USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711 Doc: 46 Filed: 06/12/2024 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4711
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD P. HARGRAVE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00425-BHH-1)
Submitted: April 4, 2024 Decided: June 12, 2024
Before WYNN, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, ELIZABETH FRANKLIN-BEST, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Winston D. Holliday, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711 Doc: 46 Filed: 06/12/2024 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Ronald P. Hargrave, a former physician, of seven counts of
unlawfully distributing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C). On appeal, Hargrave challenges the district court’s jury instructions, the
sufficiency of the evidence, and the exclusion of one of his proposed witness’ testimony.
We affirm Hargrave’s convictions on Counts 1 through 3, vacate his convictions on Counts
4 through 7, and remand for further proceedings.
Hargrave relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S.
450 (2022), to argue that the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous because they
applied an objective, rather than subjective, standard to the requirement that Hargrave’s
actions were outside the scope of a professional medical practice. The Government argues
that Hargrave invited any error by proposing some of the language in the jury’s
instructions. Alternatively, the Government contends that plain-error review applies. We
disagree with the Government on invited error but agree on plain error.
Under the invited error doctrine, “a court can not be asked by counsel to take a step
in a case and later be convicted of error, because it has complied with such request.” United
States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
have applied the doctrine in the context of jury instructions. Id. at 76. However,
Hargrave’s “requested instructions ‘relied on settled law that changed while the case was
on appeal.’” United States v. Kumar, No. 20-4478, 2024 WL 1134035, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar.
15, 2024) (quoting United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239, 1255 (11th Cir. 2023)). Thus,
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we will consider Hargrave’s challenge on the merits, employing plain-error review. See
Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 1257.
To succeed on plain-error review, Hargrave “has the burden to show that: (1) there
was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” United
States v. Cowden, 882 F.3d 464, 475 (4th Cir. 2018). If Hargrave makes this showing, “we
may exercise our discretion to correct the error only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). The
Government does not dispute the first two prongs of plain-error review are satisfied, and
in light of Ruan and our subsequent decision in United States v. Smithers, 92 F.4th 237 (4th
Cir. 2024), we agree they are. See United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215
(4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing error is plain when it is “clear or obvious at the time of
appellate consideration” (cleaned up)); see also Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 1258 (“[A] district
court errs by instructing a jury to apply an objective standard to the usual course of
professional practice requirement, or failing to convey that a subjective analysis is
required.” (cleaned up)).
To establish the error affected his substantial rights, Hargrave has the “burden of
showing that the error actually affected the outcome of the proceedings.” United States v.
Nicolaou, 180 F.3d 565, 570 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, Hargrave must “show that the proper instruction, on the same evidence, would have
resulted in acquittal, or at the very least a hung jury.” Id.
It is illegal to distribute or dispense a controlled substance “[e]xcept as authorized”
by law. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In Ruan, the Supreme Court held that § 841’s “knowingly
3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711 Doc: 46 Filed: 06/12/2024 Pg: 4 of 6
or intentionally” mens rea applies to the “[e]xcept as authorized” clause of the statute. 597
U.S. at 454, 468. Thus, when a defendant shows that he is authorized to issue prescriptions
for controlled substances, “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.” Id. This is a
subjective, rather than objective, inquiry. United States v. Kim, 71 F.4th 155, 160, 164 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 436 (2023). The Government cannot meet its burden by
proving that the physician lacked objective good faith in issuing the prescriptions. Ruan,
597 U.S. at 465.
On Counts 1 through 3, we do not believe the instructional error affected Hargrave’s
substantial rights. These counts related to his conduct with C.K., who testified that
Hargrave wrote her prescriptions for controlled substances and gave her cash in exchange
for sex. While Hargrave attacked C.K.’s credibility, two employees testified that they
observed the beginning of Hargrave’s encounter with C.K., confirming C.K.’s account. In
the face of substantial evidence of this quid-pro-quo relationship with C.K., Hargrave
cannot satisfy his burden to show that the jury would have acquitted him, or at least hung,
if it had been properly instructed. See Nicolaou, 180 F.3d at 570.
As for counts 4 through 7, which corresponded with prescriptions Hargrave issued
J.L., D.W., and M.F., those three individuals did not testify at trial. The Government
introduced an expert who testified that these prescriptions were not justified by Hargrave’s
written notes, but Hargrave called his own expert to testify that they were. While C.K.
testified that J.L. was a drug dealer and referred her to Hargrave, she was unsure if J.L.
called Hargrave on her behalf or if he simply provided Hargrave’s contact information, and
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there was no other evidence linking them to a conspiracy.
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USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711 Doc: 46 Filed: 06/12/2024 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4711
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD P. HARGRAVE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00425-BHH-1)
Submitted: April 4, 2024 Decided: June 12, 2024
Before WYNN, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, ELIZABETH FRANKLIN-BEST, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Winston D. Holliday, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711 Doc: 46 Filed: 06/12/2024 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Ronald P. Hargrave, a former physician, of seven counts of
unlawfully distributing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C). On appeal, Hargrave challenges the district court’s jury instructions, the
sufficiency of the evidence, and the exclusion of one of his proposed witness’ testimony.
We affirm Hargrave’s convictions on Counts 1 through 3, vacate his convictions on Counts
4 through 7, and remand for further proceedings.
Hargrave relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S.
450 (2022), to argue that the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous because they
applied an objective, rather than subjective, standard to the requirement that Hargrave’s
actions were outside the scope of a professional medical practice. The Government argues
that Hargrave invited any error by proposing some of the language in the jury’s
instructions. Alternatively, the Government contends that plain-error review applies. We
disagree with the Government on invited error but agree on plain error.
