NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0442n.06
Case No. 25-1213
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Sep 30, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN RONNIE DUKE, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) _______________________________________ ) OPINION
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Beginning in 2012, Ronnie Duke had a
series of run-ins with the law, which included conspiracy to commit wire fraud, failure to
surrender, assault of a federal official, and attempting to escape detention. In 2023, after the district
court had sentenced Duke for each of these offenses, the Sentencing Commission promulgated
Amendment 821. Because this amendment impacted Duke’s criminal history score in his assault
conviction, Duke filed a motion to reduce his sentence for that conviction. The district court denied
the motion, and Duke now appeals. We affirm.
I.
In 2012, Duke was convicted and sentenced to 156 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy
to commit wire fraud (Case One). United States v. Duke, 870 F.3d 397, 399 (6th Cir. 2017).
However, Duke failed to self-report to prison for this sentence, leading to an arrest warrant and a
new federal indictment charging him with failure to surrender for a sentence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2) (Case Two). Id. Duke was then arrested for his failure to surrender, and No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
at his arraignment hearing, Duke violently attacked the government’s counsel after counsel
opposed Duke’s request to be transferred to a different prison facility. Id. at 399-400. Duke hurled
expletives at counsel, struck her in the face numerous times, and repeatedly “smashed” her head
into the table. Id. at 400. A federal grand jury later indicted Duke on one count of assaulting a
federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b) (Case Three). Id.
While detained for the failure-to-surrender and assault charges, Duke attempted to escape
from the detention facility. This resulted in the government’s obtaining a superseding indictment
in Case Two that added an attempted-escape charge. This meant that Case Two included two
counts: failure to surrender and attempted escape. Duke pleaded guilty to the assault of a federal
officer in Case Three. Duke, 870 F.3d at 400. At the same hearing, Duke also pleaded guilty to
both of the charges in Case Two.
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) for the assault charge calculated that Duke
had six criminal-history points: three points from Case One, one point from Case Two, and two
points for committing the assault while under a criminal-justice sentence for Case One. This score
placed Duke in Criminal History Category III.
At sentencing for the assault charge, Duke objected to the PSR’s application of the
criminal-history point for Case Two. The district court did not rule on the objection at the time
because Duke remained at Criminal History Category III, even without that point. The district
court sentenced Duke to 97 months’ imprisonment for the assault charge. At the subsequent
sentencing hearing for Case Two, the district court sentenced Duke to 18 months’ imprisonment
for the failure-to-surrender and attempted-escape charges. Duke appealed his 97-month sentence
from Case Three, and this Court affirmed. United States v. Duke, 870 F.3d at 406. Duke later
2 No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his conviction in Case Three, but it was denied as
untimely.
Since then, the Sentencing Commission has retroactively amended the Guidelines. On
November 1, 2023, Part A of Amendment 821 took effect, reducing the number of criminal history
points assessed against a defendant based on prior convictions (“status points”). U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.1(e) (2023). Because this retroactive change affected Duke’s sentence in Case Three, he
moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and renewed his prior objection to
the additional criminal-history point assessed from Case Two. Duke renewed this objection
because if the district court reduced his criminal score by one point—in addition to the loss of the
two status points from the retroactive change—he would drop to a Criminal History Category II.
The district court denied the motion, finding that Duke’s guilty plea from Case Two
counted as a “prior sentence,” according to the text of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1), and although the
attempted escape might have been relevant conduct to the assault, the failure to surrender was not.
This meant that the additional criminal history point was properly assessed, and Duke’s Criminal
History Category remained at III, making Duke ineligible for a sentence modification. Because
the district court held that Duke was ineligible for the sentence reduction, it did not consider
whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of a reduction.
Duke appeals, arguing that the district court erred by finding that the failure-to-surrender
conviction was not relevant conduct to the assault, and hence, the criminal-history point applied.
II.
Generally, once the district court imposes a sentence, it may not be modified. However,
§ 3582(c)(2) provides an exception and allows modification when a defendant “has been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
3 No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
Sentencing Commission,” and the district court finds that a “reduction is consistent with” relevant
Guidelines policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). This does not, however, require a full
resentencing. Rather, § 3582(c)(2) grants district courts the “power to ‘reduce’ an otherwise final
sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission.” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817,
825 (2010) (quoting § 3582(c)). Thus a § 3582(c)(2) sentencing modification proceeds in two
steps. Id. at 827. First, the district court must determine if the defendant is eligible for the
reduction under §1B1.10. Id. Second, if the district court finds that the defendant is eligible, it
must then “consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion,” the
reduction is warranted. Id.
We review the denial of a sentence reduction for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies
on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous
legal standard.” United States v.
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0442n.06
Case No. 25-1213
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Sep 30, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN RONNIE DUKE, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) _______________________________________ ) OPINION
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Beginning in 2012, Ronnie Duke had a
series of run-ins with the law, which included conspiracy to commit wire fraud, failure to
surrender, assault of a federal official, and attempting to escape detention. In 2023, after the district
court had sentenced Duke for each of these offenses, the Sentencing Commission promulgated
Amendment 821. Because this amendment impacted Duke’s criminal history score in his assault
conviction, Duke filed a motion to reduce his sentence for that conviction. The district court denied
the motion, and Duke now appeals. We affirm.
I.
In 2012, Duke was convicted and sentenced to 156 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy
to commit wire fraud (Case One). United States v. Duke, 870 F.3d 397, 399 (6th Cir. 2017).
However, Duke failed to self-report to prison for this sentence, leading to an arrest warrant and a
new federal indictment charging him with failure to surrender for a sentence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2) (Case Two). Id. Duke was then arrested for his failure to surrender, and No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
at his arraignment hearing, Duke violently attacked the government’s counsel after counsel
opposed Duke’s request to be transferred to a different prison facility. Id. at 399-400. Duke hurled
expletives at counsel, struck her in the face numerous times, and repeatedly “smashed” her head
into the table. Id. at 400. A federal grand jury later indicted Duke on one count of assaulting a
federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b) (Case Three). Id.
While detained for the failure-to-surrender and assault charges, Duke attempted to escape
from the detention facility. This resulted in the government’s obtaining a superseding indictment
in Case Two that added an attempted-escape charge. This meant that Case Two included two
counts: failure to surrender and attempted escape. Duke pleaded guilty to the assault of a federal
officer in Case Three. Duke, 870 F.3d at 400. At the same hearing, Duke also pleaded guilty to
both of the charges in Case Two.
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) for the assault charge calculated that Duke
had six criminal-history points: three points from Case One, one point from Case Two, and two
points for committing the assault while under a criminal-justice sentence for Case One. This score
placed Duke in Criminal History Category III.
At sentencing for the assault charge, Duke objected to the PSR’s application of the
criminal-history point for Case Two. The district court did not rule on the objection at the time
because Duke remained at Criminal History Category III, even without that point. The district
court sentenced Duke to 97 months’ imprisonment for the assault charge. At the subsequent
sentencing hearing for Case Two, the district court sentenced Duke to 18 months’ imprisonment
for the failure-to-surrender and attempted-escape charges. Duke appealed his 97-month sentence
from Case Three, and this Court affirmed. United States v. Duke, 870 F.3d at 406. Duke later
2 No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his conviction in Case Three, but it was denied as
untimely.
Since then, the Sentencing Commission has retroactively amended the Guidelines. On
November 1, 2023, Part A of Amendment 821 took effect, reducing the number of criminal history
points assessed against a defendant based on prior convictions (“status points”). U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.1(e) (2023). Because this retroactive change affected Duke’s sentence in Case Three, he
moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and renewed his prior objection to
the additional criminal-history point assessed from Case Two. Duke renewed this objection
because if the district court reduced his criminal score by one point—in addition to the loss of the
two status points from the retroactive change—he would drop to a Criminal History Category II.
The district court denied the motion, finding that Duke’s guilty plea from Case Two
counted as a “prior sentence,” according to the text of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1), and although the
attempted escape might have been relevant conduct to the assault, the failure to surrender was not.
This meant that the additional criminal history point was properly assessed, and Duke’s Criminal
History Category remained at III, making Duke ineligible for a sentence modification. Because
the district court held that Duke was ineligible for the sentence reduction, it did not consider
whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of a reduction.
Duke appeals, arguing that the district court erred by finding that the failure-to-surrender
conviction was not relevant conduct to the assault, and hence, the criminal-history point applied.
II.
Generally, once the district court imposes a sentence, it may not be modified. However,
§ 3582(c)(2) provides an exception and allows modification when a defendant “has been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
3 No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
Sentencing Commission,” and the district court finds that a “reduction is consistent with” relevant
Guidelines policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). This does not, however, require a full
resentencing. Rather, § 3582(c)(2) grants district courts the “power to ‘reduce’ an otherwise final
sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission.” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817,
825 (2010) (quoting § 3582(c)). Thus a § 3582(c)(2) sentencing modification proceeds in two
steps. Id. at 827. First, the district court must determine if the defendant is eligible for the
reduction under §1B1.10. Id. Second, if the district court finds that the defendant is eligible, it
must then “consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion,” the
reduction is warranted. Id.
