United States v. Rodriguez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: June 15, 2000
• Docket: 98-6118
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 12 United States v. Pollard, et al. Nos. 98-5908/6118 Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0201P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0201p.06 996 n.5 (6th Cir. 1994). While we generally limit “exigent circumstances” to these three situations, we may recognize new exigencies when necessary. See United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1519 (6th Cir. 1996). In determining whether UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS to fashion a new exigency, we assess the nature of the FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT government interest involved; the interplay of that interest and _________________ the citizen’s privacy interests; and whether immediate action is needed. See id. at 1518. ;  In this case, none of our traditionally recognized exigent UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  circumstances justify the officers’ search of the home, and the Plaintiff-Appellee,  facts of this case do not support creating a new exigency.

 There is no evidence of any threat to Officer Askew; no Nos. 98-5908/6118 evidence that either Pollard or Rodriguez was armed; and no v.  evidence that either Pollard or Rodriguez intended to destroy > any evidence. Under the analysis we articulated in Rohrig, JERRY POLLARD (98-5908)  the government has not demonstrated that it was necessary   and EDDIE RODRIGUEZ that the officers raid the home when they received the signal Defendants-Appellants.  (98-6118), from the informant, nor has it shown, on the facts of this case, that any legitimate government interests purportedly  vindicated by the “consent once remove doctrine” override 1 Pollard’s privacy expectations. In short, without any specific reason to believe that evidence would be destroyed or that Appeal from the United States District Court officer safety was in danger, there is no justification for a for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. warrantless intrusion into the sanctity of a private home. No. 97-20159—Julia S. Gibbons, Chief District Judge. Without an exigent circumstance to support the government’s entry, all evidence recovered after the illegal search should be Argued: January 28, 2000 suppressed. See, e.g., United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 982-83 (6th Cir. 2000). Decided and Filed: June 15, 2000

While I agree that Rodriguez does not have standing to Before: JONES, NORRIS, and SILER, Circuit Judges. challenge the government’s search, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s adoption of the “consent once removed” _________________ doctrine and its decision to affirm the denial of Pollard’s suppression motion. COUNSEL ARGUED: Doris A. Randle-Holt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Memphis, Tennessee, Jeffrey M. Brandt, BRANDT LAW OFFICES, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Thomas A. Colthurst, ASSISTANT UNITED

1 2 United States v. Pollard, et al. Nos. 98-5908/6118 Nos. 98-5908/6118 United States v. Pollard, et al. 11

STATES ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. ________________ ON BRIEF: Doris A. Randle-Holt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE WESTERN DISSENT DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Memphis, Tennessee, Jeffrey ________________ M. Brandt, BRANDT LAW OFFICES, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Thomas A. Colthurst, ASSISTANT UNITED NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge, dissenting. In STATES ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. affirming the district court’s denial of Pollard’s motion to suppress, the majority adopts the Seventh Circuit’s “consent SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which once removed” doctrine. This rule provides essentially that NORRIS, J., joined. JONES, J. (pp. 11-12), delivered a when an individual grants an undercover officer consent to separate dissenting opinion. enter a residence, the citizen has sufficiently compromised his Fourth Amendment privacy expectations to justify a _________________ warrantless search. See United States v. Akinsaya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995). Because I believe this doctrine OPINION represents an unjustified extension of our traditional exigent _________________ circumstances jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent. SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendants Jerry Pollard and Eddie While the Fourth Amendment is implicated whenever Rodriguez appeal their convictions after entering conditional government attempts to search its citizens, its protections guilty pleas of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute apply with particular force to the home. See Payton v. New cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, the York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that the Framers defendants argue the district court erred in denying their drew “a firm line at the entrance to the house”). It is well motions to suppress evidence because they claim the arresting settled that warrantless searches of a home are unreasonable officers illegally searched a residence in effecting their arrest. unless supported by probable cause and exigent The government contends that the defendants lack standing to circumstances. See Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, challenge the search of the residence and that exigent 1158 (6th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Strong, 156 F.3d 1131, 1134 circumstances justified the entry of the residence without a (11th Cir. 1998); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, warrant. We AFFIRM. 750 (1984) (“Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to I. BACKGROUND demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the On August 4, 1997, Pollard and Rodriguez were arrested presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all while selling cocaine to a confidential informant and warrantless home entries.”). undercover police officer. The arrests occurred in Memphis, We have recognized the existence of the following three Tennessee, at a residence rented to Irma Howard, who lived exigent circumstances: 1) when officers are in hot pursuit of there with her cousin, her son and two grandchildren. She a fleeing suspect; 2) when the suspect represents an had known Pollard about six or seven years, and he immediate threat to the arresting officers or the public; or 3) occasionally spent the night there, sleeping on the couch in when immediate police action is necessary to prevent the the living room. Pollard kept personal belongings in a closet destruction of vital evidence or to thwart the escape of known in the living room but did not know how to open the door criminals. See O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 10 United States v. Pollard, et al. Nos. 98-5908/6118 Nos. 98-5908/6118 United States v. Pollard, et al. 3

Although the court found Howard consented to the search, without a key.1 Howard did not know Rodriguez before the we need not decide that question in light of finding there was night in question, when Pollard brought him to the house. a “consent once removed.” Before the arrests, on July 31, officers learned that a AFFIRMED. shipment of drugs was en route to Memphis. On August 4, the informant told Officer Anthony Berryhill that Pollard had contacted him, told him that his source of cocaine had arrived in Memphis from Texas, and arranged to meet him. At approximately 8:00 p.m., on August 4, the informant met Pollard and Rodriguez at Howard’s residence. Rodriguez wrote down the price ($76,500) and the amount (4 kilograms) and told the informant he needed to be back by 10:00 p.m. because Rodriguez was leaving Memphis. The informant returned to Officer Berryhill’s office and gave him the piece of paper. Berryhill wired the informant, assembled a team of officers, and gathered $50,000 in purchase money for the drugs. A “takedown” signal was established. During these preparations, the informant was paged at least twice and returned the calls to tell the sellers he was coming. Between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m., approximately six officers and the informant returned to the residence. The back-up officers were monitoring the transmitter on the informant. The informant and Detective Rodney Askew, who was acting undercover, approached the house and knocked on the door. Pollard admitted them. Rodriguez immediately left by the front door and returned a few seconds later with a duffle bag. Howard then told Pollard to lock the door; Pollard led them to a back bedroom and Howard switched on the light and left. Rodriguez placed the duffle bag on top of the bed,

1 Since the original key had been lost, Howard would lock the house from the inside and return by means of a “little trick lock on the wrought iron door” or she would have one of the grandchildren go through the wrought iron bars and take out a window screen. 4 United States v. Pollard, et al. Nos. 98-5908/6118 Nos. 98-5908/6118 United States v. Pollard, et al. 9

opened it, removed some clothes and pulled out three bundles been, is being or will be committed,” Sangineto-Miranda, 859 wrapped in plastic. He began to unwrap one of the bundles. F.2d at 1507, Askew could have arrested both Pollard and The takedown signal was given before Rodriguez finished Rodriguez had he chosen to do so. unwrapping the bundles. Instead, Askew relied upon the back-up officers to effect The back-up officers, without knocking or announcing the arrest. The government argues that this court should themselves, broke down the front door, entered and said adopt the doctrine of “consent once removed,” which requires “police, get down.” They entered without a prior the following: announcement to avoid the risk that the undercover officer (the “new” face in the transaction) would be taken hostage or The undercover agent or informant: 1) entered at the injured by gunfire. Howard and her cousin were in the front express invitation of someone with authority to consent; of the house. Some officers stayed in the front of the house 2) at that point established the existence of probable while others went toward the back. One officer forced his cause to effectuate an arrest or search; and 3) way into the locked bedroom where Pollard, Rodriguez, the immediately summoned help from other officers. informant and Askew were gathered. Rodriguez jumped into a closet and Pollard ran into a nearby bathroom. The officers United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995); arrested everyone in the room and took them into the living accord United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th room for questioning. Cir. 1996). In United States v. Ogbuh, 982 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1993), this court considered this argument based on the No threats were made to Askew or the informant. Before decision in United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. the officers entered the house, there were no indications that 1986). We held that “assuming without deciding that Paul is Pollard or Rodriguez was planning to destroy the drugs. correctly decided,” the case before us was distinguishable because the contraband had been brought by the informant Howard signed a consent to search form. Although she and the agents entered without receiving a signal from the testified that the drugs had already been removed from the informant. Ogbuh, 982 F.2d at 1005. bedroom by the time she signed the form, Askew testified that no evidence had been retrieved from the bedroom prior to the We adopt the doctrine of “consent once removed” because consent to search. After Howard had signed the form, Askew this entry was lawful under those circumstances. Pollard observed one bundle in the closet and one bundle halfway admitted the undercover officer and informant in Howard’s under the bed. presence; the officer obtained probable cause for an arrest when Rodriguez displayed the cocaine on the bed; and the In 1997, Magistrate Judge James H. Allen filed his informant accompanying the officer immediately summoned Recommendation. He found that while Rodriguez had no the other officers for assistance. Moreover, the back-up standing to contest the entry and search, Pollard had a officers were acting within constitutional limits when they reasonable expectation of privacy in the Howard home and entered to assist him since no further invasion of privacy was thus had standing to contest the search. But the magistrate involved once the undercover officer made the initial entry. reasoned that the question of “exigent circumstances” was controlling. The district court adopted the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in part. But the court determined that 8 United States v. Pollard, et al. Nos. 98-5908/6118 Nos. 98-5908/6118 United States v. Pollard, et al. 5

III. LEGALITY OF ENTRY neither defendant had standing to contest the search, because Pollard “was, at most, a casual visitor.” It further concluded We review the district court’s factual determination that that there were exigent circumstances to justify the entry there were exigent circumstances for clear error, while the without a warrant, because the drug sale was being transacted lower court’s legal conclusions with respect to exigency are at the time the officers entered, an undercover detective and reviewed de novo. See United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 an informant were possibly in danger and the drugs may have F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 1998). In addition, this court must been destroyed by a further delay. Therefore, it denied the review the evidence in the light most likely to support the motions to suppress. district court’s conclusion. See United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir. 1996). The government bears the Later, Pollard and Rodriguez entered guilty pleas to the burden of proving exigent circumstances exist. See Roark, 36 conspiracy charge. Each was sentenced to seventy months F.3d at 17. imprisonment. It is undisputed that the officers did not identify themselves II. STANDING OF POLLARD AND RODRIGUEZ prior to entry. The defendants argue there was no exigency justifying the forced entry because they did not suspect that When ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court their guests were working with the police. The district court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and found that “once the undercover officer had probable cause its legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Roark, 36 for the arrest, the raid team was clearly acting within F.3d 14, 16 (6th Cir. 1994). Similarly, the trial judge’s Constitutional limits when they entered to assist him.” findings of fact regarding the defendants’ standing to challenge alleged Fourth Amendment violations are examined Under normal circumstances, the police are required to for clear error, while the legal determination of standing is knock on the door, announce their presence and await reviewed de novo. See United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, admittance for a reasonable time before forcibly entering a 1511 (6th Cir. 1996). residence. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). However, it is well established that an undercover officer may “[I]n determining whether a defendant is able to show the gain entrance by misrepresenting his identity and may gather violation of his (and not someone else’s) Fourth Amendment evidence while there. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. rights, the ‘definition of those rights is more properly placed 206 (1966); United States v. Baldwin, 621 F.2d 251, 252-53 within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law (6th Cir. 1980). Askew, the undercover officer, entered the than within that of standing.’” Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. apartment at the invitation of Pollard and established the Ct. 469, 472 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, existence of probable cause to arrest when he saw Rodriguez 140 (1978)).2 Thus, to determine whether the defendants can pull out the three drug containers.4 As a warrantless arrest “is claim that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when justified if, at the time of the defendant’s arrest, police officers have probable cause to believe that an offense has 2 In Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, the Supreme Court stated that not 4 all expectations of privacy will be considered “legitimate” for purposes Citing the First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Santiago, 828 of Fourth Amendment protection: “[l]egitimation of expectations of F. 2d 866 (1st Cir. 1987), the government contends that probable cause privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, did not exist before the cocaine was displayed and hence the officers either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to could not have obtained a warrant prior to the undercover transaction. understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Id. 6 United States v. Pollard, et al. Nos. 98-5908/6118 Nos. 98-5908/6118 United States v. Pollard, et al. 7