Under the invited error doctrine, “a court can not be asked by counsel to take a step
in a case and later be convicted of error, because it has complied with such request.” United
States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
have applied the doctrine in the context of jury instructions. Id. at 76. However,
Hargrave’s “requested instructions ‘relied on settled law that changed while the case was
on appeal.’” United States v. Kumar, No. 20-4478, 2024 WL 1134035, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar.
15, 2024) (quoting United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239, 1255 (11th Cir. 2023)). Thus,
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we will consider Hargrave’s challenge on the merits, employing plain-error review. See
Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 1257.
To succeed on plain-error review, Hargrave “has the burden to show that: (1) there
was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” United
States v. Cowden, 882 F.3d 464, 475 (4th Cir. 2018). If Hargrave makes this showing, “we
may exercise our discretion to correct the error only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). The
Government does not dispute the first two prongs of plain-error review are satisfied, and
in light of Ruan and our subsequent decision in United States v. Smithers, 92 F.4th 237 (4th
Cir. 2024), we agree they are. See United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215
(4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing error is plain when it is “clear or obvious at the time of
appellate consideration” (cleaned up)); see also Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 1258 (“[A] district
court errs by instructing a jury to apply an objective standard to the usual course of
professional practice requirement, or failing to convey that a subjective analysis is
required.” (cleaned up)).
To establish the error affected his substantial rights, Hargrave has the “burden of
showing that the error actually affected the outcome of the proceedings.” United States v.
Nicolaou, 180 F.3d 565, 570 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, Hargrave must “show that the proper instruction, on the same evidence, would have
resulted in acquittal, or at the very least a hung jury.” Id.
It is illegal to distribute or dispense a controlled substance “[e]xcept as authorized”
by law. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In Ruan, the Supreme Court held that § 841’s “knowingly
3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711 Doc: 46 Filed: 06/12/2024 Pg: 4 of 6
or intentionally” mens rea applies to the “[e]xcept as authorized” clause of the statute. 597
U.S. at 454, 468. Thus, when a defendant shows that he is authorized to issue prescriptions
for controlled substances, “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.” Id. This is a
subjective, rather than objective, inquiry. United States v. Kim, 71 F.4th 155, 160, 164 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 436 (2023). The Government cannot meet its burden by
proving that the physician lacked objective good faith in issuing the prescriptions. Ruan,
597 U.S. at 465.
On Counts 1 through 3, we do not believe the instructional error affected Hargrave’s
substantial rights. These counts related to his conduct with C.K., who testified that
Hargrave wrote her prescriptions for controlled substances and gave her cash in exchange
for sex. While Hargrave attacked C.K.’s credibility, two employees testified that they
observed the beginning of Hargrave’s encounter with C.K., confirming C.K.’s account. In
the face of substantial evidence of this quid-pro-quo relationship with C.K., Hargrave
cannot satisfy his burden to show that the jury would have acquitted him, or at least hung,
if it had been properly instructed. See Nicolaou, 180 F.3d at 570.
As for counts 4 through 7, which corresponded with prescriptions Hargrave issued
J.L., D.W., and M.F., those three individuals did not testify at trial. The Government
introduced an expert who testified that these prescriptions were not justified by Hargrave’s
written notes, but Hargrave called his own expert to testify that they were. While C.K.
testified that J.L. was a drug dealer and referred her to Hargrave, she was unsure if J.L.
called Hargrave on her behalf or if he simply provided Hargrave’s contact information, and
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there was no other evidence linking them to a conspiracy. And although a pharmacist
testified that she observed some questionable behavior between Hargrave and M.F. that
signified there may have been a sexual relationship between the two, Hargrave only treated
C.K. one time, three days after their sexual encounter, while Hargrave had an extended
physician-patient relationship with M.F., and he ordered an MRI that confirmed M.F. had
a nerve condition that caused pain.
Thus, on this record, we believe that a properly instructed jury could have at least
hung, Nicolaou, 180 F.3d at 570, and the “instructional error undermines our confidence
in the outcome of the trial,” Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 1261 (cleaned up). Accordingly, we
believe it prudent to exercise our discretion to correct the plain error and vacate Hargrave’s
convictions on Counts 4 through 7. In light of our decision to vacate, we need not address
Hargrave’s sufficiency challenge to those counts. See Smithers, 92 F.4th at 240. And for
the reasons stated above, we reject Hargrave’s sufficiency challenge on Counts 1 through
3.
Finally, Hargrave challenges the district court’s decision to exclude the testimony
of a pharmacist. We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. * See
United States v. Parker, 262 F.3d 415, 420 (4th Cir. 2001). “An error [in an evidentiary
* In his brief, Hargrave conceded that this argument is reviewed for plain error. However, “parties cannot waive the proper standard of review by failing to argue it or by consenting to an incorrect standard.” United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court excluded the testimony upon motion of the Government, and Hargrave argued for allowing the witness to testify. Thus, Hargrave preserved his argument below.
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ruling] is harmless if it’s highly probable that it did not affect the judgment.” United States
v. Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191, 204 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). We conclude that any error was
harmless. Hargrave presented testimony from a physician who opined that his
prescriptions were written for legitimate purposes. Moreover, Hargrave’s conduct with
C.K. was so beyond the pale that the pharmacist’s proposed testimony that others have
received similar prescriptions would not have swayed the jury.
Accordingly, we affirm Hargrave’s convictions on Counts 1 through 3, vacate his
remaining convictions, and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED