United States v. Richard Langley

62 F.3d 602, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 22239, 1995 WL 476634

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: August 14, 1995
• Docket: 93-5219
• Status: Published

Opinions

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge HAMILTON wrote the majority opinion, in which Judges RUSSELL, WIDENER, HALL, WILKINSON, WILKINS,

NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ joined. Senior Judge PHILLIPS wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which Chief Judge ERVIN and Judges MURNAGHAN and MICHAEL joined.

OPINION

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:

Richard Langley appeals his convictions for making a false statement to a federally-licensed firearms dealer, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A), and knowingly possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, see 18 UlS.C. § 922(g)(1).¹ We affirm.

I

In October 1991, Langley purchased two firearms from Guns Unlimited, a federally-licensed firearms dealer in Carrollton, Virginia. Prior to the sale, Langley completed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Form 4473.² On ATF Form 4473, Langley certified that he had not been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

After a routine check of Langley’s criminal history, Special Agent Herbert Tatem of the ATF discovered that Langley had previously been convicted of robbery in Pennsylvania, a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.³

On September 24, 1992, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia returned a two-count indictment charging Langley with making a false statement to a federally-licensed firearms dealer, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A), and possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, see 18 U.S.C. (g)(1). . A jury convicted Langley on both counts. The district court sentenced Langley , to twelve months’ imprisonment, and he now appeals.

II

Langley argues the district court’s instructions to the jury on the § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession count were erroneous because the jury was not instructed that the government was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he knew: (1) he was a convicted felon, and (2) the firearm travelled in or affected interstate commerce. With respect to this count, the district court instructed the jury that it should return a verdict of guilty if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Langley had been convicted in some court of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) he thereafter voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce at some point during its existence. We conclude that the district court properly instructed the jury.

A

Section 922(g)(1), enacted as part of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 (FOPA), Pub.L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986), is a consolidation of portions of three former provisions of Title 18: § 922(g)(1) (unlawful for convicted felon to ship or transport a firearm in interstate commerce); § 922(h)(1) (unlawful for convicted felon to receive a firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce); and § 1202(a) (18 U.S.C.App.) (unlawful for convicted felon to receive, possess, or transport a firearm in or affecting commerce). The predecessor statutes to § 922(g)(1). contained no mens rea requirement. However, cases interpreting these predecessor statutes made clear that these statutes required proof of a mens rea element and were not strict liability offenses; that is, courts required proof that “the defendant knowingly received, transported, or possessed a firearm,” but, at the same time, recognized that “the defendant’s knowledge of the weapon’s interstate nexus or of his felon status was irrelevant.” United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir.1988) (collecting eases); see also United States v. Santiesteban, 825 F.2d 779, 782-83 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Williams, 588 F.2d 92, 92-93 (4th Cir.1978).

Similar to its predecessors, § 922(g)(1) contains no mens rea requirement. Section 922(g)(1) makes it:

unlawful .for any person ... who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

When Congress amended § 922 in 1986,18 U.S.C. § 924(a), the penalty provision applicable to § 922, was also amended. See Pub.L. 99-308, § 104(a), 100 Stat. 449, 456 (1986). Pre-FOPA § 924(a) provided penalties for “[wjhoever violate[d]” any provision of Title 44, including § 922. The FOPA version of § 924(a) provided penalties for violations of Title 44 committed either “knowingly” or “willfully.” Id. (codified until amended in 1988 at 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(l)(B)-(D)). The FOPA penalty provision applicable to § 922(g) provided “whoever ... knowingly violates subsection ... (g).” In 1988, Congress amended § 924(a), increasing the term of imprisonment for, among other things, certain “knowing” violations, including violations of § 922(g). See Pub.L. 100-690, § 6462, 102 Stat. 4359, 4374 (currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) and (2)).⁴

Langley argues that Congress’ insertion of the word “knowingly” in § 924(a), as amended in 1986, mandates that the government must prove, in' a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, not only that the defendant knowingly possessed, transported, shipped, or received the firearm, but also that he or she knew, at the time he or she knowingly possessed, transported, shipped, or received the firearm, of his or her prior felony conviction and the firearm’s interstate nexus. We disagree.

