FILED: June 23, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4050 (1:09-cr-00072-WO-1)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD WAYNE BRYANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
O R D E R
The Court withdraws the opinion filed June 23, 2011, and
substitutes the attached opinion.
For the Court – By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk UNPUBLISHED
No. 10-4050
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greenboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00072-WO-1)
Argued: May 12, 2011 Decided: June 23, 2011
Before TRAXLER, Chief Circuit Judge, GREGORY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Davis joined.
ARGUED: Mark Everette Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Harry L. Hobgood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This case involves interpreting the scope of the
language in a restitution clause of a plea agreement. On
November 24, 2009, in the Middle District of North Carolina,
Ronald Wayne Bryant was sentenced to twenty-six months in prison
and ordered to pay $110,325 in restitution. Bryant only appeals
the order of restitution, arguing that the district court
misconstrued the plea agreement when it held that the
restitution clause encompassed losses from uncharged offenses as
well as charged offenses. We agree and remand this matter for
resentencing as to restitution only in accordance with our
decision.
I.
Bryant was indicted on thirteen counts of making false
claims to the IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). For
our purposes, it is uncontested that Bryant submitted twenty-
seven false tax returns from 2002 until 2006. Only thirteen of
those false returns were included in the indictment. Following
a Rule 11 plea colloquy, Bryant pled guilty to two of the
thirteen counts with a written plea agreement.
The restitution clause of the plea agreement stated that
Bryant “agree[d] to pay restitution for the total loss suffered
by all victims which resulted from and is related to the
3 offenses charged in the Indictment.” J.A. 19 (emphasis added).
During the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court specifically
reviewed the restitution clause with Bryant, explaining that it
allowed the court to order “restitution for all of the offense
conduct in the case.” J.A. 28. When asked for clarification,
the district court further stated that “you are agreeing that
the [c]ourt can order restitution for all of the offense conduct
under the indictment without regard to whether it would fall
under a dismissed count or a count to which you plead guilty.”
J.A. 29 (emphasis added).
The presentence report calculated Bryant’s guidelines
sentence to be twenty-one to twenty-seven months. The
presentence report also calculated his restitution to be
$110,325 including all twenty-seven fraudulent tax returns.
Bryant objected to the amount of restitution. He argued that
the restitution should be limited to losses from the thirteen
offenses charged in the indictment, which totaled $54,295.
At the sentencing hearing, Bryant renewed his objection to
the amount of restitution. He argued that his understanding of
the plea agreement was that he would pay restitution for the
indicted charges, including those that were dismissed, but not
for any conduct outside the indictment. After hearing from the
government, the district court found that the broadly worded
language of the restitution provision encompassed losses
4 resulting from the additional uncharged fraudulent tax returns
filed by Bryant. The district court sentenced Bryant to twenty-
six months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution in the amount
of $110,325. Bryant timely appealed.
II.
We review orders of restitution for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). The
district court may order restitution for non-convicted conduct
based on a defendant’s plea agreement. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3)
(2006). When, as here, the parties dispute the interpretation
of language in the plea agreement, we apply basic contract
principles. United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th
Cir. 2007). However, “we analyze a plea agreement with greater
scrutiny than we would apply to a commercial contract. We thus
hold the Government to a greater degree of responsibility than
the defendant for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea
agreements.” Id. 509 F.3d at 196 (citations and quotations
omitted).
In Hughey v. United States, the Supreme Court held that in
the absence of clear statutory authority to do so, district
courts lacked the authority to order restitution beyond
convicted counts. 495 U.S. 411, 442 (1990). In response,
Congress passed a statute which stated that “courts may also
5 order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to
by the parties in a plea agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (a)(3)
(2006). This essentially overturned Hughey by allowing plea
agreements to expand the courts’ authority to order restitution.
In our analysis, we first turn to the language of the plea
agreement. It states that restitution can be ordered for losses
“which resulted from and is related to the offenses charged in
the Indictment.” J.A. 19 (emphasis added). Therefore, the
losses covered by the order of restitution must be both related
to the indicted offenses and result from them. Though they
might be related to Bryant’s “offense conduct,” the losses from
the (uncharged) fourteen separately prepared tax returns clearly
do not “result from” the charged offenses. Based on this
record, each unique tax return was prepared and filed separately
and did not occur as the result of another tax return being
filed. Therefore, we conclude that the language in the plea
agreement can be fairly interpreted as ambiguous.
Where there are ambiguities in a plea agreement, courts may
look to extrinsic evidence to show that the parties to the
agreement had “mutually manifested their assent to [] an
interpretation Jordan, 509 F.3d at 200 (citation omitted).
Here, the district court’s guidance to the defendant on
restitution at the plea colloquy cleared up any existing
ambiguities. The court explained that restitution included “all
6 of the offense conduct under the indictment without regard to
whether it would fall under a dismissed count or a count to
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED: June 23, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4050 (1:09-cr-00072-WO-1)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD WAYNE BRYANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
O R D E R
The Court withdraws the opinion filed June 23, 2011, and
substitutes the attached opinion.
For the Court – By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk UNPUBLISHED
No. 10-4050
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greenboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00072-WO-1)
Argued: May 12, 2011 Decided: June 23, 2011
Before TRAXLER, Chief Circuit Judge, GREGORY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Davis joined.
ARGUED: Mark Everette Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Harry L. Hobgood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This case involves interpreting the scope of the
language in a restitution clause of a plea agreement. On
November 24, 2009, in the Middle District of North Carolina,
Ronald Wayne Bryant was sentenced to twenty-six months in prison
and ordered to pay $110,325 in restitution. Bryant only appeals
the order of restitution, arguing that the district court
misconstrued the plea agreement when it held that the
restitution clause encompassed losses from uncharged offenses as
well as charged offenses. We agree and remand this matter for
resentencing as to restitution only in accordance with our
decision.
I.
Bryant was indicted on thirteen counts of making false
claims to the IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). For
our purposes, it is uncontested that Bryant submitted twenty-
seven false tax returns from 2002 until 2006. Only thirteen of
those false returns were included in the indictment. Following
a Rule 11 plea colloquy, Bryant pled guilty to two of the
thirteen counts with a written plea agreement.
The restitution clause of the plea agreement stated that
Bryant “agree[d] to pay restitution for the total loss suffered
by all victims which resulted from and is related to the
3 offenses charged in the Indictment.” J.A. 19 (emphasis added).
During the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court specifically
reviewed the restitution clause with Bryant, explaining that it
allowed the court to order “restitution for all of the offense
conduct in the case.” J.A. 28. When asked for clarification,
the district court further stated that “you are agreeing that
the [c]ourt can order restitution for all of the offense conduct
under the indictment without regard to whether it would fall
under a dismissed count or a count to which you plead guilty.”
J.A. 29 (emphasis added).
The presentence report calculated Bryant’s guidelines
sentence to be twenty-one to twenty-seven months. The
presentence report also calculated his restitution to be
$110,325 including all twenty-seven fraudulent tax returns.
Bryant objected to the amount of restitution. He argued that
the restitution should be limited to losses from the thirteen
offenses charged in the indictment, which totaled $54,295.
At the sentencing hearing, Bryant renewed his objection to
the amount of restitution. He argued that his understanding of
the plea agreement was that he would pay restitution for the
indicted charges, including those that were dismissed, but not
for any conduct outside the indictment. After hearing from the
government, the district court found that the broadly worded
language of the restitution provision encompassed losses
4 resulting from the additional uncharged fraudulent tax returns
filed by Bryant. The district court sentenced Bryant to twenty-
six months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution in the amount
of $110,325. Bryant timely appealed.
II.
We review orders of restitution for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). The
district court may order restitution for non-convicted conduct
based on a defendant’s plea agreement. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3)
(2006). When, as here, the parties dispute the interpretation
of language in the plea agreement, we apply basic contract
principles. United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th
Cir. 2007). However, “we analyze a plea agreement with greater
scrutiny than we would apply to a commercial contract. We thus
hold the Government to a greater degree of responsibility than
the defendant for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea
agreements.” Id. 509 F.3d at 196 (citations and quotations
omitted).
In Hughey v. United States, the Supreme Court held that in
the absence of clear statutory authority to do so, district
courts lacked the authority to order restitution beyond
convicted counts. 495 U.S. 411, 442 (1990). In response,
Congress passed a statute which stated that “courts may also
5 order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to
by the parties in a plea agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (a)(3)
(2006). This essentially overturned Hughey by allowing plea
agreements to expand the courts’ authority to order restitution.
In our analysis, we first turn to the language of the plea
agreement. It states that restitution can be ordered for losses
“which resulted from and is related to the offenses charged in
the Indictment.” J.A. 19 (emphasis added). Therefore, the
losses covered by the order of restitution must be both related
to the indicted offenses and result from them. Though they
might be related to Bryant’s “offense conduct,” the losses from
the (uncharged) fourteen separately prepared tax returns clearly
do not “result from” the charged offenses. Based on this
record, each unique tax return was prepared and filed separately
and did not occur as the result of another tax return being
filed. Therefore, we conclude that the language in the plea
agreement can be fairly interpreted as ambiguous.
Where there are ambiguities in a plea agreement, courts may
look to extrinsic evidence to show that the parties to the
agreement had “mutually manifested their assent to [] an
interpretation Jordan, 509 F.3d at 200 (citation omitted).
Here, the district court’s guidance to the defendant on
restitution at the plea colloquy cleared up any existing
ambiguities. The court explained that restitution included “all
6 of the offense conduct under the indictment without regard to
whether it would fall under a dismissed count or a count to
which you plead guilty,” effectively limiting restitution to the
losses arising from charges in the indictment. J.A. 29
(emphasis added). The district court’s explanation confirms the
defendant’s interpretation on appeal, and makes clear that the
defendant correctly believed that in pleading guilty, the scope
of his restitution obligation would be the charged offenses.
The government makes much out of two statements made during
the plea hearing. At one point, defense counsel noted that
“[Bryant] agrees to pay restitution for the total loss suffered
by all victims in the case.” J.A. 26. Later, the district
court noted that the defendant agreed to pay “restitution for
all of the offense conduct in the case.” J.A. 28. However,
both of these statements were made before the court’s above
quoted clarifying statement and do not clearly manifest an
intent to include the uncharged offenses in the order of
restitution.
Further, the government argues that “related to” must mean
the additional tax returns otherwise it would be superfluous
language. Bryant argues that “related to” was meant to
encompass legal expenses and fees for the people named on the
illegal tax returns. However, the district court determined
that the government was the only victim in this scheme and thus
7 these related expenses, anticipated in the plea agreement, were
not applicable. Since “related to” is susceptible to multiple
interpretations, we construe it against the government and find
that it was meant to encompass only the extraneous expenses
suffered by Bryant’s clients. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d
294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986).
III.
In conclusion, we find that the plea agreement’s
restitution clause was, at best, ambiguous and thus, construing
ambiguities against the government, find that it does not
encompass uncharged offenses. Accordingly, this matter is
VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING AS TO RESTITUTION ONLY.