CDC document that
characterizes these "other significant conditions" as diseases or
conditions that "may have contributed to the death." Id. at 17
(emphasis added). Relying on this latter statement, Rosario-Ramos
argues that a report averring that an event "may" have contributed
to a death provides insufficient support for a finding that that
event "did" so contribute.
Rosario-Ramos marshals no legal or evidentiary support
for the proposition that courts should interpret the autopsy report
by reference to CDC guidance. Thus, we cannot say with any
confidence that the phrase "contributory factors" in the autopsy
report carries the same indefinite meaning as the phrase "other
significant conditions" within the CDC report. In other words,
Rosario-Ramos has not established a basis for reading the word
"contributory" in any way other than according to its plain and
ordinary meaning.2 Moreover, the record contains other evidence
that buttresses the district court's finding that the attack
contributed, as the word is typically understood, to Lebrón-
Serrano's death. As the district court noted, most of the medical
findings in the autopsy report -- which included fractures,
2 As pertinent here, Merriam-Webster defines "contributory" as "playing a part in bringing about an end or result." Contributory, Merriam-Webster, https://perma.cc/V3UH-VAVK (last visited Apr. 18, 2025).
- 7 - contusions, and lacerations on the victim's face, thigh, and back
areas -- were a direct result of the beating. The victim's
relative also testified that the victim was unable to sleep at the
hospital, even when medicated, and that she continued to relive
the assault in ways that underscored the traumatic impact of the
assault.
Certainly, it might have been a coincidence that Lebrón-
Serrano died nine days after the attack, as she was awaiting
surgery to address the injuries caused by the beating. But against
this backdrop, we cannot say that the district court's finding
that the attack contributed to Lebrón-Serrano's death gives rise
to "a strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has been made."
United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 990 F.3d 60, 73 (1st Cir. 2021)
(quoting Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st
Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Gallardo-Ortiz, 666 F.3d
808, 811 (1st Cir. 2012) ("[T]he sentencing court has wide
discretion to decide whether particular evidence is sufficiently
reliable to be used at sentencing." (quotation marks and citation
omitted)). "When all is said and done, sentencing courts are
entitled to draw common-sense inferences from the evidence
adduced." United States v. Melendez-Rosado, 57 F.4th 32, 40 (1st
Cir. 2023).
- 8 - B.
Next, we consider Rosario-Ramos's argument that his
upwardly variant sentence is procedurally unreasonable because it
was impermissibly based on aggravating factors that were already
contemplated by the Guidelines. At sentencing, the district court
applied a series of sentencing enhancements for the use of a
dangerous weapon; permanent or life-threatening injury suffered by
Lebrón-Serrano; physical restraint of Lebrón-Serrano; carjacking;
and fact that Lebrón-Serrano was a vulnerable victim. Rosario-
Ramos now contends that the district court erred by proceeding to
impose, in addition to these enhancements, an upwardly variant
sentence that is "based on those same factors."
To begin, we disagree with the government's contention
that Rosario-Ramos failed to preserve this challenge by failing to
raise it below. After the district court laid down his sentence,
Rosario-Ramos objected by asserting that his proposed, upwardly
variant sentence already "included all the aggravating factors
that we know of in this case." This objection, though brief, was
specific enough "to call the district court's attention to the
asserted error." United States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448
n.1 (1st Cir. 2017). We thus review for abuse of discretion.
We have held that "a sentencing court may rely on a
factor that is already included in the calculation of the
[Guidelines sentencing range] to impose an upward . . . variance
- 9 - as long as the court articulates specifically the reasons that
this particular defendant's situation is different from the
ordinary situation covered by the guidelines calculation." United
States v. Bruno-Campos, 978 F.3d 801, 806 (1st Cir. 2020) (cleaned
up); see also United States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145, 156 (1st
Cir. 2020) (noting that a district court may impose an upward
variance based on factors that were "considered in constructing
the [Guidelines sentencing range] but not in a way that
sufficiently accounts for the idiosyncrasies of a particular
case"). The question before us, then, is whether the district
court adequately explained why Rosario-Ramos's circumstances
warrant a departure from the norm. We think it did.
At sentencing, the district court underscored the fact
that Rosario-Ramos had a personal connection with Lebrón-Serrano:
He had accompanied his grandfather to do work for Lebrón-Serrano
at her home and had hatched the plan to rob her after she was kind
enough to give him her debit card and PIN to purchase breakfast
for himself and his grandfather. The court also outlined in detail
the "brutal" and "unnecessary" nature of the attack, which involved
blindfolding, gagging, and beating Lebrón-Serrano with a frying
pan to the point of unconsciousness, even after she willingly gave
up her PINs and the locations of her valuables. The court then
considered the "distrust and stress" the attack had sown within
the local community; the role of the attack in expediting the
- 10 - victim's death; and the testimony that it had heard from one of
Lebrón-Serrano's family members, who described the psychological
torment that Lebrón-Serrano suffered because of the attack.
Finally, the district court observed that from his arrest up until
the sentencing hearing itself, Rosario-Ramos recanted and revised
his telling of the facts, first attempting "to attribute all the
aggravating factors . . . to a third individual that is non-
existent," and later attempting to ascribe those same aggravating
factors to his brother. See United States v. Reyes-Santiago, 804
F.3d 453, 467 (1st Cir. 2015) (recognizing that there is a
"permissible distinction" for sentencing purposes "between
[defendants] who cooperate and those who do not, and between those
whose cooperation is 'prompt and full' and those whose cooperation
is 'belated and grudging'" (citations omitted)).
The district court was careful and conscientious in its
effort to explain why the circumstances of the offense warranted
an upward variance separate and apart from the sentencing
enhancements. These aggravating features are captured only in
part by the enhancements, which focus on discrete and limited
aspects of the offense. The district court's sentencing rationale
concentrated instead on the features of the attack that made it
uniquely jarring, including how it arose -- i.e., following an act
of kindness and trust by Lebrón-Serrano -- and the gratuitous
viciousness with which it was perpetrated. "[N]one of these
- 11 - specific factors are either inherent in his crimes of conviction
or fully accounted for by the [G]uidelines." United States v.
Leach, 89 F.4th 189, 197–98 (1st Cir. 2023). We conclude that
these idiosyncratic circumstances are sufficient to warrant a
separate basis for an upward variance and thus discern no abuse of
discretion in the district court's judgment.
C.
We turn now to Rosario-Ramos's argument that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is five years
higher than that imposed on his brother and co-defendant, Martínez-
Ramos. We note that the standard of review for a claim of
substantive unreasonableness is "somewhat blurred." United States
v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir. 2015). But because
Rosario-Ramos's substantive-reasonableness argument fails
regardless, "we assume, favorably to the appellant, that review is
for abuse of discretion." United States v. Demers, 842 F.3d 8, 14
(1st Cir. 2016).
We dispose of this issue quickly. "We have routinely
rejected disparity claims" when defendants "fail to acknowledge
material differences between their own circumstances and those of
their more leniently punished confederates." Reyes-Santiago, 804
F.3d at 467. Such is the case here. At sentencing, the district
court outlined several differences between Rosario-Ramos and his
brother. Unlike his brother, Rosario-Ramos had a personal
- 12 - connection with Lebrón-Serrano. Rosario-Ramos was also the one
who devised the plan for the robbery, recruited his brother to
assist, and then lied about who perpetrated the beating. And the
district court was within its rights to consider these differences
material to sentencing. We therefore cannot say that its decision
to impose a harsher sentence on Rosario-Ramos amounts to an abuse
of discretion.
D.
Finally, we address Rosario-Ramos's alternative
contention that because his sentence exceeds the Guidelines
sentencing range and the already upwardly variant sentences
proposed by both parties, it is substantively unreasonable.3
Again, "we assume, favorably to the appellant, that review is for
abuse of discretion." Demers, 842 F.3d at 14.
The district court retains broad discretion in the realm
of sentencing. See United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 73
(1st Cir. 2008) (emphasizing that, in the context of sentencing,
"the broad discretion afforded to the district court is
3Rosario-Ramos argues that his sentence also violates the parsimony principle. See United States v. Arsenault, 833 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2016) (defining the parsimony principle as "the obligation to impose a sentence that is sufficient, but no greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of the law" (internal quotations omitted)). We have noted that "[a] claim that a sentence offends the parsimony principle is typically treated, for all practical purposes, as a claim that the challenged sentence is substantively unreasonable." United States v. Coombs, 857 F.3d 439, 452 (1st Cir. 2017). We treat this argument accordingly.
- 13 - paramount"). The "linchpin" of whether a sentence is substantively
reasonable is the existence of "a plausible sentencing rationale
and a defensible result." Martin, 520 F.3d at 96. Under this
deferential standard, we may reverse the district court on the
grounds of substantive unreasonableness "if -- and only if -- the
sentencing court's ultimate determination falls outside the
expansive boundaries of [the] universe [of reasonable sentences]."
Id. at 92. If a district court decides to depart from the
Guidelines sentencing range, it "must consider the extent of the
deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently
compelling to support the degree of the variance." Gall, 552 U.S.
at 50.
There is no doubt that Rosario-Ramos's sentence is
steep. His sentence of twenty-three years is nine years above the
maximum Guidelines-recommended sentence of fourteen years, and
seven years above the upwardly variant sentence of sixteen years
that the government proposed. Even so, the bar for finding that
a sentence is substantively unreasonable is high. As we detailed
above, the district court explained at length the aggravating
factors of the offense that plausibly justified an upward variance.
The district court considered, too, mitigating factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Rosario-Ramos's age, dependents, and
educational and professional background. Still, it determined
that several elements of Rosario-Ramos's offense were grievous
- 14 - enough to justify a significant upward departure from the
Guidelines sentencing range. Affording, as we must, due deference
to the district court's weighing of factors, we are persuaded that
the district court's justification was "sufficiently compelling"
to support the upward variance, Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, and that the
district court's rationale was at least "plausible," Martin, 520
F.3d at 96.
Nor can we say that Rosario-Ramos's sentence is
substantively indefensible. We have upheld similarly dramatic
upward variances before. See, e.g., Gallardo-Ortiz, 666 F.3d at
810, 812, 818 (sentence that was 146% of the maximum Guidelines-
recommended sentence); United States v. Scherrer, 444 F.3d 91, 92,
95 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (sentence that was 152% of the maximum
Guidelines-recommended sentence); Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d at 150, 158
(sentence that was 162% of the maximum Guidelines-recommended
sentence). But see United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57,
58–61 (1st Cir. 2006) (invalidating, as substantively unreasonable
for lack of adequate explanation, a sentence that was 800% of the
maximum Guidelines-recommended sentence). Rosario-Ramos's
sentence, viewed against this case law and considered alongside
the district court's sentencing rationale, does not exceed "the
expansive boundaries of [the] universe [of reasonable sentences]."
Martin, 520 F.3d at 92. "The fact that [this] court might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
- 15 - appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district
court." Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Because the district court's
rationale for its sentence is at the very least "plausible," and
the sentencing outcome "defensible," we decline to disturb its
judgment. Martin, 520 F.3d at 98.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court's judgment.
- 16 -