We review the denial of a sentence reduction for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies
on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous
legal standard.” United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks
omitted). Under this standard we reverse only when we are “firmly convinced that a mistake has
been made.” United States v. Webb, 760 F.3d 513, 517 (6th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
Both the government and Duke agree that Amendment 821 lowers his criminal history
score in Case Three from six to four points, and that the guilty plea from Case Two qualifies as a
prior sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(4). So, Duke’s only argument on appeal is that the
district court erred by concluding that the failure-to-surrender conviction was not relevant conduct
to the assault. If Duke were correct, his total criminal history points would be reduced from four
to three, placing him in Criminal History Category II and making him eligible for a potential
sentence reduction.
4 No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
Conduct is part of the instant offense if it “is relevant conduct . . . under the provisions of
§ 1B1.3.” U.S.S.G § 4A1.2 cmt. n.1. And § 1B1.3 defines relevant conduct as “all acts and
omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for
that offense.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1).
Duke contends that the district court erred by finding that his failure-to-surrender
conviction was not related to the instant offense; counting it as a separate, prior conviction under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1); and assigning one criminal history point for it. This argument fails. The
instant offense is assault of a federal officer. Duke’s failure to surrender and his assault of the
federal officer are severable into two distinct offenses, even though the assault occurred at Duke’s
failure-to-surrender arraignment hearing. Duke’s Appellate brief offers a remarkable explanation
for why his failure to surrender was part of the instant offense:
If not for the failure to surrender, there would have been no assault. Duke’s attempt to evade sentence on the wire fraud generated a new indictment. The new indictment led to Duke’s arrest. Duke’s arrest required an initial appearance in duty court. In duty court, Duke assaulted the AUSA.
But Duke did not assault the AUSA during, in preparation for, “or in the course of attempting to
avoid detection or responsibility” for failing to report to prison for his sentence in Case One.
U.S.S.G § 1B1.3(a)(1). In fact, Duke’s failure to surrender occurred over eight months before the
assault, indicating that the courtroom assault was not part of a scheme or plan common to the
failure-to-surrender conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5 (“For two or more offenses to
constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be substantially connected to each other by
at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or
similar modus operandi.”). Further evidence that the failure-to-surrender conviction is not relevant
5 No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
conduct to the assault is the fact that the PSR and district court did not assess a two-point offense-
level increase for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G § 3C1.1.
And Duke contends that the failure to surrender has a logical relationship to the assault in
that they both indicate his desire to avoid responsibility. Duke relies on two cases to support this
proposition: United States v. Hodge, 805 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2015), and United States v. McDaniel,
398 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2005). But these do not save Duke’s argument. True, Hodge states that
“relevant conduct must also bear some logical relationship to the offense of conviction” but this is
in addition to the § 1B1.3 requirements, not in place of them. Hodge, 805 F.3d at 680. And the
facts of Hodge further illuminate what “some logical relationship” means. Id. In Hodge, the
instant offense was receipt of child pornography downloaded from the internet. Id. at 677. Hodge
also had one pending state charge for voyeurism. Id. The district court held, and we affirmed, that
the creation of the voyeuristic videos was relevant conduct to his receipt-of-child-pornography
conviction because the voyeurism conduct met the threshold requirements for relevant conduct in
§ 1B1.3 and was logically related to the instant conduct. Id. at 680-81. Unlike the situation in
Hodge, Duke’s underlying conduct in the failure-to-surrender conviction bears no relation to his
assaulting the federal official, and Hodge is inapposite.
McDaniel is likewise inapt. In McDaniel, 398 F.3d at 553, the defendant’s state court mail-
fraud convictions qualified as relevant conduct to the instant federal offenses of conspiracy, theft
of U.S. mail, and bank fraud because the modus operandi, the victims, and the time period were
the same for both. We have none of those things here. There is no discernable modus operandi
between the failure to surrender and the assault, there are no overlapping victims, and there was
an eight-month time difference between the two events. McDaniel, therefore, does not rescue
Duke’s argument.
6 No. 25-1213, United States v. Duke
Finally, Duke makes two alternative arguments on reply that were not developed in his
opening brief. But as we have consistently held, arguments made for the first time in a reply brief
are waived. Scarber v. Palmer, 808 F.3d 1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 2015).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.