Mr. Justice NELSON
delivered the opinion of the court
Several objections are taken to the decree of the court be[646]*646low. The first is, that this court had no power to grant the relief prayed for by a bill or petition of review. As we have seen, the cause was dismissed the 8th of August, 1860, for want of prosecution; and, on the 22d of February, 1861, some five months afterwards, notice was given for leave to file this petition, which was granted on the 4th of October, 1862, at a special term of the court, sitting at Los'Angeles. There was no great delay, therefore, in making the application for relief, founded on the newly discovered evidence. The ninth section of the act of March 3d, 1851,
This provision, doubtless, refers to the rules to be observed by the courts in passing upon the merits of the claimant’s right or title to the land; but no one can avoid seeing, that the liberal and equitable principles thus enjoined as a duty in the decision of the cases, cannot be fully or fairly carried out, without giving to them a reasonable application and effect in conducting the proceedings before the courts as well as in passing upon the merits. And, regarding these principles in this light, we cannot agree that the court possessed no power to open the case for the purpose of hearing the newly discovered evidence. It is not important what [647]*647the proceedings are called, petition of review, or motion to set aside the decree dismissing the case for want of prosecution, for the purpose of letting in the new evidence. There had been no decree on the merits. The confusion and disorder that existed, in respect to the Spanish and Mexican archives at the close of the war, when the Mexican authorities hastily left the country, has been shown in several cases before this court; and some indulgence is due to an honest claimant as to the order and time in which to produce his evidence.
The next question, and the only remaining one, that it is material to notice, is whether the case presented to the court below justified the confirmation of the claim.
Antonio José Rocha and his legal representatives had been in the possession and occupation of the land in question, claiming title to the same, for a period of twenty-four years, when, in 1852, the petition was presented to the commissioners for confirmation. The representatives have since been in the possession and occupation, and in continued litigation to defend their rights, for the period of eighteen years, making an uninterrupted possession of forty-two years. The present appellees are the children and grandchildren of the original occupant of the tract as early as 1828. He was then a blacksmith by trade, and one of the most respectable and substantial settlers in the pueblo of Los Angeles. The first claim of title under which he took possession was a grant of the president of the ayuntamiento of this pueblo, dated April 8th, 1828. The document is in the usual form by which grants were made of pueblo lands. Carillo, the president, still living in Los Angeles, was examined before the commissioners, and verified the document as original and signed by him. The rancho La Brea was then, and long afterwards, supposed to belong to the pueblo, and, if so, the council of the city had the right to dispose of it. This right is recognized in the act of 1851 for settling these titles. Section fourteen enacts “ that the provisions of this act shall not extend to any town-lot, farm-lot, or pasture-lot held under a grant from any corporation or town to which [648]*648lands may have been granted for the establishment of a town by the Spanish or Mexican governments.” The section then provides that the claim for land embraced within the limits of the town may be presented to the commissioners by the corporate authorities.
It appears from the evidence that it was the general understanding and belief of the authorities of the city of Los Angeles, at the time, that the Rancho La Brea was situated within the limits of the city, and which was founded on an idea, which was prevalent, that a pueblo, according to Mexican laws, was entitled from the government to sixteen square leagues, whereas it was ultimately determined that it was entitled only to four, which left this ranch outside of the city limits. But this was not settled till after the cession to this government. The city of Los Angeles presented their petition before the commissioners for the confirmation of sixteen square leagues. Four only were confirmed.
Then, as to the second claim, founded on this newly discovered evidence. This is obtained from Governor Alvarado, in the year 1840. It is true that the formal papers were before Tiburcio Tapia, the prefect of the district, but authority had been conferred upon him by the governor. The authority was issued March 7th, 1839. It states, 1st, that persons presenting petitions for land shall direct the same to the prefects of the district, who will make report on them; 2d, these expedientes shall be directed to the Secretary of the State by the prefects.
The reason assigned was for the convenience of the people, most of whom resided at great distances from Monterey, the ■ residence of the governor. The city of Los Angeles was over four hundred miles distant. The papers in the case conform strictly to this regulation. Objection is made that there was no proof of the signatures of the officials to the expediente; hut the answer is, that no objection was made to it upon this ground in the court below; nor, indeed, does it appear that any objection was made to it as it respected the genuineness of the papers. The objection seems to have been founded on the legal effect of the instrument as a concession [649]*649of any title to the premises. The prefect had expressed his opinion to the governor that there was no objection to the grant of the land to the petitioner; but the governor, it would seem, being uncertain whether or not the tract might not lie within the limits of the town-lands, or ejidos of the city of Los Angeles, issued his decree that this as well as other neighboring tracts theretofore ceded for ranchos within the jurisdiction of the prefect of this district, should remain as provisional grants until the ejidos of the city should be ascertained. The prefect was directed to make this communication to the petitioner, which he did.
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Mr. Justice NELSON
delivered the opinion of the court
Several objections are taken to the decree of the court be[646]*646low. The first is, that this court had no power to grant the relief prayed for by a bill or petition of review. As we have seen, the cause was dismissed the 8th of August, 1860, for want of prosecution; and, on the 22d of February, 1861, some five months afterwards, notice was given for leave to file this petition, which was granted on the 4th of October, 1862, at a special term of the court, sitting at Los'Angeles. There was no great delay, therefore, in making the application for relief, founded on the newly discovered evidence. The ninth section of the act of March 3d, 1851,
This provision, doubtless, refers to the rules to be observed by the courts in passing upon the merits of the claimant’s right or title to the land; but no one can avoid seeing, that the liberal and equitable principles thus enjoined as a duty in the decision of the cases, cannot be fully or fairly carried out, without giving to them a reasonable application and effect in conducting the proceedings before the courts as well as in passing upon the merits. And, regarding these principles in this light, we cannot agree that the court possessed no power to open the case for the purpose of hearing the newly discovered evidence. It is not important what [647]*647the proceedings are called, petition of review, or motion to set aside the decree dismissing the case for want of prosecution, for the purpose of letting in the new evidence. There had been no decree on the merits. The confusion and disorder that existed, in respect to the Spanish and Mexican archives at the close of the war, when the Mexican authorities hastily left the country, has been shown in several cases before this court; and some indulgence is due to an honest claimant as to the order and time in which to produce his evidence.
The next question, and the only remaining one, that it is material to notice, is whether the case presented to the court below justified the confirmation of the claim.
Antonio José Rocha and his legal representatives had been in the possession and occupation of the land in question, claiming title to the same, for a period of twenty-four years, when, in 1852, the petition was presented to the commissioners for confirmation. The representatives have since been in the possession and occupation, and in continued litigation to defend their rights, for the period of eighteen years, making an uninterrupted possession of forty-two years. The present appellees are the children and grandchildren of the original occupant of the tract as early as 1828. He was then a blacksmith by trade, and one of the most respectable and substantial settlers in the pueblo of Los Angeles. The first claim of title under which he took possession was a grant of the president of the ayuntamiento of this pueblo, dated April 8th, 1828. The document is in the usual form by which grants were made of pueblo lands. Carillo, the president, still living in Los Angeles, was examined before the commissioners, and verified the document as original and signed by him. The rancho La Brea was then, and long afterwards, supposed to belong to the pueblo, and, if so, the council of the city had the right to dispose of it. This right is recognized in the act of 1851 for settling these titles. Section fourteen enacts “ that the provisions of this act shall not extend to any town-lot, farm-lot, or pasture-lot held under a grant from any corporation or town to which [648]*648lands may have been granted for the establishment of a town by the Spanish or Mexican governments.” The section then provides that the claim for land embraced within the limits of the town may be presented to the commissioners by the corporate authorities.
It appears from the evidence that it was the general understanding and belief of the authorities of the city of Los Angeles, at the time, that the Rancho La Brea was situated within the limits of the city, and which was founded on an idea, which was prevalent, that a pueblo, according to Mexican laws, was entitled from the government to sixteen square leagues, whereas it was ultimately determined that it was entitled only to four, which left this ranch outside of the city limits. But this was not settled till after the cession to this government. The city of Los Angeles presented their petition before the commissioners for the confirmation of sixteen square leagues. Four only were confirmed.
Then, as to the second claim, founded on this newly discovered evidence. This is obtained from Governor Alvarado, in the year 1840. It is true that the formal papers were before Tiburcio Tapia, the prefect of the district, but authority had been conferred upon him by the governor. The authority was issued March 7th, 1839. It states, 1st, that persons presenting petitions for land shall direct the same to the prefects of the district, who will make report on them; 2d, these expedientes shall be directed to the Secretary of the State by the prefects.
The reason assigned was for the convenience of the people, most of whom resided at great distances from Monterey, the ■ residence of the governor. The city of Los Angeles was over four hundred miles distant. The papers in the case conform strictly to this regulation. Objection is made that there was no proof of the signatures of the officials to the expediente; hut the answer is, that no objection was made to it upon this ground in the court below; nor, indeed, does it appear that any objection was made to it as it respected the genuineness of the papers. The objection seems to have been founded on the legal effect of the instrument as a concession [649]*649of any title to the premises. The prefect had expressed his opinion to the governor that there was no objection to the grant of the land to the petitioner; but the governor, it would seem, being uncertain whether or not the tract might not lie within the limits of the town-lands, or ejidos of the city of Los Angeles, issued his decree that this as well as other neighboring tracts theretofore ceded for ranchos within the jurisdiction of the prefect of this district, should remain as provisional grants until the ejidos of the city should be ascertained. The prefect was directed to make this communication to the petitioner, which he did.
We think it clear, that the fair import and effect of this instrument, reading it in connection with the petition of the widow, that she and her children should take the titles provisionally, that is, if the tract fell within the limits of the town-land, when they were ascertained, it should be inoperative ; but if outside these limits, the title should become absolute.
The petitioner had stated in her petition that she was the widow of Antonio Rocha; that the tract had been ceded to her husband, in 1828, provisionally; that it was about two leagues from the city of Los Angeles; that it was covered with cattle and horses, and that she desired it for the subsistence of her numerous family.
The ejidos were not ascertained during the existence of the Mexican government, as the disturbances broke out soon after this grant, which resulted in the war with this country and the cession of the lands. Since the peace, the limits belonging to the city have been defined under the direction of the surveyor-general of the United States, and the premises in question are not included within them. If this had taken place under the former government, it cannot, we think, be doubted but that under the Mexican laws and usages this title would have become perfect, and hence, under the treaty and act of Congress, it is the duty of this court so to hold. As we have seen, that treaty and act of Congress make it our duty to decide these cases “ according to the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the [650]*650government from which the claim is derived, the principles of equity, and the decisions of this court as far as applicable.” Here the claimants and their ancestors have been in the uninterrupted possession and occupation approaching the period of half a century, having entered first under a pueblo grant, which at the time was supposed to be in pursuance of authority; and, second, was confirmed by a provisional grant from the Mexican governor, who possessed full authority, which, we think, fairly enough brings the case within the principles governing these cases.
Decree aeeirmed.
9 Stat. at Large, 631.