NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-50327
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00933-CAS-1 v.
RONALD GERARD BOYAJIAN, AKA MEMORANDUM * Ronald G. Boyajian, AKA Ronald Geral Boyajian, AKA Ronald Gerald Boyajian, AKA John,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2023 Pasadena, California
Before: HURWITZ and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.**
Ronald Boyajian was convicted of traveling with intent to engage in illicit
sexual conduct with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (Count One),
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** This case was decided by quorum of the panel. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2(h). engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor in foreign places in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2423(c) (Count Two), and commission of these offenses while required to
register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A (Count Three). We have
jurisdiction over this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
1. The jury instruction on Count Two was erroneous because it would allow
conviction even if Boyajian had stopped traveling at the time of the offense. See
United States v. Pepe, 895 F.3d 679, 691 (9th Cir. 2018). But the error was harmless.
See United States v. Conti, 804 F.3d 977, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2015). The evidence that
Boyajian was traveling in Cambodia when he committed the offense was
overwhelming. In the nine years before the offense, he had traveled to Asia thirty-
five times, each time returning to California. He traveled on a United States
passport, had a California driver’s license, described his travels to custom officials
as for “vacation” or “business,” told those officials that he lived in California, and
stayed in various guesthouses in Cambodia. He described Cambodia as a “dirty”
“third-world country” and had booked a return flight to the United States for the day
after he was arrested in Cambodia. See United States v. Johnson, 823 F. App’x 485,
488–89 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding a § 2423(c) conviction and noting that “during
the nine-year period in which Johnson avers he resided in Cambodia, he maintained
a permanent residence in Oregon, held an Oregon driver’s license, and took other
2 actions consistent with that of a citizen of the United States traveling temporarily
overseas. On U.S. passport forms, for example, Johnson would describe his ‘trips
abroad’ as ‘temporary.’”).
2. We rejected the claim that § 2423(c) regulates activity outside of
Congress’s foreign commerce powers in United States v. Pepe, 895 F.3d 679, 689–
90 (9th Cir. 2018).
3. Contrary to Boyajian’s argument, § 2423(b), which prohibits “travel[ ] in
foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with
another person,” does not require that the illicit conduct be a but-for purpose of the
travel. See United States v. Flucas, 22 F.4th 1149, 1156–57, 1164 (9th Cir. 2022).
4. Boyajian’s argument that his convictions violate the doctrines of dual
criminality and specialty also fails. These doctrines apply to transfers occurring
through extradition treaties. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886). The
United States and Cambodia have no such treaty, and the Cambodian Supreme Court
expressly determined that Boyajian’s transfer to this country was not an extradition.
5. In sentencing, the district court invoked U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(d)(1), which
provides that “[i]f the offense involved more than one minor,” grouping rules “shall
be applied as if . . . each victim had been contained in a separate count of
conviction.” Boyajian argues that his abuse against children other than the named
victim was not within “the offense” of conviction because “it fell well outside the
3 temporal scope of the conduct charged in the indictment.” See United States v.
Schock, 862 F.3d 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2017).
However, any error in applying the Guideline enhancement was harmless.
The district court imposed the statutory maximum sentences on Counts One and Two
and explained why those sentences were necessary. United States v. Munoz-
Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1030 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
6. The district court did not err in denying Boyajian’s motion to suppress
evidence seized in his room at a Cambodian guesthouse during a joint raid by United
States and Cambodian officials. The Cambodian Supreme Court found the search
illegal under Cambodian law, and “compliance with foreign law alone determines
whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Barona, 56
F.3d 1087, 1092 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). But United States law “governs whether
illegally obtained evidence should be excluded, and the essence of our inquiry is
whether exclusion serves the rationale of deterring federal officers from unlawful
conduct.” United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply when “law
enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith.” United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 908 (1984). The search of Boyajian’s room was found illegal under
Cambodian law because it was conducted without the guesthouse owner’s written
consent—a rule with no counterpart in our jurisprudence. Moreover, the United
4 States officials conducting the search reasonably relied on representations by their
foreign counterparts that the prosecutor’s verbal submission sufficed, and the
government presented testimony from multiple Cambodian officials and legal
experts who believed that this advice was accurate when given. See Peterson, 812
F.2d at 492.
7. We review a district court’s finding that a defendant has knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel de novo and a finding that
the waiver was unequivocal for clear error. See United States v. Mendez-Sanchez,
563 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2009).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-50327
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00933-CAS-1 v.
RONALD GERARD BOYAJIAN, AKA MEMORANDUM * Ronald G. Boyajian, AKA Ronald Geral Boyajian, AKA Ronald Gerald Boyajian, AKA John,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2023 Pasadena, California
Before: HURWITZ and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.**
Ronald Boyajian was convicted of traveling with intent to engage in illicit
sexual conduct with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (Count One),
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** This case was decided by quorum of the panel. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2(h). engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor in foreign places in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2423(c) (Count Two), and commission of these offenses while required to
register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A (Count Three). We have
jurisdiction over this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
1. The jury instruction on Count Two was erroneous because it would allow
conviction even if Boyajian had stopped traveling at the time of the offense. See
United States v. Pepe, 895 F.3d 679, 691 (9th Cir. 2018). But the error was harmless.
