United States v. Robert Pugh

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 20, 2025
Docket24-13145
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Robert Pugh (United States v. Robert Pugh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Robert Pugh, (11th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-13145 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 1 of 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-13145 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

ROBERT PUGH, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00162-SDM-NHA-1 ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Robert Pugh appeals his sentence of 120 months’ imprison- ment for possession of a firearm by a felon. Pugh asserts his sen- tence is substantively unreasonable because the district court USCA11 Case: 24-13145 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 24-13145

imposed it without regard for the sentencing considerations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). After review, 1 we affirm. “A district court abuses its considerable discretion and im- poses a substantively unreasonable sentence only when it ‘(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac- tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.’” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). Section 3553(a)’s “statutory command” is that any sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of punishment. Hewitt v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2165, 2175-76 (2025) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). These purposes include the need “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,” deter criminal conduct, and “protect the public from” the defendant’s fu- ture crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sen- tence, the court must also consider the offense’s “nature and cir- cumstances,” the defendant’s “history and characteristics,” the “kinds of sentences available,” the applicable Guidelines range, Sentencing Commission policy statements, “the need to avoid un- warranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” and “the need to provide restitution to any” of the defendant’s victims. 18

1 When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we use the abuse-of-discre-

tion standard. United States v. Sotelo, 130 F.4th 1229, 1244 (11th Cir. 2025). USCA11 Case: 24-13145 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 3 of 5

24-13145 Opinion of the Court 3

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). The district court does not have to give equal weight to all factors. United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2025). The weight that a district court gives to “any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Rodriguez, 34 F.4th 961, 969 (11th Cir. 2022). Pugh has not met his burden of showing the district court abused its considerable discretion. See Sotelo, 130 F.4th at 1245 (stat- ing the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of estab- lishing it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the § 3553(a) factors). As to Pugh’s argument that the district court weighed the factual elements within each § 3553(a) factor incor- rectly because it did not find that a downward variance was mer- ited, it is not an abuse of discretion to weigh the facts differently than how the parties might have. It would only be an abuse of discretion if the district court did not consider an important fact, gave significant weight to an improper fact, or committed a clear error of judgment in the weighing of the factors. See Sotelo, 130 F.4th at 1244. The district court explicitly stated on the record it considered all of the legal factors, but it also enumerated and dis- cussed five of them—the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence, the need for the sentence to protect the public, and the need for the sentence to avoid unwarranted sen- tence disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(6). Additionally, the court noted it had considered all USCA11 Case: 24-13145 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 24-13145

submissions of counsel, both oral and written. That included Pugh’s PSI objections, sentencing memorandum, oral argument, and allocution. Therefore, there is no evidence the court omitted a fact in making its determination. Pugh also asserts the court relied on clearly erroneous facts as applied to the relevant factors, but this contention is without merit. Pugh contends the district court’s determination that his history with firearms is “troubled” is erroneous because most of his prior criminal history involved small amounts of drugs. The district court’s characterization is not erroneous, however, because Pugh’s most recent and most serious conviction involved a loaded firearm and a felony assault with a threat to kill his roommate. Ad- ditionally, Pugh’s contention that the weighing of the public pro- tection factor was erroneously based on his relatively distant crim- inal history is also without merit. Half of Pugh’s criminal history points were acquired from 15-year-old convictions, and the other half came from recent offenses for which he had been released from incarceration 2 years prior to the instant case. Thus, the dis- trict court did not abuse its discretion in finding this fact to weigh against a downward variance under the public protection factor. Lastly, Pugh received a sentence at the bottom of his Guide- lines range of 120 to 150 months’ imprisonment, and 60 months below the statutory maximum penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). Sentences that fall well below the statutory maximum and within the Guidelines range are “ordinarily ex- pected” to be reasonable. See United States v. Blanco, 102 F.4th 1153, USCA11 Case: 24-13145 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2025 Page: 5 of 5

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1168 (11th Cir. 2024) (stating while we do not automatically pre- sume a sentence falling within the Guidelines range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable); United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining one in- dicator of reasonableness is whether the sentence falls well below the maximum penalty).

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Related

United States v. Irey
612 F.3d 1160 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Jesus Rosales-Bruno
789 F.3d 1249 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Jarred Alexander Goldman
953 F.3d 1213 (Eleventh Circuit, 2020)
United States v. Edwar Rodriguez
34 F.4th 961 (Eleventh Circuit, 2022)
United States v. Jonathan Blanco
102 F.4th 1153 (Eleventh Circuit, 2024)
United States v. Alexander Olson
127 F.4th 1266 (Eleventh Circuit, 2025)
United States v. Moises Abraham Sotelo
130 F.4th 1229 (Eleventh Circuit, 2025)
Hewitt v. United States
606 U.S. 419 (Supreme Court, 2025)

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United States v. Robert Pugh, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-robert-pugh-ca11-2025.