USCA4 Appeal: 23-4119 Doc: 28 Filed: 09/26/2024 Pg: 1 of 7
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4119
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD CRAIG FLETCHER, a/k/a Ronnie Fletcher,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:22-cr-00003-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: May 14, 2024 Decided: September 26, 2024
Before RUSHING and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Kristen M. Leddy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, Lara K. Omps-Botteicher, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4119 Doc: 28 Filed: 09/26/2024 Pg: 2 of 7
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Craig Fletcher appeals from his 110-month sentence imposed pursuant to
his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute eutylone. On appeal, he challenges
his sentence on several bases. We affirm.
Fletcher first argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that he was
responsible for the methamphetamine recovered from Maneika Shifflett’s purse during a
May 25, 2021, traffic stop. Fletcher was driving the vehicle, and Shifflett was in the
passenger seat. They were returning to West Virginia after having traveled to Ohio, where
they both purchased controlled substances in separate transactions. Fletcher contends that
he and Shifflett were not involved in joint activity on the trip to Ohio and instead conducted
their drug business separately. He asserts that he was unaware of the methamphetamine
recovered from Shifflett’s purse.
“We review a district court’s calculation of the quantity of drugs attributable to a
defendant for sentencing purposes for clear error.” United States v. Williamson, 953 F.3d
264, 272 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, reversal
is not warranted unless we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” United States v. Crawford, 734 F.3d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[I]n order to attribute to a defendant for sentencing purposes
the acts of others in jointly-undertaken criminal activity, those acts must have been within
the scope of the defendant’s agreement and must have been reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant.” United States v. Flores-Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Only acts of others that fall within “the scope of the criminal
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4119 Doc: 28 Filed: 09/26/2024 Pg: 3 of 7
activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake” may be attributable under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3. United States v. Evans, 90 F.4th 257, 262-
63 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that particularized findings
must be made in this regard).
We find that the district court’s conclusions were not clearly erroneous. Four days
prior to the traffic stop, Shifflett and Fletcher distributed methamphetamine together. The
fact that they were working together on that particular day is undisputed. Moreover, it is
undisputed that Shifflett and Fletcher each actively distributed methamphetamine, that they
drove to Ohio together, and that they each purchased drugs there for resale. They then
drove back to West Virginia with the drugs and an unsecured firearm in the car. Shifflett
told the officer that all the methamphetamine in the car belonged to Fletcher. Moreover,
after Fletcher was incarcerated, he wrote to Shifflett advising her to obtain and sell drugs
on his behalf with his tax return funds. Given Fletcher and Shifflett’s joint drug activities
both before and after the traffic stop and the fact that both were found in a car with a
distributable amount of drugs and a firearm, we conclude that the court did not commit
reversible error in determining drug quantity. See Butts v. United States, 930 F.3d 234,
238 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that this court may find clear error only if the court’s findings
were “not supported by substantial evidence in the record” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Fletcher next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the district
court’s application of the two-level enhancement for possession of a deadly weapon under
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). Specifically, he asserts that he was not aware that the firearm was
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in the car and, in any event, it belonged to Shifflett and he was not in possession of it. The
Guidelines authorize a two-level increase in a defendant’s offense level “[i]f a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). “The government
bears the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the weapon
was possessed in connection with the relevant illegal drug activity.” United States v.
Mondragon, 860 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 2017). This requires it to “prove only that the
weapon was present, which it may do by establishing a temporal and spatial relation linking
the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Once the Government carries this burden, the “court presumes that the weapon
was possessed in connection with the relevant drug activity and applies the enhancement,
unless the defendant rebuts the presumption by showing that such a connection was clearly
improbable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Fletcher has not established that the district court clearly erred in finding that he
possessed the firearm in connection to his drug trafficking. The firearm was found in plain
view in the vehicle that Fletcher was driving, near various drugs that had recently been
purchased to distribute. Although the firearm was found on the floor of the passenger seat
and Shifflett admitted that the firearm belonged to her, the evidence strongly suggested that
Fletcher was aware of its presence and possessed it. Fletcher had recently been in the
passenger seat, and his shoes were found on the floorboard of the vehicle close to the
firearm. In addition, Shifflett told the officer that Fletcher used the firearm for protection.
These facts are more than sufficient to establish a “temporal and spatial relation linking the
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weapon, the drug trafficking activity,” and Fletcher. Id. at 231 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Further, the absence of evidence that Fletcher carried the firearm during drug
transactions does not establish that the gun was unconnected to his drug trafficking, or that
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USCA4 Appeal: 23-4119 Doc: 28 Filed: 09/26/2024 Pg: 1 of 7
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4119
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD CRAIG FLETCHER, a/k/a Ronnie Fletcher,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:22-cr-00003-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: May 14, 2024 Decided: September 26, 2024
Before RUSHING and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Kristen M. Leddy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, Lara K. Omps-Botteicher, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4119 Doc: 28 Filed: 09/26/2024 Pg: 2 of 7
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Craig Fletcher appeals from his 110-month sentence imposed pursuant to
his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute eutylone. On appeal, he challenges
his sentence on several bases. We affirm.
Fletcher first argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that he was
responsible for the methamphetamine recovered from Maneika Shifflett’s purse during a
May 25, 2021, traffic stop. Fletcher was driving the vehicle, and Shifflett was in the
passenger seat. They were returning to West Virginia after having traveled to Ohio, where
they both purchased controlled substances in separate transactions. Fletcher contends that
he and Shifflett were not involved in joint activity on the trip to Ohio and instead conducted
their drug business separately. He asserts that he was unaware of the methamphetamine
recovered from Shifflett’s purse.
“We review a district court’s calculation of the quantity of drugs attributable to a
defendant for sentencing purposes for clear error.” United States v. Williamson, 953 F.3d
264, 272 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, reversal
is not warranted unless we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” United States v. Crawford, 734 F.3d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[I]n order to attribute to a defendant for sentencing purposes
the acts of others in jointly-undertaken criminal activity, those acts must have been within
the scope of the defendant’s agreement and must have been reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant.” United States v. Flores-Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Only acts of others that fall within “the scope of the criminal
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4119 Doc: 28 Filed: 09/26/2024 Pg: 3 of 7
activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake” may be attributable under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3. United States v. Evans, 90 F.4th 257, 262-
63 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that particularized findings
must be made in this regard).
We find that the district court’s conclusions were not clearly erroneous. Four days
prior to the traffic stop, Shifflett and Fletcher distributed methamphetamine together. The
fact that they were working together on that particular day is undisputed. Moreover, it is
undisputed that Shifflett and Fletcher each actively distributed methamphetamine, that they
drove to Ohio together, and that they each purchased drugs there for resale. They then
drove back to West Virginia with the drugs and an unsecured firearm in the car. Shifflett
told the officer that all the methamphetamine in the car belonged to Fletcher. Moreover,
after Fletcher was incarcerated, he wrote to Shifflett advising her to obtain and sell drugs
on his behalf with his tax return funds. Given Fletcher and Shifflett’s joint drug activities
both before and after the traffic stop and the fact that both were found in a car with a
distributable amount of drugs and a firearm, we conclude that the court did not commit
reversible error in determining drug quantity. See Butts v. United States, 930 F.3d 234,
238 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that this court may find clear error only if the court’s findings
were “not supported by substantial evidence in the record” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Fletcher next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the district
court’s application of the two-level enhancement for possession of a deadly weapon under
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). Specifically, he asserts that he was not aware that the firearm was
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4119 Doc: 28 Filed: 09/26/2024 Pg: 4 of 7
in the car and, in any event, it belonged to Shifflett and he was not in possession of it. The
Guidelines authorize a two-level increase in a defendant’s offense level “[i]f a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). “The government
bears the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the weapon
was possessed in connection with the relevant illegal drug activity.” United States v.