officers entered the residence, this court must decide whether obviously somewhere in between.” Id. at 474. The Carter Pollard and Rodriguez had “an expectation of privacy in the Court concluded that defendants were not overnight guests, place searched, and whether [their] expectation[s were] were only in the home a few hours, had no previous reasonable.” Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 469. A defendant must relationship with the3 lessee, and the purpose of their visit was satisfy a two-pronged test to show a legitimate expectation of purely commercial. Id. at 493. Thus, the defendants had no privacy: 1) he must manifest an actual, subjective expectation legitimate expectation of privacy for their activities and could of privacy; and 2) that expectation is one that society is not contest the search. prepared to recognize as legitimate. See Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d at 1510. Pollard has standing to contest the search. He had been friends for approximately seven years with the lessee, A. Standing of Pollard Howard, and had been staying at the home earlier in the week. Furthermore, Pollard occasionally spent the night at the On appeal, Pollard argues he had a legitimate expectation residence and kept some personal belongings in a closet in the of privacy in Howard’s home under Minnesota v. Olson, 495 living room. In addition, he sometimes ate meals with the U.S. 91 (1990). The government argues that Pollard fails to family during his visits. Finally, although Pollard did not meet the “heightened” burden under Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 469, know the makeshift method to open the door, he was allowed for a defendant claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy to stay in the home even if the residents were not present. in a dwelling other than his own home, where the defendant’s presence is for an illegal commercial or business purpose. B. Standing of Rodriguez See United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999). The government contends that Pollard lacks standing Rodriguez argues the district court erred in failing to because he used the Howard home as a convenient site for recognize his legitimate privacy expectation in the Howard himself and Rodriguez to meet the customer to complete an residence, manifested by his presence in the locked bedroom. illegal sale of cocaine. The district court found that Rodriguez was a “mere visitor” and had no standing to challenge the search. In Olson, 495 U.S. at 98, the Supreme Court held that an overnight guest had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his We agree that Rodriguez has no standing to contest the host’s home and thus could challenge officers’ warrantless search, because he had never been to the premises before and entry into the home to arrest him. The Olson court recognized did not know the renter of the premises. Further, when that “[s]taying overnight in another’s home is a longstanding Rodriguez came to the house he did not bring any personal social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by possessions or luggage. Finally, he stated he planned to leave society.” Id. But more recently, in Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473- immediately after the cocaine sale and catch a plane back to 74, the Court held that defendants who were in another’s his home state of Texas. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 469. apartment solely for the purpose of packaging cocaine had no legitimate expectation of privacy because they failed to demonstrate they were guests on the premises for a personal 3 occasion, rather than for strictly business purposes. The The Court explained that an individual’s expectation of privacy in Court determined that the overnight guest in Olson and commercial premises is “‘different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.’” Id. at 474 (quoting New York v. someone legitimately on the premises represented different Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)). The Court found that, although the ends of the privacy spectrum, and that “the present case is apartment was a dwelling place, for the defendants it was “simply a place to do business.” Id.