United States v. Ricky Funke

846 F.3d 998, 2017 WL 343530, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1202
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit·Decided January 24, 2017·No. 16-1218·Published·Cited by 23 cases

Opinion

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Ricky J. Funke pled guilty to one count of possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The district court 1 sentenced him to 135 months’ imprisonment and ordered $3,500 in restitution. He appeals the sentence and restitution. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

Funke possessed over 600 images and videos of child pornography, including depictions of child rape and bondage. Among *1000 these were 21 videos from the “Vicky series,” depicting her sexual abuse at the age of 10 and 11. Some of the images and videos had been on his computer since 2001.

Funke’s guideline range was 135 to 168 months. At sentencing, he moved for a downward variance. The district court denied it, sentencing him to 135 months’ imprisonment. Vicky requested $27,500 in restitution and attorney’s fees. On the government’s recommendation, the court ordered $3,500 restitution to Vicky.

I.

Funke argues the district court erred in sentencing him to 135 months, the bottom of the guidelines range. He asserts the court gave insufficient weight to his military service, lack of criminal record, and long-term employment.

This court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harlan, 815 F.3d 1100, 1107 (8th Cir. 2016).

An abuse of discretion occurs when: 1) a court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; 2) a court gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or 3) a court considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing them commits a clear error of judgment.

United States v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2011). Where “a sentence imposed is within the advisory guideline range, [this court] typically accord[s] it a presumption of reasonableness.” United States v. Scales, 735 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2013), quoting United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 634 (8th Cir. 2010). “It is the defendant’s burden to rebut the presumption and to show that the sentence should have been lower.” United States v. Goodale, 738 F.3d 917, 926 (8th Cir. 2013), citing United States v. Peck, 496 F.3d 885, 891 (8th Cir. 2007).

Funke has not rebutted the presumption. After argument from both parties, the district court stated it had “carefully considered each and every factor under 18 United States Code § 3553(a).” The court considered Funke’s military service, lack of criminal record, and long-term employment, but determined that the length of his criminal conduct and the large number of images did not warrant a downward variance. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing at the bottom of the guidelines range. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable,”) (quotation omitted).

II.

Funke contests the restitution. First, he contends the district court should not have included future costs in “costs incurred” by Vicky. Second, he challenges the amount of the award. “An award of restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and district court interpretations of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) are reviewed de novo.” United States v. Evans, 802 F.3d 942, 950 (8th Cir. 2015), quoting United States v. Allison, 772 F.3d 554, 556 (8th Cir. 2014).

A.

Restitution shall be awarded for the “full amount of the victim’s losses,” defined as “any costs incurred by the victim for”:

(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
*1001 (C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3).

Funke argues “costs incurred” do not include future costs. Five circuits hold that future losses are compensable under section 2259. See United States v. Rogers, 758 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2014) (affirming restitution based on “an estimate of Vicky’s future therapy costs, occasioned by defendant’s conduct”); United States v. Pearson, 570 F.3d 480, 486 (2nd Cir. 2009) (holding that costs incurred “may include restitution for estimated future medical expenses”); United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that future counseling expenses are compensa-ble under section 2559); United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1246-48 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 966-67 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). As the Seventh Circuit explained:

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United States v. Ricky Funke, 846 F.3d 998, 2017 WL 343530, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1202 (8th Cir. 2017).

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