United States v. Reyes-Rivas

909 F.3d 466
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedNovember 28, 2018
Docket16-2008P
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 909 F.3d 466 (United States v. Reyes-Rivas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Reyes-Rivas, 909 F.3d 466 (1st Cir. 2018).

Opinion

BARRON, Circuit Judge.

Ismael Reyes-Rivas ("Reyes") challenges his sentence of 77 months of imprisonment on the grounds (1) that he was improperly subjected to the career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, because one of his predicate crimes did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the career *467 offender guideline and (2) that the District Court impermissibly considered an untranslated Spanish-language document in violation of the Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 864 . For the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

I.

In 2015, Reyes was indicted in the District of Puerto Rico on one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, see 18 U.S.C. § 113 (a)(3), for stabbing a fellow prisoner with a "homemade weapon." Reyes pleaded guilty to that offense, and his case proceeded to sentencing.

On April 28, 2016, the Probation Office released a Presentence Report ("PSR") in Reyes's case. The PSR classified Reyes as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), a "career offender" includes "those defendants who have two prior convictions, whether for a 'controlled substance offense,' any 'crime of violence,' or any combination thereof." United States v. Steed , 879 F.3d 440 , 443 (1st Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).

At the time of Reyes's sentencing, the career offender guideline defined a "crime of violence" as:

[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that- (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2015). Thus, an offense could fit within the then-operative "crime of violence" definition if it were encompassed by that definition's force clause ("has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another"), enumerated offenses clause ("is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives"), or residual clause ("otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another").

The PSR determined, without express references to any of the clauses just referenced, that Reyes qualified as a "career offender" because he had two prior convictions for "crimes of violence." Those convictions were a 2014 federal carjacking conviction, see 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1), and a 2012 Puerto Rico conviction for aggravated battery, see P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 33 § 4750.

To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence," we apply the "categorical approach." UnitedStates v. Dávila-Félix , 667 F.3d 47 , 55 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 , 600-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) ). Under that approach, "we look to the statutory definition of the offense in question, as opposed to the particular facts underlying the conviction." United States v. Piper , 35 F.3d 611 , 619 (1st Cir. 1994).

The conviction that is at issue in this appeal is the one for aggravated battery. The Puerto Rico aggravated battery statute provides that:

If the battery described in § 4749 [misdemeanor simple battery] of this title causes an injury that does not leave permanent harm, but requires medical attention, specialized professional outpatient treatment, shall incur a fourth degree felony.
If the battery causes an injury that requires hospitalization or extended treatment, or causes permanent harm, the perpetrator shall incur a third degree felony. This modality also includes mayhem, *468 those that transmit an illness, syndrome or condition requiring prolonged physical treatment, or those that require prolonged psycho-emotional treatment.

P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 33 § 4750. A separate provision of that statute defines simple battery as occurring when "[a]ny person who illegally through any means or form inflicts injury to the bodily integrity of another[.]" Id. § 4749.

Reyes objected to the PSR on the ground that his conviction for aggravated battery was not a "crime of violence." The Probation Office responded to Reyes's objection with an email that stated that Reyes's conviction was for "fourth degree aggravated battery" and that this conviction was for an offense that qualified as a "crime of violence" 1 under the "force clause." The government asserted the same conclusion in its Response to the Defendant's Objection to the Presentence Report.

To support that assertion, the government attached as "Exhibit 1" a Spanish-language copy of a Puerto Rico judgment of conviction for the offense at issue and requested that the District Court grant the government ten days to file a certified translation of the judgment. The government did not thereafter file a translation.

The District Court then held a sentencing hearing on June 24, 2016.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Ramos-Carreras
59 F.4th 8 (First Circuit, 2023)
United States v. Hernandez-Mieses
931 F.3d 134 (First Circuit, 2019)
United States v. Pacheco
921 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
909 F.3d 466, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-reyes-rivas-ca1-2018.