NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-7519 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cr-02576-JES-1 v. MEMORANDUM* DWIGHT WILLIAM RHONE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California James E. Simmons, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 4, 2026 Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.**
Dwight William Rhone (“Rhone”) challenges his conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) on numerous grounds. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. § 1291. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds, United States v. Zone, 403 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam), but underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, United States
v. Ziskin, 360 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2003). We review de novo due process
claims alleging destruction of, or failure to preserve, potentially exculpatory
evidence. United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2019). Related
factual findings, including the lack of bad faith, are reviewed for clear error. Id.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo and the factual
findings underlying its ruling for clear error. United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877,
880 (9th Cir. 2005). A district court’s discovery rulings are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1023 n.15 (9th Cir. 2019).
“We review de novo issues involving waiver.” United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d
1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
1. Rhone appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss the Information on
double jeopardy grounds. He contends that he meets the exception articulated in
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), to the dual sovereign doctrine because the
state prosecution was a “sham” and a “cover” for the federal prosecution. See
United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1991). However,
Rhone fails to point out any facts that would show impermissible collusion
2 24-7519 between the federal and the state governments. Instead, in support of his
argument, Rhone notes that his arrest was initiated by Project Safe Neighborhoods,
that the timing of the federal prosecution was strange, and that the federal
prosecution served “no legitimate” interest. Taken at face value, these allegations
are insufficient to meet the “extremely difficult and highly unusual” Bartkus
exception. Id. at 1019. At most, Rhone’s allegations show limited cooperation
between the two sovereigns, but even “very close coordination in the prosecutions”
does not offend double jeopardy. Id. at 1020. The district court correctly denied
the motion to dismiss the Information.1
2. The district court correctly denied Rhone’s motion to dismiss for the
alleged destruction of, or failure to preserve, exculpatory evidence. First, the
exculpatory nature of the Camaro was not apparent. The firearm, ammunition, and
drugs were found on Rhone’s person, and proving that the third brake light on the
Camaro worked would not negate any element of either the felon in possession of a
firearm or ammunition offenses. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489
(1984). Second, Rhone had an alternative “available means” to obtain comparable
evidence because he could have asked his friend and owner of the Camaro, Mr.
1 Because we find that the Bartkus exception is inapplicable, we need not address the applicability of the Blockburger test to determine whether Rhone was prosecuted twice for the same offense. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
3 24-7519 Clemons, to allow him to inspect it. Id. Lastly, because there was no “apparent
exculpatory value” of the Camaro at the time it was released from impound, bad
faith cannot be established. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)
(noting that unless a defendant “can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process
of law”); United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
bad faith “turns on the government’s knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value
of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed”).
3. The district court properly denied Rhone’s motion to suppress based
on an alleged unlawful traffic stop. Here, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. There is no
dispute that California Vehicle Code § 24252(a)(1) requires a third brake light to
be working properly. The officer who conducted the stop unequivocally and
repeatedly stated that he observed the third brake light not working on more than
one occasion before the Camaro came to a complete stop. The district court found
the officer credible, and there is nothing in the record that suggests that the district
court’s credibility finding is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Hodges, 770
F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1985) (questions of credibility are generally immune
from appellate review).
4 24-7519 Whether the stop was pretextual is irrelevant if the traffic stop was based on
reasonable suspicion. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (a
traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment is lawful,
even if the ultimate charge was not related to the traffic stop). Also, the officers
were not required to give a fix-it ticket for the traffic violation because “it [is]
reasonable for the officers to view any traffic violations as inconsequential in light
of [Rhone’s] arrest.” See United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting that Fourth Amendment case law “require[s] that the officers have
reasonable suspicion to stop a driver for traffic infractions, not that the officers
issue citations”).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-7519 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cr-02576-JES-1 v. MEMORANDUM* DWIGHT WILLIAM RHONE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California James E. Simmons, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 4, 2026 Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.**
Dwight William Rhone (“Rhone”) challenges his conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) on numerous grounds. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. § 1291. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds, United States v. Zone, 403 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam), but underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, United States
v. Ziskin, 360 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2003). We review de novo due process
claims alleging destruction of, or failure to preserve, potentially exculpatory
evidence. United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2019). Related
factual findings, including the lack of bad faith, are reviewed for clear error. Id.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo and the factual
findings underlying its ruling for clear error. United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877,
880 (9th Cir. 2005). A district court’s discovery rulings are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1023 n.15 (9th Cir. 2019).
“We review de novo issues involving waiver.” United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d
1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
1. Rhone appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss the Information on
double jeopardy grounds. He contends that he meets the exception articulated in
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), to the dual sovereign doctrine because the
state prosecution was a “sham” and a “cover” for the federal prosecution. See
United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1991). However,
Rhone fails to point out any facts that would show impermissible collusion
2 24-7519 between the federal and the state governments. Instead, in support of his
argument, Rhone notes that his arrest was initiated by Project Safe Neighborhoods,
that the timing of the federal prosecution was strange, and that the federal
prosecution served “no legitimate” interest. Taken at face value, these allegations
are insufficient to meet the “extremely difficult and highly unusual” Bartkus
exception. Id. at 1019. At most, Rhone’s allegations show limited cooperation
between the two sovereigns, but even “very close coordination in the prosecutions”
does not offend double jeopardy. Id. at 1020. The district court correctly denied
the motion to dismiss the Information.1
2. The district court correctly denied Rhone’s motion to dismiss for the
alleged destruction of, or failure to preserve, exculpatory evidence. First, the
exculpatory nature of the Camaro was not apparent. The firearm, ammunition, and
drugs were found on Rhone’s person, and proving that the third brake light on the
Camaro worked would not negate any element of either the felon in possession of a
firearm or ammunition offenses. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489
(1984). Second, Rhone had an alternative “available means” to obtain comparable
evidence because he could have asked his friend and owner of the Camaro, Mr.
1 Because we find that the Bartkus exception is inapplicable, we need not address the applicability of the Blockburger test to determine whether Rhone was prosecuted twice for the same offense. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
3 24-7519 Clemons, to allow him to inspect it. Id. Lastly, because there was no “apparent
exculpatory value” of the Camaro at the time it was released from impound, bad
faith cannot be established. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)
(noting that unless a defendant “can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process
of law”); United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
bad faith “turns on the government’s knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value
of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed”).
3. The district court properly denied Rhone’s motion to suppress based
on an alleged unlawful traffic stop. Here, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. There is no
dispute that California Vehicle Code § 24252(a)(1) requires a third brake light to
be working properly. The officer who conducted the stop unequivocally and
repeatedly stated that he observed the third brake light not working on more than
one occasion before the Camaro came to a complete stop. The district court found
the officer credible, and there is nothing in the record that suggests that the district
court’s credibility finding is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Hodges, 770
F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1985) (questions of credibility are generally immune
from appellate review).
4 24-7519 Whether the stop was pretextual is irrelevant if the traffic stop was based on
reasonable suspicion. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (a
traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment is lawful,
even if the ultimate charge was not related to the traffic stop). Also, the officers
were not required to give a fix-it ticket for the traffic violation because “it [is]
reasonable for the officers to view any traffic violations as inconsequential in light
of [Rhone’s] arrest.” See United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting that Fourth Amendment case law “require[s] that the officers have
reasonable suspicion to stop a driver for traffic infractions, not that the officers
issue citations”).
Accordingly, given the totality of the circumstances, the officers had
specific, articulable facts that rise to the level of reasonable suspicion to effectuate
the stop. United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rhone’s
motion to compel some items of discovery under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16. Rhone failed to establish materiality of these items because he
failed to show that such information would be helpful to prepare his defense. See
United States v. Lucas, 841 F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2016). But even if Rhone had
shown materiality, he failed to show that he was prejudiced because the district
court properly denied all of Rhone’s pre-trial motions. See United States v. Cruz,
5 24-7519 82 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To justify reversal for a discovery violation, the
defendant must show a likelihood that the verdict would have been different had
the government complied with the discovery rules.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
5. Lastly, contrary to Rhone’s argument, the federal government did not
waive any legal positions. Rhone asserts that the government failed to address
every authority Rhone cited and that it failed to contest various factual
representations. But “we do not require a party to file comprehensive trial briefs
on every argument that might support a position on an issue.” W. Watersheds
Project v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 677 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2012). It suffices
if the party takes a position and the district court rules on it—as it happened here.
See id. Even if the government had failed to raise any issues or arguments before
the district court, the waiver rule “does not apply where the district court
nevertheless addressed the merits of the issue not explicitly raised by the party.”
See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1260 n.8 (9th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as Rhone conceded, the district court
addressed all the issues and ruled on them.
AFFIRMED.
6 24-7519