United States v. Robert Rutherford Bond and Margaret E. Bond

258 F.2d 577, 2 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5311, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 5582
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJuly 18, 1958
Docket16954_1
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 258 F.2d 577 (United States v. Robert Rutherford Bond and Margaret E. Bond) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Robert Rutherford Bond and Margaret E. Bond, 258 F.2d 577, 2 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5311, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 5582 (5th Cir. 1958).

Opinions

John R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

The question here is whether amounts paid by Taxpayer to a Texas life insurance company under an Annuity Savings Bond and Annuity Loan Note were deductible as interest under Section 23(b) of the Internal Revenue Code1 of 1939. In the suit for refund, the District Court held for the Taxpayer.

The facts are uncontradicted and were largely stipulated. The Taxpayer in December 1952 purchased2 from the Sam Houston Life Insurance Company (in Texas) a single-premium, thirty-year maturity, Annuity Savings Bond of a stated guaranteed cash value of $209,700 at maturity at a premium cost of $100,-100 of which he paid $100 in cash and executed an Annuity Loan Note in the amount of $100,000. The Note provided that interest be paid in advance at the rate and as provided in the Bond. During 1952 Taxpayer paid as interest $2,-750 at the rate of 2%% of the principal amount of the Note.

Under the Annuity Bond, the Company agrees to pay, on the thirtieth anniversary, an annuity of $1,830.68 per month with a Cash Value on the Original Maturity Date of $209,700. At any time before the thirty-year Maturity Date, the annuitant may elect to receive in [579]*579a single sum the net cash value at the time, or to receive a reduced annuity computed, according to the then age of the annuitant, upon the net cash value. There are various alternatives on the death of the Bondholder. If after payments start, the Bondholder dies, payments will continue to the beneficiary; if she dies, payments will be made to the estate of the last to die of the Bondholder or beneficiary. In either event, the aggregate sum payable will be the net cash value on maturity of the Policy. If the Bondholder or Annuitant dies before the Maturity Date, a death benefit will be paid to the beneficiary or to his estate of the then net cash value.

The Cash Value was determined by a table 3 in the Bond specifying the Cash or Loan Value at the end of each contract year from 1 through 30. The term “Net Cash Value” was defined to “mean the Cash Value * * * on the date as of which it is being computed and decreased by the amount of any indebtedness to the Company against this Contract.”

The Annuity Loan Note recites the receipt of $100,000 advanced by the Company “as a loan on the sole security of and in accordance with the provisions contained in Annuity Savings Bond Number * * *,” and which sum the Company is directed to apply to pay the remaining premiums of the Annuity Savings Bond. The Maker of the Note expressly assigns the Annuity Savings Bond and all sums due under it to the Company as security for the repayment of the loan and interest. Interest is payable at the rate and at the time provided in the Bond. The principal of the loan becomes due and payable whenever the Bond shall become due and payable or whenever the total indebtedness on the Bond shall equal or exceed the guaranteed Cash Value of the Bond. In the event the Bond lapses or becomes forfeited, the amount of the Loan with interest is to be deducted from any Cash Surrender Value of the Bond. It expressly states “ * * * that there is no personal liability upon the makers of this note for the payment thereof, the sole recourse being against the said Annuity Savings Bond.”

Taking as its dominant theme, which recurs in major and minor key, the oft-quoted generality, frequently repeated with an uncritical regard for the case which gave it birth, that “as respects ‘interest,’ the usual import of the term is the amount which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money,” Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560, 52 S.Ct. 211, 214, 76 L.Ed. 484, 489, and its paraphrase that “In the business world ‘interest on indebtedness’ means compensation for the use or forbearance of money,” Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 498, 60 S. Ct. 363, 368, 84 L.Ed. 416, 424, the Government insists that this is not an indebtedness. The annual payments, denominated interest, are something else since no money was loaned or borrowed nor were other economic benefits actually advanced to Taxpayer by the Company. On this approach, if this is not indebtedness, the annual payment could not be interest, and since neither of the dual requirements of Section 23(b), note 1, supra, is present, the meaning, application, or historical development of Section [580]*58024(a) (6) of the 1939 Code4 is of no importance at all.

In the determination of the interest status of these annual payments, it is not, in our view, proper to divorce Section 23(b) from Section 24(a) (6) since both are a part of a single Code coming to bear here on a single subject. That being so, a proper regard for the historical development of these Code provisions as well as the intrinsic nature of this Annuity Bond contract will establish that the District Judge was right in declaring this to be deductible interest.

The Government would have us believe that this was an artificial transaction with nothing but a swapping of ostensible interest charges and offsetting credits or payments. Since the amount of the Note, representing the premium, must first be deducted, it is claimed that the so-called Cash Value is an illusion, that the Taxpayer could not derive any benefit from it, nor could the Company retain or invest it as it saw fit or lend it to Taxpayer or others as money belonging to the Company. This is especially true, it says, since payment of the Note is secured solely by assignment of the Bond without personal liability of the Maker.

The Government contrasts this to the case in which, prior to the 1954 Code, see note 20, infra, one desiring to procure a single premium Annuity could borrow the full amount of the premium from a bank, use the proceeds to pay the premium to the company and deduct the interest. It is not at all articulate in pointing out what are the distinguishing comparative factors.5 We could hardly believe that they are the fact that no money actually passes, that a check from the lender is not issued, deposited by the borrower, and then a new cheek in payment of the single premium drawn by lender and delivered to the company issuing the Annuity Bond. Nor can the mere fact that the Maker of the Note has no personal liability deprive the annual payment of its interest status.6

But this Bond is not the mere sham supposed. It was, and is, a legitimate Annuity Contract, the issuance of which in Texas subjects the Company to the status of a regulated life insurance company.7 As such, it is mandatory that the annuity or insurance contract provide that the company will “ * * advance upon proper assignment of the policy and upon the sole security thereof at a specified rate of interest a sum equal to * * * the cash value of the policy.” 8 A Texas insurance company is also required to invest in Texas securities 75% of the aggregate amount of the [581]*581legal reserve 9 required to be maintained on Texas contracts. Under the Insurance Code “Texas securities” expressly includes “ * * * loans made to policyholders on the sole security of the reserve values of their policies.” 10

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Bluebook (online)
258 F.2d 577, 2 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5311, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 5582, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-robert-rutherford-bond-and-margaret-e-bond-ca5-1958.