United States v. Ronald Lee Jacobs

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 3, 2024
• Docket: 24-3165
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0480n.06

Case No. 24-3165

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED Dec 03, 2024 ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF RONALD LEE JACOBS, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: McKEAGUE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Ronald Jacobs committed thirteen robberies in under two

months. He was charged with six and convicted of each. Now he objects to several of the district

court’s decisions at trial. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him of

brandishing a firearm while committing one of the robberies. Those claims don’t have merit. But

his sentencing claim—that the district court didn’t adequately explain how it arrived at his

Guidelines range—does.

I.

Ronald Jacobs committed a slew of armed robberies in Columbus. While robbing a

Walgreens, Jacobs grabbed a package of gum but left it behind. The police found Jacob’s

fingerprints on the gum and obtained a warrant for his arrest. Jacobs surrendered and confessed. No. 24-3165, United States v. Jacobs

We confirmed that his confession was voluntary, and his case proceeded to trial. See United States

v. Jacobs, 63 F.4th 1055, 1060 (6th Cir. 2023).

The jury convicted Jacobs of six counts of Hobbs Act robbery. And the jury found Jacobs

guilty of one count of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. Now

Jacobs appeals (1) the district court’s decision to admit fingerprint evidence at trial without a

Daubert hearing, (2) the district court’s answer to a jury question about the fingerprints, (3) the

sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for brandishing a firearm, and (4) the district

court’s calculation of his total offense level and Guidelines range.

II.

This case began with Jacobs picking up a package of gum and leaving his fingerprints

behind for the police to find. See id. at 1057. Fittingly, two of Jacobs’s claims on appeal relate to

these fingerprints. First, he objects to the admission of testimony by a forensic fingerprint

examiner. Jacobs argued below that fingerprint evidence was unreliable and should be excluded.

The district court declined to hold a Daubert hearing and rejected his motion. See Daubert v.

Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Now Jacobs contends that the court abused its

discretion by declining to hold a hearing. It did not.

A.

At trial, the government sought to introduce testimony by Amanda Wilberg, a forensic

fingerprint examiner. Wilberg had used the ACE-V method1 to match the “latent” prints the robber

left behind with two sets of “known” prints that belonged to Jacobs. Latent fingerprints are

fingerprints left behind on an object. Known fingerprints, by contrast, are made by an individual

1 “ACE-V” stands for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification.

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who rolls their fingerprint in ink. Jacobs filed a motion in limine, contending that this evidence,

and the ACE-V fingerprint identification method in general, was unreliable.

Jacobs alleged that there hasn’t been testing on the probability of different people having

the same fingerprint characteristics. Without this testing, latent fingerprint evidence lacked a

known error rate. And a known error rate helps show reliability under Daubert. See Daubert, 509

U.S. at 594. In support, Jacobs cited two articles calling for studies on the accuracy of fingerprint

evidence.2

In response, the district court pointed out that (1) Jacobs’s articles were twenty years old

and (2) Jacobs couldn’t identify a single case in which a court had adopted the reasoning from

these articles to exclude fingerprint evidence. Instead, the district court concluded that this was an

“ordinary case[] where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted.” R. 105,

Pg. ID 938 (alteration in original) (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152

(1999)). In doing so, the district court relied on cases where courts rejected similar attacks on

latent fingerprint evidence without a hearing. See id. at Pg. ID 937–38 (discussing United States

v. Stone, 848 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717 (E.D. Mich. 2012) and United States v. Cromer, No. 1:01-CR-

130-01, 2006 WL 1430210, at *1 (W.D. Mich. May 23, 2006)).

Jacobs argues that fingerprint evidence’s admissibility is now up-for-grabs. See R. 73, Pg.

ID 800 (calling the reliability of fingerprint evidence an “unproven assumption that . . . can no

longer be sustained post-Daubert”). But courts have repeatedly upheld the use of latent fingerprint

evidence under the ACE-V method in the thirty years since Daubert. See United States v. Pena,

2 Jacobs cited a National Institute of Justice article from 2000 that solicited further research on fingerprints. Courts have rejected reliability attacks based on this exact article. See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 267, 270 (4th Cir. 2003).

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586 F.3d 105, 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009) (collecting cases); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215,

233–46 (3d Cir. 2004) (conducting an exhaustive Daubert analysis of the ACE-V method).3

Jacobs further contends the district court abdicated its “gatekeeping” responsibilities by

not holding a hearing. But courts don’t have to hold a Daubert hearing every time a party raises a

reliability question. Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 667 (6th Cir. 2000); see Mitchell, 365

F.3d at 246 (concluding that a district court wouldn’t abuse its discretion by “dispensing with the

hearing altogether if no novel challenge [to latent fingerprint evidence] was raised”).

The district court provided Jacobs with a reasoned decision that responded to his reliability

concerns. As the district court concluded, “[i]t would be a drastic measure” to find that this

fingerprint evidence failed Daubert’s reliability threshold. R. 105, Pg. ID 938. And Jacobs has

not provided us with any reason to question the district court’s judgment here, let alone conclude

that “it committed a clear error of judgment” when it declined to hold a hearing on such a well-

established form of evidence. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 781 (6th Cir.