See United States v. Conti, 804 F.3d 977, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2015). The evidence that
Boyajian was traveling in Cambodia when he committed the offense was
overwhelming. In the nine years before the offense, he had traveled to Asia thirty-
five times, each time returning to California. He traveled on a United States
passport, had a California driver’s license, described his travels to custom officials
as for “vacation” or “business,” told those officials that he lived in California, and
stayed in various guesthouses in Cambodia. He described Cambodia as a “dirty”
“third-world country” and had booked a return flight to the United States for the day
after he was arrested in Cambodia. See United States v. Johnson, 823 F. App’x 485,
488–89 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding a § 2423(c) conviction and noting that “during
the nine-year period in which Johnson avers he resided in Cambodia, he maintained
a permanent residence in Oregon, held an Oregon driver’s license, and took other
2 actions consistent with that of a citizen of the United States traveling temporarily
overseas. On U.S. passport forms, for example, Johnson would describe his ‘trips
abroad’ as ‘temporary.’”).
2. We rejected the claim that § 2423(c) regulates activity outside of
Congress’s foreign commerce powers in United States v. Pepe, 895 F.3d 679, 689–
90 (9th Cir. 2018).
3. Contrary to Boyajian’s argument, § 2423(b), which prohibits “travel[ ] in
foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with
another person,” does not require that the illicit conduct be a but-for purpose of the
travel. See United States v. Flucas, 22 F.4th 1149, 1156–57, 1164 (9th Cir. 2022).
4. Boyajian’s argument that his convictions violate the doctrines of dual
criminality and specialty also fails. These doctrines apply to transfers occurring
through extradition treaties. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886). The
United States and Cambodia have no such treaty, and the Cambodian Supreme Court
expressly determined that Boyajian’s transfer to this country was not an extradition.
5. In sentencing, the district court invoked U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(d)(1), which
provides that “[i]f the offense involved more than one minor,” grouping rules “shall
be applied as if . . . each victim had been contained in a separate count of
conviction.” Boyajian argues that his abuse against children other than the named
victim was not within “the offense” of conviction because “it fell well outside the
3 temporal scope of the conduct charged in the indictment.” See United States v.
Schock, 862 F.3d 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2017).
However, any error in applying the Guideline enhancement was harmless.
The district court imposed the statutory maximum sentences on Counts One and Two
and explained why those sentences were necessary. United States v. Munoz-
Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1030 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
6. The district court did not err in denying Boyajian’s motion to suppress
evidence seized in his room at a Cambodian guesthouse during a joint raid by United
States and Cambodian officials. The Cambodian Supreme Court found the search
illegal under Cambodian law, and “compliance with foreign law alone determines
whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Barona, 56
F.3d 1087, 1092 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). But United States law “governs whether
illegally obtained evidence should be excluded, and the essence of our inquiry is
whether exclusion serves the rationale of deterring federal officers from unlawful
conduct.” United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply when “law
enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith.” United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 908 (1984). The search of Boyajian’s room was found illegal under
Cambodian law because it was conducted without the guesthouse owner’s written
consent—a rule with no counterpart in our jurisprudence. Moreover, the United
4 States officials conducting the search reasonably relied on representations by their
foreign counterparts that the prosecutor’s verbal submission sufficed, and the
government presented testimony from multiple Cambodian officials and legal
experts who believed that this advice was accurate when given. See Peterson, 812
F.2d at 492.
7. We review a district court’s finding that a defendant has knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel de novo and a finding that
the waiver was unequivocal for clear error. See United States v. Mendez-Sanchez,
563 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2009). We find no error.
Boyajian did not condition his request to proceed pro se below on an alleged
decision by the district court denying him new counsel. Rather, Boyajian stated that
“I am simply asking to go pro se and nothing else,” and that “the only thing I want
is pro se. I don’t want anything else. . . . Hundred percent.” He thereafter
complained that standby counsel was overstepping his role; filed a “Standing
Objection to the Court Advancing Standby Counsel George Buehler to Trial
Counsel”; and stated during sentencing that “I do not want under Faretta [standby
counsel] to speak at all in this courtroom, at all, and I’d like to make that record very
clear.” He repeatedly confirmed that he did not want his pro se status revoked.
8. Boyajian also argues that he was denied the right to counsel during a
hearing concerning a fee dispute between Boyajian and former counsel. The district
5 court, however, merely required that the lawyers who sought to argue about “ethics
issues” become counsel of record. Their refusal to do so did not violate Boyajian’s
constitutional rights.
9. “[A] federal court properly may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over
attorney fee disputes collateral to the underlying litigation.” K.C. ex rel. Erica C. v.
Torlakson, 762 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). However, the exercise
of that jurisdiction is discretionary. See id. at 971. The district court did not abuse
its discretion in declining to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the fee dispute. The
court noted that adjudicating that dispute would cause further delay in the already
extended criminal proceedings, Boyajian provided “no reason why he cannot resolve
his fee dispute in state court as a state law claim for breach of contract,” and he failed
to show how resolving this dispute would “facilitate the resolution of his criminal
trial.”
AFFIRMED.