Mondragon, 860 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 2017). This requires it to “prove only that the
weapon was present, which it may do by establishing a temporal and spatial relation linking
the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Once the Government carries this burden, the “court presumes that the weapon
was possessed in connection with the relevant drug activity and applies the enhancement,
unless the defendant rebuts the presumption by showing that such a connection was clearly
improbable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Fletcher has not established that the district court clearly erred in finding that he
possessed the firearm in connection to his drug trafficking. The firearm was found in plain
view in the vehicle that Fletcher was driving, near various drugs that had recently been
purchased to distribute. Although the firearm was found on the floor of the passenger seat
and Shifflett admitted that the firearm belonged to her, the evidence strongly suggested that
Fletcher was aware of its presence and possessed it. Fletcher had recently been in the
passenger seat, and his shoes were found on the floorboard of the vehicle close to the
firearm. In addition, Shifflett told the officer that Fletcher used the firearm for protection.
These facts are more than sufficient to establish a “temporal and spatial relation linking the
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4119 Doc: 28 Filed: 09/26/2024 Pg: 5 of 7
weapon, the drug trafficking activity,” and Fletcher. Id. at 231 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Further, the absence of evidence that Fletcher carried the firearm during drug
transactions does not establish that the gun was unconnected to his drug trafficking, or that
the connection was clearly improbable. A defendant need not carry the firearm with him
for the weapons possession enhancement to apply. Id. (noting that “precisely concurrent
acts” are not required). An inference that Fletcher possessed the firearm in relation to drug
trafficking was more than plausible here given that Fletcher was transporting a large
quantity of drugs across state lines in order to distribute them while in possession of the
firearm. Accordingly, there was no error in the application of the firearm enhancement.
Finally, Fletcher alleges that the court failed to sufficiently address his 20-year
history of addiction when denying his motion for a downward variance. “When rendering
a sentence, the district court must place on the record an individualized assessment based
on the particular facts of the case before it.” United States v. Mitchell, 78 F.4th 661, 667
(4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court must “explain
adequately the sentence imposed to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote
the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir.
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation should provide
some indication that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors” and “considered [the]
defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a lower sentence.” United States v. Nance, 957
F.3d 204, 212-13 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). However, “in a routine case, where the
district court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the explanation need not be elaborate
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or lengthy.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court adequately explained the rationale for the sentence and
meaningfully considered and addressed Fletcher’s addiction argument. In the district court,
Fletcher argued that his addiction was a mitigating circumstance because it constituted a
chronic brain disease that impaired his decision-making skills and mental capacity.
However, Fletcher made this argument in a very conclusory way without discussing details
of his addiction or how his addiction personally affected his criminal culpability.
Nonetheless, the court recognized Fletcher’s long history of drug use and abuse.
While the court did not specifically state why it rejected Fletcher’s argument that his
addiction was serious enough to support a downward variance sentence, the court explained
that it relied on Fletcher’s serious relevant conduct, his crossing of state lines to purchase
drugs, his extensive criminal history, and his violations of prior probation. Despite these
factors, the court imposed a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. In addition,
the court recommended extensive drug abuse treatment. Given Fletcher’s Guidelines
sentence and the conclusory nature of his mitigating arguments, we find that the court
properly, albeit briefly, considered his arguments for a lower sentence.
To the extent Fletcher also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence, we “examine the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth
in § 3353(a).” Arbaugh, 951 F.3d at 176 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is
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presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted by
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Fletcher’s sentence—which is within the Guidelines range—is presumptively
substantively reasonable. Fletcher has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness. On
appeal, Fletcher does not address the factors cited by the district court as supporting the
imposed sentence. The district court reasonably determined that a within-Guidelines-range
sentence was appropriate given the relevant drug weight, the seriousness of the offense
conduct, the extent of Fletcher’s criminal history, and his prior violations of supervision.
Based on the factors identified by the district court, therefore, we find that Fletcher’s
sentence is substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED