Affirmed by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINS joined. Judge MICHAEL wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Patrick Leroy Crisp appeals multiple convictions arising from an armed bank robbery carried out in Durham, North Carolina, on June 13, 2001. Crisp maintains that his trial was tainted by the Government’s presentation of inadmissible expert testimony. His appeal presents a single question: whether the disciplines of forensic fingerprint analysis and forensic handwriting analysis satisfy the criteria for expert opinion testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). As explained below, the prosecution’s fingerprint and handwriting evidence was properly admitted, and we affirm the convictions.
I.
At approximately 12:25 p.m. on June 13, 2001, a lone male, wearing a mask and surgical gloves, and carrying a handgun, entered the Central Carolina Bank in Durham, North Carolina. He approached Joan Adams, a teller, threw a bag on the counter, and instructed her to “fill up the god*mned f* * *ing bag.” Adams promptly gave the gunman the sum of $7,854 in cash, which included bait bills and an electronic tracking device. Then, a horn sounded twice from the parking lot outside, and the robber left the bank and made his getaway in a purple Ford Probe automobile.
Shortly thereafter, Durham police officer Michael Britton heard radio traffic stating that a purple Ford Probe was involved in a bank robbery. Driving on Faison Road, he observed a purple Ford Probe parked on the wrong side of the street. Officer Britton immediately secured the vehicle, and he later learned that it had been stolen the previous day.
The next day, June 14, 2001, the authorities received a call on its Crimestoppers telephone line from an individual who [264]*264claimed to have information about the robbery of the Central Carolina Bank. The caller provided detailed information, and later that day the police met the caller, Michael Mitchell, at a local restaurant. Mitchell informed the officers that Patrick Crisp and Lamont Torain had robbed the bank. He further attested that Crisp and Torain had attempted to recruit him to participate in the robbery, but that he had declined. Mitchell explained that Crisp had detailed the entire robbery plan to him. On the basis of Mitchell’s information, the police obtained an arrest warrant for Crisp.
On June 15, 2001, Crisp, while driving a rented Pontiac Grand Am with Mitchell as a passenger, came upon a police license checkpoint. Crisp was unable to produce a valid driver’s license, and he advised the officers that his name was Jermaine Jackson. A small amount of marijuana was found in the vehicle. While Crisp was being interviewed, Mitchell informed the police of Crisp’s real identity, and the officers promptly learned of the outstanding warrant for Crisp’s arrest. Crisp was then taken into custody.
Torain was also arrested, and he was incarcerated in the same jail as Crisp. On June 20, 2001, as he walked past Crisp’s cell, a handwritten note (the “Note”) was slid out from under Crisp’s door. The Note, the last line of which was allegedly crossed out when delivered, stated:
Lamont
You know if you don’t help me I am going to get life in prison, and you ain’t going to get nothing. Really it’s over for me if you don’t change what you told them.
Tell them I picked you up down the street in Kathy’s car. Tell them that I don’t drive the Probe. Tell them Mike drove the Probe. He is the one that told on us. Tell them the gun and all that shit was Mike’s. That is what I am going to tell them tommorow [sic].
Tell the Feds Mike drove you away feom-the-bank Patrick.
During the investigation of the robbery, Crisp’s girlfriend, Katherine Bell, gave police officers consent to search both her residence in Hillsborough, North Carolina, and her car, a white Ford Escort. The officers found surgical gloves in the vehicle, and in her bedroom they discovered a bullet proof vest and a sawed-off shotgun. In the course of the investigation, the officers obtained palmprints and handwriting exemplars from Crisp.
Both Mitchell and Torain testified against Crisp at Crisp’s trial, which was conducted from September 10 through September 13, 2001, in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.1 Mitchell testified, inter alia, that on June 11, 2001, Crisp told him he needed to make some quick money and that he planned to rob a bank. Mitchell told the jury that Crisp then took him to the Central Carolina Bank, informed him that he (Crisp) and Lamont Torain were going to rob it, and asked if Mitchell would participate. The following day, Mitchell, Crisp, and Torain discussed the robbery plan in further detail. Crisp showed Mitchell a bullet proof vest, a sawed-off shotgun, an automatic weapon, a mask, and clothing, all of which Crisp and Torain intended to use in the bank robbery. Mitchell further testified that Crisp had shown him the purple Ford Probe. According to Mitchell, the initial plan was that he and Torain would enter the bank, and Crisp would drive the getaway vehicle. The following morning, however, when To-rain came to pick up Mitchell for the rob[265]*265bery, Mitchell begged off, explaining that he had to babysit his children.
Torain described to the jury a slightly different set of events. He asserted that it was Mitchell and Crisp who planned the robbery, and that, originally, it was he who was to drive the getaway vehicle. According to Torain, when Mitchell refused to participate, the plan changed: Torain entered the bank, while Crisp waited in the getaway car.
At trial, Mary Katherine Brannan, a fingerprint expert with the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”), testified that Crisp’s right palm had produced a latent print that had subsequently been recovered from the Note. Furthermore, a handwriting expert, Special Agent Thomas Currin, a “questioned document analyst” with the SBI, testified that Crisp had authored the Note.
Crisp presented an alibi defense. His cousin, Cecilia Pointer, claimed that, on the day of the robbery, her husband and Crisp came to her place of employment at approximately 12:30 p.m., and that the two men then left to submit applications at a temporary employment agency. She testified that they stopped back by her work around 1:00 p.m. or 1:15 p.m.
After the four-day jury trial, Crisp was found guilty of bank robbery, bank robbery with a dangerous weapon, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to the bank robbery. On November 27, 2001, he received a sentence of 356 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. His notice of appeal was timely filed on November 27, 2001, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Fingerprint and handwriting analysis have long been recognized by the courts as sound methods for making reliable identifications. See, e.g., Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75, 81 (7th Cir. 1936) (fingerprints); Robinson v. Mandell, 20 F.
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Affirmed by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINS joined. Judge MICHAEL wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Patrick Leroy Crisp appeals multiple convictions arising from an armed bank robbery carried out in Durham, North Carolina, on June 13, 2001. Crisp maintains that his trial was tainted by the Government’s presentation of inadmissible expert testimony. His appeal presents a single question: whether the disciplines of forensic fingerprint analysis and forensic handwriting analysis satisfy the criteria for expert opinion testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). As explained below, the prosecution’s fingerprint and handwriting evidence was properly admitted, and we affirm the convictions.
I.
At approximately 12:25 p.m. on June 13, 2001, a lone male, wearing a mask and surgical gloves, and carrying a handgun, entered the Central Carolina Bank in Durham, North Carolina. He approached Joan Adams, a teller, threw a bag on the counter, and instructed her to “fill up the god*mned f* * *ing bag.” Adams promptly gave the gunman the sum of $7,854 in cash, which included bait bills and an electronic tracking device. Then, a horn sounded twice from the parking lot outside, and the robber left the bank and made his getaway in a purple Ford Probe automobile.
Shortly thereafter, Durham police officer Michael Britton heard radio traffic stating that a purple Ford Probe was involved in a bank robbery. Driving on Faison Road, he observed a purple Ford Probe parked on the wrong side of the street. Officer Britton immediately secured the vehicle, and he later learned that it had been stolen the previous day.
The next day, June 14, 2001, the authorities received a call on its Crimestoppers telephone line from an individual who [264]*264claimed to have information about the robbery of the Central Carolina Bank. The caller provided detailed information, and later that day the police met the caller, Michael Mitchell, at a local restaurant. Mitchell informed the officers that Patrick Crisp and Lamont Torain had robbed the bank. He further attested that Crisp and Torain had attempted to recruit him to participate in the robbery, but that he had declined. Mitchell explained that Crisp had detailed the entire robbery plan to him. On the basis of Mitchell’s information, the police obtained an arrest warrant for Crisp.
On June 15, 2001, Crisp, while driving a rented Pontiac Grand Am with Mitchell as a passenger, came upon a police license checkpoint. Crisp was unable to produce a valid driver’s license, and he advised the officers that his name was Jermaine Jackson. A small amount of marijuana was found in the vehicle. While Crisp was being interviewed, Mitchell informed the police of Crisp’s real identity, and the officers promptly learned of the outstanding warrant for Crisp’s arrest. Crisp was then taken into custody.
Torain was also arrested, and he was incarcerated in the same jail as Crisp. On June 20, 2001, as he walked past Crisp’s cell, a handwritten note (the “Note”) was slid out from under Crisp’s door. The Note, the last line of which was allegedly crossed out when delivered, stated:
Lamont
You know if you don’t help me I am going to get life in prison, and you ain’t going to get nothing. Really it’s over for me if you don’t change what you told them.
Tell them I picked you up down the street in Kathy’s car. Tell them that I don’t drive the Probe. Tell them Mike drove the Probe. He is the one that told on us. Tell them the gun and all that shit was Mike’s. That is what I am going to tell them tommorow [sic].
Tell the Feds Mike drove you away feom-the-bank Patrick.
During the investigation of the robbery, Crisp’s girlfriend, Katherine Bell, gave police officers consent to search both her residence in Hillsborough, North Carolina, and her car, a white Ford Escort. The officers found surgical gloves in the vehicle, and in her bedroom they discovered a bullet proof vest and a sawed-off shotgun. In the course of the investigation, the officers obtained palmprints and handwriting exemplars from Crisp.
Both Mitchell and Torain testified against Crisp at Crisp’s trial, which was conducted from September 10 through September 13, 2001, in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.1 Mitchell testified, inter alia, that on June 11, 2001, Crisp told him he needed to make some quick money and that he planned to rob a bank. Mitchell told the jury that Crisp then took him to the Central Carolina Bank, informed him that he (Crisp) and Lamont Torain were going to rob it, and asked if Mitchell would participate. The following day, Mitchell, Crisp, and Torain discussed the robbery plan in further detail. Crisp showed Mitchell a bullet proof vest, a sawed-off shotgun, an automatic weapon, a mask, and clothing, all of which Crisp and Torain intended to use in the bank robbery. Mitchell further testified that Crisp had shown him the purple Ford Probe. According to Mitchell, the initial plan was that he and Torain would enter the bank, and Crisp would drive the getaway vehicle. The following morning, however, when To-rain came to pick up Mitchell for the rob[265]*265bery, Mitchell begged off, explaining that he had to babysit his children.
Torain described to the jury a slightly different set of events. He asserted that it was Mitchell and Crisp who planned the robbery, and that, originally, it was he who was to drive the getaway vehicle. According to Torain, when Mitchell refused to participate, the plan changed: Torain entered the bank, while Crisp waited in the getaway car.
At trial, Mary Katherine Brannan, a fingerprint expert with the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”), testified that Crisp’s right palm had produced a latent print that had subsequently been recovered from the Note. Furthermore, a handwriting expert, Special Agent Thomas Currin, a “questioned document analyst” with the SBI, testified that Crisp had authored the Note.
Crisp presented an alibi defense. His cousin, Cecilia Pointer, claimed that, on the day of the robbery, her husband and Crisp came to her place of employment at approximately 12:30 p.m., and that the two men then left to submit applications at a temporary employment agency. She testified that they stopped back by her work around 1:00 p.m. or 1:15 p.m.
After the four-day jury trial, Crisp was found guilty of bank robbery, bank robbery with a dangerous weapon, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to the bank robbery. On November 27, 2001, he received a sentence of 356 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. His notice of appeal was timely filed on November 27, 2001, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Fingerprint and handwriting analysis have long been recognized by the courts as sound methods for making reliable identifications. See, e.g., Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75, 81 (7th Cir. 1936) (fingerprints); Robinson v. Mandell, 20 F. Cas. 1027 (D.Mass.1868) (handwriting). Today, however, Crisp challenges the district court’s decisions to permit experts in those fields to testify on behalf of the prosecution. The fingerprinting expert, Brannan, gave her opinion that a palm print lifted from the Note was that of Crisp; the handwriting expert, Currin, testified that, in his judgment, the handwriting on the Note matched Crisp’s handwriting. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to admit or reject expert testimony. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997); see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (“[T]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.”).
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.... ” Fed.R.Evid. 702. The Supreme Court has made clear that it is the trial court’s duty to play a gatekeeping function in deciding whether to admit expert testimony: “[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
In Daubert, the Court announced five factors that may be used in assessing the relevancy and reliability of expert tes[266]*266timony: (1) whether the particular scientific theory “can be (and has been) tested”; (2) whether the theory “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) the “known or potential rate of error”; (4) the “existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation”; and (5) whether the technique has achieved “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific or expert community. Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Rather than providing a definitive or exhaustive list, Daubert merely illustrates the types of factors that will “bear on the inquiry.” Id. As Daubert emphasized, the analysis must be “a flexible one.” Id.; see also Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (concluding that testing of reliability should be flexible and that Daubert’s five factors neither necessarily nor exclusively apply to every expert).
A.
We turn first to whether the fingerprint evidence was properly admitted against Crisp. Crisp has challenged the admission of this evidence on several grounds: His primary contention is that the premises underlying fingerprinting evidence have not been adequately tested. Crisp also maintains that there is no known rate of error for latent fingerprint identifications, that fingerprint examiners operate without a uniform threshold of certainty required for a positive identification, and that fingerprint evidence has not achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.
1.
Fingerprint identification has been admissible as reliable evidence in criminal trials in this country since at least 1911. See People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Finger-print Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 Brooklyn L.Rev. 13 (2001) (discussing history of fingerprint identification evidence). While we have not definitively assessed the admissibility of expert fingerprint identifications in the post -Daubert era,2 every Circuit that has done so has found such evidence admissible. See United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that fingerprint identification satisfies Dau-bert ); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir.1996) (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that “fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,” and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549, 572-73 (E.D.Pa.2002) (discussing long history of latent fingerprint evidence in criminal proceedings, and citing lack of proof of its unreliability, to hold such evidence admissible); United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D.La. May 14, 2001) (observing that “fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a rehable science over decades of use for judicial purposes”); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R.2001) (noting that questions of reliability of fingerprint identifications can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination of expert witness).
Upholding a district court’s admission of fingerprint evidence, the Seventh Circuit [267]*267emphasized in Haward that the district court “properly considered the Daubert factors in analyzing [the defendant’s] motion and concluded that fingerprinting techniques have been tested in the adversarial system, that individual results are routinely subjected to peer review for verification, and that the probability of error is exceptionally low.” 260 F.3d at 601. As here, the defendant in Haward contended that “fingerprint comparisons are not reliable because the government admits that the basic premise that all fingerprints are unique remains unproven, and because there are no objective standards for defining how much of a latent fingerprint is necessary to conduct a comparison or for evaluating an individual examiner’s comparison.” Id. at 600. The defendant further maintained that the district court erred in requiring him to offer some basis on which to find fingerprint analysis unreliable. Id. The Haward court, however, properly rejected this line of argument. Emphasizing that general acceptance remains an important consideration under Daubert, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court properly recognized that “establishing the reliability of fingerprint analysis was made easier by its 100 years of successful use in criminal trials, and appropriately noted that nothing presented at the hearing undermined [the expert’s] testimony.” Id. at 600-01.
2.
In his challenge to the admissibility of the fingerprint evidence, Crisp begins with the contention that the basic premises underlying fingerprint identification have not been subjected to adequate testing. The two premises that he singles out as requiring more searching scrutiny are: (1) that no two persons share the same fingerprint; and (2) that fingerprint examiners are able to make reliable identifications on the basis of small, distorted latent fingerprint fragments. In support of his assertions, Crisp notes that the expert in this case, Brannan, was unable to reference any study establishing that no two persons share the same fingerprint; she was able only to testify that no study had ever proven this premise false. In addition, Crisp contends that the Government itself seems unsure of the reliability of fingerprint evidence: in particular, Crisp notes that the National Institute of Justice, an arm of the Department of Justice, issued a solicitation for fingerprint validation studies in March of 2000. This solicitation calls for “basic research to determine the scientific validity of individuality in friction ridge examination,” and also seeks the development of standard procedures for fingerprint comparisons and for the testing of those procedures once adopted. National Institute of Justice, Forensic Friction Ridge (Fingerprint) Examination Validation Studies 4 (Mar.2000). Finally, though Crisp cites no studies demonstrating the unreliability of fingerprinting analysis, he brings to our attention two law review articles discussing the paucity of research into the fingerprint identification process.3
[268]*268Crisp next maintains that, because the basic premises behind fingerprint analysis have not been properly tested, there can be no established error rates.4 He also asserts that fingerprint examiners operate without uniform, objective standards, noting that Brannan herself testified that there is no generally accepted standard regarding the number of points of identification necessary to make a positive identification. Finally, Crisp contends that, while fingerprint analysis has gained general acceptance among fingerprint examiners themselves, this factor should be discounted because, according to Crisp, the relevant community “is devoid of financially disinterested parties such as academics.” United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F.Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y.1995).
3.
Crisp today advocates the wholesale exclusion of a long-accepted form of expert evidence. Such a drastic step is not required of us under Daubert, however, and we decline to take it. The Daubert decision, in adding four new factors to the traditional “general acceptance” standard for expert testimony, effectively opened the courts to a broader range of opinion evidence than was previously admissible. Although Daubert attempted to ensure that courts screen out “junk science,” it also enabled the courts to entertain new and less conventional forms of expertise. As the Court explained, the addition of the new factors would put an end to the “wholesale exclusion [of expert testimony based on scientific innovations] under an uncompromising ‘general acceptance’ test.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
The touchstones for admissibility under Daubert are two: reliability and relevancy. See id. at 589, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786; see also Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (“The objective of [Daubert’s gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony.”). Under Daubert, a trial judge need not expend scarce judicial resources reexamining a familiar form of expertise every time opinion evidence is offered. In fact, if a given theory or technique is “so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law,” then it need not be examined at all, but instead may properly be subject to judicial notice. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
While the principles underlying fingerprint identification have not attained the status of scientific law, they nonetheless bear the imprimatur of a strong general acceptance, not only in the expert community, but in the courts as well. See Havvard, 260 F.3d at 601 (noting lower court’s observation that fingerprint analy[269]*269sis has enjoyed “100 years of successful use in criminal trials”); Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d at 563, 572-76 (describing longstanding consensus in expert community as to reliability of fingerprint identification process in holding admissible expert fingerprint identification evidence); see also Hernandez, 299 F.3d at 991 (upholding admissibility of fingerprint identification evidence one year ago); Jennings, 96 N.E. at 1083 (upholding admissibility of fingerprint identification evidence ninety-two years ago). Put simply, Crisp has provided us no reason today to believe that this general acceptance of the principles underlying fingerprint identification has, for decades, been misplaced. Accordingly, the district court was well within its discretion in accepting at face value the consensus of the expert and judicial communities that the fingerprint identification technique is rehable.
In addition to a strong expert and judicial consensus regarding the reliability of fingerprint identification, there exist the requisite “standards controlling the technique’s operation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. As Brannan testified, while different agencies may require different degrees of correlation before permitting a positive identification, fingerprint analysts are held to a consistent “points and characteristics” approach to identification. Analysts are also consistently subjected to testing and proficiency requirements. Brannan’s testimony is entirely in keeping with the conclusions of the post-Daubert courts that uniform standards have been established “through professional training, peer review, presentation of conflicting evidence and double checking.” Rogers, 2001 WL 1635494, *1; see also, e.g., Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d at 566-71 (detailing development of identification criteria and holding that “standards which control the opining of a competent fingerprint examiner are sufficiently widely agreed upon to satisfy Daubert requirements”); cf. Harvard, 260 F.3d at 599 (holding that, while uniform standards may not exist, “the unique nature of fingerprints is counterintuitive to the establishment of such a standard”).
Furthermore, in Havvard, the Seventh Circuit determined that Daubert’s “known error rate” factor was satisfied because the expert had testified that the error rate for fingerprint comparison was “essentially zero.” 260 F.3d at 599. Similarly, and significantly, Brannan testified here to a negligible error rate in fingerprint identifications.
In sum, the district court heard testimony to the effect that the expert community has consistently vouched for the reliability of the fingerprinting identification technique over the course of decades. That evidence is consistent with the findings of our sister circuits, and Crisp offers us no reason to believe that the court abused its discretion in crediting it. The district court also heard evidence from which it was entitled to find the existence of professional standards controlling the technique’s operation. Those standards provide adequate assurance of consistency among fingerprint analyses. Finally, the court heard testimony that fingerprint identification has an exceedingly low rate of error, and the court was likewise within its discretion in crediting that evidence. While Crisp may be correct that further research, more searching scholarly review, and the development of even more consistent professional standards is desirable, he has offered us no reason to reject outright a form of evidence that has so ably withstood the test of time.
Finally, even if we had a more concrete cause for concern as to the reliability of fingerprint identification, the Supreme Court emphasized in Daubert that “[v]igor[270]*270ous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Ultimately, we conclude that while further research into fingerprint analysis would be welcome, “to postpone present in-court utilization of this bedrock forensic identifier pending such research would be to make the best the enemy of the good.” Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d at 573 (internal quotation omitted).
B.
In seeking to have his convictions vacated, Crisp also challenges the admissibility of the opinions of Currin, the handwriting expert, on grounds that are essentially idéntical to those on which he relied to make his case against fingerprint evidence. Crisp contends that, like fingerprinting identifications, the basic premise behind handwriting analysis is that no two persons write alike, and thus that forensic document examiners can reliably determine authorship of a particular document by comparing it with known samples. He maintains that these basic premises have not been tested, nor has an error rate been established. In addition, he asserts that handwriting experts have no numerical standards to govern their analyses and that they have not subjected themselves and their science to critical self-examination and study.
While the admissibility of handwriting evidence in the post-Ncm&erf world appears to be a matter of first impression for our Court, every circuit to have addressed the issue has concluded, as on the fingerprint issue, that such evidence is properly admissible. See United States v. Jolivet, 224 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir.2000) (citing Eleventh Circuit’s Paul decision and upholding admission of expert handwriting testimony); United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906, 911 (11th Cir.1999) (emphasizing “flexible” nature of district court’s gatek-eeping function, and noting that “the ability of the jury to perform the same visual comparisons as the experts cuts against the danger of undue prejudice from the mystique attached to experts” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1161 (6th Cir.1997) (upholding admission of expert handwriting testimony and observing that “just because the threshold for admissibility [of expert testimony] under Rule 702 has been crossed, a party is not prevented from challenging the reliability of the admitted evidence”); United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3rd Cir.1995) (discussing standard methodology applied by handwriting analysts, and upholding admission of expert handwriting testimony).5
The Government’s handwriting expert, Thomas Currin, had twenty-four years of experience at the North Carolina SBI. On voir dire, and then on direct examination, he explained that all questioned documents that come into the SBI are analyzed first by a “questioned document examiner”; [271]*271and that the initial analysis is then reviewed by another examiner. Currin discussed several studies showing the ability of qualified document examiners to identify questioned handwriting.6 In addition, he had passed numerous proficiency tests, consistently receiving perfect scores. Cur-rin testified to a consistent methodology of handwriting examination and identification, and he stated that the methodology “has been used not only at the level of state crime laboratories, but [also in] federal and international crime laboratories around the world.” When he was questioned regarding the standards employed in questioned document examination, Cur-rin explained that every determination of authorship “is based on the uniqueness of [certain] similarities, and it’s based on the quality and the skill and the training of the document examiner.”
At trial, Currin drew the jury’s attention to similarities between Crisp’s known handwriting exemplars and the writing on the Note. Among the similarities that he pointed out were the overall size and spacing of the letters and words in the documents; the unique shaping of the capital letter “L” in the name “Lamont”; the spacing between the capital letter “L” and the rest of the word; a peculiar shaping to the letters “o” and “n” when used in conjunction with one another; the v-like formation of the letter “u” in the word “you”; and the shape of the letter “t,” including the horizontal stroke. Currin also noted that the word “tomorrow” was misspelled in the same manner on both the known exemplar and the Note. He went on to testify that, in his opinion, Crisp had authored the Note.
Our analysis of Daubert in the context of fingerprint identification applies with equal force here: like fingerprint analysis, handwriting comparison testimony has a long history of admissibility in the courts of this country. See, e.g., Robinson v. Mandell, 20 F. Cas. 1027 (D.Mass.1868). The fact that handwriting comparison analysis has achieved widespread and lasting acceptance in the expert community gives us the assurance of reliability that Daubert requires. Furthermore, as with expert testimony on fingerprints, the role of the handwriting expert is primarily to draw the jury’s attention to similarities between a known exemplar and a contested sample. Here, Currin merely pointed out certain unique characteristics shared by the two writings. Though he opined that Crisp authored the Note in question, the jury was nonetheless left to examine the Note and decide for itself whether it agreed with the expert.
To the extent that a given handwriting analysis is flawed or flimsy, an able defense lawyer will bring that fact to the jury’s attention, both through skillful cross-examination and by presenting expert testimony of his own. But in light of Crisp’s failure to offer us any reason today to doubt the reliability of handwriting analysis evidence in general, we must decline to deny our courts and juries such insights as it can offer.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and [272]*272thus we affirm the convictions of Patrick Leroy Crisp.
AFFIRMED