It is firmly entrenched that Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; that is with the knowledge of the interpretation that courts have given to an existing statute. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-68, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 1317-18, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32, 111 S.Ct. 317, 325, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1957-58, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “Thus, it is proper to consider that Congress acts with knowledge of existing law, and that ‘absent a clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construction.’ ” Estate of Wood v. C.I.R., 909 F.2d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir.1990) (quoting Johnson v. First Nat’l Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 277 (8th Cir.1983)). Because these concepts were firmly entrenched judicially, we may assume that Congress was aware that: (1) no court prior to FOPA required the government to prove knowledge of felony status and/or interstate nexus in prosecutions under § 922(g)(l)’s predecessor statutes; (2) the only knowledge the government was required to prove in a prosecution under § 922(g)(l)’s predecessor statutes was knowledge of the possession, transportation, shipment, or receipt of the firearm; and (3) Congress created the FOPA version of § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a) consistent with these judicial interpretations. We, therefore, must determine whether, in enacting FOPA, Congress manifested a clear intent to change the well-settled law.

B

Prior to FOPA, many provisions regulating firearms were classified as strict liability offenses. See United States v. Collins, 957 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.1988). Because liability could be imposed on law-abiding citizens for “unintentional missteps,” United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 312 (7th Cir.1994), Congress enacted FOPA in 1986, which “added a set of mens rea requirements by amending section 924(a)(1) to punish certain violations only if they are committed ‘willfully’ and others only if they are committed ‘knowingly.’ ” Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1001; see also David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 Cumb. L.Rev. 585, 604-07 (1987). Though it is unusual that Congress chose to add a mens rea requirement to a penalty provision, we agree with the Sherbondy court that “it is highly likely that Congress used section 924(a) simply to avoid having to add ‘willful’ or ‘knowing’ into every subsection of section 922.” Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1002.

Prior to the passage of FOPA, the scienter debate pitted the Treasury Department against the National Rifle Association (the NRA). In an effort to make prosecutions easier, the Treasury Department advocated the “knowing” standard; while the NRA, in an effort to protect gun owners, wanted the “willful” standard to govern. Hardy, supra, at 615-16. A compromise was reached: the term “knowingly” would govern the more serious firearm offenses. Id. at 615-17, 647-48; Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1002. Accordingly, it is fair to say that Congress, through FOPA, intended the term “knowingly” to modify each section of 922 that it applied to.

It is far from clear, however, exactly what Congress intended to modify in each section of 922 with its use of the term “knowingly.” For example, it is not clear from the legislative history of FOPA whether Congress intended to extend the term “knowingly” to one or all of the substantive elements of each offense in § 922. More pertinent to this case, in the legislative history of FOPA, there is no suggestion that Congress intended to dispense with the judicial interpretation of - § 922(g)(l)’s predecessor statutes. At most, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to avoid the prosecution of “unintentional missteps,” Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 312. And although an individual who possesses a firearm, unaware that it is stolen, may commit an “unintentional misstep[ ],” id., the same cannot be said for the felon (an individual who has pleaded guilty to, or has been convicted by a jury of, a felony) who knowingly possesses a firearm. Clearly, the act of possessing a firearm by a felon does not fall into the class of “unintentional missteps,” id., envisioned by Congress when it enacted FOPA. Because the legislative history is at best unclear (but more accurately silent) on whether Congress intended to require the government to prove knowledge of felony status or interstate nexus in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, we cannot conclude that Congress’ insertion of the term “knowingly” in the penalty provision applicable to § 922(g)(1) represents “ ‘a clear manifestation of contrary intent,’ ” Estate of Wood, 909 F.2d at 1160 (quoting Johnson, 719 F.2d at 277), allowing us to displace the presumption that Congress created the. FOPA version of § 922(g)(1) consistent with existing law and the settled judicial understanding of § 922(g)(l)’s predecessor statutes. If Congress intended such a revolutionary change in the law, a change that involves the perniciousness of felons possessing firearms, it would have made clear its intention to do so.

Our conclusion that Congress did not intend, through FOPA, to place the additional evidentiary burdens on the government suggested by Langley is supported by several other considerations. First, it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to make it easier for felons to avoid prosecution by permitting them to claim that they were unaware of them felony status and/or the firearm’s interstate nexus. Second, in light of Congress’ repeated efforts to fight violent crime and the commission of drug offenses, it is unlikely that Congress intended to make the application of the enhancement provision contained in § 924(e)(1)⁵ more difficult to apply.

In sum, we hold that in order to prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that: (1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed, transported, shipped, or received, the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had travelled in interstate or foreign commerce at some point during its existence. Because the district court correctly instructed the jury, Langley’s challenge to the jury instructions cannot be sustained.