2002). Thus, Jacobs’s claim fails.

B.

Now, for the second fingerprint claim. The government called Wilberg, the forensic

fingerprint examiner, as an expert witness at trial. The government also presented two slides with

side-by-side comparisons of the latent and known fingerprints to the jury. The first slide showed

the latent prints on the left and one set of Jacobs’s known prints (labeled “185417GD”) on the

3 In fact, the National Institute of Justice—the author of the article from 2000 that Jacobs relied on—confirmed in 2022 that Wilberg’s methodology was sound. See National Institute of Justice, The History and Legacy of the Latent Fingerprint Black Box Study, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/history-and-legacy-latent-fingerprint-black-box-study (discussing a 2011 FBI study that determined latent fingerprint evidence had a false positive rate of only 0.1%).

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right. The second slide also compared the latent prints on the left with Jacobs’s other set of known

prints (labeled “165329DC”) on the right.

(1)

When the jury was deliberating, they had a question about these exhibits. They asked,

“Are the fingerprints . . . in Exhibits [P]10B, the same person? Specifically, we are asking if the

right fingerprint in 165329DC [(S6)] is the same individual as in 185417GD [(S6)]?” R. 174, Pg.

ID 2568. After some back-and-forth between the lawyers and the district court, they determined

that the jury was referencing the two sets of known prints. The fingerprint marked “185417GD”

was one of Jacobs’s known prints. And the fingerprint marked “165329DC” was Jacobs’s other

known print.

The jury did not ask if Jacobs’s known prints matched the robber’s latent prints. That was

a question the jurors had to consider for themselves. Rather, the jurors were confirming that both

known prints came from the same person. After all, if they weren’t from the same person, that

would mean there were two potential matches for the robber’s prints. And it’d be much harder to

conclude that Jacobs committed the crime.

Since the known fingerprints belonged to the same person (Jacobs), the government

thought the judge’s answer should simply be “yes.” The only thing challenged at trial was the

“results of a comparison” between the latent and known prints—not the authenticity or validity of

the known prints themselves. Plus, the jury didn’t ask whom the known prints belonged to; they

just wanted to check that the two known prints belonged to the same person. So answering “yes”

would clear up any potential confusion about there being “two matches” for the robber.

But Jacobs requested a different answer from the court. Since this was a question of fact,

and since there was no formal stipulation that the known prints belonged to the same individual,

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Jacobs maintained that the court should simply “refer the jury back to their collective memory.”

Id. at Pg. ID 2575. The court struck a compromise and did both. Since “nobody contested that

these were the prints of the same person,” the court told the jury that the direct answer to its

question was “yes.” Id. at Pg. ID 2575, 2589. But the court also reminded the jury to “rely on

your collective memories.” Id. at Pg. ID 2589.

(2)

Jacobs objected to the court’s response below and appeals on the same basis. Jacobs argues

that the court’s “yes” inappropriately usurped the jury’s role as factfinder. He claims that this was

a “contentious fact-based question” and that the court should have referred the jurors to their

collective memory rather than deciding an evidentiary dispute. Appellant Br. at 19. We review a

district court’s response to jury questions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 970 F.3d

650, 662 (6th Cir. 2020). And we reverse only if the response prejudiced the defendant. Id.

Here, we need not even decide whether the district court abused its discretion because the

answer wasn’t prejudicial. Neither party contested that the known fingerprints both belonged to

Jacobs, since that fact was indisputable. The known prints came from Jacobs’s prior conviction

for robbery and his arrest for the string of robberies that gave rise to this case. Indeed, the exhibits

could’ve labeled the known fingerprints with Jacobs’s name instead of a string of numbers, and

Jacobs couldn’t have objected. This court has declined to find prejudice in similar circumstances,

when there was “literally zero [contradictory] evidence in the record.” Id. at 662–63 (citation

omitted). We do the same here.

III.

Next, Jacobs brings a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to his § 924(c) conviction for

brandishing a firearm while robbing a Wing Snob. Section 924(c) criminalizes “brandish[ing]” a

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firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Hobbs

Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v. Camp, 903 F.3d 594, 597 (6th

Cir. 2018).

We must affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Davis, 473 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2007).

Moreover, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. And Jacobs

didn’t renew his Rule 29 motion for acquittal after presenting his evidence. So Jacobs must also

show that his denied Rule 29 motion resulted in a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States

v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 877 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Jacobs thus faces an uphill

battle.

Jacobs contends that there wasn’t enough proof that he had a firearm when he robbed the

Wing Snob. The camera and video footage were blurry; any weapon he allegedly had was

concealed; and the sole eyewitness’ testimony wasn’t corroborated. So, he says, all this evidence

amounted to “speculation.” Appellant Br. at 31. We disagree.

Kristie Eaton, a shift manager at Wing Snob, testified that she “looked up and there was a

gun and he said to get on the ground, open the safe and be quiet.” R. 170, Pg. ID 1696. When

asked to describe the gun, Eaton responded that “[i]t was a single barrel on the smaller end. It

wasn’t very large. But it looked like a rifle.” Id. at Pg. ID 1697. Though she couldn’t see the

whole gun because “[i]t was covered with a jacket,” Eaton identified the gun when shown

surveillance photos. Id.; Id. at Pg. ID 1700–01. As Eaton explained, the gun clanged on Jacobs’s

jacket zipper, and “metal against metal makes a different noise than plastic on metal.” Id. at Pg.

ID 1712. When pressed on cross-examination, Eaton retorted that it “was plain as day” that Jacobs

had a firearm. R. 170, Pg. ID 1713.

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Police officer testimony corroborated Eaton’s account. The officer who investigated the

robbery reported his conversation with the cashier shortly after the incident. The cashier relayed

that the perpetrator was “concealing a black rifle.” Id. at Pg. ID 1688. And if that weren’t enough,

Jacobs’s own statements serve as evidence for his § 924(c) conviction. Detective Agee

interviewed Jacobs after Jacobs turned himself in. At trial, the government played video

recordings of Jacobs’s incriminating response to Detective Agee that “[t]he weapons, they gone.”

R. 172, Pg. ID 2154. Jacobs also told Detective Agee he had placed clothing over his shotgun

because the gun was “too big.” Id. at Pg. ID 2165.

One eyewitness, corroborating officer testimony, and several incriminating statements by

Jacobs. That’s more than enough to support a guilty verdict on the § 924(c) count.

IV.

Finally, Jacobs objects to the district court’s calculation of his total offense level and

Guidelines range. Jacobs contends that his total offense level should’ve been 27, not 28. And

Jacobs argues his Guidelines range thus should’ve been 78–97 months, not 87–108 months. A

sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court miscalculates the Guidelines range or

fails to adequately explain the chosen sentence. See United States v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074, 1084

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Since Jacobs failed to make

this argument below, our review is for plain error. See United States v. O’Lear, 90 F. 4th 519, 535

(6th Cir. 2024).

It’s unclear from the record how the district court arrived at an offense level of 28. This

much we do know: The base offense level for Hobbs Act robbery is 20. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a).

The probation officer recommended several enhancements: brandishing a firearm (+5), physically

restraining a person in commission of the offense (+2), obstruction of justice (+2), and a multiple-

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count adjustment (+5). The district court sustained Jacobs’s objections to the firearm and

obstruction enhancements. But the district court found that the physical-restraint enhancement

applied to count two. So Jacobs’s highest adjusted offense level was 22. Next, to calculate

Jacobs’s combined adjusted offense level, the district court would’ve taken the highest adjusted

offense level (22) and added it to the multiple count adjustment (5). That sum should’ve made 27,

as Jacobs argues.

But there’s a twist. The government argued at sentencing for a three-level enhancement

for brandishing a dangerous weapon if the court declined to apply the five-level firearm

enhancement. That enhancement would’ve made Jacobs’s highest adjusted offense level 23, not

22. If the court indeed applied the three-level dangerous-weapon enhancement, the math checks

out: a base level of 20, plus three for the dangerous-weapon enhancement, plus five for the

multiple-count adjustment makes 28.

The problem is there’s no mention of the dangerous-weapon enhancement in the

presentence report. And at sentencing, the district court never said that it would apply the

dangerous-weapon enhancement. Instead, the district court consulted off-the-record with the

probation officer and then announced an offense level of 28. To be sure, the district court had

earlier mused that it could find that “[Jacobs] had something wrapped up and maybe that was a

dangerous weapon.” R. 199, Pg. ID 2795. And the district court requested a separate

memorandum from the probation officer with calculations for the dangerous-weapon

enhancement.

But critically, the district court never stated what enhancements it applied. In fact, at the

time, the government seemed to think the district court hadn’t applied the dangerous-weapon

enhancement since it expressly preserved an objection to the court’s “declining to impose the

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dangerous weapon enhancement.” R. 200, Pg. ID 2850. If the district court really did apply the

dangerous-weapon enhancement, that would’ve been a great opportunity to clarify.

“[I]t is not this court’s duty to supply reasons for the district court’s sentencing decision.”

United States v. Fowler, 819 F.3d 298, 306 (6th Cir. 2016). The district court didn’t just fail to

give an adequate explanation of the reasons for the sentence it imposed; it failed to identify what

enhancements it applied. That amounts to plain error. Thus, we vacate Jacobs’s sentence and

remand for the district court to clarify what sentencing enhancement it used.

* * *

There was sufficient evidence to support Jacobs’s § 924(c) conviction. And the district

court didn’t abuse its discretion when it (1) admitted fingerprint evidence without a Daubert

hearing and (2) answered the jury’s question about the fingerprint evidence. But we remand for

the district court to clarify which sentencing enhancements it applied.

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