C

Our holding today comports with all of the post-FOPA decisions that have, by implication, rejected the notion that the government is required to prove either knowledge of felony status or interstate nexus in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution. See United States v. Ramos, 961 F.2d 1003, 1005 (1st Cir.) (In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, the “government need prove only the requisite predicate offense and that the defendant knowingly possessed firearms with prescribed interstate connections.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 364, 121 L.Ed.2d 277 (1992); United States v. McNeal, 900 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir.1990) (“In order to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government is required to show: 1) that the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony; 2) that the defendant knowingly possessed the gun; and 3) that the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Skunk, 881 F.2d 917, 921 (10th Cir.1989) (In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, the government must prove: “(1) the defendant was convicted of a felony; (2) [thereafter the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) [t]he defendant’s possession of the firearm was in or affecting commerce.”); Dancy, 861 F.2d at 81-82.⁶

Furthermore, we do not believe the Supreme Court’s recent decisions of United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994) and Staples v. United States, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), dictate the outcome of this case.

Staples came first, and there the Supreme Court held that, in a § 5861(d) prosecution involving the possession of a machinegun without proper registration, the government must prove that the defendant knew the weapon he possessed was capable of automatic firing, thereby allowing the firearm to fall within the statutory definition of ma-chinegun. Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1804. The statute in Staples, which criminalized the possession of a machinegun without proper registration, contained no mens rea requirement. The Court extended a mens rea requirement (knowledge) beyond that of mere possession to the nature of the weapon (its capability of automatic firing) over a concern that to hold otherwise would criminalize behavior that fell within “a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals.” — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1799-1800. In other words, the mens rea requirement was extended to all the elements necessary to avoid prosecution of conduct a reasonable person would otherwise expect to be innocent. The Court also explained that a statute’s harsh penalty was a “significant consideration in determining whether the statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea." Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1802.

In X-Citement Video, the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which prohibits knowingly transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing a visual depiction, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and (2), if the depiction “involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A) and (2)(A), requires the government to prove both the defendant’s knowledge of “the sexually explicit nature of the material and ... to the age of the performers.” — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 472. As in Staples, the driving force behind the Court’s decision in X-Citement Video was to read the statute to avoid placing ordinary citizens at risk of criminal prosecution for “otherwise innocent conduct.” Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 469. Because “one would reasonably expect to be free from regulation when trafficking in sexually explicit, though not obscene, materials involving adults,” the Court extended the term “knowingly” to modify the age of the performer element. Id. The Court characterized the age of the performer element as the “crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct.” Id.

For three reasons, we conclude that Staples and X-Citement Video do not dictate the outcome of Langley’s case. First, since this is a prosecution under a felon-in-possession statute, we see no need to apply a scienter requirement to “each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct,” X-Citement Video, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 469, because the reasonable expectations of felons are wholly distinct from the reasonable expectations of ordinary citizens. In other words, an ordinary citizen “would reasonably expect to be free from regulation,” id., when possessing a firearm unaware of its automatic firing capability as in Staples and when trafficking in sexually explicit, though not obscene, materials involving adults as in X-Citement Video; but the same cannot be said with respect to a felon who possesses a firearm, because a person who pleads guilty to, or is convicted by a jury of, a felony cannot, thereafter, reasonably expect to be free from regulation when possessing a firearm, notwithstanding his or her unawareness of his or her felony status or the firearm’s interstate nexus. Second, the Court in Staples and X-Citement Video was not confronted with the issue of extending a mens rea requirement to a defendant’s felony status or the issue of extending a mens rea requirement to an interstate nexus element. Certainly, the elements of felony status'and interstate nexus are hot traditionally associated with a mens rea requirement. Third, the statutes at issue in Staples and X-Citement Video did not have long-standing, firmly entrenched, uniform judicial interpretations that necessitated the application of the presumption that “Congress acts with knowledge of existing law, and that ‘absent a clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construction,’ ” Estate of Wood, 909 F.2d at 1160 (quoting Johnson, 719 F.2d at 277).

Ill

Langley also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on both counts. Because the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find each essential element of the crimes charged, beyond a reasonable doubt, we reject Langley’s contention. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

1 . The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" is commonly referred to as a "felony.” In this opinion,'these terms are used interchangeably.

2 . ATF Form 4473 must be completed by a person purchasing a firearm from a federally-licensed firearms dealer. One of the questions on the form specifically addresses whether the purchaser has been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. A firearms dealer is prohibited from selling a firearm to a person answering "yes” to this question.

3 .The record reflects that Langley was initially charged with several offenses in a criminal complaint, but entered a plea of guilty to a single charge of robbery on April 1, 1986. Langley did not appear for sentencing.

4 . Section 924(a)(2) provides:

Whoever knowingly violates subsection (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

5 . Section 924(e)(1) provides for increased penalties for individuals who violate § 922(g) and have three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, provided the predicate crimes were punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

6 . In each of these cases, save Dancy, the court did not specifically address whether the government was required to prove knowledge of felony status or interstate nexus in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution. In Dancy, the court explicitly rejected the notion that the government was required to prove knowledge of felony status in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution. See Dancy, 861 F.2d at 81-82.